11  B  RAR.Y 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
OF    ILLINOIS 


325*342 


v.l 

cop.  3 


mm  tusTURjcfit  wvft 

LIBRARY 


i/d** 

.  c 


The  Mississippi  Valley 
in  British  Politics 


The  Mississippi  Valley 
in  British  Politics 

* 

A- STUDY  OF  THE  TRADE,  LAND  SPECULATION,  AND 

EXPERIMENTS  IN  IMPERIALISM  CULMINATING 

IN  THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 


BY 


CLARENCE  WALWORTH  ALVORD 


WITH  MAPS 


VOLUME  I 


THE  ARTHUR  H.  CLARK  COMPANY 

CLEVELAND,  U.S.  A 

1917 


COPYRIGHT,   I9l,  BY 

CLARENCE  WALWORTH  ALVORD 


• 


To 
EDMUND  JANES  JAMES 

this  volume 
is  gratefully  dedicated 


I 


CONTENTS 

PREFACE           .            .            .            .            .            .  13 

I  GOVERNMENT  BY  FACTIONS        .            .            .  19 

II  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE,  1763    .  .  .  -45 

III  THE  BEGINNING  OF  WESTERN  SPECULATION     .            .  77 
THE  EARLIER  WESTERN  COLONIAL  POLICY  OF  GREAT 

BRITAIN           ......  103 

V  THE  CHOICE  OF  THE  MAN        ....  135 

VI  THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  POLICY           .            .            .  157 

VII  PROCLAMATION  OF  OCTOBER  7,  1763      .  .  .183 

VIII  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  INDIAN  DEPARTMENT       .  211 

IX  THE  PLANS  OF  THE  OLD  WHIGS           .            .            .  229 

X  THE  CHATHAM  MINISTRY        ....  267 

XI  INDIAN  MANAGEMENT  AND  WESTERN  TRADE  .            .  287 

XII  LORD  SHELBURNE'S  WESTERN  POLICY  .            .            .  325 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

WESTERN  COLONIAL  SCHEMES,  174.8-1756        .  .  Frontispiece 

WESTERN  COLONIAL  SCHEMES,  1763    .            .  .  .97 

WESTERN  COLONIAL  SCHEMES,  1766-1767        .  .  .    317 


PREFACE 

In  my  humorous  moods -for  such  come  even  to  the 
most  "dry  as  dust"  historians -I  have  a  vision  of  some 
future  critic  chuckling  over  my  rashness  in  writing  a 
drama  of  the  pre-revolutionary  era  with  several  well 
known  Hamlets  omitted.  Within  these  pages  the 
stereotyped  narrative  of  events  preceding  the  American 
Revolution  is  not  to  be  found.  To  seek  the  material 
for  a  history  of  the  period  wholly  outside  that  conse- 
crated circle  which  encloses  such  important  and  por- 
tentous events  as  the  Boston  massacre  and  the  famous 
tea-party  must  appear  to  the  general  reader  to  be  in 
itself  revolutionary.  I  confess  that  to  me,  whose  early 
impressions  of  life  were  received  in  a  small  town  of 
Massachusetts,  the  act  sometimes  appears  one  of  mild 
bravado.  Yet  while  I  am  writing  the  preface,  where 
surely  my  imagination  may  be  permitted  to  take  a 
higher  flight  than  when  restrained  by  the  somber  chron- 
icling of  serious  history,  let  me  forget  for  a  moment  my 
critic  and  boldly  assert  that  whenever  the  British  min- 
isters soberly  and  seriously  discussed  the  American  prob- 
lem, the  vital  phase  to  them  was  not  the  disturbances  of 
the  "madding  crowd"  of  Boston  and  New  York  but  the 
development  of  that  vast  transmontane  region  that  was 
acquired  in  1763  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 

Having  thus  hurled  my  defiance,  let  me  present  my 
plea  for  forbearance.  My  experience  in  research  has 
been  difficult  and  may  be  likened  to  the  hardships  suf- 
fered by  the  hardy  pioneers  who  first  crossed  the  Appa- 


H  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

lachian  Mountains  and  descended  to  the  fertile  valleys 
beyond.  They  were  obliged  to  find  their  way  through  a 
seemingly  limitless  wilderness  wherein  they  wandered 
aimlessly  and  blindly,  their  passage  so  blocked  by  moun- 
tains, rushing  streams,  and  dense  underbrush,  that  only 
after  many  attempts  did  they  discover  the  shortest  and 
most  convenient  path  to  the  prairie  lands  of  the  West. 
For  several  years  now  I  have  been  wandering- and 
frequently  very  aimlessly  and  blindly- in  two  wilder- 
nesses: one  was  covered  by  the  dense  underbrush  of 
British  political  intrigue,  where  I  found  many  a  path 
leading  only  to  a  cul-de-sac  and  was  so  frequently  mis- 
led that  I  have  despaired  at  times  of  ever  finding  my 
way  out  of  the  darkness  and  gloom;  the  other  wilder- 
ness, no  less  difficult  of  penetration,  lay  in  western 
America  and  was  formed  by  the  actual  occurrences - 
a  new  and  little  known  country,  through  whose  wooded 
hills  and  valleys  no  traveler  has  passed,  though  here  and 
there  a  short  blazed  path  has  assisted  my  progress.  It 
is  not  to  be  expected  that  I  have  always  followed  the 
best  trace,  or  that  I  have  never  pointed  out  a  closed 
trail  for  the  true  road,  but  it  is  my  hope  that  the  journal 
of  my  explorations  may  assist  later  discoverers  and  that 
in  the  end  the  true  connection  between  British  politics 
and  the  Mississippi  Valley  may  be  made  known. 

Although  my  point  of  observation  lies  on  the  western 
prairies,  the  work  is  not  a  history  of  the  West.    Rather 

N  my  eyes  have  been  concentrated  on  the  British  ministry 
in  England  in  the  hope  of  discovering  the  obscure  de- 
velopment of  a  western  policy  within  the  kaleidoscopic 

"changes  of  ministries  and  underneath  the  hot  strife  of 
factions,  for  it  has  seemed  to  me  to  be  impossible  to 
understand  the  British-American  policy  without  a 
thorough  comprehension  of  British  politics  during  the 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  15 

eighteenth  century.  Too  frequently  American  histori- 
ans have  read  back  the  conditions  of  the  succeeding 
century  in  order  to  explain  these  politics,  and  having 
classified  men  with  their  measures  as  Whig  and  Tory 
have  rested  satisfied.  A  more  careful  analysis  does  not 
reveal  any  such  division  of  men  and  measures,  but  does 
reveal  a  struggle  for  the  flesh  pots  of  Egypt  between 
factions  usually  Whig  in  origin,  one  of  them  being  led 
by  the  king  who  entered  the  lists  in  the  hope  of  saving 
his  prerogative.  Of  principles  there  is  almost  no  sign. 
Such  was  the  condition  in  Great  Britain  when  the 
treaty  of  peace  closing  the  Seven  Years' War  was  signed 
<!at  Paris  in  1763.  Great  Britain  had  won  the  West  and 
Canada.  What  was  to  be  done  with  them?  That  was 
the  first  and  last  question  asked  of  ministries  between 
vthe  years  of  the  treaty  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary War.  Every  ministry  realized  that  this  was 
^he  most  important  of  all  the  American  problems,  but 
"it  was  hydra-headed.  How  could  there  be  a  reconcili- 
ation between  the  various  interests  clamoring  for  con- 
sideration? The  Indians'  rights  must  be  protected; 
the  claims  of  various  colonies  to  the  West  must  be  con- 
sidered; the  influence  of  the  great  land  companies  of 
different  colonies  must  not  be  neglected;  there  were  the 
fur  traders  who  opposed  western  colonization;  and 
these  latter  were  supported  by  British  and  American 
speculators  in  eastern  lands  who  feared  the  effect  of 
opening  the  West;  and  last  of  all  there  were  the  im- 
perial interests  to  be  conserved.  To  these  difficulties 
lying  in  the  very  problem  itself  must  be  added  the 
chaotic  state  of  ministries  composed  of  groups  of  fac- 
tions each  subjected  to  influences  according  to  its  per- 
sonal interests  in  colonial  affairs. 

Successive  administrations  worked  on  this  problem; 


16  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

three  distinct  plans  were  developed  and  partially  adopt- 
ed. The  decisions  to  tax  the  colonies  by  the  Stamp  Act 
and  the  Townshend  Act  were  only  subordinate  parts  of 
these  broader  policies;  but  the  strife  aroused  in  the  col- 
onies and  Parliament  by  these  acts  of  taxation  fre- 
quently obscured  the  real  issue,  even  in  the  eyes  of  the 
ministers.  The  passage  of  the  Quebec  Act  in  1774 
closed  the  era  under  consideration  with  the  last  defini- 
tive step  taken  towards  the  settlement  of  a  western 
policy,  and  that  was  brought  to  naught  by  the  Revolu- 
tionary War.  The  result  of  the  eleven  years  was  nil. 
These  pages  contain  a  history  of  the  development  of 
these  plans,  a  development  running  parallel  with  the 
well  known  occurrences  of  the  eastern  settlements  and 
important  for  the  proper  interpretation  of  their  signifi- 
cance, since  these  plans  for  the  West  formed  the  warp 
and  woof  of  the  British  imperial  policy. 

It  must  be  evident  to  anyone  familiar  with  the  litera- 
ture of  American  and  British  eighteenth  century  history 
that  the  double-headed  problem  that  I  have  proposed 
to  myself  has  meant  the  mastery  of  an  immense  mass  of 
printed  and  unprinted  material.  A  glance  at  the  "Bib- 
liography" at  the  end  of  this  work  will  prove  that  the 
attempt  at  such  mastery  has  conscientiously  been  made; 
but  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  I  have  worked  in  the  follow- 
ing libraries,  the  University  of  Illinois,  the  Parliamen- 
tary of  Ottawa,  the  Canadian  Archives,  the  Boston 
Athenaeum,  and  Boston  Public,  besides  freely  borrow- 
ing books  from  the  Harvard  Library,  the  Library  of 
Congress,  and  the  Carter-Brown  Library,  there  are  the 
names  of  many  books  and  pamphlets  in  my  notes  which 
it  has  been  impossible  for  me  to  examine.  The  manu- 
script material  has  been  collected  from  many  sources; 
the  most  valuable  for  this  present  study  has  come  from 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 17 

the  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  for  the  use  of  which  I  am 
indebted  to  the  courtesy  of  the  Most  Honorable  the 
Marquess  of  Lansdowne,  and  from  the  Dartmouth 
Manuscripts,  copies  of  which  were  made  for  me  by  the 
kind  permission  of  the  Right  Honorable  the  Earl  of 
Dartmouth.  For  similar  favors  I  am  indebted  to  the 
officials  of  the  Canadian  Archives,  the  Public  Record 
Office  of  London,  the  New  York  State  Library,  the 
Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  the  Library  of  Con- 
gress, and  other  institutions. 

In  quoting  from  original  and  contemporary  docu- 
ments, both  printed  and  manuscript,  the  publishers 
have  followed,  as  is  their  custom,  the  sensible  sugges- 
tions adopted  "to  secure  greater  uniformity  of  treat- 
ment in  the  reprinting  of  such  documents,"  by  the 
American  Historical  Association.  Palpable  printers' 
errors  and  obvious  slips  of  the  pen  have  been  corrected. 
Changes  in  punctuation  have  been  made  where  the  orig- 
inal puctuation  was  erroneous  or  confused.  The  over- 
use of  capitals  in  the  original  manuscript  has  been  made 
to  conform  to  modern  usage.  In  every  other  respect 
the  reprints  absolutely  follow  the  originals. 

There  have  been  many  who  have  given  me  sugges- 
tions and  help  in  the  preparation  of  this  work  and  to 
whom  I  wish  to  express  my  gratitude.  I  am  under 
especial  obligations  to  Hubert  Hall,  Esq.,  formerly  of 
the  Colonial  Office,  London,  for  his  untiring  search  for 
material.  The  Right  Honorable  Lord  Edmund  Fitz- 
maurice,  Doctor  J.  Franklin  Jameson,  and  Professor 
Frederick  J.  Turner  have  made  valuable  suggestions 
and  given  other  assistance.  Dean  David  Kinley  of  the 
Graduate  School  of  the  University  of  Illinois  has  been 
unsparing  in  his  efforts  to  find  funds  for  the  copying 
of  manuscripts.  My  colleagues,  Professor  Evarts  B. 


i8  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

Greene  and  Doctor  Theodore  C.  Pease  have  read  the 
manuscript  and  have  offered  many  well  considered  crit- 
icisms. I  wish  also  to  express  appreciation  of  valued 
help  given  by  my  secretarial  assistants,  Mary  G. 
Doherty,  Leila  O.  White,  and  Ruth  E.  Hodsdon;  by 
Susan  M.  Reed  in  the  preparation  of  the  maps;  by  Lois 
Reed  upon  the  bibliography;  and  by  my  wife,  Idress 
Head  Alvord,  for  patient  help  and  suggestive  criticisms 
during  the  preparation  of  the  work. 

CLARENCE  WALWORTH  ALVORD. 
Urbana,  Illinois,  February  15,  1916. 


I.     GOVERNMENT  BY  FACTIONS 

The  versatility  of  courts  has  been  the  popular  theme  of  writers 
during  several  of  the  later  centuries.  It  would  have  been  more  to 
the  honour  of  history  had  the  causes  of  such  mutability  been  ex- 
plained.-JOHN  ALMON. 

William  Pitt  leaned  impressively  forward  and  asked 
the  representatives  of  Great  Britain  anxiously  waiting 
on  his  every  word:  "Some  are  for  keeping  Canada; 
some  Guadaloupe;  who  will  tell  me  which  I  shall  be 
hanged  for  not  keeping?"  1  The  costly  war  with  France 
was  under  discussion;  and  the  speaker,  from  his  inti- 
mate knowledge  of  the  House  of  Commons,  understood 
that  he  was  hurling  into  the  midst  of  the  wrangling  fac- 
tions an  issue  certain  to  provoke  dissensions.  In  front  of 
him  sat  conservatives  and  progressives,  men  represent- 
ing sugar  or  fur  trading  merchants,  promoters  of  land 
companies,  imperialists  and  anti-imperialists,  whose 
personal  beliefs  and  private  interests  were  touched  to 
the  quick  by  the  issue  raised  over  the  retention  of  a 
tropical  or  northern  territory.  To  understand  how  this 
august  body  of  so-called  representatives  answered  Pitt's 
question  and  all  succeeding  questions  growing  out  of 
their  answer  is  to  understand  the  history  of  the  British 
colonial  empire  in  the  last  half  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury; but  that  history  can  never  be  interpreted  by  con- 
centrating the  attention  exclusively  on  the  colonies. 
The  acts  of  ministries  and  Parliament  were  potent  fac- 
tors in  the  evolution  of  America,  and  the  why  and 

1  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  26. 


20  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

wherefore  of  imperial  action  can  only  be  discovered  by 
tracing  the  twistings  and  turnings  of  politics  in  that 
most  complicated  period  which  ended  in  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  British  oversea  dependencies ;  and  it  is  also 
certain  that  those  baffling  kaleidoscopic  changes  of  min- 
istries had  a  meaning  in  the  colonial  backwoods,  even 
though  the  discovery  of  that  connection  prove  to  be 
difficult. 

Pitt  was  at  the  head  of  the  ministry  when  he  shouted 
his  Guadaloupe-Canada  dilemma  at  his  colleagues. 
Three  short  years  were  to  pass  before  the  option  ceased 
to  vex  politicians;  but  in  that  period  two  radical 
changes  had  taken  place  in  the  personnel  of  the  cab- 
inet, and  the  men  who  made  the  choice  between  the 
southern  and  the  northern  territory,  though  opponents 
of  Pitt  at  the  time,  reached  a  decision  similar  to  his  own. 
The  explanation  of  this  fact  is  to  be  sought  in  the  de- 
velopment of  factions,  in  an  understanding  of  their 
mutual  relations,  and  in  the  discovery  of  the  attitude  of 
each  to  the  colonial  problem -or  more  generally  speak- 
ing in  a  comprehension  of  British  political  history.2 

Throughout  the  eighteenth  century  the  tradition  of 
the  right  of  the  Whigs  to  rule  was  the  all-pervading 
force  in  British  politics.  It  originated  in  the  Revolu- 
tion of  1688  and  had  a  second  birth  in  the  succession  of 
the  Hanoverian  dynasty  to  the  throne.  So  successfully 
did  certain  noble  Whig  families  use  their  opportunity 
and  identify  their  own  interests  with  those  of  the  new 

2  For  the  substance  of  this  chapter,  I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness 
to  the  brilliant  biography  of  William  Pitt  by  Doctor  Albert  von  Ruville. 
Although  my  own  researches  were  leading  me  to  similar  conclusions,  before 
reading  this  work,  the  systematic  and  exhaustive  analysis  of  conditions  by 
Doctor  von  Ruville  has  given  me  the  ground  on  which  to  base  my  own  study. 
The  same  author's  William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute  was  even  more  helpful  on 
account  of  the  full  references  and  citations  from  manuscripts  to  which  I  had 
no  access. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  21 

dynasty  and  so  exclusively  did  they  secure  for  them- 
selves the  offices  of  power  that  Whiggism  became  a 
necessary  attribute  of  aspirants  for  political  honors. 
The  tradition  became  finally  so  firmly  rooted  that  even 
a  George  III.  did  not  dare  to  defy  it;  and  the  eighteenth 
century  came  almost  to  a  close  before  there  was  selected 
a  cabinet  in  which  a  majority  of  the  members  did  not 
proudly  count  themselves  within  the  ranks  of  the  ruling 
party.  Under  such  conditions  the  attempt  to  interpret 
British  political  history  through  an  assumed  rivalry  of 
Whigs  and  Tories -so  usual  among  the  older  histori- 
ans-only obscures  the  truth.  Such  rivalry  did  not 
exist.  Only  after  the  French  Revolution  had  spread 
abroad  its  principles  of  the  rights  of  man  did  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  shake  off  their  traditional  affiliations 
and  range  themselves  definitely  on  the  progressive  or 
the  conservative  side  of  home  and  imperial  issues.  In 
those  years  of  storm  and  stress  were  evolved  the  modern 
parties;  then  the  names  of  Whig  and  Tory  assumed 
their  present  meanings.  Even  during  these  later  days, 
however,  the  elderly  king  and  the  grey-haired  poli- 
ticians, companions  and  opponents  of  younger  years, 
still  played  the  political  game  as  they  had  learned  it  in 
their  youth  and  continued  to  speak  the  language  of 
former  times.  So  little  did  George  III.  appreciate  the 
great  change  that,  almost  on  his  death-bed,  he  was  still 
calling  himself  an  Old  Whig.3 

These  old  politicians  were  in  many  ways  more  cor- 
rect in  their  use  of  words  than  are  those  who  attempt  to 
read  into  the  political  history  of  the  reign  of  George 
III.  more  modern  but  inapplicable  terms.  The  party 
system  of  government  is  to-day  so  common  a  phenom- 

3  Malmesbury,  Diaries,  vol.  iv,  44,  quoted  in  Lewis,  Administrations  of 
Great  Britain,  96,  footnote  2. 


22  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

enon  that  its  development  in  England  during  the  last 
part  of  the  seventeenth  and  the  first  part  of  the  eigh- 
teenth centuries  has  given  to  British  politics  of  the  age 
a  very  modern  appearance  and  has  superficially  justi- 
fied the  employment  of  modern  names  to  describe  the 
political  struggles.  This  early  development  was,  how- 
ever, only  partial  and  the  growth  was  arrested  for  about 
a  generation  because  the  British  people  did  not  regard 
it  as  a  natural  and  inevitable  means  of  conducting  pub- 
lic affairs.  Party  rule  showed  only  its  sinister  side 
to  a  large  number,  probably  to  a  majority,  of  Eng- 
lishmen and  to  all  Scotchmen.  To  them  its  most 
conspicuous  result  appeared  to  be  the  unsavory  manip- 
ulation of  the  borough  representation  by  such  skill- 
ful politicians  as  Robert  Walpole  and  the  Pelhams 
for  the  purpose  of  exercising  complete  political  pow- 
er and  of  subordinating  the  king  to  the  cabinet.  The 
opponents  of  this  system  were  desirous  of  substitut- 
ing some  other  method  of  conducting  the  government 
that  did  not  totally  submerge  one  of  the  concomitant 
institutions  of  the  constitution  and  did  not  place  such  ir- 
responsible power  in  the  hands  of  a  small  plutocracy. 
Undoubtedly  the  leaders  of  the  opposition  were  in- 
spired by  the  purely  selfish  wish  to  occupy  the  places  of 
authority  and  to  enjoy  the  emoluments  which  were  held 
so  exclusively  by  the  Whig  oligarchy;  but  nevertheless 
the  widespread  dissatisfaction  with  political  conditions 
gave  to  their  leadership  popular  authority  and  caused 
an  opposing  theory  of  government  propounded  by  them 
to  find  a  ready  acceptance. 

The  dissatisfaction  with  party  government  as  exem- 
plified by  the  Whigs  gave  birth  to  this  new  theory  of 
politics  and  it  was  formulated  about  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  into  a  philosophical  system  by  Lord 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  23 

Bolingbroke.4  The  principle  of  the  supreme  legisla- 
tive power  of  the  representatives  in  Parliament,  upon 
which  the  predominant  party  had  based  its  tenure  of 
office,  had  become  so  well  accepted  among  the  people 
that  it  must  remain  a  part  of  any  new  form  of  political 
thought.  But  the  principle  of  the  Tories  upon  which 
they  had  stood  until  completely  crushed  by  their  op- 
ponents, namely  the  right  of  the  king  to  the  leadership 
under  the  constitution,  seemed  to  the  many  as  of  equally 
binding  force.  It  was  Bolingbroke's  purpose  in  his 
Idea  of  a  Patriot  King  to  reconcile  these  two  seemingly 
antagonistic  principles.  He  did  this  by  denying  that 
an  antagonism  existed.  The  purpose  of  the  king  and 
representatives,  he  argued,  should  be  one  and  the  same, 
the  search  for  the  highest  good  of  the  nation;  and  if 
both  had  the  same  aim  each  would  find  in  the  other  the 
necessary  complement.  Under  such  a  system  parties 
would  disappear;  the  names  of  Tory  and  Whig  would 
lose  their  significance,  since  differences  of  opinion 
would  cease  to  exist.  The  country  as  represented  in 
Parliament  would  find  itself  in  accord  with  the  "Pa- 
triot King." 

This  theory  is  the  opposite  to  that  underlying  the 
party  system  of  government  that  has  developed  more 
recently  out  of  the  eighteenth  century  conditions.  The 
evils  of  this  latter  method  appeared  in  an  exaggerated 
form  to  men  with  ideas  akin  to  Bolingbroke's;  a  party 
is,  and  must  always  remain,  but  a  part  of  the  people 
and  naturally  views  the  weal  of  the  state  as  identical 
with  its  own;  and  so,  as  Bolingbroke  wrote:  "The  in- 
terest of  the  State  becomes  ...  a  remote  consid- 
eration, is  never  pursued  for  its  own  sake,  and  is  often 

4  Consult  his  "Idea  of  a  Patriot  King,"  and  "Dissertation  upon  Parties," 
in  his  Works,  vol.  ii,  372,  375.  See  also  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  vol.  i, 
103-106;  vol.  iii,  2-10. 


24  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

sacrificed  to  the  other."5  Furthermore  a  party  gov- 
ernment which  should  force  itself  upon  the  king  is  the 
most  arbitrary  possible,  because  neither  Parliament  nor 
the  king  can  exercise  any  control  over  it.  On  the  other 
hand  ministers  selected  for  their  worth  by  the  crown 
are  amenable  to  the  discipline  of  the  people's  repre- 
sentatives.6 In  discussing  the  situation  under  the  Stu- 
arts, Bolingbroke  pointed  out  that  when  the  Whigs 
changed  their  system  of  government  from  what  he 
called  a  "broad  bottom"  to  a  narrow,  from  the  nation  to 
a  party,  they  forced  the  court  itself  to  become  a  faction 
and  to  attempt  government  by  a  small  fraction  of  the 
nation.7  In  this  way  the  idea  of  a  "Patriot  King"  was 
obscured  and  it  became  impossible  for  the  monarch  to 
place  himself  above  all  parties  and  hold  all  alike  in 
check. 

The  Bolingbroke  theory  was  first  the  platform  of  the 
older  Leicester  House  group  that  was  formed  around 
the  person  of  Frederick,  Prince  of  Wales.  This  coali- 
tion was  composed  of  many  incompatible  elements  from 
the  Whigs  and  the  Tories  united  by  their  opposition  to 
the  Walpole  regime.  Among  them  a  most  important 
factor  was  that  band  of  "Young  Patriots"  who  looked  to 
Lord  Cobham  as  leader  and  counted  in  their  ranks 
William  Pitt,  George  Lyttelton,  and  the  Grenvilles- 
men  who  were  to  play  important  roles  in  the  early  years 
of  the  reign  of  George  III.  Closely  associated  with 
these  were  two  other  prominent  men  of  the  later  days, 
William  Murray  [Lord  Mansfield]  and  Robert  Hen- 
ley [Lord  Northington].8  Bolingbroke's  platform  for 

5  Bolingbroke,  "Patriot  King,"  in  Works,  vol.  ii,  402. 

6  See  "Letter  from  a  Gentleman  in  Town,"  in  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol. 
xxxiii,  190. 

7  Bolingbroke,  "Dissertation  upon  Parties,"  in  Works,  vol.  ii,  50. 

8  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  vol.  i,  109. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  25 

the  "Patriots"  was  taken  very  seriously;  and,  although 
later  events  were  to  separate  the  enthusiasts  and  to  com- 
pel them  to  fight  under  many  banners,  they  never  com- 
pletely lost  the  glamour  of  their  youthful  philosophy; 
and  the  ideas  which  were  preached  by  the  magnetic 
Bolingbroke  became  through  his  disciples  a  very  potent 
force  in  politics. 

The  fundamental  idea  which  held  the  "Patriots"  to- 
gether seemed  about  to  bear  fruit,  when  the  opposition 
succeeded  in  overthrowing  Robert  Walpole;  but  in  the 
end  the  strength  and  the  craft  of  the  allied  great  fam- 
ilies proved  to  be  too  great.  From  that  time,  however, 
the  number  of  men  opposed  to  the  continuance  of  the 
oligarchy  in  such  unlimited  power  increased.  To  the 
forces  of  the  opposition  Whigs  there  were  joined  in 
ever  increasing  numbers  the  Tories  who  looked  on  Pitt 
in  particular  as  a  leader.  The  death  of  Pelham  in 
1754  and  the  failure  of  the  Cumberland  and  Newcastle 
factions  to  master  the  crisis  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
raised  that  popular  idol  to  the  leadership  in  the  min- 
istry. Pitt's  great  day  had  come;  but  from  his  advent 
must  be  dated  the  end,  for  a  generation  at  least,  of 
party  regime  in  England.9 

9  The  importance  of  this  fact  has  not  always  been  noticed  by  historians 
who  have  been  more  inclined  to  see  in  the  action  of  George  III.  and  the  Earl 
of  Bute  the  cause  of  the  break-up  of  the  Whig  party.  The  condition  existing 
in  1760  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  statement  in  the  text,  but  the  following  asser- 
tions of  keen  contemporary  observers  bring  supplementary  proofs.  William 
Pitt,  in  Parliament,  May  12,  1762,  said:  "He  was  so  far  from  meditating 
opposition,  that  he  should  regard  the  man  who  would  revive  parties  as  an 
enemy  to  his  country.  Himself  had  contributed  to  annihilate  party,  but  it  had 
not  been  to  pave  the  way  for  those  who  only  intended  to  substitute  one  party 
for  another."- Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  130.  Horace  Wal- 
pole wrote  of  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  George  III.:  "The  moment  of 
his  accession  was  fortunate  beyond  example.  The  extinction  of  parties  had 
not  waited  for,  but  preceded,  the  dawn  of  his  reign."  -Idem,  4.  Walpole 
also  quotes  Bamber  Gascoyne  as  stating  in  Parliament,  "By  destroying  parties 
we  had  created  factions."  -  Idem,  91. 


26  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  strife  of  factions  had  replaced  the  supremacy  of 
the  Whig  oligarchy -the  Venetian  party  as  Disraeli 
called  it.  A  memory  of  their  former  glory  still  lin- 
gered for  many  years  in  the  tradition  of  the  Whigs' 
right  to  govern;  but  the  Whigs  themselves,  after  an- 
nihilating the  Tories  by  systematically  denouncing 
them  as  Jacobites,  had  themselves  been  shattered  on  the 
rocks  of  political  spoils.  True  parties  no  longer  ex- 
isted; factions  ruled.10  A  political  condition  which 
Bolingbroke  considered  the  worst  possible  had  been 
brought  upon  Great  Britain  by  the  greed  of  the  Whig 
plutocracy,  "for  faction  is  to  party  what  the  superlative 
is  to  the  positive;  party  is  a  political  evil,  and  faction  is 
the  worst  of  all  parties."  " 

The  subsequent  contests  were  rather  a  struggle  for  power  than 
the  settled  animosity  of  two  parties,  though  the  body  of  Opposi- 
tion still  called  itself  Whig,  an  appellation  rather  dropped  than 
disclaimed  by  the  Court;  and  though  the  real  Tories  still  ad- 
hered to  their  old  distinctions,  while  they  secretly  favoured, 
sometimes  opposed,  the  Court,  and  fluctuated  according  as  they 
esteemed  particular  chiefs  not  of  their  connection,  or  had  the 
more  agreeable  opportunity  of  distressing  those  who  supported 
the  cause  of  freedom.12 

10  See  an  excellent  account  of  the  disappearance  of  this  old  distinction  in 
Annual  Register,  vol.  v,  47.     In   1770  the  historian  Gibbon  wrote  "of  those 
foolish,  obsolete,  odious  words,  Whig  and  Tory,"  and  Lord  Shelburne  about 
the  same  time  placed  it  on  record  in  his  papers  that  in  his  opinion  the  Old 
Whig    and   Tory   parties   were   extinguished.     See   Kent,   English   Radicals, 
9,  10. 

11  Bolingbroke,  "Patriot  King,"  in  Works,  vol.  ii,  401. 

12  Walpole  chose  to  date  this  crisis  in  1765,  but  the  description  is  no  less 
true  five  or  even  ten  years  earlier.     Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  111.,  vol. 
ii,  67.     No  one  should  use  Walpole's  Memoirs  of  George  III.  as  a  source  of 
information  without  a  careful   study  of  the   analysis  of  that  work  by  Carl 
Becker  in  the  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  xvi,  255  ff.     The  Memoirs 
were  written  by  Walpole  in  two  different  periods,  1768-1769  and  1771-1772, 
and  he  revised  the  work,  making  many  additions,  in  1775  and  again  in  1784. 
Between  the  writing  of  the  first  draft  and  the  latest  revision  Walpole's  polit- 
ical opinions  were  radically  altered,  and  Mr.  Becker  proves  conclusively  by  a 
careful  comparison  of  Walpole's  letters  with  his  Memoirs  "that  the  additions, 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  27 

No  noble  principles  of  reform  separated  these  bands 
of  politicians.  Their  ideals  seldom  rose  above  a  greed 
for  office  thinly  veiled  by  the  profession  of  public  ser- 
vice. A  contemporary  with  a  long  experience  in  gov- 
ernment wrote  at  the  end  of  the  period  under  review: 

I  thought  it  right  to  investigate  the  cause  of  the  disease;  and 
therefore  have  diligently  enquired  whether  our  present  dissen- 
tions  have  arisen,  as  formerly,  from  any  differences  of  opinion, 
or  any  contradictory  articles  in  our  political  creeds;  but  on  the 
strictest  examination,  I  can  find  no  such  differences  to  exist: 
parties  I  see  many,  but  cannot  discern  one  principle  amongst 
•  them;  they  are  neither  Whigs  nor  Tories,  Monarchy-men  nor 
Republicans,  High-church  nor  Low-church,  Hanoverians  nor 
Jacobites :  they  have  all  acted  alternatively  on  all  these  principles 
as  they  have  served  a  present  occasion  but  have  adhered  to  none 
of  them,  nor  even  pretended  to  profess  them :  they  have  all  been 
ready  to  support  government,  whenever  they  have  enjoyed  the 
administration  of  it ;  and  almost  all  as  ready  to  subvert  it,  when- 
ever they  were  excluded.13 

When  George  III.  ascended  the  throne  the  condi- 
tions seemed  favorable  for  an  experiment  in  the  theory 
of  government  which  had  been  so  joyfully  proclaimed 
by  the  adherents  of  his  father;  but  when  tried  in  the 
realm  of  practical  politics,  Bolingbroke's  idealism  was 
found  to  be  unworkable.  Allegiance  to  faction  was  too 
firmly  established  and  all  that  could  be  accomplished 
was  to  unite  several  of  the  groups  for  the  purpose  of 
conducting  the  business  of  state.  Such  a  ministry  was 

though  not  considerable  in  amount  perhaps,  modified  in  an  important  way  the 
interpretation  of  the  reign  of  George  III."  [p.  259].  In  the  earlier  draft 
Walpole  wrote  the  history  of  the  struggling  factions  and  knew  nothing  of  any 
danger  from  the  increase  of  the  king's  prerogative  or  from  the  Tory  poli- 
ticians. All  passages  containing  these  latter  ideas  are  generally  of  the  latest 
revision.  Using  Mr.  Becker's  principles  of  criticism,  it  is  possible  to  divide 
the  work  into  its  separate  parts  more  completely  than  he  was  able  to  do  in 
the  compass  of  his  article. 

13  Soame  Jenyns,  "A  Scheme  for  the  Coalition  of  Parties,"  written  in 
1782,  in  Works,  vol.  ii,  251. 


28  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

called  "broad  bottom"  and  was  supposed  to  differ  from 
the  narrower  basis  of  the  former  Whig  party  system; 
but  the  "broad  bottom"  government  in  no  way  fulfilled 
the  conditions  of  Bolingbroke's  ideal.  He  had  dreamed 
of  an  administration  representing  the  people  and  work- 
ing in  harmony  with  the  king  for  the  supposedly  dis- 
coverable public  good;  this  was  a  league  of  more  or 
less  hostile  factions,  always  suspicious  of  each  other, 
held  together  by  the  love  of  office,  and  generally  work- 
ing for  their  selfish  interests. 

To  enter  the  arena  where  fought  these  hungry  fol. 
i  lowers  of  factions  in  search  of  the  causes  of  events  in 
/  the  heart  of  western  America  may  appear  a  futile  task. 
Yet  above  the  snarls  of  this  greedy  crowd  of  place  hunt- 
ers and  sinecurists  can  be  heard  the  principles  which 
were  formulated  for  the  guidance  of  the  men  who  gov- 
erned the  wilderness.  These  principles  embodied  a 
political  philosophy  of  colonization,  varying  in  each 
faction,  and  the  discovery  of  the  beliefs  of  the  different 
groups  is  the  only  means  of  knowing  what  was  the  pre- 
dominant opinion  in  each  composite  cabinet. 

In  the  eyes  of  historians  generally  the  most  impor- 
tant and  dignified  group  of  politicians  has  been  that  of 
the  Old  Whigs,  whose  very  name  connected  them  with 
the  events  of  the  "Glorious  Revolution  of  1688"  and 
seemed  to  point  to  them  as  the  fathers  of  the  progressive 
Whigs  of  the  nineteenth  century.  In  traditional  rights 
and  in  family  connections  there  is  no  doubt  about  their 
superiority  to  their  rivals;  and  after  emerging  from 
the  struggle  over  Robert  Walpole,  the  Old  Whigs  had 
succeeded  also  in  retaining  that  popular  support  that 
attaches  itself  so  unquestionably  to  affiliations  of  long 
standing.  The  glamour  that  enfolds  them  has  been  in- 
tensified by  the  accident  that  their  official  spokesman, 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  29 

Edmund  Burke,  proved  himself  to  be  one  of  the 
ablest  of  the  eighteenth  century  men  of  letters;  and,  as 
a  result,  the  pamphlets  he  penned  in  defense  of  his  fac- 
tion have  been  widely  read,  and  the  Old  Whigs'  inter- 
pretation of  events  and  their  claim  of  representing  the 
policies  of  the  former  Whig  party  of  revolutionary 
ays  have  come  to  be  popularly  accepted.14 
Although  it  was  generally  conceded  that  this  partic- 
ular group  was  the  strongest,  yet  its  councils  were  al- 
ways divided,  for,  as  a  contemporary  wrote,  it  "may 
more  aptly  be  compared  to  an  alliance  of  different 
clans,  fighting  in  the  same  cause,  professing  the  same 
principles,  but  influenced  and  guided  by  their  different 
chieftains."15  In  the  disintegration  of  the  party  sys- 
tem, the  Old  Whigs  had  suffered  most  severely.  Some 
members,  who  refused  absolutely  to  act  longer  with 
their  former  associates,  set  up  new  factions,  others 
joined  themselves  to  rival  leaders,  but  the  greatest  de- 
fection was  to  the  court.  It  was  from  the  Old  Whigs 
that  there  came  the  loudest  complaints  of  the  evils  of 
their  time,  when  households  were  politically  separated 
and  traditional  associations  were  broken  up;  and  they 
were  only  too  ready  to  lay  the  blame  on  their  opponents 
rather  than  on  the  past  conditions  for  which  they  them- 
selves had  been  responsible. 

14  Another  classical  writer,  Horace  Walpole,  although  not  a  member  of 
the  faction,  became  very  friendly  to  it  in  later  life,  so  that  many  of  his  com- 
ments seem  to  support  Burke's  statements. 

15  William  Knox  wrote  of  them:    "For  connected  by  many  ties  or  relation- 
ship, they  found  themselves  the  most  numerous  body  in  Parliament,  except 
the  dependents  of  the  Crown."  -  Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  i,  3.     Their 
lack  of  unity  was  always  conspicuous  in  the  negotiations  for  the  formation  of 
a  cabinet.     The  Yorkes  particularly  were  very  independent,  as  was  also  the 
Duke  of  Richmond.     The  quotation  in  the  text  is  from  Waldegrave,  Memoirs, 
20.     Consult  also  Harris,  Life  of  Hardiuicke,  vol.  iii,  325 ;  Williams,  "The 
Eclipse  of  the  Yorkes,"  in  Royal  Historical  Society,   Transactions,  third  ser., 
vol.  ii,  129  ff. ;  Yorke,  Life  of  Hardiaicke,  passim. 


30  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Under  the  long  leadership  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle 
and  Lord  Hardwicke,  the  Old  Whigs  had  not  revealed 
any  strong  fealty  to  noble  principles.  Their  battle  slogan 
was  "back  to  the  good  old  days"  when  the  government 
was  controlled  by  the  family  connections  of  the  revolu- 
tionary nobility  and  the  royal  power  was  a  cipher.16 
During  the  opening  years  of  the  reign  of  George  III. 
the  leadership  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  Marquis  of 
Rockingham,  who  exhibited  little  talent  for  statesman- 
ship and  even  less  ability  to  hold  his  followers  together; 
but  his  good  nature  did  yield  somewhat,  in  later  years, 
to  the  idealism  of  Edmund  Burke,  and  this  group  of 
noble  politicians  came  to  stand  for  reform  in  a  mild 
way.17  In  general,  however,  an  opposition  writer  was 
not  far  wrong  when  he  wrote  of  them : 

You  seem  not  to  be  contented  to  live  upon  an  equality  with  your 
fellow-subjects.  You  must  either  have  all  power  or  no  power, 
all  posts  or  no  posts.  In  a  word,  nothing  will  satisfy  you  but 
:  making  the  one  half  of  the  people  a  set  of  specious  slaves,  and 
Royalty  itself  a  splendid  phantom.18 

During  the  period  under  consideration  this  Whig 
branch  only  once  came  into  power,19  and  the  leaders 
then  attempted  to  establish  firmly  their  system  of  gov- 
ernment.20 Their  failure  to  accomplish  this  induced 

16  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  402 ;  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt, 
passim. 

17  The  members  of  the  faction,  most  important  for  the  understanding  of 
colonial  politics,  were:  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  Lord  Hardwicke,  the  Duke  of 
Devonshire  (after  1766),  the  Duke  of  Portland,  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham, 
the  Duke  of  Richmond   (each  of  these  was  leader  of  a  numerous  following), 
the  Earl  of  Dartmouth   (until  1772),  Lord  Mansfield  (for  the  early  period), 
all  the  Yorkes,  all  the  Cavendishes   (after  1766),  General  Conway,  William 
Dowdeswell   (a  recruit  from  the  Tories  [Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III., 
vol.  ii,  137,  footnote  i]),  Edmund  Burke,  and  Charles  Townshend. 

18  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol.  xxxiii,   61 ;   see   also  Knox,  Extra   Official 
State  Papers,  vol.  i,  2  ff. 

19  In  1765-1766.     See  pages  232  ff. 

20  For  a  discussion  of  Rockingham's  attitude  towards  the  royal  power  con- 
sult Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  87. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  31 

them  thereafter  to  adopt  the  prevailing  talk  of  a  "broad 
bottom"  ministry  and  to  attempt  to  unite  with  other  fac- 
tions.21 Yet  Old  Whigs  were  and  remained  the  most 
like  a  real  party  with  political  principles  of  any  of  the 
contemporary  factions;22  and  Burke,  their  chief  writer, 
glorying  in  the  fact,  wrote:  "Party  divisions,  whether 
on  the  whole  operating  for  good  or  evil,  are  things  in- 
separable from  free  government."23 

Those  who  revolted  from  the  Whig  party  rule  had 
been  held  together  until  1742  only  by  their  mutual  op- 
position to  Robert  Walpole,  but  as  soon  as  that  minister 
had  fallen,  there  began  a  scramble  for  places,  in  which 
self-interest  became  the  chief  motive.24  This  resulted  not 
only  in  a  further  dismemberment  of  the  oligarchical 
ring  but  also  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  opposition  into 
constituent  parts,  thus  by  the  multiplication  of  factions 
intensifying  the  seeming  disintegration  of  the  former 
predominant  party.  The  principal  Whig  offshoots  in 
1760,  besides  that  of  the  Old  Whigs,  were  the  followers 
of  the  Duke  of  Cumberland,  the  Bedfordites,  the 
George  Grenville  faction,  and  the  adherents  of  William 

21  In  1763  Lord  Hardwicke  talked  of  a  broad  bottom  ministry.     See  Har- 
ris, Life  of  Hardivicke,  vol.  iii,  351,  369.     In  1767  and  1782  the  "broad  bot- 
tom" was  very  popular  with  the  Old  Whigs.     See  Grafton,  Autobiography, 
146  ff. ;    Almon,  Anecdotes  of  Pitt,  vol.  55,   118   ff. ;   Albemarle,  Rockingham 
Memoirs,  vol.  55,  451  ff. ;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  55,  87. 

22  In  1767  one  of  the  causes  of  their  failure  to  unite  with  the  Bedfords 
was   their   refusal   to    adopt  certain   harsh   principles   towards  the   American 
colonies.     In  1782  the  Old  Whigs  refused  to  take  office  before  the  king  had 
pledged  himself  to  promote  certain  definite  principles.     See  Grafton,  Auto- 
biography, 143 ;  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  55,  451  ff. 

23  Burke,   "Observations   on   a  Late   Publication,"   in    Works,  vol.   i,   271. 
For  a  similar  statement  see  "Substance  of  the  Letters  to  the  Duke  of  Devon- 
shire published  in  January,  1764,"  in  A  new  and  impartial  Collection  of  in- 
teresting Letters,  vol.  i,  321  ff. 

24  In  this   account  of  the   factions,  the  contemporary  correspondence  has 
been  carefully  examined.     It  is  impossible  to  give  specific  references  to  all 
the  conclusions;  but  the  best  contemporary  discussions  of  the  subject  are  as 
follows:  by  Fox  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  142  ff. ;  by  Mitchell 
in  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  ii,  170,  footnote. 


32  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Pitt.  The  downfall  of  the  Whig  oligarchy  had  caused 
such  deep  rooted  suspicion  of  treachery  among  these 
political  groups  that  the  hostility  existing  between  some 
of  them  was  greater  than  that  between  themselves  and 
the  court  faction  which  was  not  of  such  pure  Whig  de- 
scent. For  instance  the  enmity  between  William  Pitt 
and  his  brother-in-law,  George  Grenville,  for  years 
seemed  irreconcilable,  and  the  Bedfordites  found  it 
more  difficult  to  unite  with  the  Rockinghams  than  with 
the  followers  of  the  king. 

The  former  coterie  of  Robert  Walpole  and  of  the 
adherents  of  George  II.  was  led  by  the  Duke  of  Cum- 
berland. The  most  brilliant  member  was  unquestion- 
ably Henry  Fox,  who,  though  generally  distrusted,  was 
the  representative  of  the  duke  and  had  connections  with 
many  powerful  families  whom  he  was  able  to  influ- 
ence.25 By  his  frequent  changes  of  politics  between 
1756  and  1762  he  practically  ruined  the  Cumberland 
following.  In  general  the  relation  of  this  group  to  the 
Old  Whigs  was  friendly  and  its  leader  was  frequently 
called  upon  to  act  as  the  spokesman  for  that  oligarchy. 
The  faction,  however,  lacked  coherence  and  solidarity, 
and  its  members  were  easily  persuaded  to  transfer  their 
allegiance  to  the  new  court;  and  after  the  death  of  their 
leader  in  1765,  it  ceased  to  exist. 

Numerically  the  strongest  of  these  offshoots  of  the 
Revolution  Whigs  was  the  Bedfordites.26  The  Duke 

25  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  45  ff.  Consult  also  Riker,  Henry 
Fox,  First  Lord  Holland.  The  Duke  of  Devonshire  and  his  family  was  a 
most  important  member  of  this  faction,  but  later  joined  the  Old  Whigs.  A 
lieutenant  of  Fox  was  Welbore  Ellis,  who  appeared  as  a  member  of  those 
ministries  in  which  Fox  was  influential.  See  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  68, 
footnote  2. 

26 The  principal  followers  of  the  Duke  of  Bedford  were:  Earl  Gower, 
Earl  of  Sandwich,  Viscount  Weymouth,  and  Richard  Rigby.  Lord  Sandwich 
estimated  the  strength  of  the  faction  in  the  House  of  Commons,  in  1766,  as 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  33 

of  Bedford  had  begun  his  parliamentary  career  by  join- 
ing the  "Patriots"  in  their  opposition  to  Walpole.  In 
the  break-up  of  parties  after  the  fall  of  that  minister  he 
attached  himself  to  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  and  was 
closely  associated  with  the  brilliant  Henry  Fox  to 
whose  political  principles  he  generally  subscribed.27 
Earlier  than  Fox,  he  joined  the  Earl  of  Bute  and  gave 
his  assistance  in  making  the  treaty  of  peace;  but  he  was 
always  seeking  to  lead  an  independent  faction,  and  this 
he  succeeded  in  doing  during  the  early  years  of  George 
III.28  The  Bedfords  were  noted  for  their  conservatism, 
which  originated  no  doubt  in  their  close  alliance  with 
many  Tories.29  Although  the  Duke  of  Bedford,  as 
seen  in  his  correspondence,  was  a  man  of  ideals,  the 
chief  purpose  of  his  followers -popularly  called  the 
"Bloomsbury  Gang" -was  the  attainment  of  office,  so 
that  they  never  stood  out  very  firmly  for  principles 
when  asked  to  unite  in  a  coalition  to  form  a  ministry. 
The  "Grenville  connections"  formed  rather  a  small 
group  which  had  broken  away  from  their  former  alle- 
giance at  the  time  of  the  resignation  of  Pitt  in  1761, 
since  they  preferred  office  to  following  that  erratic 
leader.  The  head  of  the  faction  was  the  brother-in- 
law  of  William  Pitt,  George  Grenville,  a  man  of  some 
ability,  pedantic  in  character,  well  trained  in  parlia- 
mentary tactics  and  in  finance,  who  proved  himself  a 
useful  man  in  several  administrations.30 

one  hundred  thirty  votes.     This  estimate  was  high,  even  if  it  included  the 
followers  of  Grenville.     See  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  204. 

27  George  Grenville  regarded  Bedford  and  Fox  [Lord  Holland]  as  form- 
ing a  distinct  faction.     See  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  213. 

28  See  George  Grenville's  statement  in  idem,  213. 

29  The  Duke  of  Bedford  married  the  sister  of  Earl  Gower  and  that  Tory 
family  formed  a  part  of  the  faction  throughout  these  years. 

30  See   Burke's   estimate   of   him   in   "Speech   on  American   Taxation,"   in 
Works,  vol.  ii ;  Fox's  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  144,  148 ;  Wai- 


34  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  most  notable  faction  of  all  was  marshalled  under 
the  banner  of  William  Pitt,  notable  not  only  on  account 
of  the  success  of  its  leader's  ministry  during  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  but  also  on  account  of  its  popularity  and 
of  the  ability  of  its  members.  Although  small  in  num- 
bers, it  counted  among  its  adherents  some  of  the  ablest 
minds  in  England.  Besides  its  leader,  there  were  the 
Earl  of  Shelburne  (after  1763),  the  Duke  of  Grafton, 
Lord  Camden,  Dunning,  and  Barre.31  The  language 
of  both  rivals  and  followers  implies  that  Pitt  was  not 
so  much  the  leader  as  the  master  of  his  associates  who 
looked  up  to  him  with  an  almost  religious  fervor. 
They  all  prided  themselves  on  their  constancy  to  the 
principles  of  the  Whigs  of  the  "Revolution,"  yet  their 
leader  was  the  most  consistent  exponent  of  the  Boling- 
broke  system  among  his  contemporaries.32  His  broad 
bottom  ministry  of  1766  was  his  ideal,  and,  like  the 
king,  he  desired  the  extinction  of  partisanship.  It  was 
their  common  belief  that  explains  the  willingness  of 
George  III.  to  turn  to  Pitt  at  every  ministerial  crisis  in 
the  hope  of  enlisting  him  in  the  struggle  of  the  mon- 
archy against  factions.  At  a  time  when  the  Rocking- 
hams  were  talking  loudly  of  the  revolutionary  Whig 
families,  the  Bedfords  of  their  adherents,  and  the  cour- 
tiers of  the  "King's  Friends,"  Pitt's  followers  took 
pride  in  proclaiming  their  slogan  of  "Measures  not 

pole's  in  Memoirs  of  George  ///.,  vol.  i,  27 ;  his  friend  William  Knox's  in 
Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  ii,  34  ff.  The  chief  members  of  the  faction 
were  Earl  of  Egremont,  Lord  Lyttelton,  Sir  George  Sackville,  Wedderburn, 
and  Jenkinson  (later  follower  of  Earl  of  Bute). 

31  In  1766  a  few  months  before  he  again  became  minister,  Pitt  said  that  he 
had  only  five  followers  in  the  House  of  Lords  and  four  in  the  Commons.    See 
Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  216. 

32  It  is  to  be  supposed  that  all  Pitt's  followers  during  these  years  shared 
with  him  in  this  belief,  but  it  should  be  noted  that  Lord  Shelburne  in  his  old 
age,  long  after  these  events,  considered  Bolingbroke's  writings  very  super- 
ficial.    See  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  25. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  35 

Men."33  To  their  party  motto  they  remained  faithful 
and  throughout  these  years  they  stood  out  more  con- 
stantly for  principles  than  any  of  their  rivals. 

The  political  condition  of  England  in  the  middle  of 
the  eighteenth  century  caused  the  development  of  a  fac- 
tion around  the  king.  This  was  an  inevitable  conse- 
quence as  soon  as  a  scion  of  the  Hanoverian  dynasty 
should  uproot  his  German  traditions  and  become  firmly 
attached  to  the  British  soil  and  customs.  To  remain  a 
parasite  drawing  support  from  the  Whig  oligarchy 
was  an  insufferable  condition  for  a  monarch  trained  in 
English  thought.  To  win  independence  the  king  must 
enter  politics.34  His  only  method  of  fighting  factions 
was  to  enter  the  political  arena  at  the  head  of  a  court 
following.  The  origin  of  this  new  group  is  to  be  found 
in  that  Leicester  House  faction  which  formed  the  nu- 
cleus of  the  opposition  to  Robert  Walpole.  After  the 
death  of  Frederick,  Prince  of  Wales,  a  similar  band  of 
politicians  grew  up  around  his  son,  later  George  III., 
and  was  the  deciding  power  in  placing  Pitt  in  his  his- 
toric ministry.  When  its  leader  ascended  the  throne, 
its  increase  in  strength  was  rapid. 

The  heart  of  the  court  faction  was  a  clique,  number- 
ing about  thirty,  which  was  called  the  "King's  Friends," 
a  name  that  came  into  common  use  about  the  year 
I765-35  The  members  were  men  of  not  very  good  polit- 

33  See  particularly  Pitt's  letter  to  Newcastle,  October,  1764,  in  Pitt,  Corre- 
spondence, vol.  ii,  296;  also  the  same  to  Thomas  Walpole,  November  5,  1765, 
idem,  327 ;  and  Shelburne  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  232 ;  and 
more  particularly  Shelburne's  remarks  in  eulogy  of  Chatham  after  the  latter's 
death,  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xix,  1249. 

34  The  advisability  of  the  king  thus  entering  politics  with  his  own  faction 
was  a  disputed   point  among  contemporaries.     The  Old  Whigs  particularly 
disapproved  of  it.     See  discussion  between  Edmund  Burke  and  Lord  Temple, 
Burke,  Correspondence,  vol.  i,  209. 

85  In  Almon,  Anecdotes  of  Pitt  [vol.  ii,  23,  footnote]  the  number  of  this 
group  is  estimated  at  about  thirty.  In  January  of  1766,  John  Home,  former 


36  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ical  standing,  without  the  usual  attachment  to  some 
noble  lord,  and  were  looked  upon  as  particularly  sordid 
in  their  ideals.  They  held  to  no  political  principles 
except  that  of  the  predominance  of  the  king,  whose  real 
purposes  they  were  supposed  to  know  more  correctly 
than  the  actual  ministers.  Contemporaries  spoke  of  the 
secret  cabinet,  chosen  from  these  men,  which  formed 
the  real  administration  of  Great  Britain.36 

Politically  the  most  important  group  in  the  king's 
coterie  was  composed  of  the  independent  or  unattached 
Whigs  who  one  by  one  joined  their  fortunes  to  the  court 
as  the  opportunities  for  gaining  office  through  the  royal 
influence  increased.  These  men  generally  belonged  by 
tradition  to  the  inner  circle  of  Whig  politicians  whose 
families  had  held  high  offices  of  state  for  generations; 
or,  if  not  that,  at  least  they  had  received  a  baptism 
into  Whiggism  from  the  hand  of  such  leaders  as  the 
Duke  of  Newcastle,  the  Duke  of  Bedford,  or  William 
Pitt.37  They  were  not  so  unthinkingly  devoted  to  the 
king  as  were  the  members  of  the  previous  group,  and 
frequently  they  posed  as  men  of  independent  opinion 

secretary  of  Lord  Bute,  wrote  of  the  king's  friends  as  a  new  faction.  Cald- 
well,  Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications,  vol.  Ixxi],  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  57.  The 
following  were  numbered  among  the  king's  friends:  Lord  Talbot,  Lord  Eglin- 
ton,  Sir  Francis  Dashwood,  Jeremiah  Dyson,  and  Jenkinson  (certainly  after 
1763). 

36  There  can  be   no   doubt   about  the   influence  of   certain   of   the   king's 
friends  upon  George  III.,  just  as  every  administrator  has  his  personal   ad- 
visers, but  such  hardly  constitute  an  inner  cabinet. 

37  It  is  difficult  always  to  distinguish  between  the  first  two  groups,  but 
among  the  politicians  of  this  latter  group  must  be  counted  Lord  Halifax,  Lord 
Hillsborough,  Lord  Barrington,  Lord  North  (a  Tory  by  descent,  but  baptized 
a  Whig  by  the  Duke  of  Newcastle)  ;  later  in  the  reign  may  be  counted  Lord 
Mansfield,   Lord   Dartmouth,   Wedderburn    (after   1770),    and   many   others. 
After  1768  the  desertion  from  other  factions  to  that  of  the  court  was  very 
rapid,  for  rewards  were  ample.     In   1770  as  many  as  192  members  of  the 
House  of  Commons  held  office  under  the  government.     See  Annual  Register 
(1770),  vol.  xiii,  72. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  37 

and  often  boasted  of  not  being  attached  to  any  noble- 
man. Although  they  willingly  acknowledged  the  flag 
under  which  they  served,  George  III.  was  never  able  to 
demand  such  blind  obedience  from  them,  as  could  the 
leaders  of  other  political  affiliations  from  their  follow- 
ers; and  his  failure,  on  some  occasions,  to  deliver  the 
votes  of  these  adherents  gave  color  to  the  charge  of  de- 
ceit so  frequently  made  against  him.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  little  solidarity  existed  within  this  group,  because 
there  was  lacking  that  clannish  spirit  which  held  such 
parliamentary  strength  as  that  of  the  Yorkes  together. 
Another  court  group  of  more  coherence  and  greater 
political  unity  was  formed  by  the  Scotch  representatives 
in  Parliament.  Their  influence  was  due  in  great  meas- 
ure to  the  rapid  economic  development  of  the  northern 
kingdom  during  the  eighteenth  century,  when  former 
fishing  ports  became  the  center  of  a  thriving  and  rapid- 
ly growing  trade.  This  material  progress  was  contem- 
porary with  a  no  less  remarkable  intellectual  awaken- 
ing, which  has  given  to  the  world  of  letters,  philosophy, 
and  science,  some  of  its  most  notable  figures.  The 
Scotch  set  of  politicians  was  closely  connected  with  the 
group  of  scholars  who  were  making  the  northern  uni- 
versities famous,  while  Oxford  and  Cambridge  were 
still  cherishing  their  dead  and  deadening  traditions. 
The  most  noted  scholar  among  the  politicians  was 
James  Oswald,  one  of  the  earliest  advocates  of  that  eco- 
nomic freedom  which  his  friend,  Adam  Smith,  was  to 
make  the  very  heart  of  his  famous  work.38  The  philos- 

38 A  contemporary  wrote  of  Oswald:  "That  eminent  person,  who  joined 
the  accomplishments  of  a  scholar  to  the  qualities  of  a  statesman,  willingly 
gave  the  leisure  he  could  spare  to  the  company  of  men  of  letters,  whom  he 
valued,  and  who  held  his  great  talents  in  high  estimation.  He  was  the  first 
patron  of  Douglas;  David  Hume  submitted  to  him  his  Essays  on  Political 
Economy,  and  the  pages  of  his  History,  before  they  went  to  the  press,  and 


38  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

opher,  David  Hume,  entered  the  outer  edge  of  politics; 
and  Gilbert  Elliot,  who  was  to  mount  high  on  the  lad- 
der of  governmental  preferment,  was  a  member  of  the 
inner  circle  of  these  student  politicians.  The  "master" 
of  this  Scotch  band  of  thinkers,  as  Adam  Smith  calls 
him,  was  Lord  Kames  who  was  in  constant  correspon- 
dence with  the  intellectual  and  political  leaders  of  Lon- 
don.39 

The  northern  kingdom  sent  to  Parliament  sixteen 
peers  and  forty-five  representatives.  With  a  singular 
tenacity  of  purpose  these  members  always  held  together 
and  voted  unanimously  for  government  whatever  its 
complexion.  For  a  century  there  was  practically  no 
rebellion  in  the  ranks  against  their  leader,  the  lord  ad- 
vocate. So  well  recognized  was  the  situation  that  one 
of  the  Scottish  members  facetiously  remarked  that  "the 
government  ought  always  to  select  a  tall  man  to  fill  the 
office  of  Lord  Advocate"  so  that  when  divisions  were 
demanded,  the  Scottish  members  could  see  how  they 
were  expected  to  vote.  This  constancy  in  the  support 
of  the  administration  was  rewarded  by  countless  gifts 
to  Scotchmen  of  offices  in  the  government  at  home,  in 
the  colonies,  and  in  East  India.  As  long  as  the  Whig 
oligarchy  enjoyed  undisputed  sway,  they  could  count 
on  Scottish  support;  butwith  the  break-up  of  that  coali- 
tion, the  Scots  were  drawn  gradually  into  the  circle  of 
the  court,  where  the  influence  of  the  Earl  of  Bute  and 

drew  from  his  deep  insight  into  the  political  state  of  England,  both  in  ancient 
and  modern  times,  many  valuable  remarks.  Lord  Kames  consulted  him  upon 
his  literary  labours,  and  Adam  Smith  was  indebted  to  that  large  and  compre- 
hensive mind,  for  many  of  the  views  of  finance,  that  are  found  in  the  Wealth 
of  Nations." -Memorials  of  the  Public  Life  and  Character  of  James  Oswald, 
p.  xv. 

39  Rae,  Life  of  Adam  Smith,  chap.  iv.  Lord  Mansfield  might  be  named  in 
this  connection,  but  he  had  not  yet  emancipated  himself  from  the  faction  of 
the  Old  Whigs. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  39 

his  successors  kept  them  faithful  to  any  ministry  which 
the  king  favored.  Their  wishes  were,  therefore,  a  fac- 
tor that  had  always  to  be  considered  by  every  admin- 
istration; and  in  the  end,  since  so  many  Scotchmen 
emigrated  to  Canada,  these  northern  members  of  Par- 
liament came  to  exercise  an  undue  influence  on  the 
affairs  of  western  America.40 

Another  group  of  the  composite  court  faction  was 
formed  by  the  adherents  of  the  earlier  Tory  party. 
These  men,  who  had  for  years  held  themselves  aloof 
from  public  affairs,  began  to  participate  in  politics 
again  at  the  formation  of  the  first  Leicester  House  fac- 
tion, became  more  numerous  after  the  success  of  the 
opposition  in  1742  and  the  failure  of  the  Jacobite  re- 
bellion in  1745,  were  brought  forward  prominently  by 
William  Pitt,  and  with  the  accession  of  George  III.  to 
the  throne  thronged  to  London  for  his  support.41  The 
members  of  the  old  Tory  families  drew  their  strength 
from  landed  interests,  were  especially  influential  in  the 
counties,  and  formed  a  counterpoise  to  the  merchant 
class  which  supported  the  Old  Whigs.42  During  the 
period  under  consideration,  however,  they  never  ap- 
peared in  politics  as  a  party,  but  many  individuals  be- 
came scattered  among  the  Whig  factions,  and  the  re- 

40  For  a  discussion  of  this  situation  in  Scotland  see  Porritt,  Unreformed 
House  of  Commons,  vol.  ii. 

41  Fitzmaurice,    Life    of   Shelburne,    vol.    i,    38;    Albemarle,    Rocking/tarn 
Memoirs,  vol.  i,  69. 

42  In   Soame  Jenyns's   "Reflections  on   Several   Subjects"   [Works,  vol.   ii, 
215]  occurs  the  following:     "It  is  often  asserted,  that  the  landed  and  trading 
interest  of  a  nation  must  ever  be  inseparable;   and  each  of  them  assure  us, 
that  their  own  is  the  interest  of  the  public:  but  all  these  propositions  are  fal- 
lacious; there  are  few  instances  in  which  the  landed  and  trading  interests 
coincide;  in  most  they  are  diametrically  opposite;  nor  are  either,  or  both  of 
them,  always  the  interest  of  the  public;  whose  true  interest  is  only  to  keep 
them  from  destroying  each  other,  and  involving  herself  in  dangers  and  ex- 
penses." 


40 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

mainder  united  as  a  subgroup  with  the  court  faction  to 
which  they  generally  but  not  always  gave  their  support. 
Horace  Walpole  regarded  them  as  so  insignificant  that 
they  could  be  ignored  in  his  narrative.*3 

Made  up  as  it  was  of  groups  and  individuals  united 
only  in  their  loyalty  to  the  king  but  separated  by  their 
personal  interests,  the  court  faction  did  not  always  act 
as  a  unit  in  Parliament,  and  in  the  councils  of  the  fac- 
tion the  views  were  often  divergent.  Even  the  Earl  of 
Bute,  who  was  conspicuous  for  his  personal  devotion  to 
the  king,  was  not  always  willing  to  compel  his  follow- 
ers44 to  vote  for  measures  which  had  received  the  royal 
approbation.45  With  the  passage  of  years  and  with 
greater  experience  in  politics  and  increasing  opportuni- 
ties to  secure  public  offices  the  coalition  grew  more 
coherent  and  manageable.  Before  the  close  of  the 
American  Revolution,  however,  another  change  is  to  be 
noted.  The  faction  ceased  to  belong  so  peculiarly  to 

43  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  67.     Samuel  Johnson  in  the 
False  Alarm  complained  that  the  Tories  did  not  give  the  king  their  support. 
In  1765  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham  was  ready  to  make  a  bid  for  the  Tory 
support  of  his  Old  Whig  ministry.     Newcastle,  Correspondence,  in  Camden 
Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix,  29.     In  1769  Burke  speaks  of  Tory 
support  of  the  Old  Whigs.     Burke,  Correspondence,  vol.  i,  192.    There  were, 
however,  Tories  in   all  factions.     Pitt  could  always  count  on  some  support 
from  them;   and  among  the  Old  Whigs,  Grenvillites,  and  Bedfordites  there 
were  also  former  members  of  this  practically  defunct  party. 

44  Among  the  followers  of  Lord  Bute  were  Earl  of  Northumberland,  Earl 
of  Egmont,  Lord  Denbigh,  Sir  Gilbert  Elliot,  James  Oswald.     It  was  esti- 
mated that  Bute  controlled,  in  1766,  eighty  or  ninety  votes  in  the  House  of 
Commons.     See  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  204. 

45  Note  particularly  the  vote  on  the  cider  tax  in  1763  which  the  Tory  lords 
opposed  and  the  vote  on  the  land  tax  in  1767,  when  the  landed  interests  of 
Bute's  followers  induced  them  to  vote  against  the  king's  wishes.     See  idem, 
vol.  i,  200;  Harris,  Life  of  Hardwicke,  vol.  iii,  336.     From  many  points  of 
view  Bute's  followers  might  be  regarded  as  a  separate  faction  from  that  of 
the  king's  friends  or  Scotch  group.     See  the  negotiations  in  1766,  Newcastle, 
Correspondence   [Camden  Society,  Publications,   new   ser.,  vol.  lix],   61,   62; 
also  attitude  of  Bute  during  Rockingham's  ministry,  Caldwell,  Papers  [Mait- 
land  Club  Publications,  vol.  Ixxi],  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  57  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  41 

the  king  and,  after  a  conversion  to  the  nature  of  its 
rivals,  it  came  to  be  little  more  than  a  personal  follow- 
ing of  Lord  North;  but  this  metamorphosis  occurred 
after  the  period  covered  by  the  narrative  of  this  work. 
From  the  foregoing  description  of  factions  it  may  be 
perceived  that  political  chaos  confronted  the  new  mon- 
arch during  the  first  years  of  his  reign.  To  him  there 
was  one  real  danger  which  he  felt  must  be  avoided, 
namely  the  reseating  of  the  Whig  oligarchy  in  power.46 
His  object  was,  however,  larger  than  this,  for  he  in- 
tended, quite  in  keeping  with  the  theories  of  Lord 
Bolingbroke,  to  abolish  party  and  factious  divisions  al- 
together.47 To  use  his  own  words  he  wished  that  "his 
administration  follow  strenuously  his  example  in  op- 
posing factious  bands,  in  whatever  quarters  they  ap- 
pear, though  willing  to  receive  able  and  good  men,  let 
their  private  friendships  be  where  they  will."48  In 
other  words  he  hoped  to  unite  all  men  as  individuals  in 

46  For  an  excellent  statement  of  the  king's  purposes  in  1763,  see  Bute  to 
Bedford,  April  2,  1763,  in  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  224;  also  Dod- 
ington  to  Bute,  December  22,  1780  in  Adolphus,  History  of  England,  vol.  i, 

57i- 

4T  See  letters  of  the  king  to  Pitt  in  Pitt's  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  21,  134, 
137.  There  is  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  king's  purposes  in  Annual  Regis- 
ter (1762),  vol.  v,  47;  also  by  Sir  John  Phillips  in  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii, 
118 ;  and  in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol.  xxxii,  366.  In  1761  there  was 
printed  a  pamphlet  by  Dr.  John  Douglas  entitled  Seasonable  Hints  from  an 
Honest  Man,  in  which  the  new  system  was  fully  expounded.  This  is  outlined 
in  Hunt,  History  of  England,  vol.  x,  16.  See  also  letter  in  Gentleman's  Mag- 
azine, vol.  xxxiii,  211. 

48  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  134.  A  contemporary  writer  expresses 
the  principle  thus:  "Nothing  so  much  manifests,  as  well  as  augments  the 
weakness  of  a  state,  as  being  obliged  to  admit  men  into  power  by  the  force  of 
faction  and  opposition  to  power;  because  this  continually  incites  more  faction, 
and  more  opposition  for  the  sake  of  power,  and  at  the  same  time  incapaci- 
tates all  who  thus  acquire  it  to  exercise  or  retain  it;  every  succeeding  opposi- 
tion grows  stronger  by  experience  in  the  arts  of  distressing,  and  every  admin- 
istration weaker  from  inexperience  in  the  arts  of  governing;  for  opposition  is 
the  most  unpromising  school  in  which  a  minister  can  receive  his  education." - 
Jenyns,  Works,  vol.  ii,  223. 


42  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  support  of  his  throne  and  in  this  way  to  disunite  the 
political  affiliations  which  he  considered  as  dedicated 
to  the  pursuit  of  purely  selfish  ends,  which  endangered 
not  only  the  prerogative  of  the  crown  but  also  the  in- 
terests of  the  people. 

Besides  the  king's  own  immediate  followers  there 
were  only  two  of  the  political  groups  which  professed 
his  faith.  These  were  the  Pittites  who  generally  pro- 
claimed loudly  their  adherence  to  Bolingbroke's  ideal 
and  the  Grenvillites  who  were  less  loud  in  voicing  their 
creed.  Unfortunately  for  George  III.  these  two  bands, 
during  the  early  years  of  his  reign,  were  divided  by  a 
family  feud  and  could  not  be  persuaded  to  act  together. 
The  court  faction  in  union  with  only  one  of  these  was 
unable  to  command  a  safe  majority  in  the  houses  of 
Parliament,  and  therefore  it  was  generally  found  neces- 
sary to  form  a  "broad  bottom"  ministry  supported  by 
at  least  three  of  the  warring  factions. 

Such  coalitions  were  necessarily  weak  and  inharmo- 
nius;  but,  since  government  was  carried  on,  during  the 
eighteenth  century,  by  ministers  who  conducted  the 
affairs  of  their  departments  independently  of  each 
other,  personal  hostility  between  them  was  not  such  an 
evil  as  it  would  prove  today.49  The  number  of  prin- 
cipal cabinet  positions  to  be  filled  varied  from  ten  to 
sixteen,  but  the  policies,  so  far  as  any  existed,  were  de- 
termined by  an  inner  circle  of  five  or  six  officers.50 
Among  the  members  of  this  committee  confidence  and 

49  Lord  Shelburne  once  said  that  when  he  was  president  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  he  kept  all  the  official  business  transacted  by  himself  and  colleagues 
"as  much  a  secret  as  possible  from  the  secretary  of  state."     See  Parliamen- 
tary History,  vol.  xix,  509 ;  Hunt,  History  of  England,  vol.  x,  7  ff.     The  mem- 
bers of  Lord   North's  cabinet  were  particularly  independent  of  each  other. 
See  Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  372. 

50  Winstanley,  "George  III.  and  his  First  Cabinet,"  in  English  Historical 
Review,  vol.  xvii,  679. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  43 

good  faith  were  more  essential  but  not  customary.  As 
a  rule  George  III.  selected  most  of  the  members  of  the 
inner  circle  from  the  factions  with  pure  Whig  tradi- 
tions, though  the  majority  of  the  votes  in  Parliament 
were  given  by  his  own  followers. 

The  king  never  emancipated  himself  from  the  polit- 
ical chaos  created  by  the  annihilation  of  parties,  and 
the  strife  of  factions  threatened  to  disrupt  every  min- 
istry that  was  formed  during  his  long  reign.  He  did, 
however,  free  the  monarchy  from  its  subjection  to  the 
Whig  oligarchy,  and  thus  the  way  was  prepared  for  a 
development  of  better  political  conditions.  True  party 
government  was  finally  evolved  out  of  the  prevailing 
political  disorder  of  his  time,  but  its  culmination  falls 
well  within  the  nineteenth  century.  The  latter  half  of 
the  eighteenth  century  knew  it  not. 


II. 

/  shall  burn  all  da$  my  Greek  and  Latin  books^  They  are  his- 
tories of  little  people.  The  Romans  never  conquered  the  world^till 
they  had  conquered  three  parts  of  it,  and  were  three  hundred  years 
about  it.'  We  subdue  the  globe  in  three  campaigns;  and  a  globe,  let 
me  tell  you,  as  big  again  as  it  was  in  their  day.  —  HORACE  WALPOLE. 

The  foregoing  description  of  the  parliamentary  fac- 
tions will  have  made  clear  the  purpose  of  Pitt's  question 
about  the  retention  of  Guadaloupe  or  Canada.  Know- 
ing well  that  in  every  political  issue  these  bands  of 
politicians  would  seek  for  their  own  particular  interest 
and  that  towards  the  colonial  problem  they  had  already 
assumed  a  mental  bias  that  would  find  expression  in  de- 
bate, he  had  consciously  touched  a  match  to  the  tinder 
of  factional  discord.  Since  partisanship  on  American 
questions  had  not  become  so  sharply  defined  as  it  was  in 
later  years  after  many  disputes  between  the  mother 
country  and  the  colonies  had  arisen,  it  is  difficult  to-day 
to  determine  with  exactness  and  completeness  what  was 
the  result  of  Pitt's  experiment;  the  prevailing  opinion 
concerning  the  future  of  the  American  dependencies 
entertained  by  each  of  the  factions  at  this  early  date 
was  not  fully  disclosed.  Still  Pitt's  question  raised  to 
political  importance  a  clear  cut  issue  originating  in  the 
conditions  brought  about  by  the  war;  and  very  early  in 
the  discussion  of  it,  there  came  from  the  court  group  a 
distinct  pledge  to  promote  a  policy  of  rapid  westward 
expansion,  and  by  their  stand  there  was  forced  on  their 
rivals  the  necessity  of  making  some  declaration  in  favor 


46  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

of,  or  against,  such  a  development  of  the  hinterland. 
Thus  it  may  be  said  with  approximate  truth  that  all 
future  issues  concerning  the  Mississippi  Valley  were 
formed  and  the  trend  of  partisan  opinion  determined 
during  the  critical  period  of  the  peace  negotiations. 

The  treaty  which  closed  the  Seven  Years'  War  was 
in  its  significance  of  world-wide  importance,  but  only 
one  phase  of  it  is  related  to  the  subject  of  this  study, 
namely,  that  affecting  America.  The  first  blow  in  the 
war  had  been  struck  on  the  waters  of  the  upper  Ohio, 
where  the  imperial  ambitions  of  England  and  France 
met  in  a  struggle  which  was  inevitable  and  could  be 
decided  only  by  force  of  arms.  England  had  based 
her  rights  to  this  region  upon  the  priority  of  the  dis- 
coveries by  the  Cabots,  but  more  directly  on  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  by  which  the  Iroquois  and 
their  territory  were  acknowledged  to  be  under  British 
protection.  According  to  British  interpretation  the 
sphere  of  influence  of  these  formidable  Indians  was 
bounded  on  the  north  by  the  southern  bank  of  the  Saint 
Lawrence,  included  at  least  the  land  bordering  the 
southern  lakes,  and  extended  as  far  west  as  the  Illinois 
River.51  By  the  same  process  of  reasoning  the  terri- 
tory south  of  the  Ohio  fell  under  the  dominion  of  Great 
Britain,  because  here  also  dwelt  her  Indian  allies.  The 
French  had  put  forward  with  equal  force  the  argument 
of  prior  discovery  which  was  strengthened  in  their  case 
by  actual  occupation.  They  feared  the  British  colonies 
and  did  not  wish  to  permit  them  to  secure  a  foothold 
west  of  the  Alleghenies.  After  the  first  blood  had 
been  spilt  in  this  clash  of  rival  interests,  the  two  courts 
appointed  commissioners  in  the  hope  of  adjusting  their 
claims.  France  showed  a  moderate  spirit  of  compro- 

51  At  times  these  claims  were  more  extended. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  47 

mise  and  was  willing  to  make  the  territory  lying  be- 
tween the  Ohio  and  the  Virginia  mountains  neutral 
ground  whose  status  should  be  determined  by  the  slow 
methods  of  diplomacy;  but  England  demanded  that 
France  should  immediately  vacate  the  country  south  of 
the  Great  Lakes  as  far  west  as  the  Wabash  River  and 
that  a  definite  boundary  line  between  the  two  countries 
should  be  established.5.  These  negotiations  were  broken 
off  by  the  aggressive  policy  in  the  West  on  the  part  of 
both  courts,  and  the  struggle  for  the  greatest  and  most 
fertile  valley  in  the  world  began.  The  conquest  of 
Canada  in  1759  and  1760  apparently  put  an  end  to  this 
colonial  phase  of  the  war  by  deciding  the  territorial 
question  between  the  two  countries  and  there  was  no 
reason  for  postponing  longer  the  efforts  to  bring  about 
peace. 

The  exhaustion  of  France  was  such  that  almost  all 
classes  were  crying  out  for  a  cessation  of  hostilities; 
and  the  Due  de  Choiseul,  who  had  just  secured  a  con- 
dition in  the  ministry  that  placed  full  powers  in  his 
hands,  was  ready  by  1761  to  win  the  encomiums  of  his 
countrymen  by  acceding  to  their  demands;53  but  the 
position  of  his  country  was  so  weakened  by  the  series 
of  disastrous  defeats  that  he  thought  to  strengthen  his 

52  The  memorials  and  letters  exchanged  by  the  two  courts  are  printed  in 
The  Mystery  Reveal'd,  259  ff.  See  particularly  the  memorials  [pages  289, 
300].  It  is  not  probable  that  either  of  the  nations  was  sincere  in  these  nego- 
tiations, for  both  continued  to  push  their  preparations  to  occupy  and  to  hold 
the  disputed  territory. 

5SThe  frequent  doubt  that  has  been  passed  on  the  sincerity  of  Choiseul's 
desire  seems  to  be  completely  dispelled  by  the  careful  study  of  his  private  and 
public  letters.  See  Barthelemy,  "Le  traite  de  Paris  entre  la  France  et  I'Angle- 
terre,"  in  Revue  des  questions  historiques,  vol.  xliii,  420;  Bouquet,  "Le  due  de 
Choiseul  et  PAngleterre,"  in  Revue  historique,  vol.  Ixxi,  i.  During  the  course 
of  the  negotiations  Choiseul  became  more  and  more  convinced  of  the  hopeless- 
ness of  a  satisfactory  peace  and  was  obliged  to  rely  more  completely  on  the 
Spanish  alliance. 


48  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

position  in  the  future  negotiations  by  securing  the  sup- 
port of  Spain  whose  ministers  were  anxious  to  force  on 
England  a  settlement  of  certain  existing  disputes.  To 
this  end  Choiseul  began  negotiations  that  were  to  lead 
to  the  pacte  de  famille  and  a  defensive  and  offensive 
alliance  between  the  two  Bourbon  monarchies  before 
all  hope  of  an  agreement  with  England  was  lost.  In 
attempting  this  Choiseul  may  have  committed  an  error 
in  tactics  because  English  suspicions  were  aroused;  and 
to  this  fact  almost  alone  the  failure  of  the  negotiations 
must  be  ascribed. 

In  England  the  time  seemed  propitious  for  a  pro- 
posal of  peace.  The  new  monarch,  George  III.,  had 
made  up  his  mind  to  bring  the  war  to  a  close,  a  deter- 
mination which  the  influential  favorite,  Lord  Bute,  was 
eager  to  further.  The  Old  Whigs  under  the  leader- 
ship of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  were  equally  anxious 
for  an  end  of  hostilities;  and  even  the  great  war  min- 
ister, Pitt,  saw  no  good  purpose  to  be  served  in  pro- 
longing the  war,  provided  the  fruits  of  his  victories 
were  gathered.  The  most  uncompromising  supporters 
of  the  peace  policy  were  the  members  of  the  Bedford 
faction.  The  duke  had  become,  for  political  reasons, 
an  enthusiastic  advocate  of  pacific  measures  and  was 
being  pushed  to  the  front  as  their  champion  by  those 
who  were  undermining  the  influence  of  the  popular 
war  minister. 

The  British  army  and  navy  had  been  so  uniformly 
victorious  in  all  parts  of  the  world  that  it  would  be 
difficult  to  negotiate  a  treaty  sufficiently  brilliant  to 
meet  the  approval  of  the  enthusiastic  supporters  of  im- 
perial expansion.  As  the  news  of  victories  followed 
in  rapid  succession,  there  was  developed  even  in  the 
mind  of  the  public  the  determination  to  take  advantage 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  49 

of  the  humiliation  of  their  traditional  enemy  and  to 
exact  the  utmost  farthing  as  an  indemnity  for  what  was 
popularly  interpreted  as  her  trickery  and  deceit.  The 
question  of  the  ownership  of  the  insignificant  territory 
around  the  upper  Ohio  River- the  immediate  occasion 
of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities -was  now  totally  forgotten 
in  the  vision  of  much  larger  acquisitions.  Canada, 
Louisiana,  and  the  islands  of  the  West  Indies  might  all 
be  demanded  as  the  price  of  peace. 

Such  was  the  dream  of  the  men  on  the  street  and  it 
gave  a  popular  basis  for  the  criticism  of  the  later  treaty, 
but  the  ministers  were  well  aware  that  there  must  be 
some  moderation  in  their  demands  from  France;  and, 
when  William  Pitt  shouted  the  dramatic  question  in 
Parliament,  "Some  are  for  keeping  Canada;  some  Gua- 
daloupe;  who  will  tell  me  which  I  shall  be  hanged  for 
not  keeping?"  he  was  stating  the  alternative  that  had 
been  finally  presented  to  those  who  would  be  respon- 
sible for  the  terms  upon  which  a  firm  stand  was  to  be 
taken.  Guadaloupe  represented  a  greatly  desired  trop- 
ical possession,  exporting  products  not  raised  in  Great 
Britain;  Canada,  on  the  other  hand,  would  round  out 
the  territory  of  the  American  colonies  and  insure  their 
rapid  development  in  population  and  wealth.  Both 
the  province  and  the  island  could  not  be  secured;  be- 
tween them  a  choice  must  be  made.  The  final  decision 
on  this  momentous  question  was  influenced  by  economic 
theory  and  financial  interests,  and  by  it  the  future 
colonial  policy  of  the  British  empire  was  determined. 

Most  of  Pitt's  hearers  were  unable  to  understand  the 
potential  economic  consequences  that  lay  within  the 
alternatives  he  presented;  but  he  could  take  for  granted 
that  their  previous  training  had  tuned  their  thought  to 
respond  to  certain  common  chords  upon  which  his  gen- 


50  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ius  had  been  long  accustomed  to  play.  They  were  men 
of  the  eighteenth  century  and  so  far  as  they  entertained 
opinions  on  economic  theory,  they  were  in  sympathy 
with  the  view  of  the  mercantilists  and  thought  their 
nation  prosperous,  provided  her  yearly  exports  so  ex- 
ceeded her  imports  that  a  balance  in  money  was  to  be 
paid  her  merchants.  When  they  speculated  on  the  the- 
ory of  colonies,  they  took  as  an  incontrovertible  prin- 
ciple that  these  should  assist  the  mother  country  to  sup- 
ply her  needs  in  such  measure  that  her  imports  from 
aliens  might  be  decreased  and  her  exports  increased. 
The  result  should  be  a  self-sufficing  empire,  producing 
all  that  was  needed  for  home  consumption  and  a  surplus 
for  foreign  trade." 

In  this  view  the  center  of  the  empire  was  naturally 
enough  the  mother  country  whose  interests  were  the 
principal  consideration.  To  her  the  colonies  should  be 
only  feeders ;  to  her  their  economic  life  should  be  subor- 
dinated. Franklin  has  stated  with  precision  the  opin- 
ion of  the  average  Englishman:  "Nature  has  put 
bounds  to  your  abilities,  tho'  none  to  your  desires. 
Britain  would,  if  she  could,  manufacture  and  trade  for 
all  the  World;  England  for  all  Britain; -London  for 
all  England; -and  every  Londoner  for  all  London." 
A  memorialist  in  1763  wrote:  "The  British  Colonies 
are  to  be  regarded  in  no  other  light,  but  as  subservient 
to  the  commerce  of  their  mother  country;  the  colonists 
are  merely  factors  for  the  purposes  of  trade,  and  in  all 
considerations  concerning  the  Colonies,  this  must  be 

54  For  this  whole  discussion  of  the  colonial  theory  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, I  have  relied  upon  Smith,   Wealth  of  Nations;   Beer,  British  Colonial 
Policy,  1754-1765;  and  Hertz,  Old  Colonial  System.     An  interesting  discussion 
from  a  mercantile  viewpoint  is  contained  in  [Mitchell]  Present  State  of  Great 
Britain. 

55  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  245. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  51 

always  the  leading  idea."56  The  central  position  of 
Great  Britain  imposed  upon  her  certain  very  grave 
duties  towards  her  dependencies.  The  interests  of  these 
latter  were  of  prime  importance  where  they  were  sup- 
plemental in  character  and  should  be  fostered  by  every 
means.  Imports  from  the  oversea  dominions  should 
enjoy  preferential  rates;  therefore  within  the  British 
empire,  everybody  was  obliged  to  smoke  colonial  to- 
bacco, eat  colonial  sugar,  and  use  colonial  tar.  Bounties 
were  given  or  duty  regulations  made  for  the  purpose  of 
encouraging  or  starting  certain  American  industries, 
as  the  cultivation  of  hemp  and  silk,  the  trade  in  beavers, 
and  the  whale  fisheries.57  This  duty  of  promoting  the 
industries  of  the  dependencies,  which  was  a  tenet  of 
every  statesman's  belief,  was  thus  expressed  by  George 
Grenville:  "I  perfectly  agree  with  you  'that  we  ought 
to  take  our  materials  for  manufactures  from  our  col- 
onies, altho'  we  should  pay  higher  prices  for  them  or 
be  obliged  to  reduce  the  price  of  them  to  our  manu- 
facturers by  bounties.'"58  This  encouragement  to 
/colonial  industries  was  not,  however,  to  be  extended  to 
\  manufactures.  Few  eighteenth-century  men  had  eman- 
cipated themselves  sufficiently  from  mercantilist 
thought  to  regard  possible  competition  with  equanim- 
ity. In  his  famous  speech  on  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp 
Act  William  Pitt  affirmed,  "that  if  the  Americans 
should  manufacture  a  lock  of  wool  or  a  horse  shoe,  he 
would  fill  their  ports  with  ships  and  their  towns  with 
troops." 59 

56  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  26-35. 

57  Smith,   Wealth  of  Nations,  book  iv,  chap,  vii ;   Beer,  British  Colonial 
Policy,  215,  217,  218;  Hertz,  Old  Colonial  System,  38,  44  ff. 

58  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  95,  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report 
on  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  vol.  vi. 

69  Grenville  to  Knox,  August  15,  1769,  in  Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Pa- 


52  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

In  asking  the  question  about  Canada  and  Guada- 
loupe,  Pitt  knew  that  the  above  principles  were  held 
by  practically  all  his  hearers,  but  he  directed  his  di- 
lemma at  a  growing  difference  in  opinion  over  the 
value  that  colonies  were  to  Great  Britain.  Many  of 
the  politicians  were  still  clinging  to  that  time-worn 
theory  which  had  been  the  incentive  among  European 
countries  to  undertake  the  planting  of  dependencies, 
namely  that  these  would  produce  the  staple  commodi- 
ties and  those  raw  materials,  required  for  manufactur- 
ing purposes,  which  could  not  be  supplied  in  sufficient 
quantities  in  the  mother  country.  To  men  of  this 
thought  that  was  the  sole  value  of  colonies.  When  the 
manufacturers,  however,  increased  in  number  and  the 
volume  of  their  output  grew,  and  when  the  middlemen 
became  wealthy  through  furnishing  the  world's  mar- 
kets with  British  products,  a  new  conception  of  the 
place  of  colonies  in  the  empire  developed  -rapidly  and 
impregnated  the  thought  of  the  progressive  politicians, 
who  looked  upon  Pitt  in  particular  as  their  spokesman. 
According  to  this  new  view,  dependencies  should  be 
fostered  for  the  sake  of  their  markets.  Rapidly  in- 
creasing communities  capable  of  purchasing  large 
quantities  of  merchandise  were  preferable  to  territory 
whose  sole  value  was  the  production  of  staple  and  raw 
materials.  The  following  words  written  in  1769  have 
a  very  modern  sound: 

The  first  ends  proposed  in  planting  Colonies,  are  to  encrease 
the  strength  of  the  mother  country  by  providing  room  for  an  en- 
crease  of  people ;  and  to  encrease  its  wealth  by  establishing  with 
them  an  intercourse  of  commerce,  mutually  advantageous,  colo- 
nization in  any  other  view  than  one  of  them,  or  tending  to  them, 
being  absurd,  and  subversive  of  itself.60 

pers,  vol.  il,  appendix  xv.     See  also  Essays  Commercial  and  Political  on  the 
Real  and  Relative  Interests  of  Imperial  and  Dependent  States  (1777),  51. 
60  American  Traveller,  119.     See  also  page  70,  where  the  writer  advocated 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  53 

This  more  recent  conception  of  dependencies  won  a  not- 
able victory  in  the  treaty  of  peace.61 

Still  the  older  view  of  the  purposes  of  colonies  died 
slowly,  and  there  are  many  indications  that  the  public 
still  clung  to  the  idea  that  the  dependencies  whose  agri- 
cultural and  mineral  products  differed  from  those  of 
England  were  particularly  valuable  and  that  any  whose 
economic  resources  were  similar  wrere  of  little  worth  to 
the  mother  country.  To  the  average  Englishman  the 
West  Indies  and  the  continental  colonies  from  Mary- 
land southward  appeared  ideal,  and  he  could  calculate 
their  advantages  to  the  empire,  but  the  northern  colo- 
nies seemed  of  minor  consequence,  since  they  must  even- 
tually become  rivals.62  The  author  of  An  Impartial 
History  of  the  late  glorious  War  expressed  a  thought 
commonly  enough  entertained,  when  he  wrote  that 
"neither  the  soil  nor  climate  will  admit  of  any  improve- 
ment for  Britain,  in  any  of  those  Northern  colonies," 
and  maintained,  as  did  many  other  writers,  that  the  best 
means  of  continuing  them  in  the  condition  of  depend- 
ence was  to  "remove  their  spare  people  who  want  lands, 
to  those  vacant  lands  in  the  southern  parts  of  the  con- 
tinent, which  turn  to  so  much  greater  account  than  any 
they  are  possessed  of."  Here,  "they  may  now  make 

the  encouragement  of  agriculture  and  manufacturing  in  the  colonies,  in  order 
that  the  people  may  become  rich  and  buy  more  from  the  mother  country. 

61  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1271;  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  155. 

62  An  Examination  of  the  Commercial  Principles.     A  memorialist  of  1763 
wrote:     "Whoever  attentively  considers  the  nature  of  our  settlements  on  the 
continent  of  America,  will  soon  be  convinced,  that  'tis  for  the  interest  of  this 
nation  to  check  population  in  the  northern  colonies  and  encourage  it  in  the 
southern."  -  Lansdovine  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  536  ff.     An  excellent  discus- 
sion based  on  this  view  is  in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol.  xxxiii,  380.    See 
also  Essays  Commercial  and  Political  on  the  Real  and  Relative  Interests  of 
Imperial  and  Dependent  States    (1777),  sec.  ii.     The  writer  advances  as   a 
general  principle  that  "we  shall  find  as  they  [the  colonies]   advance  towards 
the  sun,  they  are  more  beneficial  to  Britain"  [page  10].     See  also  Beer,  British 
Colonial  Policy,  134,  135,  149. 


54  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

some  staple  commodity  for  Britain,  on  which  the  in- 
terest of  the  colonies,  and  of  the  nation  in  them,  chiefly 
depends."63  Upon  the  final  determination  of  the  use 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  this  prejudice  had  consider- 
able influence. 

It  is  impossible  to  find  the  line  in  the  English  popu- 
lation that  separated  those  who  still  clung  to  the  older 
colonial  theory  from  those  who  had  been  converted  to 
the  new;  but  in  general  the  merchants  of  the  city  seem 
to  have  favored  the  southern  and  tropical  colonies  and 
preferred  that  England  should  retain  her  conquest  of 
Guadaloupe  rather  than  Canada;  whereas  the  manu- 
facturing and  the  farming  population  which  was  at  this 
time  particularly  interested  in  wool  held  to  the  opposite 
opinion.6*  Against  the  merchants  were  all  those  inter- 
ested in  the  production  of  sugar,  who  feared  that  an 
increase  of  sugar  producing  territory  would  decrease 
the  value  of  their  own  plantations.65 

Pitt  undoubtedly  kept  his  fingers  on  the  public  pulse 
to  learn  the  popular  opinion  on  the  issue,  but  the  align- 
ment of  the  factions  in  Parliament  was  the  particular 
occasion  of  his  dilemma.  They,  not  the  public,  would 
hold  him  to  a  future  accounting  of  his  stewardship. 
It  may  be  that  at  the  time  he  was  speaking  there  was 
some  doubt  in  his  mind  how  the  votes  would  be  divided 
when  a  future  treaty  of  peace  should  be  proposed.  Still 
such  doubt  could  not  have  lasted  long,  since  the  ma- 
jority of  factions  soon  spoke  in  decisive  terms.  The 
choice  of  Pitt  and  his  followers  had  long  been  made. 

63  Printed  in  1764.     This  discussion  is  in  an  appendix,  pages  311  ff. ;  the 
quoted  passages  are  found  on  pages  320,  321. 

64  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  139. 

65  Reasons  for  keeping  Guadaloupe  at  a  Peace,   13.     In  reference  to  the 
possible  capture  of  Martinique  the  Duke  of  Bedford  wrote:     "Which  I  sup- 
pose the  sugar  planters  will  no  more  desire  should  be  retained  by  us  than 
they  did  in  relation  to  Guadaloupe." -Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  25. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  55 

They  favored  Canada66  and  may  possibly  have  consid- 
ered the  retention  of  Guadaloupe  also,  but  this  latter  is 
very  uncertain.67  The  Grenvillites  were  always  staunch 
advocates  for  keeping  the  northern  province  and  were 
never  in  doubt  as  to  how  they  would  cast  their  votes. 
Of  much  more  importance  was  the  opinion  of  the  king's 
followers,  who  were  now  the  most  powerful  factor  in 
politics.  Under  the  leadership  of  the  Earl  of  Bute 
they  expressed  their  sentiments  in  favor  of  rounding 
out  the  British  dominions  in  North  America  by  taking 
from  France  the  valleys  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  and  the 
Mississippi  Rivers.68  Openly  and  outspokenly  opposed 
to  the  keeping  of  the  northern  French  province  were 
the  Bedfordites.  Their  reasons  were  twofold:  first, 
they  feared  that,  like  Spain,  England  would  become 

66  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  23.     See  also  the  papers  during 
the  negotiations,  printed  in  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1018  ff. 

67  He  stated  during  the  discussion  of  the  preliminaries  that  he  desired  to 
keep  Guadaloupe,  according  to  the  report  in  Parliamentary  History  [vol.  xv, 
1264]  ;  but  his  well  known  friendship  for  Alderman  Beckford,  whose  financial 
interests   in   the   West  Indies   made   him   oppose   further   acquisition   in   that 
region,  made  his  contemporaries  believe  that  Pitt  also  shared  these  opinions. 
Mauduit,  Considerations  on  the  Present  German  War.     In  a  copy  of  a  fourth 
edition  of  this  work  in  the  British  Museum  are  some  annotations  by  Mauduit 
himself.     One  of  these  is  as  follows:     "During  the  whole  of  Mr.  Pitt's  admin- 
istration, no  one  had  as  much  of  his  confidence  as  Mr.  Beckford.     He  was 
made  to  believe  that  he  held  the  city  by  Beckford's  means,  and  gave  free  ad- 
mission to  him,  while  he  kept  himself  inaccessible  to  every  one   else.     .     . 
Beckford  dreaded  the  increase  of  our  sugar  islands,  lest  that  might  lessen  the 
value  of  his   lands   in  Jamaica,   and   hence  proceeded   Mr.   Pitt's   invincible 
aversion  to  any  attempts  on  the  French  Islands;  and  the  speech  he  made  on 
the  first  day  of  the  sessions,   1760,  soon   after  the   Considerations  had  been 
published,   in  which  he  expressly  declared   against  making  any  further  con- 
quests in  the  West  Indies."     For  this  passage  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  W. 
L.  Grant  of  Queen's  University,  Kingston,  who  kindly  loaned  me  the  manu- 
script of  his  paper  on  "Canada  versus  Guadaloupe,  an  Episode  of  the  Seven 
Years  War."     This  was   later  printed   in  the  American  Historical  Review, 
vol.  xvii,  735. 

68  Bute  to  Bedford,  July  12,   1761,  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.   iii,   33. 
The  best  source  for  Bute's  attitude  during  the  negotiations  is  contained  in  a 
series  of  letters   from  Jenkinson  to   Grenville,   in   Grenville,   Papers,  vol.   i, 
363   ff- 


56  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

weakened  by  too  many  colonies;  and  secondly,  they 
thought  the  neighborhood  of  a  hostile  colony  on  the 
north  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  the  dependency 
of  America.69  Pitt  could  have  entertained  no  doubt 
about  the  opinion  of  the  politicians  attached  to  the 
above  groups,  but  his  hesitancy  in  announcing  his  own 
choice  was  due  to  the  doubtful  attitude  of  those  who 
were  marshalled  under  the  flags  of  the  Duke  of  Cum- 
berland and  of  the  Old  Whigs.  Even  to-day  the  atti- 
tude of  these  on  the  issue  is  a  matter  of  speculation, 
because  their  numerous  leaders  were  not  unanimous  on 
the  subject.  Many  did,  however,  share  the  fears  of  the 
Bedfordites,  and  in  the  following  pages  will  be  found 
the  reasons  for  suspecting  that  those  who  looked  to  the 
leadership  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  at  least,  were  in 
favor  of  compelling  France  to  yield  the  tropical  island 
rather  than  Canada. 

Over  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  peace  there  was  waged 
a  pamphlet  discussion  that  not  only  throws  considerable 
light  on  the  opinion  of  those  men  who  were  to  deter- 
mine the  destinies  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  but  also 
contains  the  germs  of  those  arguments  in  favor  of  this 
or  that  disposition  of  it  which  were  later  to  be  devel- 
oped with  greater  detail  and  with  more  precise  defini- 
tion by  partisan  writers.  The  first  pamphlet,  entitled 
A  Letter  addressed  to  two  great  Men  on  the  Prospect 
of  Peace,  appeared  shortly  after  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Quebec.70  The  author  urged  the  "two  great  men," 

69  British  Museum,   Newcastle,  Papers,   32922 ;   Bedford,   Correspondence, 
vol.   iii,   17.     The   idea  that   Great  Britain  might  become  burdened   by  the 
weight   of   her  possessions   was   not   an   uncommon   one.     See  the   pamphlet 
published  in  London,  1765,  Thoughts  on  a  Question  of  Importance  proposed 
to  the  Public,  whether  it  is  Possible  that  the  Immense  Extent  of  Territory 
acquired  by  the  Nation  at  the  Late  Peace,  will  operate  towards  the  Prosperity, 
or  the  Ruin  of  the  Island  of  Great  Britain. 

70  London,  December,  1759.     I  have  used  the  second  edition,  1760.     For  a 
list  of  the  pamphlets  on  the  peace  see  the  "Bibliography." 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  57 

Pitt  and  Newcastle,  to  make  the  cession  of  Canada  one 
of  the  conditions,  because  in  no  other  way  could  the 
safety  of  the  colonies  be  protected  from  French  en- 
croachments, and  because  the  colonies  offered  a  grow- 
ing market  for  British  manufactures.  The  publication 
of  the  pamphlet  gains  great  significance  from  the  fact 
that  it  emanated  from  the  court  faction.  Although  it 
was  published  anonymously,  contemporaries  knew  that 
it  was  written  by  John  Douglas,  later  Bishop  of  Salis- 
bury, a  follower  of  the  Earl  of  Bath. 

The  ablest  of  these  pamphlets  was  in  part  composed 
by  a  man  equally  in  sympathy  with  the  circle  of  the 
king's  followers.  Benjamin  Franklin  was  at  the  time 
living  in  England  and  was  watching  with  interest  the 
course  of  the  war  and  the  changing  scenes  in  imperial 
politics.  His  sympathies  were  aroused  by  the  youth 
and  inexperience  of  the  king  who  appeared  so  unfitted 
to  cope  with  the  factious  crowd  of  self-seekers  around 
him.  Possibly  self-interest  also  made  him  join  himself 
to  Lord  Shelburne  and  the  followers  of  the  Earl  of 
Bute  and  eschew  their  chief  opponents,  the  Old  Whigs, 
as  stupid  and  brutal.71  In  the  preparation  of  the  pam- 
phlet, Franklin  had  the  assistance  of  the  learned  Rich- 
ard Jackson,  agent  for  Pennsylvania,  who  was  to  be- 
come better  known  as  a  follower  of  Shelburne  when 
in  opposition;  but  at  this  time  he  was,  like  his  later 

71  Franklin  wrote  to  Strahan,  December  7,  1762:  "I  hope  the  crazy  heads 
that  have  been  so  long  raving  about  Scotchmen  and  Scotland  are  by  this  time 
either  broke  or  mended."  -  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  181.  A 
year  later  he  wrote  to  the  same:  "You  now  fear  for  our  virtuous  young 
king,  that  the  faction  forming  will  overpower  him  and  render  his  reign  un- 
comfortable. On  the  contrary,  I  am  of  opinion  that  his  virtue  and  the  con- 
sciousness of  his  sincere  intentions  to  make  his  people  happy  will  give  him 
firmness  and  steadiness  in  his  measures  and  in  the  support  of  the  honest 
friends  he  has  chosen  to  serve  him." -Idfm,  212.  Besides  the  influence  of  the 
faction  with  which  Franklin  was  associated,  he  had  the  colonial  and  his  own 
interests  in  mind  in  writing  the  pamphlet.  It  was  through  the  influence  of 
the  Earl  of  Bute  that  Franklin's  son,  William,  was  made  a  baronet. 


58  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

leader,  on  the  side  of  the  close  intimates  of  the  king. 
These  two  men  published  in  1760  The  Interest  of  Great 
Britain  considered72  answering  the  pamphlet  Remarks 
on  the  Letter  addressed  to  two  great  Men.  They  argued 
that  the  retention  of  Canada  by  England  was  the  only 
means  of  preventing  war,  because  it  would  be  impossi- 
ble to  draw  a  boundary  through  the  forests  which  the 
frontiersmen  of  either  nation  would  respect;  that  the 
increase  of  territory  would  mean  cheap  land,  a  colonial 
farming  community,  and  the  postponement  of  a  manu- 
facturing era;  that  the  growing  population  would  con- 
sume more  British  products;  that  there  was  no  danger 
of  the  colonies  declaring  their  independence  on  account 
of  their  particularism  and  mutual  jealousy. 

Such  was  the  view  of  the  question  taken  by  the  party 
most  closely  associated  with  George  III.  There  were 
many  who  disagreed  with  these  arguments.  The  most 
notable  champion  of  the  opposing  view  was  in  all  prob- 
ability a  follower  of  the  Old  Whigs.  This  was  Wil- 
liam Burke,  a  connection  of  the  more  famous  Edmund. 
He  wrote  an  answer  to  the  pamphlet  by  Douglas,73  in 
which  he  advised  that  Canada  with  boundaries  circum- 
scribed in  accordance  with  the  claims  of  England  be- 
fore the  war  be  returned  to  France.  To  him  it  ap- 
peared that  all  the  advantages  which  England  could 
expect  to  obtain  from  the  West  might  be  hers  provided 

72  The  full  title  is  The  Interest  of  Great  Britain  Considered  with  regard  to 
her  Colonies  and  the  Acquisitions  of  Canada  and  Guadaloupe.    It  is  printed 
in  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  32.     The  greater  part  of  it  was 
written  by  Jackson.     See  idem,  vol.  i,  138. 

73  Remarks   on   the  Letter  address' d  to   two   great  Men    (London,   1760). 
It  has   also  been   ascribed   to   Charles   Townshend,   but  I   feel   quite  certain 
that  he  was  not  the  author,  since  he  was  at  the  time  attached  to  Lord  Bute. 
The  Dictionary  of  National  Biography  [article  on  "William  Burke"]  claims 
Burke  as  the  author.     William  Burke  was  for  a  time  secretary  of  Guadaloupe, 
a  fact  which  undoubtedly  affected  his  opinion,  Weston  Underwood,  Manu- 
scripts, Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report,  vol.  x,  Appendix  i,  893. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  59 

the  territory  in  the  Ohio  Valley  was  so  extended  as  to 
control  the  fur  trade  of  the  southern  Great  Lakes, 
"Thus  without  aiming  at  the  total  possession  of  Canada, 
by  establishing  proper  limits,  and  by  securing  them 
properly,  we  may  draw  to  ourselves  a  great  part  of  that 
trade  which  must  give  Canada  itself  any  value,  in  the 
eyes  of  a  commercial  nation." 74 

From  another  viewpoint  the  cession  of  Canada  to 
England  was  regarded  by  Burke  as  a  distinct  evil.  If 
all  danger  from  a  French  colony  on  the  north  should 
be  removed,  the  English  colonists  would  freely  spread 
themselves  westward.  Here  they  would  increase  rap- 
idly, become  strong  and  more  independent,  and  soon 
throw  off  all  political  relations  with  the  mother  coun- 
try. "A  neighbor  that  keeps  us  in  some  awe,  is  not 
always  the  worst  of  neighbors." 

In  the  discussion  of  the  relative  values  of  Canada 
and  Guadaloupe,  Burke  showed  that  he  had  not  eman- 
cipated himself  from  the  older  colonial  theory.  The 
island  was  of  greater  value  because  its  products  were 
tropical  and  did  not  compete  with  those  of  England. 
"It  is  a  known  fact  that  they  make  more  sugar  in  Guad- 
aloupe, than  in  any  of  our  islands,  except  Jamaica.  This 
branch  alone,  besides  the  employment  of  so  much  ship- 
ping, and  so  many  seamen,  will  produce  clear  300,000 

74  Remarks  on  the  Letters,  etc.,  39  (wrongly  numbered  37  in  the  edition 
used).  These  are  somewhat  more  limited  than  the  bounds  that  were  at  the  time 
under  consideration  by  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  the  leader  of  the  Old  Whigs, 
for  whom  the  Earl  of  Morten  drew  up  a  paper  on  the  subject  in  January  of  the 
same  year.  According  to  this  England  should  demand  the  cession  of  all  the 
territory  south  of  the  line  of  the  Saint  Lawrence  and  Ottawa  Rivers  and  the 
northern  boundary  of  Lakes  Huron  and  Michigan,  along  the  western  shore 
of  the  latter  lake,  to  the  Desplaines  River,  down  the  Illinois  and  Mississippi 
to  the  Yasoo,  thence  in  a  southeastern  direction  to  Georgia.  The  Earl  of 
Morten  also  recommended  the  Mississippi  as  the  most  natural  boundary;  and 
gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  it  would  be  best  for  England  to  unite  with  Spain 
and  drive  the  French  from  the  American  continent.  Morten  to  Newcastle, 
January  15,  1760,  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  32901,  p.  290. 


6o  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

per  annum  to  our  Merchants." 75  Compared  with  the 
value  of  this  single  product  of  Guadaloupe,  the  island 
was  more  valuable  than  all  Canada.  "The  produce  of 
all  the  northern  colonies  is  the  same  as  that  of  England, 
corn,  and  cattle:  and  therefore,  except  for  a  few  naval 
stores,  there  is  very  little  trade  from  thence  directly  to 
England.  Their  own  commodities  bear  a  very  low 
price;  and  thus  they  are  of  necessity  driven  to  set  up 
manufactures  similar  to  those  of  England,  in  which 
they  are  favoured  by  the  plenty  and  cheapness  of  pro- 
visions."76' 

To  the  same  pamphlet  debate  belongs  the  Reasons 
for  keeping  Guadaloupe  at  a  Peace  preferable  to  Can- 
ada.1'' This  contained  a  series  of  letters  dated  at  Guad- 
aloupe, December  12,  1760.  The  writer  was  complete- 
ly convinced  that  the  American  colonies  would  become 
independent  in  the  future  and  that  the  driving  of  the 
French  from  Canada  would  only  hasten  the  final  act. 
He  returns  to  this  idea  again  and  again,  exhibits  his 
reasons  now  from  one  viewpoint,  now  from  another. 
"As  America  increases  in  people,  so-she  must  increase 
in  arts  and  sciences,  in  manufactures  and  trade,  while 
she  has  the  same  laws,  liberties,  and  genius  we  have  at 
home;  the  more  she  increases  in  these,  the  less  she  must 

7 '5  Remarks  on  the  Letter,  etc.,  40. 

76  —  Idem,  49.     In  1762  William  Burke  wrote  another  pamphlet,  entitled, 
An  Examination  of  the  Commercial  Principles  of  the  Late  Negotiation  (Lon- 
don), in  which  he  developed  the  same  arguments.     The  full  force  of  his  rea- 
soning can  only  be  appreciated  by  reading  both  works. 

77  Full  title:  Reasons  for  keeping  Guadaloupe  at  a  Peace,  preferable  to 
Canada,  explained  in  Five  Letters,  from  a  Gentleman  in  Guadaloupe,  to  his 
Friend  in  London    (London,   1761).     The  writer  claimed  that  he  resided  in 
Guadaloupe  and  was  familiar  with  the  British  custom  and  naval  offices.     His 
pamphlet  was  an  answer  to  all  those  published  previously,  but  seems  to  have 
been  directly  called  out  by  a  pamphlet  by  Charles  Lee,  entitled,   The  Impor- 
tance of  Canada  considered  in  Tivo  Letters  to  a  Noble  Lord  (London,  1761). 
This  latter  is  not  outlined  here,  since  the  arguments  advanced  are  practically 
covered  by  the  other  writers  on  the  same  side. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  61 

want  from  Britain;  the  more  she  rises  above  a  certain 
pitch,  her  utility  and  advantage  to  Britain  must  pro- 
portionably  decrease."78  "The  having  all  North-Amer- 
ica to  ourselves,  by  acquiring  Canada,  dazzles  the  eyes, 
and  blinds  the  understandings  of  the  giddy  and  un- 
thinking people,  as  it  is  natural  for  the  human  mind  to 
grasp  at  every  appearance  of  wealth  and  grandeur,  yet 
it  is  very  easy  to  discover  that  such  a  peace  might  soon 
ruin  Britain :  I  say  the  acquisition  of  Canada  would  be 
destructive,  because  such  a  country  as  North-America, 
ten  times  larger  in  extent  than  Britain,  richer  soil  in 
most  places,  all  the  different  climates  you  can  fancy,  all 
the  lakes  and  rivers  for  navigation  one  could  wish, 
plenty  of  wood  for  shipping,  and  as  much  iron,  hemp, 
and  naval  stores,  as  any  part  of  the  world;  such  a  coun- 
try at  such  a  distance,  could  never  remain  long  subject 
to  Britain."79 

Between  the  values  of  Canada  and  Guadaloupe  there 
can  be  no  comparison,  the  author  thinks.  The  former 
can  add  only  a  slight  extension  of  the  fur  trade,  while 
Guadaloupe  "can  furnish  as  much  sugar,  cotton,  rum 
and  coffee"  as  all  the  other  British  Islands.80  He 
enumerates  at  length  all  the  products  of  the  island, 
gives  the  statistics  of  past  exports,  and  indicates  their 
future  development.  Besides  the  local  value  of  her 
products,  the  possession  of  the  island  will  increase  the 
value  of  the  whole  North  American  trade,  which  is 
largely  dependent  on  the  islands,  because  these  latter 
form  one  of  the  three  constituent  parts  of  the  valuable 
colonial  commerce.  "Since  these  three  parties,  Britain, 
North  America,  and  the  West-Indies,  are  so  inseparably 
linke.d  in  one  trade  and  interest,  and  that  the  West- 

78  Reasons  for  keeping  Guadaloupe,  etc.,  20. 
6. 

7. 


62  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Indies,  one  of  the  three,  is  universally  allowed  to  be  so 
far  deficient  in  extent  of  territory  as  thereby  to  confine 
and  limit  the  trade  and  profit  of  the  whole,"  it  follows 
that  the  rich  Guadaloupe  should  be  retained  to  make 
the  three  parties  more  equal.81 

A  memorial  called  Miscellaneous  Representations 
relative  to  our  Concerns  in  America  was  submitted  by 
Henry  M'Culloh  to  the  Earl  of  Bute  during  the  year 
1 76 1.82  Although  this  was  not  published  at  the  time, 
it  was  read  by  many  of  the  ministers  with  interest. 
M'Culloh  was  at  the  time  an  official  in  North  Carolina. 
His  political  affiliations  had  been  with  the  Old  Whigs 
to  whom  he  owed  his  place,  but  he  was  now  courting 
their  opponents.  He  took,  on  the  whole,  a  middle 
ground  in  the  argument;  but  the  chief  significance  of 
his  memorial  is  that  his  experiences  in  the  southern 
colonies  had  taught  him  the  value  of  Louisiana  which 
he  regarded  as  of  more  importance  to  the  empire  than 
Canada.  He  pointed  out  that  if  the  French  were  per- 
mitted to  hold  this  territory, they  would  continue  to 
reap  the  advantages  they  had  hitherto  enjoyed  in  the 
West.83  "In  this  light  as  conceived  it  will  appear,  that, 
if  the  French  are  left  in  possession  of  Louisiana,  our 
having  possession  of  Canada  will  not  free  our  frontier 
settlements  from  being  annoyed  by  the  Indians,  unless 
we  regulate  our  commerce  with  them,  and  fortify  the 
lakes ;  and  that  if  we  have  possession  of  the  lakes  and  the 
territories  belonging  thereto,  and  also  the  whole  prov- 
ince of  Acadia,  the  remainder  of  Canada  exclusive  of 

81  Reasons  for  keeping  Guadaloupe,  etc.,  24. 

82  This  has  been  edited  by  W.  H.  Shaw  and  published  in  London,  1905. 

83  In  a  pamphlet  written  after  the  preliminaries  were  published  the  im- 
portance of  Louisiana  to  the  colonies  was  elaborated  at  great  length.     The 
title   is:    An  Impartial  Enquiry  into   the  Right  of  the  French  King  to  the 
Territory   West  of  the  Great  River  Mississippi,  etc.    (London,   1762).     For 
other  pamphlets  with  a  similar  view  see  the  "Special  Bibliography." 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  63 

the  fishery  is  not  an  object  of  any  great  moment  to  this 
Kingdom."84  On  the  other  hand  M'Culloh  was  not 
in  favor  of  keeping  Guadaloupe  but  preferred  some  of 
the  neutral  islands. 

The  issue  raised  by  Pitt's  dramatic  question  had  al- 
ready been  decided  by  the  ministers  long  before  the 
pamphlet  warfare  ceased,  and  so  all  this  argument 
about  the  relative  values  of  Canada  and  Guadaloupe 
was  not  of  much  avail,  except  to  offer  an  opportunity 
to  assert  the  platforms  of  the  factions.  The  French 
minister  possessed  a  very  clear  understanding  of  the 
opinion  prevailing  in  the  British  ministry  and  had  made 
up  his  mind  that  peace  could  be  bought  only  by  the 
sacrifice  of  Canada;  and  this  he  acknowledged  by  his 
first  proposal  on  March  26,  1761,  that  the  basis  of  the 
peace  negotiations  should  be  the  uti  possidetis  on  cer- 
tain fixed  dates.85  From  the  course  of  the  negotiations 
it  is  evident  that  Choiseul  hoped  to  obtain  for  France 
some  fishing  rights  off  Newfoundland  and  in  the  Gulf 
of  Saint  Lawrence  and  the  return  of  Guadaloupe.  To 
the  latter  the  British  ministry  were  agreed,  but  the  con- 
dition concerning  the  fisheries  caused  the  warmest  dis- 
pute. Both  Pitt  and  Bute  were  in  favor  of  excluding 


84  Miscellaneous    Representations    relative    to    our    concerns    in    America, 
6.     Although    as    evidence    it   is   by   no   means   conclusive,    the    fact   is    sig- 
nificant that  the  Earl  of  Morten's  Report  [see  footnote  74],  William  Burke's 
pamphlets,    and    M'Culloh's    memorial,    all    written    by    adherents    of    the 
Old  Whigs,  underestimated  the  value  of  Canada.     Undoubtedly  a  study  of 
the   Newcastle   and   Hardwicke  Manuscripts   in  the   British   Museum  would 
yield  sufficient  data  to  form  a  judgment,  but  from  the  above  evidence  and 
from  an  extensive  reading  of  contemporary  opinion  I  am  forced  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  Old  Whigs  were  at  least  lukewarm  on  the  subject  of  keeping 
Canada,  although  there  were  individual  members  of  the  faction  who  held  an 
opposite  opinion. 

85  The  papers  of  these  first  negotiations  of  1761  were  printed  in  Paris  by 
the  Due  de  Choiseul  and  they  were  translated  into  English  and  published  as 
Historical  Memorial   of   the   Negotiations    of  France   and  England;    printed 
also   in   abridged   form   in    Gentleman's   Magazine,   vol.   xxxi,    501    ff.     The 
papers  may  also  be  found  in  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1023  ff. 


64  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

France  from  the  Canadian  seas,  but  finally  the  persist- 
ence of  the  peace  party  prevailed  and  the  right  of  fish- 
ing on  a  part  of  the  Newfoundland  coast  was  allowed, 
and  it  was  agreed  to  concede  the  small  island  of  Saint 
Pierre  for  the  purpose  of  drying  fish.86  This  propo- 
sition France  was  willing  to  accept  provided  the  small 
island  of  Miquelon  were  added. 

From  the  correspondence  concerning  the  above  con- 
ditions, it  seemed  possible  for  the  two  nations  to  reach 
an  agreement.  They  were,  however,  much  farther 
apart  on  the  interpretation  of  the  meaning  of  Canada. 
When  Governor  Vaudreuil,  in  1760,  surrendered  that 
province  to  General  Amherst,  he  had  in  his  mind  a  ter- 
ritory with  fairly  definite  boundaries,  these  having  been 
sufficiently  well  marked  in  order  to  avoid  a  conflict  of 
jurisdiction  with  Louisiana.  According  to  an  official 
statement  the  watershed  between  the  Great  Lakes  and 
the  Mississippi  Valley  as  far  south  as  the  head  waters 
of  the  Wabash  formed  the  most  northern  boundary  of 
Louisiana.  The  boundary  ,then  extended  down  the 
Wabash  to  its  junction  with  the  Ohio.  In  the  valley  of 
this  latter  river  the  limits  of  the  two  provinces  might 
have  been  a  subject  of  dispute,  but  at  the  time  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  French  and  Indian  War,  the  region 
around  the  forks  of  the  Ohio  was  actually  governed  from 
Quebec.87 

The  French  made  no  objection  to  ceding  Canada  as 
it  had  been  held  by  themselves,88  but  this  did  not  put  to 

86  Answer  of  British  minister,  August  16,  1761,  Parliamentary  History,  vol. 
xv,  1064. 

87  Memoire,  July  15,  1761,  Affaires  fitrangeres  in  Correspondence  politique 
Etats   Unis,  tome  vi,   no.   14,   ff.  79-80.     See   also   Gage's   report,  March  20, 
1762,   in   Shortt   and   Doughty,    Constitutional  Documents,   72.     According  to 
Delisle's  Carte  d'Amerique   (1722),  Louisiana  extended  to  the  valley  of  the 
Missouri  River  and  to  a  line  beginning  south  of  the  Illinois  River  and  run- 
ning east  to  the  mountains;  but  this  map  was  drawn  before  the  region  was 
well  known. 

88  The  words  were:     "The  king  cedes  and  guaranties  Canada  to  the  King 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  65 

rest  the  dispute  about  possessions  in  the  Southwest. 
Louisiana  had  always  claimed  the  whole  region  south 
of  the  Ohio  and  east  to  the  Alleghanies,  and  a  writer  in 
the  Gentleman's  Magazine  was  correct  in  pointing  out 
that  the  French  in  Louisiana  were  as  dangerous,  if  not 
more  so,  than  the  Canadians  and  that  the  establishment 
of  proper  limits  in  the  Southwest  was  just  as  important 
as  in  the  lake  region.89  To  the  demand  of  the  French 
that  "the  limits  of  Canada,  with  regard  to  Louisiana, 
shall  be  clearly  and  firmly  established,  as  well  as  those 
of  Louisiana  and  Virginia,"90  the  English  ministry  re- 
turned an  answer  which  showed  their  fear  of  French 
trickery.  They  demanded  that  the  cession  should  be 
made  "without  any  new  limits,  or  any  exceptions  what- 
ever." They  were  unwilling  to  agree  that  "whatever 
does  not  belong  to  Canada  shall  appertain  to  Louisiana, 
nor  that  the  boundaries  of  the  last  province  should  ex- 
tend to  Virginia,  or  to  the  British  possessions  on  the 
borders  of  the  Ohio."91 

The  issue  was  fairly  joined  and  one  or  both  sides  must 
yield,  if  an  agreement  was  to  be  reached.  The  English 
ministry  held  to  their  view  very  emphatically  and  were 
convinced,  as  Devonshire  wrote,  that  the  French  were 
trying  to  "chicane  about  the  limits  of  Canada  on  the 
side  of  the  Ohio." 92  Pitt  attempted  to  extend  the  Brit- 
ish claims  in  two  ways.  First  he  insisted  on  introduc- 

of  England,  such  as  it  has  been  and  in  right  ought  to  be  possessed  by 
France."  -  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1039. 

89  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol.  xxxi,  123,  499.     This  was  the  theme  of  sev- 
eral contemporary  pamphlets,  as  is  noted  in  the  "Special  Bibliography." 

90  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1040. 

91  —  Idem,  vol.  xv,  1047.     It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  English  min- 
istry was  as  ignorant  of  the  boundaries  of  Canada  as  they  pretend.     The 
author  of  the  State  of  British  and  French  Colonies  [p.  108]  which  was  pub- 
lished in  1755,  was  familiar  with  the  boundaries;   and  Jefferys's  History  of 
the  French  Dominions,   published   in   1760,  states  that  Canada   included   all 
territory  situated  between  forty  and  fifty  degrees  of  latitude. 

92Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  34. 


66  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ing  the  word  "dependencies,"  which  the  French  said 
must  be  defined,  because,  if  the  word  had  any  meaning 
at  all,  it  meant  the  whole  of  Louisiana.93  The  second 
means  used  was  to  maintain  that  Governor  Vaudreuil 
had  marked  on  a  map  such  boundaries  that  the  country 
of  the  Illinois  was  included.  This  Vaudreuil  denied 
emphatically.9*  As  a  result  of  the  negotiations  the  most 
that  the  French  could  be  persuaded  to  concede  was  the 
larger  limits  of  Canada.95  On  the  question  of  the  South- 
west both  parties  were  indisposed  to  make  complete  con- 
cessions. The  British  ministry  proposed  that  the  In- 
dian tribes  should  be  under  the  protection  of  England.96 
The  final  answer  of  the  French  to  this  was  that  in  this 
region  the  Indians  should  be  declared  neutral  and  in- 
dependent but  that  distinctly  marked  spheres  of  in- 
fluence should  be  assigned  the  two  countries.97  With 
this  exchange  of  irreconcilable  conditions  the  negotia- 
tions closed. 

This  disagreement  about  limits  south  of  the  Ohio  can 
not  be  looked  upon  as  a  main  cause  of  the  failure  of  the 
negotiations  in  1761.  Much  more  important  was  the 
belief  of  the  British  ministers  in  the  insincerity  of  Choi- 
seul,  particularly  after  their  suspicions  of  his  negotia- 

93  British  answer  of  August  16,  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1061,  1067. 

94  Gentleman's  Magazine,  vol.  xxxi,  547.     Vaudreuil  was  so  familiar  with 
both  Louisiana  and  Canada  that  it  is  not  likely  that  he  would  make  such  a 
mistake.     In   1748  he  defended  the  inclusion  of  Illinois  within  the  limits  of 
Louisiana.     See  Wisconsin  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xvii,  512. 

95  French  memorial,  September  13,  in  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1067. 

96  British  answer,  August  16,  in  idem,  1063.     Would  Pitt  have  been  satis- 
fied with  this?     In  discussing  the  preliminaries  the  next  year  he  said:     "She 
[France]  had  given  you  more  in  Canada  than  she  knew  you  could  use,  and 
more  than  he  had  contended  for."  -  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol. 
i,  182.     For  further  discussion  see  footnote  101. 

97  The  negotiations  are  not  very  clear  on  this  point.     Parliamentary  His- 
tory,  vol.   xv,    1069.      See   on   this    point   Bouquet,    "Le   due   de   Choiseul    et 
I'Angleterre,"  in  Revue  historique,  vol.  Ixxi,  13  ;  and  Historical  Memorial  of 
the  Negotiation,  50. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  67 

tions  with  Spain  were  confirmed  by  intercepted  letters 
and  by  the  attempt  to  force  the  Spanish  conditions  upon 
them.  From  various  sources  of  information  Pitt  gath- 
ered a  very  clear  idea  of  the  existing  condition  of  the 
Franco-Spanish  alliance,  and  this  explains  his  unwil- 
lingness to  make  concessions  in  order  to  promote  the 
cause  of  the  peace.  The  Due  de  Choiseul,  therefore, 
was  obliged  to  trust  more  completely  than  he  had  ex- 
pected upon  the  assistance  of  Spain ;  and  both  the  Bour- 
bon courts  prepared  for  an  active  conduct  of  the  war. 

On  the  part  of  England  the  operations  were  no  longer 
to  feel  the  guiding  hand  of  her  successful  minister. 
Convinced  as  he  was  of  the  union  of  France  and  Spain, 
Pitt  attempted  to  persuade  his  colleagues  ta  strike  im- 
mediately a  blow  at  the  latter  before  taking  further 
diplomatic  steps.  In  this  he  was  unsuccessful  and  in 
consequence  resigned  on  October  5,  1761.  Although 
Pitt  was  thus  forced  out  of  office  his  policy  prevailed, 
and  shortly  afterwards  his  successors  were  compelled  to 
declare  war  on  Spain. 

Before  the  final  peace  negotiations  were  concluded, 
the  newspapers  had  further  important  victories  to  chron- 
icle to  the  glory  of  the  army  and  navy  of  Great  Britain. 
By  the  fall  of  Martinique,  France  had  lost  her  control 
of  the  West  Indies;  and  by  the  capture  of  Havana  the 
cutting  off  of  the  Spanish  possessions  was  begun,  so  that 
the  position  of  England  in  the  new  negotiations  for 
peace  was  greatly  strengthened. 

Had  Pitt  remained  at  the  head  of  affairs,  there  can 
be  no  question  but  that  the  full  advantage  of  this  situa- 
tion would  have  been  seized;  but  the  leadership  in  the 
negotiations  fell  to  the  share  of  the  king's  favorite,  the 
Earl  of  Bute.  The  reputation  of  this  minister  has  suf- 
fered more  from  factious  literature  than  that  of  any  of 


68  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

his  contemporaries.  After  making  due  allowance  for 
prejudiced  views,  the  information  about  him  reveals  a 
man  with  a  sense  of  honor  and  with  noble  but  fantastic 
ideals  of  his  duty  to  his  king  and  country.  He  was, 
however,  without  experience  in  the  business  of  state  and 
was  so  ignorant  of  financial  affairs  that  he  complained 
of  not  understanding  the  conversation  of  the  merchants 
when  they  came  to  consult  with  him.  His  nature  was 
that  of  a  bookman,  or  rather  of  a  dilettante;  his  knowl- 
edge was  extensive  and  varied  but  his  understanding 
of  what  he  read  and  saw  was  superficial  rather  than 
deep.  His  allegiance  to  the  king  was  tinged  with  the 
emotional  fidelity  of  the  clansman  to  his  chief;  self- 
sacrifice  for  his  monarch's  honor  was  his  duty.  The 
ambition  of  his  life  was  to  make  the  reign  of  George 
III.  one  of  the  most  illustrious  in  the  annals  of  history. 
Like  other  men  of  books  he  dreamed  of  reformations 
which  should  regenerate  society;  he  would  be  the  Due 
de  Sully  of  England.  Lord  Shelburne,  who  was  on  in- 
timate terms  with  him  at  this  time  but  finally  became 
his  irreconcilable  opponent,  called  him  the  "greatest  po- 
litical coward"  he  ever  knew;  and  in  a  sense  his  opinion 
was  justified,  although  a  bold,  even  reckless,  man  like 
Lord  Shelburne  was  not  a  sympathetic  judge  of  the 
character  of  a  recluse,  brought  suddenly  into  a  position 
of  great  prominence  and  responsibility.  Lord  Bute 
lacked  confidence  in  his  own  judgment;  and,  since  he 
was  continually  asking  advice,  his  closest  associates 
colored  his  opinions  and  actions.  While  still  allied 
with  William  Pitt  he  advocated  the  boldest  plans,  but 
once  under  the  influence  of  the  pacifists  he  was  willing 
to  reverse  his  former  opinions.98 

98  The  most  favorable  picture  of  Lord  Bute  has  been  left  us  by  an  inti- 
mate friend  and  follower  long  after  personal  interest  could  have  influenced 
him.  Although  no  doubt  too  favorable,  still  it  is  probably  nearer  correct  than 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  69 

After  the  fall  of  Pitt,  Lord  Bute  drew  closer  to  the 
Bedford  faction  in  order  to  gain  a  counterpoise  to  the 
following  of  Newcastle;99  and  in  this  environment 
his  wish  for  peace,  shared  by  his  royal  master  was 
strengthened,  since  the  Duke  of  Bedford  was  willing 
for  peace  at  almost  any  reasonable  price.  With  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  from  the  min- 
istry in  the  spring  of  1762,  Bute's  power  became  more 
assured.  Fortunately  for  him  his  tendency  to  lean  on 
Bedford  was  counteracted  by  the  outspoken  opinions  of 
Grenville  and  his  brother-in-law,  Lord  Egremont,  who 
could  not  be  entirely  ignored.  The  principles  of  the 
peace  negotiations  conducted  by  these  four  men  differed 
in  some  respects  from  those  of  the  previous  year.  Pitt 
had  been  determined  to  weaken  France  to  the  utmost 
particularly  by  wresting  from  her  all  naval  power. 
The  Duke  of  Bedford  was  of  the  contrary  opinion.  In 
1761,  he  had  thus  expressed  it:  "Indeed,  my  Lord,  the 
endeavouring  to  drive  France  entirely  out  of  any  naval 
power  is  fighting  against  nature,  and  can  tend  to  no  one 
good  to  this  country;  but,  on  the  contrary,  must  excite 
all  the  naval  powers  of  Europe  to  enter  into  a  con- 
federacy against  us."  10°  Persuaded  by  Bedford  of  the 
impracticability  and  danger  of  crushing  the  French 
naval  strength,  the  value  of  the  conquests  in  the  West 
Indies  in  the  eyes  of  the  ministers  decreased,  and  they 

many  unfavorable  portraits  drawn  contemporaneously  in  the  heat  of  con- 
troversy. See  Dutens,  Memoirs  of  a  Traveller,  vol.  i,  161  ff.,  vol.  ii,  113  ff. 
Very  favorable  glimpses  may  be  found  in  the  letters  of  friends  in  Caldwell, 
Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications,  vol.  Ixxi],  passim;  Jesse,  Memoirs  of 
George  HI.,  vol.  i,  172;  consult  also  Waldegrave,  Memoirs,  37;  Fitzmaurice, 
Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  no;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  HI.,  vol.  5,  28, 
135 ;  Nichols,  Recollections  and  Reflections,  vol.  ii,  passim.  Von  Ruville  has 
drawn  an  excellent  sketch  of  the  favorite  in  his  essay  William  Pitt  und  Graf 
Bute,  14  ff.,  and  in  his  William  Pitt,  vol.  ii,  315. 
99  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  50  ff. 
26. 


70  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

looked  elsewhere  for  the  solid  advantages  from  the  war. 
With  this  altered  point  of  view  it  was  natural  that 
their  eyes  should  turn  to  that  region  south  of  the  Ohio, 
so  important  for  the  southern  colonies,  concerning  which 
Pitt  had  been  unable  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the 
French.101  Grenville  and  Egremont  were  the  first  ad- 
vocates of  this  policy  and  urged  that  Guadeloupe  and 
the  other  captured  islands  be  exchanged  for  Louisi- 
ana.102 To  them  and  finally  to  their  colleagues  it 
seemed  important  to  secure  the  full  advantages  for 
which  the  British  nation  went  to  war,  namely  the  se- 
curity of  the  colonies  on  the  frontiers,  the  possibility  of 
expansion  westward,  and  the  benefits  of  the  fur  trade. 
Should  these  be  obtained  it  was  felt  that  the  sacrifice  of 
other  conquests  would  be  only  a  just  compensation  for 
the  benefits  of  peace.  It  is  not  probable,  however,  that 
France  could  have  been  persuaded  to  give  up  all 
Louisiana.  Lord  Bute  was  the  one  to  propose  the  com- 
promise. On  May  i,  1762,  he  wrote  to  the  Duke  of 
Bedford: 

That  on  weighing  attentively  the  offer  we  had  made  of  restor- 
ing Martinique  on  the  French  ceding  Guadaloupe  or  Louisiana, 
I  frankly  owned  I  saw  no  probability  of  peace;  they  certainly 
would  not  accept  these  terms,  and  if  so,  war  must  be  continued  ; 
and  I  find  myself  reduced  to  the  painful  necessity  of  declaring 

101  In  the  discussion  of  the  preliminaries  of  peace,  it  is  possible  that  Pitt 
minimized  the  difference  between  what  he  could  have  obtained  in  the  South- 
west and  what  Bute  had  actually  secured.     According  to  the  report  of  his 
speech  he  said:     "Of  the   dereliction  of  North  America  by  the   French,   he 
entirely   approved.      But   the   negociators   had    no   trouble   in   obtaining   this 
acquisition.      It  had  been  the  uti  possldetis  in  his  own  negociation,  to  which 
the   French  had   readily  consented."  -  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,   1264. 
There  is  some  question,  however,  whether  this  is  correctly  reported,  for,  ac- 
cording to  Walpole,  Pitt  said  that  France  "had  given  you  more  in  Canada 
than  she  knew  you  could  use,  and  more  than  he  had  contended  for.     .     .     He 
applauded  the  drawing  of  the  article  of  Canada,   infinitely  better  executed 
than  he  could  have  done  it."  -  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  182. 

102  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  i,  450. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 71 

for  a  measure  I  knew  very  opposite  to  ideas  of  lords  for  whom  I 
had  a  great  regard ;  that  to  prevent  this,  I  should  propose  to  the 
French  an  offer  that  they  ought  to  accept,  and  that  we  ought 
not  to  depart  from ;  viz.  the  restoring  to  them  both  Martinique 
and  Guadaloupe,  with  Marygalante,  we  retaining  the  neutral 
islands  and  the  Grenada,  and  that  to  prevent  all  further  dis- 
putes, the  Mississippi  should  be  the  boundary  between  the  two 
nations ;  in  yielding  to  this  the  French  in  reality  part  with  noth- 
ing they  had  a  legal  claim  to,  and  so  secure  in  perpetuity  our 
northern  conquests  from  all  future  chicane.103 

To  this  the  ministry  agreed. 

This  proposal  was  accepted  by  France  without  con- 
sultation with  Spain.  One  condition  the  Due  de  Choi- 
seul  made  and  insisted  upon  in  spite  of  British  protest: 
he  demanded  that  New  Orleans  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  Mississippi  should  remain  in  the  possession  of 
France.10*  This  raised  the  question  of  the  navigation 
of  the  river  from  its  source  to  the  sea,  upon  which  the 
British  ministry  laid  great  stress,105  insisting  that  upon 
this  point  there  must  be  no  misunderstanding.10'  When 
the  Duke  of  Bedford,  appointed  to  negotiate  the  peace, 
arrived  in  Paris,  he  learned  that  Spain  had  not  been  in- 
formed of  the  French  promise  to  cede  her  possessions 
east  of  the  Mississippi  and  the  navigation  of  the  river, 
and  that  there  was  great  fear  of  objection  from  that 
state.107  In  fact  as  soon  as  the  Spanish  ambassador  re- 
ceived an  inkling  of  this,  he  raised  objections  since  the 
Spanish  court  was  unwilling  to  give  the  English  an  out- 

!°3  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  76. 

104  Outline  of  Choiseul's  dispatch  in  Corbett,  England  in  the  Seven  Years 
War,  vol.  ii,  339;  see  also  341  ff. 

105  The  king  himself  insisted  that  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  should 
be  a  condition  of  peace.     See  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  98,  footnote. 

106  Bedford   to   Egremont,   September   12,   in   Public  Record   Office,   Stale 
Papers  Foreign,  France,  253;  same  to  same,  September  19,  in  Bedford,  Cor- 
respondence, vol.  iii,  in. 

107  —  Idem,  102,  112. 


72  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

let  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  which  would  serve  to 
strengthen  their  trade  with  the  Spanish  colonies.  The 
Due  de  Choiseul,  therefore,  proposed  that  the  full  ex- 
tent of  the  concession  in  the  Southwest  should  be  con- 
cealed from  the  Spanish  ambassador.108 

Such  was  the  position  of  the  negotiations  when  the 
news  of  the  capture  of  Havana  arrived.109  Everybody 
realized  that  the  event  changed  the  conditions.  In  ex- 
pectation of  this  conquest  the  Earl  of  Bute  had  told  the 
Duke  of  Bedford  that  he  hoped  Spain  might  be  in- 
duced to  cede  Florida;  and  upon  receipt  of  the  news  he 
expressed  a  similar  wish,110  though  he  would  have  been 
willing  to  give  up  Havana  without  compensation  rather 
than  endanger  the  peace.111  The  strongest  advocate  for 
demanding  an  equivalent  for  Havana  was  George  Gren- 
ville,  who  proposed  that  Florida  and  that  part  of  Lou- 
isiana still  disputed  by  Spain  be  ceded,  or  else  the  island 
of  Porto  Rico.112  Following  the  line  of  thought  which 
had  made  them  prefer  eastern  Louisiana  to  Guadaloupe 
or  Martinique,  the  ministry  preferred  Florida,  which 
rounded  out  the  British  possessions  in  North  America.113 

Spain  was  no  longer  in  a  position  to  reject  a  reason- 
able offer;  and,  when  France  expressed  her  willingness 
to  cede  all  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi  to  her  in 
compensation  for  the  loss  of  Florida,  the  Spanish  am- 

108  Becifor(i  to  Egremont,  September  19  in  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol. 
iii,  112.     Von  Ruville,  also,  regards  that  the  main  point  at  issue  in  the  nego- 
tiations was  the  region  of  the  Southwest  and  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi. 
Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  vol.  iii,  75. 

109  September  29,  1762. 

110  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  96,  133. 

111  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  129,  132. 

112Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  ii,  36  ff. ;  Grenville,  Papers, 
vol.  i,  483.  Knox  uses  the  term  "Louisiana"  but  from  the  whole  discussion 
of  the  subject  it  is  evident  he  has  in  mind  only  East  Louisiana. 

113  Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  ii,  36  ff. ;  Bedford,  Correspond- 
ence, vol.  iii,  133. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  73 

bassador  waived  his  objections,  and  the  preliminaries 
were  signed  on  November  3,  1762.  Thus  the  British 
ministry  had  won  for  the  colonies  by  their  negotiations 
the  undisputed  possession  of  the  American  territory  as 
far  west  as  the  Mississippi  River.  Their  error  in  not 
insisting  upon  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  at  the  mouth 
of  this  great  artery  of  trade  was  only  to  become  evident 
in  the  light  of  later  events. 

The  peace  did  not  meet  the  approval  of  all  classes  of 
people.  Those  who  had  preferred  the  tropical  trade 
and  the  strategic  position  of  the  West  Indies  were  bound 
to  pass  criticisms  upon  a  treaty  based  on  principles 
so  entirely  different.  The  opposition,  particularly  the 
Old  Whigs,  hoped  to  make  some  capital  out  of  this 
dissatisfaction;  but  in  this  they  signally  failed,  because 
the  majority  of  Englishmen,  in  spite  of  their  inflated 
hopes,  were  glad  that  the  war  was  finally  over,  recog- 
nized that  great  advantages  had  been  won,  and  would 
have  indorsed  Benjamin  Franklin's  enthusiasm  when 
he  wrote,  "Just  to  congratulate  you  on  the  glorious 
peace  you  have  made,  the  most  advantageous  for  the 
British  Nation,  in  my  opinion,  of  any  your  annals  have 
recorded."114 

The  criticism  of  the  treaty  in  Parliament  by  the  op- 
position followed  along  the  lines  which  have  been  al- 
ready set  forth  in  the  discussion  of  the  pamphlet  con- 
troversy; and  the  defenders  of  the  treaty  did  not  dis- 
cover new  arguments  in  its  favor.  The  latter  pointed 
out  how  necessary  it  was  to  remove  the  French  as  far 

114  Franklin  to  Strahan,  February  23,  in  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth), 
vol.  iv,  191 ;  see  also  page  197.  The  opposition  even  was  surprised  by  the 
good  points  in  the  treaty.  Chesterfield  wrote  to  his  son  that  he  believed 
the  preliminaries  to  be  "very  near  the  mark."  -  Chesterfield,  Letters,  vol.  iv, 
352.  Wilkes  is  reported  to  have  said:  "It  was  the  damn'dest  peace  for  the 
opposition  that  ever  was  made."- Neville  to  Bedford,  February  16,  1763,  in 
Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  202. 


74  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

as  possible  from  the  English  frontiers  in  order  to  avoid 
a  future  war;  but  their  particular  contention  was  that 
the  indemnification  for  the  recession  of  the  various  West 
Indian  Islands  was  to  be  found  in  the  opportunity  given 
the  colonies  "to  extend  themselves  without  danger  or 
molestation.  They  shewed  the  great  increase  of  popu- 
lation in  those  colonies  within  a  few  years.  They 
shewed  that  their  trade  with  the  mother  country  had 
uniformly  increased  with  this  population."  The  va- 
riety of  climate  and  the  vast  resources  would  act  as  an 
irresistible  attraction  to  the  people,  so  that  "there  was 
therefore  no  reason  to  dread  that  want  of  trade  which 
their  adversaries  insinuated/since  North  America  alone 
would  supply  the  deficiencies  of  our  trade  in  every 
other  part  of  the  world."  They  went  further  and  ar- 
gued that  trade  was  not  the  only  desideratum :  "Extent 
of  territory  and  a  number  of  subjects  are  matters  of  as 
much  consideration  to  a  state  attentive  to  the  sources 
of  real  grandeur,  as  mere  advantages  of  traffic." 

Such  a  defense  was  scarcely  needed  for  it  was  well 
known  how  the  vote  would  go.  Henry  Fox  had  seen 
to  that.  The  majority  of  the  House  of  Commons  for 
the  preliminaries  was  overwhelming;  in  the  House  of 
Lords  there  was  not  even  a  division.  Thus  the  victory 
of  the  ministry  was  complete;  but  in  order  that  the 
criticisms  of  the  opposition  should  not  be  justified,  they 
were  bound  to  carry  out  a  policy  of  expansion  which 
would  make  use  of  the  broad  fields  in  the  West  which 
they  had  accepted  as  an  equivalent  for  the  rich  islands 
of  the  West  Indies.  To  this  policy  they  had  by  their 

115  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xv,  1271-1272.  There  is  a  direct  answer 
to  these  arguments,  written  evidently  by  a  follower  of  Pitt,  in  the  History  of 
the  Reign  of  George  HI.,  vol.  i,  145.  The  writer  is  very  skeptical  of  the 
return  in  trade  that  will  be  obtained  from  America  and  is  very  certain  that 
the  increase  in  population  in  the  colonies  must  end  in  their  independence. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 75 

defense  of  the  terms  of  the  treaty  given  a  pledge;  and 
at  the  moment  there  was  no  disposition  among  those  in 
power  to  disavow  it.  Their  own  opinions  and  self-in- 
terest united  in  making  a  paramount  issue  of  the  policy 
of  westward  expansion,  which  they  were  ready  imme- 
diately to  forward  with  all  their  influence. 

Shortly  after  the  treaty  was  concluded  a  ministerial 
writer  painted  in  all  the  colors  of  the  rainbow  the  splen- 
dor of  the  future  West. 

We  are  now  in  the  heart  of  their  favorite  Louisiana,  masters  of 
all  that  mighty  project  of  uniting  by  traffick,  the  lakes  and  the 
Ohio,  the  sources  of  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Mississippi,  and  of 
cloathing  unnumbered  nations  with  our  manufactories.  By 
means  of  the  Mississippi,  Canada  itself  is  improved;  by  this 
communication  its  peltry,  woods  and  lakes,  are  made  more  sub- 
servient, and  [on]  the  fertile  plains  of  the  Ohio,  brought  nearer 
the  Southern  Ocean,  rise  now  a  navigable  colony,  which  other- 
wise would  have  remained  a  mere  inland  territory  and  a  feeble 
barrier.116 


116  Reflections  on  the  Terms  of  Peace,  7.  Edmund  Burke,  a  follower  of 
the  Old  Whigs  and  therefore  opposed  to  the  peace,  wrote  in  the  Annual 
Register  (1763),  vol.  vi,  19:  "These  exertions  [to  open  up  the  West]  were 
not  likely  to  be  wanting,  or  to  be  ineffectual.  Independent  of  national  mo- 
tives, the  administration  in  England  had  a  particular  interest  in  improving 
those  acquisitions  to  the  utmost;  they  were  to  justify  the  choice  they  had 
made  in  preferring  them  to  the  West  India  islands." 


III.    THE  BEGINNING  OF  WESTERN 
SPECULATION 

//  is  almost  a  proverb  in  this  neighborhood  [Pennsylvania]  that 
"Every  great  fortune  made  here  within  these  $0  years  has  been  by 
land" -A..  MACKRABY  to  Philip  Francis. 

The  territory  which  had  been  added  to  the  British 
dominions  by  the  treaty  of  1763  was  of  vast  extent  but 
was  at  the  time  almost  unknown  by  the  triumphant  na- 
tion. Before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  no  widely  read 
English  writer  had  taken  as  his  theme  this  magnificent 
hinterland  with  its  inviting  rivers  and  lakes,  its  shaded 
hills,  and  sunny  prairies;  and  the  popular  French  books 
by  Hennepin,  Lahontan,  and  Charlevoix  had  reached 
only  a  small  circle  of  readers.  So  great  was  the  ignor- 
ance that  few  had  heard  of  the  small  French  villages 
nestling  around  the  Great  Lakes  or  hugging  the  bank 
of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  even  the  names  of  the 
more  important  towns,  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  and  Span- 
ish Pensacola,  had  been  almost  unspoken  in  the  streets 
of  London.  The  conquest  brought  from  the  British 
press  many  publications  that  somewhat  dissipated  this 
general  lack  of  knowledge,  but  up  to  the  time  of  the 
American  Revolution  the  failure  of  the  British  public 
and  their  ministers  to  understand  the  topography  of 
their  oversea  possessions  or  to  perceive  the  signal  ad- 
vantages offered  by  the  West  was  an  important  factor 
in  retarding  the  development  of  a  sound  colonial  policy. 

The  discussion  of  the  war  in  pamphlet,  book,  and 
periodical  awakened  the  imaginations  of  the  people  by 


78  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

bringing  to  them  a  realization  of  the  vastness  of  the 
territory  which  was  their  prize,  but  there  was  a  decided 
tendency  in  many  quarters  to  underestimate  the  value 
of  the  acquisition  which  had  cost  so  much  in  men  and 
money.  Canada  in  particular  was  looked  upon  as  a 
region  of  very  slight  importance  to  the  empire.  In  his 
memorial  to  the  Earl  of  Bute  in  1761,  Henry  M'Culloh, 
the  well  informed  secretary  and  clerk  of  the  crown  for 
North  Carolina,  pointed  out  that  the  chief  value  of  the 
Canadian  province  to  the  French  had  been  derived  only 
from  the  fisheries  and  the  fur  trade,  but  that  if  England 
possessed  and  fortified  the  Great  Lakes,  "the  remainder 
of  Canada  exclusive  of  the  fishery  is  not  an  object  of  any 
great  moment  to  this  kingdom."117  Of  similar  import 
was  the  argument  of  the  author  of  Reasons  for  keeping 
Guadaloupe?™  who  wrote:  "But  without  dipping  too 
deep  in  futurity,  pray  what  can  Canada  yield  to  Britain, 
in  this  or  any  subsequent  age,  but  a  little  extension  of 
the  furr-trade?"  Another  writer  was  also  of  the  opinion 
that  Canada  was  not  of  very  great  value,  for  it  is  "sit- 
uated in  a  cold  climate,  produces  no  commodity,  except 
furs  and  skins,  which  she  can  exchange  for  the  com- 
modities of  Europe ;  and  consequently  she  can  have  little 
returns  to  make  the  English  merchant." 119  Even  those 
who  had  been  in  favor  of  the  retention  of  Canada  did 
not  have  a  different  opinion  of  its  resources.  In  the 
Letter  addressed  to  two  great  Men  it  was  acknowledged 
that  the  trade  had  scarcely  defrayed  the  expense  of  the 
French  government.120  The  reasoning  of  Benjamin 
Franklin,  who  had  opportunities  to  inform  himself,  was 

11T  Miscellaneous  Representations  relative  to  our  Concerns  in  America,  6. 

118  London,  1761,  p.  7. 

119  Remarks  on  the  Letter  address'd  to  Two  Great  Men,  36. 

120  page  j0j  see  also  Charles  Lee,  The  Importance  of  Canada;  and  Con- 
siderations on  the  Importance  of  Canada,  etc. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 79 

not  based  on  the  future  wealth  of  Canada.121  Of  sim- 
ilar character  were  the  descriptions  in  popular  books 
on  America.  Jefferys,  in  his  Natural  and  Civil  His- 
tory of  the  French  Dominions,  was  particularly  pessi- 
mistic: he  described  the  six  months'  Canadian  winter 
as  extremely  cold  with  very  heavy  snowfalls  and  he  as- 
serted that  limbs  were  frozen  and  the  skin  of  the  face 
frequently  peeled  off  by  the  wind.122 

The  knowledge  of  the  West  possessed  by  the  British 
was  even  more  vague  than  that  of  Canada.  American 
traders  had  been  buying  furs  in  the  Ohio  Valley  for 
seventy-five  years,  and  settlers  had  begun  to  find  their 
way  across  the  mountains  just  previous  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  French  and  Indian  War,  but  neither  settler  nor 
trader  had  brought  back  information  for  the  reading 
public.123  The  occasion  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had 
made  the  region  of  the  upper  Ohio  a  household  word 
since  many  pamphlets  were  issued  from  the  press  in 
which  some  account  of  the  territory  was  given ;  but  in 
all  these  the  description  shows  that  the  author's  actual 
knowledge  was  confined  to  the  Ohio  district  and  that 

121  "The   Interest   of   Great   Britain   considered,   etc.,"    in    Writings    (ed. 
Smyth),  vol.  iv,  33. 

122  Page  i.     Dr.  Johnson  in  1756  called  Canada  "a  cold,  uncomfortable, 
uninviting  region,  from  which  nothing  but  furs  and  fish  were  to  be  had,  and 
where  the  new  inhabitants  could  only  pass  a  laborious  and  necessitous  life, 
in  perpetual  regret  of  the  deliciousness  and  plenty  of  their  native  country." - 
Works,  vol.  v,  345.     As  late  as  1770  we  read  in  Wynne,  General  History  of 
the  British  Empire  [vol.  ii,  431]:     "As  for  the  making  of  a  profitable  colony 
of  Canada   and   Nova-Scotia,  that  is  contrary  to  nature  itself.     Unless  they 
[the  colonists]  live  by  their  agriculture,  they  can  be  of  no  use  or  service  to 
this  nation ;  but  this  is  certainly  not  to  be  expected,  either  in  Canada  or  Nova- 
Scotia." 

123  Besides  the  references  given  above  an  examination  of  the  inadequate 
list  of  western  Indians  given  in  a  report  in  1749  by  Commissioner  Lindsay 
of  Oswego  will   prove   that  the  knowledge  of  the   West   obtainable  on  the 
frontier   of  New   York  was  very  meager.      See   New   York   Colonial  Docu- 
ments, vol.  vi,  538. 


8o  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

his  meager  information  about  the  vast  territory  beyond 
was  gained  from  French  books.12*  One  Englishman, 
Dr.  John  Mitchell,  had  made,  however,  a  careful  study 
of  the  West,  and  the  best  account  of  the  region  is  in  the 
volume  ascribed  to  his  pen,  The  Contest  in  America 
between  Great  Britain  and  France. 

The  information  about  the  West  increased  as  there 
appeared  from  the  British  press  one  book  after  another, 
most  of  them  containing  maps  based  on  earlier  French 
surveys.  Translations  of  French  books  were  printed: 
Charlevoix's  Journal  was  published  in  1760  and  again 
in  1761,  and  Du  Pratz's  History  of  Louisiana  appeared 
in  1763.  In  August,  1761,  the  Gentleman's  Magazine 
contained  a  history  of  Louisiana  and  in  June,  1763,  a 
long  description  of  the  region.  The  books  which 
were  regarded  as  summing  up  the  most  authentic 
information  about  the  Mississippi  Valley  were  Jef- 
ferys's  Natural  and  Civil  History  of  the  French  Do- 
minions (1761),  and  The  American  Gazeteer  (1762), 
3  volumes.125 

The  feature  of  the  West  which  seemed  to  English- 
men most  interesting  was  the  expansive  water  system 
as  it  was  displayed  on  the  maps  of  the  period.  The 
Great  Lakes  and  the  River  Mississippi  with  its  numer- 
ous branches  seemed  to  extend  an  invitation  to  all  those 
daring  spirits  who  would  seek  homes  in  the  wilderness. 
The  earlier  cartography  was  naturally  very  faulty. 
The  course  of  the  Ohio  was  set  down  very  incorrectly 
and  made  to  run  in  such  a  way  that  it  divided  the  West 
into  two  very  unequal  parts  and  left  to  the  north  not 
more  than  half  of  the  great  territory  which  was  to  be- 

124  See  "Bibliography"  for  a  list  of  these. 

125  This  last  was  translated  into  Italian  and  published  in  1763  at  Leghorn 
under  the  name  of  //  gazzetiere  americano.     Other  books  of  similar  kind  are 
noted  in  the  "Bibliography." 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  81 

come  the  state  of  Ohio.  This  misconception  of  the  true 
course  of  the  river  lingered  long  among  the  public  and 
was  not  without  influence  on  the  development  of  a 
western  policy  by  the  ministry.126  From  these  maps  the 
most  tempting  places  for  settlement  seemed  to  be  the 
Illinois  country,  Detroit  and  vicinity,  and  the  lower 
Mississippi  around  Natchez.127 
The  books  and  pamphlets  show  a  surprising  igno- 

126  This  is  characteristic  of  all  the  contemporary  maps,  in  which  also 
there  is  too  wide  a  space  between  the  Mississippi  and  Lake  Michigan.  The 
maps  which  I  have  had  the  opportunity  of  examining  critically  were  all 
based  on  three  original  English  ones  with  additions  particularly  in  the  West 
from  the  French  maps.  These  are: 

x.  Henry  Popple's  Map  of  the  British  Empire  in  America  ivith  the  French 
and  Spanish  Settlements  Adjacent  Thereto  (London,  1732,  1733,  1740).  As 
far  as  the  West  is  concerned,  this  is  based  on  Delisle's  maps  and  contains 
his  errors  in  making  the  Ohio  run  too  close  to  Lake  Erie.  The  map  printed 
in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine  for  1763  [vol.  xxxiii,  284]  is  based  on  Popple's. 

2.  John  Mitchell's  Map  of  the  British  Colonies  in  North  America  with  the 
Roads,  Distances,  Limits,  and  Extent  of  the  Settlements  (London,  1755).    This 
was  the  most  popular  of  the  contemporary  maps   and  was  repeatedly  re- 
produced.    It  was  indorsed  by  the  Board  of  Trade  and  was  used  by  them 
to  exhibit  boundary  decisions,  as  for  instance  in  the  case  of  the  Quebec  Act. 
(This  is  reproduced  in  the  Michigan  Pioneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol. 
xxxvi.)     Contemporary  maps  based  on  Mitchell  are  in  Annual  Register  for 
1763 ;  in  Charlevoix's  Journal,  English  translation   (Dublin,  1766)  ;  in  Gen- 
tleman's Magazine,  for  1755  [vol.  xxv,  296],  and  for  1763  [vol.  xxxiii,  477]. 
This  last  seems  to  be  made  up  from  Mitchell's  and  Popple's. 

3.  Lewis  Evans's  General  Map  of  the  Middle  British  Colonies  in  America 
(Philadelphia,  1755). 

127Jefferys  in  Natural  and  Civil  History  of  the  French  Dominions  [137- 
141]  writes  that  the  soil  of  Illinois  is  very  fertile,  especially  for  grain;  that 
the  silver  and  lead  mines  are  very  rich ;  and  there  are  copper  mines  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Illinois  River.  In  1773,  Patrick  Kennedy  made  an  expedi- 
tion up  the  Illinois  River  in  search  of  this  copper  mine.  See  Kennedy's 
Journal,  etc.,  printed  in  Hutchins,  Topographical  Description  (ed.  Hicks), 
122.  Wynne  in  1770  [General  History  of  the  British  Empire,  vol.  ii,  401, 
407]  writes  of  Louisiana  (meaning  south  of  Ohio)  :  "If  we  compare  this 
with  the  barren  deserts  of  Canada  and  Florida,  what  a  wide  difference  is 
there!"  He  urges  a  colony  at  Natchez.  See  a  similar  statement  by  Dr. 
Mitchell  in  Present  State  of  Great  Britain,  253.  For  a  glowing  tribute  to  the 
fertility  of  Illinois  by  a  writer  see  The  Expediency  of  Securing  our  American 
Colonies,  published  in  1763,  reprinted  by  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  Critical 
Period  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  chap.  iii. 


82  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ranee  of  the  settlements  of  the  French  in  the  region.  The 
books  of  Hennepin,  Lahontan,  and  Charlevoix,  from 
which  the  British  authors  usually  gleaned  their  infor- 
mation, were  written  before  the  period  of  most  active 
French  settlement,  and  so  the  public  and  even  the  min- 
isters were  led  by  the  popular  press  to  believe  that  the 
number  of  inhabitants  in  the  West  was  so  small  as  to 
be  negligible  and  that  even  these  few  would  follow  their 
flag  across  the  Mississippi.128  An  evidence  of  this  in- 
adequate information  in  England  is  furnished  by  the 
maps  of  the  period  of  the  peace  negotiations;  on  no  one 
of  these  does  the  French  village  and  trading  post  of  Vin- 
cennes  appear,  though  on  a  few  of  them  there  is  a 
French  fort  inaccurately  located  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Wabash.  In  the  map  printed  in  the  Gentleman's 
Magazine  for  June,  1763,  even  the  River  Wabash  is 
omitted.  The  first  comprehensive  view  of  the  rela- 
tively important  settlements  of  the  Illinois  country  was 
derived  from  the  letters  of  British  officers  who  visited 
the  villages  in  1765. 

On  account  of  this  widespread  ignorance  of  the  ter- 
ritory that  had  been  secured  by  the  war,  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  there  was  a  tendency  to  underestimate  its  worth, 
a  tendency  which  can  not  be  explained  on  purely  polit- 
ical grounds.  Doctor  Samuel  Johnson  was  a  partisan 
writer  on  the  side  of  those  who  had  negotiated  the  peace 
and  it  is  therefore  probable  that  he  was  expressing  a 
popular  not  a  political  opinion  when  he  wrote  that 
"large  tracts  of  America  were  added  by  the  last  war  to 
the  British  dominions,"  but  that  they  were  at  best  "on- 

128  This  is  found  in  the  correspondence  of  the  period ;  and  even  Major 
Rogers,  who  traveled  extensively  throughout  the  West,  thought  Illinois  would 
be  entirely  deserted  by  the  population.  A  Concise  Account  of  North  Amer- 
ica, 193.  It  was  not  generally  known  that  France  had  ceded  western  Louis- 
iana to  Spain. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  83 

ly  the  barren  parts  of  the  continent,  the  refuse  of  the 
earlier  adventurers,  which  the  French,  who  came  last, 
had  taken  only  as  better  than  nothing."129  William 
Knox,  also  an  apologist  of  the  peace,  whose  long  ex- 
perience as  under-secretary  for  the  colonies  gave  him  an 
intimate  knowledge  of  America,  wrote  as  late  as  1789 
that  the  Americans  could  not  settle  the  western  territory 
for  ages,  that  for  this  reason  it  must  be  given  up  to 
barbarism  like  the  plains  of  Asia,  and  that  the  pop- 
ulation would  be  as  unsettled  as  the  Scythians  and 
Tartars.130 

The  party  of  the  expansionists  was,  on  the  contrary, 
enthusiastic  over  the  results  of  the  war  and,  as  has  al- 
ready been  seen,  expected  the  empire  to  reap  rich  re- 
wards for  her  victories.  Benjamin  Franklin  was  among 
those  who  looked  with  hope  into  the  future  and  saw  as 
in  a  vision  the  valleys  of  the  West  teeming  with  a 
flourishing  population,  which  would  add  to  the  strength 
and  wealth  of  the  mother  country,  though  he  did  not 
look  for  the  fulfilment  of  this  dream  until  after  the  lapse 
of  "some  centuries."131  Doctor  John  Mitchell  had  a 
similarly  optimistic  view.  In  1757  he  wrote: 

The  great  thing  to  be  considered  by  all  states  is  power  and 
dominion,  as  well  as  trade.  Without  that  to  support  and  pro- 
tect our  trade,  it  must  soon  be  at  an  end.  But  if  we  consider 
the  vast  extent  of  those  inland  countries  in  North  America,  and 
the  numbers  of  natives  in  them,  with  the  still  greater  numbers 
of  people  they  must  maintain,  the  power  they  must  necessarily 
give  to  any  state  possessed  of  them  must  appear  to  be  very 
great.132 

129  Johnson,   Works,  vol.  v,  414. 

130  Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  ii,  49  ff. 

131  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  55. 

132  Contest  in  America,  p.  xvii.     Major  Rogers's  Concise  Account  of  North 
America  (1765),  written  by  a  man  who  personally  knew  the  West  gave  to 
the  readers  an  adequate  conception  of  the  great  fertility  of  the  region. 


84  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Of  Florida  almost  nothing  was  known.  There  never 
had  been  much  trade  between  this  Spanish  region  and 
the  British  colonies;  and  it  was  ceded  to  Great  Britain 
at  the  last  moment  just  before  the  preliminaries  were 
signed,  so  that  no  opportunity  had  been  given  to  gather 
information  regarding  the  territory.133  A  well-in- 
formed writer  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  as  late 
as  1783  members  of  the  ministry  who  made  the  treaty 
of  peace  of  that  year  and  most  of  the  members  of 
Parliament  had  very  indifferent  knowledge  of  the 
country  lying  along  the  gulf  coast.134  On  the  whole  the 
English  people  were  of  the  opinion  that  they  had  made 
a  very  bad  exchange  for  Havana.135  Every  attempt 
was  naturally  put  forth  after  the  treaty  of  peace  to 
collect  information  on  the  country  and  many  publica- 
tions about  it  were  issued  with  the  sanction  of  the 
government.136 

Making  due  allowance  for  the  partisan  bias  of  the 
supporters  of  the  peace,  it  may  be  taken  for  granted  that 
the  majority  of  Englishmen  were  either  wholly  indif- 
ferent about  the  new  acquisitions  or  were  skeptical  about 
their  value  to  the  empire.  Such  was  not  the  case,  how- 
ever, in  America,  where  a  popular  financial  interest  in 
the  transmontane  territory  had  been  recently  developed. 

iss  in  January  and  November,  1763,  the  Gentleman's  Magazine  printed 
short  accounts  of  Florida.  In  a  Review  of  Pitfs  Administration,  1763  [p.  5], 
we  find  the  following:  "What  then  did  England  gain  by  the  honesty,  the 
vigilence  and  wisdom  of  Mr.  Pitt;  Canada,  an  almost  barren  province;  Flor- 
ida, a  sandy  desert."  In  the  debate  in  the  house  in  November,  1763,  Beck- 
ford  compared  the  barrenness  of  Florida  to  Bagshot  Heath.  See  Walpole, 
Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  174, 

134Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.   ii,  427. 

135  Mitchell,  Present  State  of  Great  Britain,  253.     This  author  has  no  good 
word  to  say  for  the  Floridas. 

136  Consult  the  Gentleman's  Magazine   (1763),  vol.  xxxiii;   also  Roberts, 
An  Account  of  the  First  Discovery  and  Natural  History  of  Florida  (London, 
1763).     See   also   "Knox   Manuscripts,"    in   Historical   Manuscripts    Commis- 
sion, Report  on  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  vol.  vi. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  85 

From  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  to  the  middle  of  the 
eighteenth  century  the  British  colonies,  contented  with 
the  profits  of  the  Indian  trade,  made  no  general  effort 
to  secure  by  settlement  the  possession  of  the  Mississippi 
Valley.  Lands  were  still  plentiful  along  the  seacoast, 
and  it  was  not  until  almost  a  hundred  years  had  elapsed 
after  the  founding  of  Jamestown  that  the  colonists  first 
pushed  beyond  the  line  of  the  falls  of  the  rivers  and  be- 
gan to  clear  for  themselves  homes  in  the  uplands. 
When  the  fall  line  was  finally  crossed,  settlement  moved 
rapidly,  the  colonial  population  being  augmented  by 
the  influx  of  the  Scotch-Irish  and  Germans;137  lands 
began  to  grow  valuable  and  attention  was  more  general- 
ly given  to  securing  large  holdings  to  be  colonized  with 
foreigners,  or,  as  was  often  the  case,  to  be  held  until 
the  clearing  of  the  surrounding  tracts  should  make  them 
valuable.  By  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  all 
the  particularly  desirable  lands  in  many  of  the  old 
colonies  had  been  engrossed,  and  new  comers  were 
forced  to  cross  the  Appalachian  divide  in  search  of 
farms.138 

In  the  unbroken  wilderness  across  the  mountain  the 
speculators  were  in  advance  of  the  actual  home  maker. 
The  historic  muse  has  always  delighted  in  singing  of 
the  daring  deeds  of  the  explorer  wandering  through 
the  dark  forest  or  paddling  his  canoe  on  unknown 
rivers;  and  even  the  homesteader,  with  family  goods 
packed  in  his  prairie  schooner,  has  had  his  exploits 
chanted  in  majestic  measures;  but  few  have  noted  the 

137  See  the  interesting  figures  in  State  of  British  and  French  Colonies,  136, 
137.     The  best  modern  account  of  this  movement  is  found  in  Turner,  "The 
Old  West,"  in  Wisconsin  Historical  Society,  Proceedings,  1908,  p.  184. 

138  On  November  5,  1761,  the  Board  of  Trade  reported  that  the  increase 
of  population  in  the  old  colonies  was  such  "as  scarce  to  leave  room  in  some 
of  them  for  any  more  inhabitants."     Calendar  of  Home  Office  Papers,  of  the 
Reign  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  75. 


86  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

fact  that  both  explorer  and  homesteader  were  frequent- 
ly only  the  advance  agents  of  the  speculator  who 
dreamed  of  large  enterprises  in  land  exploitation -that 
the  Daniel  Boones  of  the  wilderness  were  only  the 
pawns  of  some  Richard  Henderson.  From  that  dis- 
tant date  when  Joliet  and  La  Salle  first  found  their 
way  into  the  heart  of  the  great  West,  up  to  the  present 
day  when  far-off  Alaska  is  in  the  throes  of  development, 
abig  business"  has  been  engaged  in  western  speculation. 
The  Mississippi  Valley  has  been  explored,  cleared,  and 
settled  in  large  measure  through  the  enterprise  and 
financial  boldness  of  moneyed  men  who  have  staked 
fortunes  in  opening  up  the  successive  lines  of  the 
American  frontier. 

Bold  speculation  was  one  of  the  characteristics  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  That  restless  business  energy 
which  manifested  itself  after  the  close  of  the  Civil 
War  in  England  continued  to  be  one  of  the  active 
forces  in  the  nation  during  the  succeeding  generations. 
Intruding  itself  into  the  affairs  of  state  it  soon  taught 
politicians  that  they  must  shape  their  policies  by  its 
needs,  so  that  by  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century 
there  had  developed  an  alliance  between  "big  business" 
and  the  governing  class  which  fostered  a  political  im- 
morality that  resembled  in  its  salient  characteristics 
the  similar  phenomenon  which  has  shown  itself  so 
plainly  in  the  United  States.  In  the  American  colonies 
the  speculative  enterprise  of  the  mother  country  nat- 
urally had  its  influence,  and  the  men  of  America  allied 
themselves  with  the  British  moneyed  classes  in  business 
operations  which  were  practically  limited  by  condi- 
tions and  colonial  laws  to  the  sale  of  merchandise  and 
land  speculation -in  the  West  to  land  speculation  and 
the  fur  trade. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  87 

The  earliest  attempts  to  form  settlements  in  the  West 
were  due  entirely  to  this  speculative  enterprise.  Since 
Virginia  had  extensive  charter  claims  in  the  region 
across  the  mountains  the  first  undertakings  naturally 
were  conceived  in  that  colony.139  In  1747  the  Ohio 
Company,  in  which  prominent  Virginians  were  allied 
with  important  financiers  of  Great  Britain,  petitioned 
for  five  hundred  thousand  acres  of  land  situated  on  the 
upper  Ohio.  This  grant  was  to  be  thus  divided :  first 
two  hundred  thousand  acres  were  to  be  granted  on  con- 
dition that  the  company  settle  two  hundred  families  up- 
on the  same  in  seven  years  and  erect  a  fort  and  maintain 
a  garrison;  and  the  remainder  was  to  be  granted  on 
condition  that  three  hundred  more  families  be  estab- 
lished there  within  the  next  seven  years. 

This  petition  was  favorably  received  by  the  Board 
of  Trade  which  reported  its  opinion  that  the  settlement 
of  the  country  westward  of  the  mountains  in  the  colony 
of  Virginia  would  be  for  his  majesty's  advantage  and 
for  the  security  of  the  colonies,  since  the  colonists  would 
carry  on  an  extensive  trade  with  the  Indians  and  also 
hinder  the  occupation  of  the  country  by  the  French. 
In  accordance  with  this  report,  on  March  16,  1748,  Sir 
William  Gooch,  at  that  time  lieutenant-governor  of 
Virginia,  was  ordered  to  make  the  grant.140  Having 
thus  obtained  the  imperial  sanction  for  the  project  the 
company  immediately  began  operations;  Christopher 

139  For  the  early  projects  of  the  settlement  of  the  West  see  House  of  Bur- 
gesses, Journals,  consult  index;  Hening,  Statutes  at  Large,  vol.  v,  79;  vol.  vi, 
208,  351. 

140  "Proceedings  of  the  Ohio  Company,"  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol. 
i,   93.     "Report  of  the  Board  of  Trade,"  June  26,   1767,  in   Public  Record 
Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.24,  p.  291.     Consult  also  The  Conduct  of  the 
Ministry  (1756),  19  ff. ;  Dinwiddie,  Official  Records,  vol.  i,  17,  footnote  23; 
"The  Ohio  Company,"  in  Craig,  The  Olden  Times,  vol.  i,  291  ff.     The  most 
important   papers   are   published   in   Fernovv,    The   Ohio    Valley   in    Colonial 
Days,  240  ff. 


88  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Gist  was  sent  to  the  region  to  make  surveys;141  goods 
were  transported  across  the  mountains  for  use  in  trade 
with  the  Indians;  and  settlements  were  begun.  The 
company  from  the  first  found  itself  beset  with  difficul- 
ties, arising  not  only  from  that  lack  of  knowledge  and 
experience  to  be  expected  in  a  new  undertaking  but 
also  from  the  jealousies  of  local  politics,  for  the  govern- 
ment of  Virginia  always  fearful  of  some  infringement 
on  its  western  rights  by  the  imperial  government,  threw 
all  the  obstacles  it  could  in  the  way  of  the  enterprise. 

Moreover,  Virginia  had  already  begun  on  her  own 
account  to  make  land  cessions  in  this  western  region. 
The  first  concession  of  one  hundred  thousand  acres  on 
Green  Brier  River  was  made  on  April  26,  1745,  to 
John  Robinson  and  others.  Other  grants  followed  in 
rapid  succession.142  According  to  the  report  of  the 
Ohio  Company,  as  soon  as  the  news  of  the  negotiations 
with  the  company  reached  Virginia,  the  governor  and 
council  increased  the  number  of  these  gifts,  some  of 
which  threatened  its  rights.  In  1754  the  Ohio  Com- 
pany presented  to  the  king  another  petition  setting 
forth  an  account  of  the  governor's  activities  and  request- 
ing that  certain  boundaries  which  they  named  might  be 
established  for  their  tract.  The  Board  of  Trade 
thought  that  the  territory  thus  described  was  too  large 
and  so  reported.  At  the  time  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
no  action  had  been  taken  by  the  Privy  Council,  and  thus 
the  matter  rested  until  the  question  of  the  dominion 
over  the  West  should  be  decided  by  force  of  arms.  The 
ministry,  however,  had  not  changed  their  opinion  of 

141  See  Christopher  Gist's  Journals,  228,  231. 

142  There  is  an  authenticated  list  of  these  Virginia  grants  in  the  Historical 
Society  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio  Company  Papers,  vol.  i,  87,  and  a  similar  list 
is  printed  in  the  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  vol.  v,  175 
if.,  241  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  89 

the  importance  of  settling  the  region,  for  on  August 
27,  1754,  the  king  instructed  the  Virginia  government 
to  grant  lands  west  of  the  Alleghanies  in  lots  of  one 
thousand  acres,  free  from  the  payment  of  quitrents  for 
ten  years  and  without  the  usual  fee  of  five  shillings  for 
each  fifty  acres,143  and  by  1757  Virginia  had  granted 
about  two  million  acres  in  this  region.  Among  these 
the  most  important  was  the  cession  in  1749  of  eight 
hundred  thousand  acres  along  the  northern  boundary 
line  of  North  Carolina  to  the  Loyal  Company,  among 
whose  members  were  John  Lewis  and  Thomas  Walker, 
both  of  whom  played  an  important  part  in  the  later 
complications  on  the  frontier.  This  grant  was  after- 
wards considered  illegal,  but  the  members  of  the  com- 
pany never  ceased  their  agitation  for  what  they  re- 
garded as  their  rights.144 

At  the  time  of  the  open  rupture  with  France  upon 
the  Ohio  waters,  further  cessions  were  made  by  Vir- 
ginia. In  order  to  promote  the  enlistment  of  men  in 
the  colonial  troops,  Governor  Dinwiddie  of  Virginia 
issued  a  proclamation  on  February  9,  1754,  in  which  he 
promised  "that  over  and  above  their  pay  200,000  acres 
of  his  Majesty  the  King  of  Great  Britain's  lands  on 
the  East  side  of  the  River  Ohio  shall  be  laid  off  and 
granted  to  such  persons  who  by  their  voluntary  engage- 
ments and  good  behavior  in  the  said  service  shall  de- 
serve the  same."145  This  proclamation  was  the  basis 
for  the  later  claims  of  the  Virginia  soldiers,  in  whose 
rights  George  Washington  became  so  much  interested. 

The  preparations  of  Virginia  to  extend  her  dominion 

143  Ohio    Company    Papers,    vol.    i,    87.     The    Conduct    of   the   Ministry 
(1756),  23. 

144  Statement  for  the  Petitioners   in  the  Case  of  the   Walpole  Company 
Grant   (pamphlet  without  title-page),  appendix  i,  i. 

145  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.1330,  pp.  323-330- 


90  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

over  the  rich  western  territory  by  actual  occupation 
were  watched  with  increasing  jealousy  by  the  men  of 
other  colonies,  who  were  far  from  being  satisfied  with 
a  policy  that  would  place  in  the  control  of  any  one 
province  the  exploitation  of  such  a  vast  and  valuable 
region.  It  is  therefore  not  strange  that  any  plans  pro- 
moted by  them  should  assume  the  form  of  a  limitation 
of  the  territory  of  Virginia  by  the  erection  of  independ- 
ent colonies.  The  city  of  Philadelphia  in  particular 
was  very  much  interested  in  the  disposition  of  the  West, 
which  was  well  known  there  from  the  accounts  of  her 
merchants  who  at  an  early  date  had  sent  their  fur-trad- 
ing representatives  across  the  mountains.148  These 
traders,  it  was  said,  were  so  hostile  to  Virginia  that 
they  were  the  chief  agents  in  arousing  among  the  In- 
dians fears  of  the  threatened  encroachments  on  their 
hunting-grounds  and  were  therefore  the  real  instiga- 
tors of  the  war,  because  the  French  were  induced  to 
enter  the  valley  of  the  Ohio  by  the  clamor  of  their  In- 
dian allies.147 

Under  the  stimulus  of  increasing  opportunity  it  was 
not  long  before  citizens  of  Philadelphia  also  formulated 
plans  for  entering  the  arena  of  westward  movement. 
The  protagonist  of  these  enterprises  was  Benjamin 
Franklin  whose  ideas  were  seconded  by  the  most  famous 
colonial  map-maker  of  the  day,  Lewis  Evans.  Frank- 
lin suggested  to  the  Albany  conference  of  1754  that  new 
colonies  be  established  and  his  project  received  the  in- 
dorsement of  both  Thomas  Pownall  and  Sir  William 
Johnson  and  was  incorporated  in  the  Plan  of  Union  as 

146  See  Hanna,  Wilderness  Trail,  passim. 

147  The  history  of  the  Quaker  traders'  attitude  towards  the  Indians  and 
the  westward  settlements  is  a  very  problematical  one.     Terrible  charges  were 
made  against  them,  but  the  proof  is  not  very  satisfactory.     See  the  sarcastic 
remarks  about  similar  charges  of  a  later  date  made  by  Benjamin  Franklin. 
Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  222. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  91 

"a  matter  of  considerable  importance  to  the  increase  of 
British  trade  and  power,  to  the  breaking  of  that  of  the 
French,  and  to  the  protection  and  security  of  our  pres- 
ent colonies." 148  Later  Franklin  drew  up  in  accord- 
ance with  his  ideas  a  plan  for  the  establishment  of  two 
colonies  between  the  Ohio  River  and  Lake  Erie.149  At 
about  the  same  time  Governor  Pownall  proposed  to 
Lord  Halifax,  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  a 
similar  scheme  of  barrier  colonies.  He  urged  that 
England  take  "one  large  step  over  the  mountains,  with 
a  numerous  military  Colony."  15°  In  a  memorial  to  the 
Duke  of  Cumberland  in  1756,  he  again  emphasized  the 
necessity  of  such  a  policy.  "I  should  imagine,"  he 
wrote,  "that  two  such  [colonies]  were  sufficient,  and 
only  requisite  and  proper:  one  at  the  back  of  Virginia, 
filling  up  the  vacant  space  between  the  Five  Nations 
and  southern  confederacy,  and  connecting,  into  one  sys- 
tem, our  barrier:  The  other  some  where  in  the  Cohass 
on  Connecticut  river,  or  wherever  best  adapted  to  cover 
the  four  New  England  colonies."151 

These  suggestions  for  the  disposition  of  the  great  val- 
ley, though  not  developed  at  this  time  in  a  more  con- 
crete form,  were  only  the  expression  of  the  prevailing 
belief,  shared  by  those  who  were  watching  the  condi- 
tions most  closely,  that  a  great  movement  westward 
must  soon  take  place.  The  same  thought  was  put  for- 
ward by  Lewis  Evans  in  a  pamphlet,  the  Analysis, 
which  was  written  to  accompany  his  Map  of  the  Mid- 
dle British  Colonies  and  at  the  same  time  to  urge  the 
erection  of  colonies  in  the  Ohio  Valley.152 

148  Franklin,   Writings,  vol.  iii,  206. 
i49_  idem,  358. 

iso  Pownall,  Administration  of  the  Colonies,  vol.  ii,  230  and  footnote,  174, 
217. 

151  —  Idem,  231. 

152  Lewis    Evans,    Geographical,   Historical,   Political,   Philosophical   and 


92  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

With  so  much  speculation  concerning  the  immediate 
division  of  the  West  into  independent  colonies,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  a  concrete  proposal  to  undertake  such 
an  establishment  was  soon  made.  A  Philadelphia  mer- 
chant by  the  name  of  Samuel  Hazard  read  an  article 
on  the  means  of  settling  a  colony  in  the  Ohio  Valley, 
which  was  written  by  Franklin  "to  divert  the  Connecti- 
cut Emigrants  from  their  design  of  invading"  Penn- 
sylvania. Hazard  adapted  this  plan  to  his  purposes 
and  proposed  to  himself  to  become  by  a  grant  from 
the  crown  a  lord  proprietor  of  a  colony  in  the  great 
valley.153  The  boundaries  of  his  proposed  domain  were 
"to  begin  at  the  distance  of  one  hundred  miles  west- 
ward of  the  western  boundaries  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
thence  to  extend  one  hundred  miles  to  the  westward  of 
the  River  Mississippi;  and  to  be  divided  from  Vir- 
ginia and  Carolina  by  the  great  chain  of  mountains  that 
runs  along  the  continent  from  the  northeastern  to  the 
southwestern  parts  of  America."15*  Only  orthodox 
Protestants  were  to  settle  there  and  no  person  was  to 
"be  obliged  to  pay  anything  towards  the  support  of  a 
minister  of  whose  congregation  he  is  not  a  member,  or 
to  a  church  to  which  he  does  not  belong."  In  May, 
1755,  Hazard  made  application  to  the  assembly  of  Con- 
necticut for  a  release  of  its  claims,  which  was  granted, 
"provided  the  petitioners  obtain  his  Majesty's  royal 
grant."  In  spite  of  Franklin's  unfavorable  opinion  of 
him,  Hazard  managed  to  persuade  several  thousand 
persons  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  to  promise  to 

Mechanical  Essays:  the  first  containing  an  Analysis  of  a  General  Map  of  the 
Middle  British  Colonies  in  America,  etc.  (Philadelphia,  1755).  This  work 
of  Evans  was  popular  and  was  frequently  quoted  by  land  speculators. 

153  Franklin,  Writings   (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iii,  265. 

154  4  American  Archives,  vol.  i,  861 ;  Gist's  Journals,  261  ff.     For  a  longer 
account  and   other   references,   see   Alden,  New  Governments   West  of  the 
Alleghanies,  7  if. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 93 

follow  him  into  the  wilderness.  After  an  exploratory 
expedition  to  the  westward  he  made  his  preparations  for 
a  voyage  to  England  to  obtain  the  royal  consent  to  his 
undertaking,  but  just  as  he  was  on  the  point  of  embark- 
ing, he  died.155 

The  French  and  Indian  War  brought  to  a  close  all 
immediate  plans  for  planting  settlements  on  the  fron- 
tier and  forced  the  few  settlers  on  the  Ohio  waters  to 
seek  refuge  in  the  East.  No  new  projects  were  started 
until  the  capture  of  Fort  Duquesne,  November  28, 
1758,  made  possible  another  westward  advance  of  the 
British  colonies.  In  Virginia  there  was  a  reawakening 
of  interest  in  the  Ohio  Company  and  among  the  various 
individual  grantees.  Also  in  New  Jersey,  one  of  the 
provinces  opposed  to  the  claims  of  Virginia,  a  new  plan 
was  formulated.  Little  is  known  of  the  enterprise  ex- 
cept that  it  was  proposed  to  make  application,  as  soon  as 
peace  was  concluded,  for  a  charter  for  a  colony  on  the 
Ohio,  which  was  to  honor  the  hero  of  the  war  by  being 
baptized  Pittsylyania.158 

The  foregoing  narrative  of  events  has  made  evident 
that  the  view  of  the  West  prevailing  in  America  dif- 
fered greatly  from  that  commonly  held  by  the  public 
in  the  mother  country.  To  Englishmen,  except  a  few 
interested  politicians,  that  region  may  have  seemed  like 
a  barren  waste  and  a  profitless  wilderness,  but  to  Amer- 
icans it  was  a  land  of  promise  offering  boundless  op- 
portunities to  their  ingenuity  and  enterprise.  Condi- 
tions had  become  favorable  for  a  general  westward 
movement.  Settlements  had  already  climbed  the  east- 

155  Later  General  Phineas  Lyman  united  the  supporters  of  Hazard's  plan 
with  one  of  his  own.     Still  later,  in  1774,  Ebenezer  Hazard,  a  son  of  Samuel, 
appealed  unsuccessfully  to  Connecticut  for  the  land  comprised  in  his  father's 
proposed  colony. 

156  Maryland  Gazette,  March  22,  1759. 


94 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

ern  slopes  of  the  mountains;  bold  speculators  and  hardy 
pioneers,  looking  with  longing  eyes  at  the  lands  beyond, 
were  preparing  to  take  the  plunge  into  the  woody  val- 
leys of  the  Ohio  waters ;  they  were  the  advance  guard  of 
that  mighty  host  of  emigrants  which  was  to  march  with 
irresistible  force  across  the  great  inland  valley,  scale  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  and  take  possession  of  the  golden 
West. 

When  the  treaty  of  peace  was  announced  and  it  be- 
came known  that  the  British  flag  was  to  wave  over  all 
the  territory  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Missis- 
sippi River,  the  imaginations  of  the  speculative  colo- 
nists were  still  further  aroused ;  they  conceived  of  great- 
er undertakings  and  began  laying  out  the  territory  into 
several  settlements  or  independent  colonies.  This  land 
craze,  which  had  been  brewing  for  several  years,  was 
as  yet  confined  to  America,  although  a  few  Englishmen 
were  already  familiar  with  the  possibilities  of  western 
speculation.  The  number  of  moneyed  men  in  the 
mother  country  in  alliance  with  these  new  enterprises 
must,  however,  be  increased  and  especially  must  con- 
nections be  established  with  those  financiers  who  were 
in  close  touch  with  the  government  before  the  question 
of  the  development  of  the  West  could  become  a  para- 
mount issue  in  British  imperial  politics.  The  men  who 
had  been  restlessly  waiting  for  their  opportunity  were 
quick  to  perceive  this  necessity  and  made  their  prepara- 
tions to  send  agents  to  England  to  win  over  to  the  idea 
of  extensive  colonization  the  men  of  financial  and  po- 
litical influence. 

The  first  to  be  ready  for  the  coming  political  cam- 
paign were  the  Virginians.  The  soldiers,  who  had 
been  promised  by  the  proclamation  of  Governor  Din- 
widdie  compensation  in  western  lands,  united  to  pro- 
mote their  claims.  Colonel  George  Washington  had 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  95 

his  own  interest  in  these  donations  and  became  the  prin- 
cipal advocate  in  pressing  the  rights  of  his  companions 
in  arms.  Under  his  leadership  the  claimants  sent  to 
the  king  a  petition  which  was  read  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  on  March  2,  1763. 15T  The  Ohio  Company  also 
did  not  delay  in  sending  a  representative  to  England. 
They  chose  Lieutenant  Colonel  Mercer,  who  sailed  on 
July  8,  iy63.158  Another  claim  of  a  different  character 
and  of  a  later  date  was  that  of  the  merchants,  mostly  of 
Pennsylvania,  who  had  suffered  severe  losses  by  the  un- 
expected outbreak  of  the  Indian  War  which  followed 
the  treaty  of  peace  between  France  and  England.  They 
now  desired  compensation  for  their  losses  by  a  grant  of 
land  in  the  West  and  to  this  end  they  sent  a  memorial 
to  the  Lords  Commissioners  for  Trade  and  Plantations.159 
Besides  the  promotion  of  these  older  claims,  new 
plans  for  founding  extensive  settlements  were  being  dis- 
cussed in  various  parts  of  the  East.  On  June  3,  1763, 
a  number  of  gentlemen  of  Maryland  and  Virginia, 
among  whom  were  numbered  the  most  prominent  men, 
such  as  George  Washington,  the  Lees,  and  the  Fitz- 
hughs,  founded  the  Mississippi  Company.  The  object 
was  to  obtain  from  the  crown  two  million  five  hundred 
thousand  acres  of  land  on  the  Mississippi  River,  be- 
ginning one  hundred  twenty  miles  above  the  Ohio, 
thence  to  the  Wabash,  up  the  Tennessee  one  hundred 
fifty  miles  above  the  juncture  with  the  Ohio,  thence  to 
the  Mississippi;  within  these  boundaries  each  of  the 
fifty  adventurers  was  to  have  fifty  thousand  acres  for 
his  own.  It  was  hoped  to  obtain  the  land  free  from 
fees,  quitrents,  and  taxes  for  the  period  of  twelve  years. 
In  return  the  company  was  to  undertake  to  settle  two 
hundred  families.  On  September  9  the  company  met 

15T  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.1330,  p.  323. 

158  Johnson  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  July  8,  1763,  in  idem,  511. 

159  —  Idem,  5.65,  p.  325. 


96  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

and  approved  a  memorial  to  the  king.  This  was  sent 
to  Thomas  Gumming  who  was  asked  to  act  as  agent  and 
to  join  the  company;  he  was  also  instructed  to  secure  the 
cooperation  of  nine  other  prominent  Englishmen.160 

A  somewhat  similar  plan  with  different  details  must 
have  been  started  in  Philadelphia  about  the  same  time. 
In  1626  King  Charles  I.  had  granted  to  Sir  Robert 
Heath  land  to  the  south  of  Virginia.  This  grant  had 
been  acquired  by  Daniel  Coxe  who  in  the  latter  part  of 
the  seventeenth  century  made  plans  to  plant  a  colony 
on  the  Mississippi.  He  did  not  receive  adequate  en- 
couragement from  the  government  and  the  enterprise 
resulted  only  in  the  publication  of  a  pamphlet  entitled 
Carolana.  The  descendants  of  the  family  now  pro- 
posed to  Benjamin  Franklin  and  some  associates  that 
they  purchase  the  title  to  the  land,  obtain  its  renewal, 
and  settle  a  colony  on  the  proposed  site.  Franklin, 
who  was  always  interested  in  such  speculations  and  en- 
gaged in  successive  schemes  to  make  his  fortune  out  of 
the  exploitation  of  the  West,  entered  into  this  proposi- 
tion with  earnestness.  The  correspondence  does  not  re- 
veal those  who  were  associated  with  him,  but  probably 
they  were  the  same  merchants  who  were  united  with 
him  in  later  projects,  Baynton  and  Wharton,  and  pos- 
sibly Galloway.  Richard  Jackson,  the  agent  for  Penn- 
sylvania, accepted  the  invitation  to  join  the  company 
and  began  to  search  in  the  archives  at  London  for  the 
papers  although  he  thought  Coxe's  title  was  a  very 
doubtful  one.  Before  any  definite  steps  were  taken, 
however,  conditions  in  the  ministry  had  changed  and 
the  project  was  dropped.161 

leo  "Mississippi  Company  Papers,"  in  Public  Record  Office,  Chatham  Man- 
uscripts. The  memorial  is  printed  in  Carter,  Great  Britain  and  the  Illinois 
Country,  1763-1774,  pp.  165  ff. 

161  Jackson  to  Franklin,  November  12,  December  27,  1763,  and  an  undated 
fragment  in  Franklin,  Papers,  vol.  i,  83;  vol.  Iviii,  114  (fragment)  D. 


IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  99 

Land  speculators  of  New  York  were  equally  ready 
to  speculate  in  land  and  made  preparations  to  settle  a 
new  colony  on  the  upper  Ohio  to  be  called  New  Wales 
in  honor  of  the  Prince  of  Wales.  To  finance  the  under- 
taking it  was  proposed  that  three  hundred  thousand 
acres  be  sold  to  the  proprietors  at  the  rate  of  fifty 
pounds  for  one  thousand  acres.  Preparations  to  launch 
the  enterprise  were  all  made  and  an  advertisement  for 
men  willing  to  move  to  the  West  was  printed  in  New 
York  and  elsewhere.  The  plan  was  popular  and  be- 
came a  general  topic  of  conversation  in  several  of  the 
colonies.162  It  was  at  about  this  time  that  Charles  Lee, 
inspired  by  the  general  speculative  movement,  formu- 
lated his  plan  for  the  erection  of  two  colonies,  one  on  the 
Ohio  below  the  Wabash  and  the  other  on  the  Illinois. 
His  intention  was  to  form  a  company,  to  secure  grants 
from  the  king,  and  to  find  settlers  in  New  England, 
Germany  and  Switzerland.163 

Although  Colonel  Bouquet,  while  stationed  at  Fort 
Pitt,  prohibited  settlers  from  establishing  themselves 
on  the  Ohio  lands,  he  was  by  no  means  opposed  to  west- 
ern expansion.  During  his  campaign  against  the  In- 
dians he  had  good  reason  to  take  into  serious  consider- 
ation the  proper  means  of  defending  the  frontier,  and 
under  his  supervision  one  of  his  officers  drew  up  a 
paper  on  the  subject  of  Indian  warfare  in  which  a 
military  settlement  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier 

162  The  New  York  paper,  April  21,  1763,  has  not  been  found  but  the  item 
was  reprinted  in  the  Gentleman's  Magazine  for  June,  1763   [vol.  xxxiii,  283, 
287].     Upon  reading  this  notice  P.  Collinson  of  London,  interested  in  invest- 
ments, wrote  to  Benjamin  Franklin  for  information.     See  American  Philosoph- 
ical Society  Franklin  Papers,  vol.  i,  75.     Sir  William  Johnson  wrote:     "This 
was   publicly  talked   of  throughout  the   whole   country,   and   soon   circulated 
amongst  the  Indians."-  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  959. 

163  Lee  Papers,  vol.  iv,  214,  in  New  York  Historical  Society,  Collections, 
1874. 


ioo  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

was  proposed.164  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Bou- 
quet had  serious  thoughts  of  promoting  a  colony  in  the 
Old  Northwest;  at  least  he  wrote  to  Franklin  about 
"when  you  and  I  settle  our  colony  upon  the  Scioto," 
and  again  "I  wish  the  plan  of  a  military  frontier  would 
be  put  in  execution." 1G5  Bouquet  was  not  the  only 
military  officer  interested  in  the  question  of  frontier 
defense  by  colonies.  On  November  30,  1762,  General 
Amherst  wrote  to  the  Earl  of  Egremont,  secretary  of 
state,  recommending  that  Detroit  be  made  a  "separate 
government,"  and  advising  less  earnestly  that  the  same 
policy  be  followed  at  Crown  Point  and  Niagara.166 

The  probable  connection  between  the  publication  of 
a  pamphlet  entitled  Expediency  of  securing  our  Amer- 
ican Colonies  by  Settling  the  Country  adjoining  the 
Mississippi  which  appeared  in  Edinburgh  in  the  fall 
of  1763,^  and  some  one  of  these  enterprises  has  not 
been  discovered.  The  writer  advocated  the  establish- 
ment of  a  province  to  be  called  Charlotina  which 

164  The  officer  was  Thomas  Hutchins.    The  paper  was  printed   in  His- 
torical Account  of  Bouquet's  Expedition  (1907),  98. 

165  August  22,  1764  in  American  Philosophical  Society  Franklin  Papers, 
vol.  i,  94. 

166  Lansdovme  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  417. 

167  Its  date  falls  between  October  7,  the  date  of  the  proclamation  of  1763, 
and  end  of  November,  for  its  publication  is  mentioned  in  Scofs  Magazine  for 
that  month.     It  is  reprinted  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  Critical  Period  [Illi- 
nois Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  chap.  iii.     The  Scotch  were  particularly 
interested  in  the  colonies  at  this  time,  and  the  pamphlet  may  have  been  written 
by  some  person  wholly  disconnected  with  the  land  companies  or  the  factions. 
Its  publication  in  Edinburgh,  however,  suggests  a  follower  of  the  Earl  of  Bute 
as  the  author.     Since  the  policy  advocated  in  the  pamphlet  is  entirely  in  accord 
with  his,  this  guess  seems  to  have  some  probability.     The  following  paragraph 
from  the  Caledonian  Mercury,  July  20,  1763,  is  of  interest:     "Extract  of  a  let- 
ter from  London  July  16.     .     .     It  is  said  a  great  number  of  discharged  sol- 
diers and  seamen  are  soon  to  embark  for  America,  in  order  to  settle  in  some 
of  our  acquired  colonies  especially  on  the  river  Mississippi.     They  are  to  re- 
ceive a  royal  bounty  for  their  subsistence  and  for  purchasing  materials     .     .     . 
and  are  to  be  exempted  from  all     ...     taxes  and  rent." 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  101 

should  extend  from  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  to  the 
Great  Lakes,  in  order  to  protect  the  older  colonies  from 
French  intrigues.  He  had  studied  the  account  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley  in  Du  Pratz's  history  and  had  be- 
come enthusiastic  over  the  natural  resources  of  the 
country.  Like  Franklin,  he  looked  forward  to  the 
time  when  the  English  people  would  fill  all  the  terri- 
tory to  the  Mississippi  and  thus  add  to  the  strength  and 
dominion  of  Great  Britain. 

Most  of  these  plans  for  colonies  which  were  proposed 
immediately  after  the  close  of  the  war  were  of  an 
ephemeral  character  and  scarcely  left  a  ripple  on  the 
politics  of  the  mother  country.  Still  the  fact  that  so 
many  schemes  were  born  at  this  time  was  significant 
and  without  doubt  had  its  influence  upon  the  public 
opinion  of  Great  Britain.  At  least  sufficient  interest 
had  been  aroused  to  call  forth  one  pamphlet  from  a 
Scottish  press  and  these  beginnings  in  western  specula- 
tion were  but  the  harbinger  of  a  growing  popular  ap- 
preciation of  the  potential  wealth  existing  in  the  new 
acquisitions.  The  time  was  approaching  when  the  fu- 
ture of  the  Mississippi  Valley  would  become  a  subject 
of  moment  among  financiers  of  Great  Britain  and  would 
prove  to  be  an  issue  of  sufficient  importance  to  force  at 
least  one  minister  out  of  the  cabinet. 


IV.    THE  EARLIER  WESTERN  COLONIAL 
POLICY  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN 

The  rulers  of  Great  Britain  have,  for  more  than  a  century  past, 
amused  the  people  with  the  imagination  that  they  possessed  a  great 
empire  on  the  west  side  of  the  Atlantic.  This  empire,  however,  has 
hitherto  existed  in  imagination  only.  It  has  hitherto  been,  not  an  em- 
pire, but  the  project  of  an  empire;  not  a  gold  mine,  but  the  project  of 
a  gold  mine.  -  ADAM  SMITH. 

The  inevitable  clash  of  the  red  men  and  the  Euro- 
peans upon  the  American  continent  could  not  be  avoided 
by  the  wisest  legislation,  and  the  logic  of  history  was 
fulfilled  in  the  occupation  by  the  better  endowed  peo- 
ple of  the  territory  so  inadequately  utilized  by  the  in- 
ferior race.  This  process  could  only  have  been  per- 
manently checked  by  rolling  back  the  inexorable  forces 
of  natural  law.  To  attempt  this  was  foolishness;  the 
destiny  of  the  West  could  not  be  thwarted.  The  popu- 
lation in  cities,  towns,  and  rural  communities  that  to- 
day fill  the  great  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  making  it  one 
of  the  happiest  and  wealthiest  spots  on  the  globe,  was 
already  held  in  the  womb  of  Nature  and  the  appointed 
period  was  rapidly  approaching.  Man-made  law  and 
governmental  policy  could  not  delay  the  day  of  de- 
livery, let  the  visionless  politicians  of  the  Old  World 
confer  as  much  as  they  would.  The  inevitableness  of 
this  westward  movement  of  the  population  was  imper- 
fectly understood  in  Great  Britain,  and  so  the  tendency 
was  to  treat  each  recurring  crisis  caused  by  the  throes 
of  Nature  as  mere  eruptions  of  lawlessness  which  might 


io4  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

be  cured  by  opportunist  treatment.  The  consequences 
of  this  superficial  diagnosis  were  prescriptions  inap- 
plicable and  ill  suited  to  the  condition.  There  were 
several  efforts  made  to  take  a  larger  view  of  the 
situation  and  to  discover  a  remedy  more  inclusive  and 
healing,  but  the  opposition  of  special  interests  and  the 
general  inertness  of  British  politicians  were  too  power- 
ful to  be  overcome. 

The  historian's  duty  does  not  include  within  its 
sphere  the  meting  out  of  censure  or  blame  upon  the  men 
of  the  past,  but  he  is  called  upon  to  elucidate  by  every 
means  in  his  power  the  principles  and  motives  under- 
lying the  thought  of  the  actors  in  the  historical  drama. 
The  performance  of  this  latter  duty  can  frequently  be 
best  accomplished  by  clearing  his  own  and  his  readers' 
views  of  possible  misconceptions  by  a  reference  to  the 
conditions  existing  then  and  now.  The  men  of  the 
past  were  working  on  a  new  problem  offered  for  their 
solution,  the  men  of  the  present  are  illumined  by  the 
experience  of  generations.  The  obstacles  that  made 
hopeless  the  formulation  and  execution  of  a  permanent 
policy  for  western  America  could  not  be  visualized  by 
eighteenth-century  politicians ;  they  can  be  by  the  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  who  have  behind  them 
that  "century  of  dishonor"  when  the  nation  miserably 
failed  to  establish  an  equitable  balance  between  the 
rights  of  the  natives  and  the  justifiable  land  needs  of  a 
growing  frontier  population.  All  the  greater  credit  is, 
therefore,  due  the  few  men  who  now  and  then  caught 
a  fleeting  view  of  the  true  situation  before  the  successive 
blunders  in  the  East,  committed  by  various  British  ad- 
ministrations, had  brought  on  the  war  that  transferred 
to  the  control  of  a  new  nation  the  western  territory  and 
its  problems. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  105 

The  wider  and  better  perspective  of  to-day  makes  it 
possible  to  analyse  the  conditions  that  existed  in  the 
past  and  to  appreciate  clearly  the  almost  insurmount- 
able obstacles  that  confronted  the  ministries  which  from 
1748  to  1774  made  vain  efforts  to  find  their  way  through 
the  labyrinth  formed  by  Indian  rights,  fur-trading  com- 
panies, frontier  settlers,  rival  land  companies,  imperial 
interests,  colonial  charters,  and  those  other  forces,  latent 
and  active,  which  lay  within  the  western  domain.  In 
order  that  these  various  complexities  may  be  better  un- 
derstood, it  will  be  necessary  to  interrupt  the  narrative 
with  a  general  discussion  of  the  problem  so  that  there 
may  be  a  better  appreciation  of  those  conditions  which 
made  every  British  ministry  during  a  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury hesitate  to  bring  to  the  issue  their  western  colonial 
policy.168 

Before  1748  the  year  in  which  the  Privy  Council 
passed  upon  the  petition  of  the  Ohio  Company,  no  at- 
tempt to  formulate  a  western  colonial  policy  that  was 
imperial  in  its  nature  had  been  made.  The  British 
government  had  preferred  to  leave  all  questions  con- 
cerning the  Indians,  the  fur  trade,  and  the  land  to  the 
judgment  of  the  governments  of  the  American  depend- 
encies with  the  result  that  various  systems  had  been  de- 
veloped, under  which  the  aborigines  had  been  continu- 
ally robbed  of  their  land  and  cheated  in  trade.  During 
the  first  colonial  war  of  the  reign  of  King  George  II.,  it 

168  I  have  attempted  in  the  following  paragraphs  a  general  sketch  of  this 
kind.  The  basis  of  such  generalizations  as  these  must  be  the  course  of  events  it- 
self; the  whole  volume,  therefore,  is  a  proof  of  these  statements  and  no  attempt 
is  made  to  cite  references  for  the  conclusions  here  given.  References  would 
be  of  little  avail,  for  no  contemporary  author  had  the  requisite  data  to  mark 
out  the  lines  of  division.  Occasionally  I  have  found  some  direct  statements 
that  have  assisted  me,  but  for  the  most  part  it  has  been  necessary  to  reason 
back  from  the  events  to  the  motives -a  common  enough  experience  to  the  his- 
torian -  rather  than  the  reverse. 


io6  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

was  learned  that  the  dishonesty  of  the  colonials  in  their 
dealings  with  the  Indians  had  created  a  fear  of  the  Eng- 
lish and  a  consequent  hostility  to  them  that  was  felt 
even  by  the  natives  in  the  most  remote  regions  of  the 
Ohio  Valley.  Only  after  the  close  of  that  war,  when 
the  threatening  clouds  of  a  new  struggle  were  gather- 
ing in  the  western  sky  were  the  first  tentative  efforts 
made  to  bring  some  system  out  of  the  chaos  of  colonial 
control.  If  the  ministry  were  intending  to  follow  up 
their  action  in  favor  of  the  Ohio  Company  by  promot- 
ing a  general  westward  movement  of  population  along 
the  back  of  the  colonies,  there  was  need  of  discovering 
some  better  method  of  suppressing  the  lawlessness  and 
dishonesty  so  characteristic  of  this  borderland  between 
the  whites  and  the  Indians  than  those  crude  means  em- 
ployed in  such  provinces  as  New  York  and  Virginia. 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  formulating  an  impe- 
rial policy  for  the  West  to  supplement  or  replace  the 
colonial  management  were  largely  the  offspring  of  the 
divergent  opinions  of  the  prominent  men  in  the  colonies 
and  the  mother  country,  which  opinions  had  their  ori- 
gin both  in  broad  and  basic  political  principles  and  in 
personal  interests.  How  such  diversities  of  principle 
and  interest  produced  heated  arguments  during  the 
period  of  the  peace  negotiations  when  Canada  and 
Guadaloupe  were  in  the  balance  has  already  been  seen. 
At  that  time  the  men  who  held  the  opinion  that  the 
chief  value  of  the  colonies  consisted  in  the  production 
of  staple  and  raw  materials  which  might  be  returned 
on  British  ships  to  the  mother  country  argued  for  the 
retention  of  Guadaloupe,  whereas  those  who  thought  of 
colonies  as  markets  where  the  manufactured  articles  of 
the  mother  country  could  be  sold  preferred  Canada. 
The  latter  triumphed  when  the  treaty  was  made.  The 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  107 

same  principles  which  underlay  the  opinions  of  these 
two  parties  continued  to  be  operative  in  all  discussions 
of  the  future  of  western  America. 

The  advocates  of  the  older  colonial  policy  at  the  out- 
set saw  advantages  only  from  the  fur  trade ;  and  while 
they  were  ready  to  develop  mines  of  copper  and  lead 
when  opportunities  were  called  to  their  attention,  such 
possibilities  were  never  a  strong  factor  in  shaping  their 
opinions.  The  fur  trade  was  dependent  upon  the  main- 
tenance of  those  primitive  conditions  that  permitted  the 
Indians  to  hunt  at  will  the  fur-bearing  animals.  The 
extension  of  the  frontiers  westward,  it  was  pointed  out 
by  this  group,  must  always  limit,  by  so  much,  the  fur 
trade  territory  and  so  should  not  be  encouraged.  With- 
in the  colonies  the  wish  to  promote  the  business  of  buy- 
ing peltries  at  the  expense  of  settlement  was  particularly 
strong  among  the  French-Canadians  and  later  among 
those  English-speaking  merchants,  mostly  Scotch,  who 
succeeded  in  securing  the  control  of  this  industry  from 
the  older  inhabitants  of  the  northernmost  region.  In 
New  York  and  Pennsylvania  the  livelihood  of  many 
was  dependent  on  the  same  trade  and  they  too  looked 
with  fear  upon  the  march  of  the  population  westward. 
In  the  southern  dependencies,  particularly  in  the  Caro- 
linas  and  Georgia,  the  fur  trade  was  widely  practiced; 
but,  since  only  low-priced  skins  were  produced  in  the 
Southwest,  its  influence  upon  the  development  of  a 
western  policy  was  not  of  much  significance.  These 
Americans  had  their  supporters  in  Great  Britain,  the 
local  merchants  being  generally  little  more  than  agents 
of  the  wealthier  companies  of  the  mother  country.  Nat- 
urally the  most  important  factor  in  this  opposition  to 
settlements  was  the  great  Hudson's  Bay  Company, 
whose  influence  in  administrative  circles  can  be  felt  by 


io8  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  close  student  of  the  period,  though  it  is  impossible 
to  follow  its  agents  through  the  subterranean  passages 
to  the  royal  closet.  The  first  rock  upon  which  the  for- 
mation of  a  western  policy  was  likely  to  be  broken, 
therefore,  was  a  widely-held  economic  principle  sup- 
ported by  numerous  influential  men  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic  who  were  teaching  the  doctrine  of  raw  prod- 
ucts and  were  exercising  their  ingenuity  in  discover- 
ing arguments  to  prove  that  the  promotion  of  coloniza- 
tion in  the  great  valley  would  be  detrimental  to  the 
empire. 

Opposed  to  these  men  were  those  who  were  advocat- 
ing the  newer  principle  that  the  value  of  the  colonies 
could  be  enhanced  by  their  growth  in  population  and 
by  the  multiplication  of  markets  for  the  consumption  of 
British  products,  and  that  this  could  be  most  easily  at- 
tained by  opening  up  for  settlement  the  rich  acres  west 
of  the  Alleghanies.  The  only  danger  to  be  feared  by 
the  mother  country,  said  those  of  this  opinion,  was  the 
development  of  colonial  manufactures,  and  the  day 
of  such  economic  independence  could  be  postponed  for 
years,  provided  forethought  was  taken  to  attract  the  in- 
coming immigrants  to  agricultural  pursuits  by  a  gen- 
erous offer  of  new  lands,  thus  avoiding  the  concentra- 
tion of  population  in  the  cities  and  the  consequent  de- 
velopment of  a  class  of  low-paid  laborers  clamoring 
for  work.  The  supporters  of  this  principle  were  not 
wholly  disingenuous  but  had  in  mind  their  own  advan- 
tage; their  names  may  generally  be  found  inscribed  in 
the  membership  list  of  one  of  the  numerous  companies 
which  were  formed  in  the  hope  of  reaping  rich  rewards 
in  land  speculation.  They  were  true  sons  of  the  eight- 
eenth century,  the  century  of  the  Mississippi  scheme  of 
John  Law  and  of  the  South  Sea  Bubble;  and  the  men 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  109 

who  still  remembered  these  or  similar  ventures  were 
eager  for  speculative  enterprises  of  all  kinds.  Vast  for- 
tunes were  being  made  in  the  East  Indies  and  the  re- 
turning nabobs  were  accorded  a  prominent  place  in  the 
social  and  political  life  of  the  empire.  Their  example 
was  an  incentive  to  their  contemporaries  and  the  ex- 
ploitation of  the  West  by  colonization  through  com- 
binations of  wealthy  associates  seemed  to  offer  almost 
as  good  an  opportunity  as  the  confiscation  of  the  wealth 
of  the  Indies. 

Each  of  these  two  parties  developed  in  the  course  of 
time  its  western  colonial  policy  supported  by  a  set  of 
arguments  in  favor  of  its  own  plans  and  against  those 
set  forth  by  the  opponents.  Each  of  the  policies  re- 
ceived attention  by  the  imperial  government  and  was 
regarded  with  favor  or  the  reversTiccording  to  the  per- 
sonal interests  and  prejudices  of  the  factions  compos- 
ing the  ministry  in  power.  Attempts  were  made  to 
force  the  adoption  in  its  most  extensive  form  of  each 
of  the  policies,  but  without  success ;  and  every  definite 
ministerial  act,  after  the  close  of  the  French  and  In- 
dian War,  can  be  interpreted  only  as  a  compromise  be- 
tween these  two  extreme  views. 

This  broad  division  of  parties  based  on  principle  and 
special  interests  was  not  the  only  divergence  to  be 
found  in  the  opinions  of  politicians.  The  clash  of  im- 
perial with  colonial  rights  of  domain  struck  off  the 
platforms  of  a  second  pair  of  opposing  parties.  Sev- 
eral of  the  provinces  such  as  Massachusetts,  Connecti- 
cut, Virginia,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia  had  extensive 
claims,  supported  by  charter  rights,  to  the  land  lying 
back  of  the  mountains.  Of  these,  Virginia's  claim  was 
the  most  extensive,  including  as  it  did,  not  only  the 
territory  directly  to  the  westward  but  also  what  be- 


i  io  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

came  known  as  the  Old  Northwest,  lying  north  of  the 
Ohio  River  and  taking  in  the  region  of  the  Great  Lakes. 
The  possibilities  of  great  wealth  to  be  attained  by  the 
exploitation  of  this  western  territory  through  coloniza- 
tion was  not  overlooked  by  the  provincials ;  particularly 
were  the  men  of  Virginia  prepared  to  take  every  ad- 
vantage of  their  monopoly.  As  has  been  seen,  individ- 
uals and  companies  were  ready  to  make  use  of  the  op- 
portunities thus  offered,  and  ambitious  governors  were 
persuaded  to  push  the  colonial  claims  to  the  farthest  in 
order  that  they  too  might  enjoy  the  expected  profits. 

Such  an  exploitation  of  the  wealth  of  the  West  by  the 
dependencies  was  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  em- 
pire. Here  was  an  immense  territory  capable  of  sup- 
porting several  populous  colonies,  which  might  not  on- 
ly augment  the  imperial  strength  but  also  by  the  proper 
control  of  the  sale  of  land  enrich  the  imperial  treasury, 
if  care  were  taken  in  the  granting  of  the  new  colonial 
charters.  Those  impressed  with  the  imperial  idea 
were  of  the  opinion  that  the  earlier  colonial  establish- 
ments had  resulted  in  a  waste  of  energy  and  treasure, 
and  they  were  fully  convinced  that  their  charters  should 
not  be  permitted  to  act  as  a  bar  to  new  and  better  con- 
sidered plans  of  ultramontane  development. 

This  imperialistic  program  was  popular  in  the  col- 
onies which  had  definite  western  boundaries.  This  was 
peculiarly  the  case  in  Pennsylvania,  whose  spokesman 
in  England,  Benjamin  Franklin,  enjoyed  great  influence 
with  several  powerful  political  factions.  The  sup- 
porters of  this  view  carefully  pointed  out  the  dangers 
that  might  arise  from  the  disproportionate  influence 
and  power  of  a  colony  like  Virginia,  should  she  main- 
tain her  claim  to  such  an  extent  of  territory.  The  self- 
ish motive  lying  underneath  their  arguments  is  not 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  in 

easily  concealed,  for  should  no  western  boundaries  be 
established,  the  citizens  of  Virginia  and  of  other  col- 
onies with  extensive  claims  would  gain  most  of  the 
profits  of  future  colonization  to  the  financial  loss  of  the 
citizens  of  colonies  not  so  happily  situated.  The  party 
was  undoubtedly  strong  in  Great  Britain  on  account  of 
its  appeal  either  to  patriotic  motives  or  to  personal 
interests. 

All  the  difficulties  in  the  formulation  of  a  western 
colonial  policy  are  so  closely  bound  together  that  the 
analysis  of  them  incurs  the  danger  of  causing  miscon- 
ceptions. On  such  a  complicated  question  with  its  many 
ramifications,  opinions  were  necessarily  very  complex, 
and  it  is  not  strange  that  men  did  not  always  support 
what  appears  to  be  the  same  side  in  every  one  of  these 
enumerated  disputes.  Generally  those  with  imperialistic 
views  were  grouped  together  on  the  above  issues;  but 
when  it  came  to  the  definitive  act  of  disregarding  the 
charter  rights  of  the  colonies  by  designating  western 
boundaries  for  them,  many  imperialists  refused  to  fol- 
low the  logic  of  their  own  principles,  and  the  alignment 
of  the  factions  was  different  from  what  would  be  ex- 
pected. The  eighteenth-century  man  was  very  loath  to 
participate  in  an  attack  on  vested  rights,  and  the  char- 
ters of  the  colonies  seemed  to  him  of  the  same  legally 
divine  origin  as  those  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company 
and  the  East  India  Company.  The  attack  on  the  latter 
in  1766  almost  annihilated  factions  and  broke  up  unions 
which  had  persisted  for  years.  An  attempt  to  abro- 
gate colonial  charters  would  be  still  more  dangerous 
because  in  the  sensitive  condition  of  the  colonies,  it 
might  cause  them  to  commit  overt  acts  looking  towards 
independence.  No  ministry  could  afford  consciously 
to  set  out  on  a  course  involving  the  possibility  of  a 


112 


THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 


[vol. 


civil  war  and  the  certainty  of  oratorical  thunderbolts 
from  those  who  were  always  eager  to  throw  their  pro- 
tection around  legally  created  monopolies. 

Westward  expansion,  whether  authorized  by  the  em- 
pire or  the  colonial  governments,  was  not  favored  by 
those  men  of  fortune  in  America  and  Great  Britain 
who  had  made  large  investments  in  land  lying  to  the 
east  of  the  mountains.169  Such  investments  were  com- 
monly made  for  speculative  purposes  and  the  land  was 
withheld  from  the  market  in  the  expectation  of  a  future 
augmentation  in  value  when  the  surrounding  popula- 
tion increased.  These  speculators  were  quick  to  per- 
ceive that  the  realization  of  their  hope  would  be  de- 
layed should  the  fertile  region  of  the  transmontane  val- 

169  Such  landholders  owned  land  in  many  colonies,  particularly  in  New 

York,  Virginia,   the   Carolinas,   Georgia,    and   the   Floridas.     The   following 

is  a  list  of  those  only  who  held  in  East  Florida  large  grants  that  lay  beyond 

the  Indian  boundary  which  was  run  in  1765. 

Acres 

Barrington,     Samuel,     Esq., 

Captain  20,000 

Beresford,  Earl  of  40,000 

Besborough,  Earl  of  20,000 

Bisset,    Robert,    Esq.,    Cap- 
tain 5,000 

Bradshaw,  Thomas,  Esq.  10,000 

Bret,  Richard,  Esq.  10,000 

Cassilis,  Earl  of  20,000 

Cooper,   Grey,  Esq.  20,000 

Croul,  William,  Esq.  10,000 

Dartmouth,  Earl  of  40,000 

Duncan,  Sir  William  20,000 

Fawcett,  William,  Esq.,  Col- 
onel 20,000 

Fitzherbert,   William^    Esq.         20,000 

Fortrey,  James,  Esq.  10,000 

Gordon,    Lord    Adam,    (out 

of  20,000)  6,000 

Grant,  Alexander,  Bart.  20,000 


Acres 

Grant,  Archibald,  Bart.  20,000 
Grant,  Duncan,  Esq.  10,000 
Greghurst,  John,  Esq.  20,000 
Jerveys,  John,  Esq.,  Captain  20,000 
Lillingston,  Luke,  Esq.  10,000 
Moira,  Earl  of  10,000 
Morray,  John,  Esq.,  Captain  10,000 
Morrison,  James,  Esq.  5,000 
Oswald,  Richard,  Esq.  20,000 
Penman,  James,  Esq.,  10,000 
Richerts,  William,  Esq.  20,000 
Robertson,  James,  Esq.,  Col- 
onel 15,000 
Southwell,  Colonel,  Esq.  20,000 
Tempel,  Lord  20,000 
Townshend,  Charles,  Esq.  20,000 
Turnbull,  Charles,  Esq.  33,ooo 
Tutchet,  N.,  Esq.  20,000 
Upton,  Cothworthy,  Esq.  20,000 
In  all 


594,000 

From  report  of  W.  G.  de  Brahm,  surveyor,  sent  to  Dartmouth,  October  23, 
1773,  Dartmouth  Manuscripts. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  113 

ley  be  opened  up  to  settlement,  and  from  them  there 
came  a  strenuous  opposition  to  every  attempt  to  foster 
the  movement  of  the  frontier  westward. 

Finally  there  were  many  men  whose  sense  of  justice 
to  the  Indians  caused  them  to  hesitate  to  support  defini- 
tive measures  that  would  permit  the  frontiersmen  to 
swarm  without  restraint  over  the  territory  which  had 
been  so  long  the  home  of  the  natives.  These  latter 
were  unquestionably  the  wards  of  the  empire  and  any 
infringement  upon  their  rights  would  be  an  injury  to 
the  good  faith  of  Great  Britain.  A  policy  of  protec- 
tion of  the  Indians'  hunting-grounds  from  encroach- 
ments must  be  maintained,  not  only  for  conscience  sake 
but  in  order  to  avoid  the  expense  of  an  Indian  war. 
Westward  expansion  could  only  be  encouraged  after 
the  Indians  were  conciliated  and  reconciled.  To  the 
imperialistic  party  it  seemed  that  the  solution  of  this 
problem  could  be  found  only  by  placing  the  West  di- 
rectly under  the  control  of  imperial  officers. 

The  difficulty  arising  from  the  presence  of  the  In- 
dians  was  not  simply  one  of  land.  The  organization 
of  the  trade  with  the  natives  was  also  a  burning  issue. 
Should  this  be  controlled  by  colonial  or  imperial  laws? 
Should  the  administrative  officers  receive  their  power 
from  the  colonies  or  the  mother  country?  It  will  later 
be  shown  that  there  was  a  difference  of  opinion  on  this 
issue  even  among  the  colonists,  but  probably  the  ma- 
jority of  those  directly  interested  preferred  that  the  hit 
or  miss  variety  of  control,  hitherto  practiced  by  the 
colonial  governments,  should  be  continued.  On  the 
other  hand  the  frauds  perpetrated  on  the  Indians  by 
the  traders  might  result  in  such  disastrous  and  costly 
wars  that  those  politicians  who  argued  for  a  complete 
imperialization  of  Indian  affairs  seemed  to  be  justi- 


ii4  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

fied.  There  were  developed  in  the  course  of  time  two 
distinct  plans  which  embodied  the  principles,  imperial 
and  anti-imperial,  that  were  maintained  by  these  two 
parties  in  regard  to  the  organization  of  the  western 
trade.170 

It  was  many  years  before  the  politicians  became  con- 
scious of  all  the  special  interests  which  were  wrapped 
up  in  the  western  colonial  question,  and  the  apprecia- 
tion of  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  formulating  a 
western  policy  had  a  very  perceptible  growth.  The 
first  British  minister  to  understand  their  full  signifi- 
cance was  the  Earl  of  Halifax.  He  was  originally  a 
partisan  of  the  Bedfords  and  owed  his  appointment  to 
the  presidency  of  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1748  to  the 
influence  of  that  faction,171  the  head  of  which  became 
at  the  time  secretary  of  state  for  the  Southern  Depart- 
ment. Lord  Halifax  was  not  regarded  by  his  contem- 
poraries as  a  steadfast  partisan.  After  being  brought 
in  by  Bedford  he  attached  himself  to  his  relative,  New- 
castle, but  remained  on  good  terms  with  his  first  pa- 
tron.172 In  1757  he  became  unfriendly  to  the  Old 
Whigs ;  and,  under  the  influence  of  the  brilliant  wit  and 
flattery  of  Dodington,  he  threw  in  his  lot  with  the  Lei- 
cester House  group,173  and,  at  the  beginning  of  the  reign 
of  George  III.,  may  be  counted  among  the  Whig  mem- 

170  The  attention  of  the  reader  should  be  called  to  the  fact  that  the  imperial 
idea  of  the  Pittites,  as  developed  by  Lord  Shelburne  in  1767,  did  not  favor 
the  multiplication  of  imperial  officials  and  that,  therefore,  the  policy  of  colonial 
control  of  the  Indian  trade  was  favored  by  them. 

171  Correspondence  between  Bedford  and  Halifax  in  1748  in  British  Mu- 
seum, Additional  Manuscripts,  32716,  pp.  88,  337;  Dodington,  Diary,  331  ff. 

172  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  ii,  250;  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  vol. 
ii,  125;  Dodington,  Diary,  331  ff.,  387,  393,  397;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shel- 
burne, vol.  i,  143,  Lyttelton,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  599,  601. 

173  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  ii,  249  ff.     His  close  friends  at  this  time 
were  Lord   Barrington,   Charles  Townshend,   James   Oswald,   Hans   Stanley, 
Lord  Hillsborough,  Bubb  Dodington.     Cumberland,  Memoirs,  121,  140. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  115 

bers  adhering  to  the  court.  Lord  Halifax  was  a  man 
of  considerable  ability,  a  pleasing  but  not  forceful 
speaker,  and  popular  with  the1  merchants.  He  was  very 
ambitious  and  pushing  in  his  own  interest,  but  was  con- 
sidered precipitate  in  judgment.  On  the  other  hand 
he  attended  to  the  duties  of  his  office;  and,  unlike  many 
contemporary  ministers,  he  wrote  his  own  dispatches. 
In  appearance  he  was  noble  and  imposing,  splendid  in 
dress,  and  he  possessed  those  superficial  qualities  that 
fascinate  the  popular  mind.174  His  reputation  among 
the  official  class  as  the  principal  authority  on  American 
subjects  was  so  well  established  that  his  colleagues  un- 
derestimated the  value  of  his  advice  as  being  biassed 
by  his  enthusiasm  and  warmth  for  the  colonies. 

During  King  George's  War  two  ideas  had  penetrated 
the  consciousness  of  governmental  circles:  the  first,  that 
the  colonies  were  destined  to  expand  westward;  and 
the  second,  that  the  French  were  closing  the  gates 
through  the  mountains  to  the  West.  It  has  already 
been  seen  that  Halifax,  with  the  assistance  of  his  patron, 
Secretary  Bedford,  took  measures  for  providing  for 
both  contingencies  by  favoring  the  grant  to  the  Ohio 
Company  which  had  been  formed  in  Virginia.  West- 
ern expansion  had  become  a  ministerial  policy.  There 
now  began  that  race  between  the  French  and  English 
to  secure  the  valley  of  the  upper  Ohio  in  which  the 
French  were  at  first  victorious.  This  event  opened 
Halifax's  eyes  to  other  elements  of  importance  in  any 
future  western  policy,  notably  the  fact  that  the  success 

174  See  characterization  of  him  by  his  secretary,  Cumberland,  Memoirs,  99, 
102,  140,  188 ;  also,  Mudford,  Critical  Examination  of  the  Writings  of  Richard 
Cumberland,  vol.  i,  152.  See  other  characterizations  of  Lord  Halifax  by  the 
following  men:  Fox,  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  143;  George 
III.,  in  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  514;  Lord  Hardwicke  quoted  in  Torrens, 
History  of  Cabinets,  vol.  ii,  204,  244. 


u6  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

of  the  French  was  due  largely  to  the  preference  of  the 
Indians  for  them.  The  hostility  of  the  Indians  to  the 
British  had  been  noticed  in  the  previous  war,  but  dur- 
ing the  interval  of  peace  it  was  forced  more  and  more 
upon  the  attention  of  the  ministry.  The  management 
of  Indian  affairs  by  the  colonies,  on  account  of  their 
mutual  rivalry  and  jealousy  in  trade,  had  completely 
broken  down  at  the  supreme  crisis  that  had  arisen.  This 
was  learned  in  particular  from  the  letters  of  an  Irish- 
man living  in  the  Mohawk  Valley,  William  Johnson, 
who  had  been  appointed  colonel  of  the  Indians  by 
Governor  Clinton.176  From  his  letters  it  became  ap- 
parent to  Halifax  that  the  Indians  had  been  systemat- 
ically defrauded  of  their  lands  and  cheated  in  trade.177 
No  less  conspicuous  than  this  neglect  of  the  colonies 
to  provide  adequately  for  Indian  affairs  was  their 
supineness  in  defending  themselves  against  the  aggres- 
sions of  the  French.  Here  again  rivalry  and  jealousy 
prevented  unity  of  action  and  efficient  preparations, 
and  their  failure  threatened  the  general  welfare  of  the 
empire  and  demanded  the  interference  of  the  mother 
country.  As  the  crisis  on  the  Ohio  became  more  alarm- 
ing, Halifax  with  the  approbation  of  the  ministry  de- 
termined that  some  decisive  measure  must  be  taken. 
In  order  to  determine  what  this  should  be,  there  was 
called  in  1754  the  famous  congress  of  delegates  at  Al- 
bany. The  Americans  preferred  to  discuss  the  details 
of  a  union  of  the  colonies  rather  than  to  provide  ef- 
fectively for  warding  off  the  immediate  danger  which 
threatened  them  on  the  western  frontier.  A  condition, 

176  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vi,  540,  546,  599.     See  also  Cad- 
wallader  Colden's  report  of  August  8,   1751   in  idem,   738.     For   a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  colonies,  see  Johnson's  memorial 
in  idem,  vol.  vii,  970. 

177  —  Idem,  vol.  vi,  918. 


'•' 

one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  117 

not  a  theory,  confronted  them,  and  they  preferred  to 
discuss  the  falter. >78 

The  Lords  of  Trade  did  not  wait  for  the  report  from 
Albany,  nor  would  the  theoretical  recommendations  of 
the  congress  have  been  of  much  assistance  in  settling 
the  critical  situation  in  western  and  Indian  affairs,  but 
they  proceeded,  on  August  9,  to  formulate  for  them- 
selves what  should  be  done.  Their  report  reveals  the 
prevailing  ideas  of  the  time  in  ministerial  circles,  and 
may  be  taken  as  the  starting  point  for  tracing  the  his- 
tory of  the  development  of  a  British  imperial  policy 
for  western  America.179  The  general  purpose  of  the 
Lords  of  Trade  was  to  stop,  the  encroachments  of  the 
FrencJi^upon  territory  claimed  by  jhe  English.  For 
this  purpose  it  seemed  to  them,  under  the  leadership 
of  Lord  Halifax,  that  the  defense  of  the  colonies 
against  the  French  and  the  management  of  the  Indians 
should  be  unified  and  placed  under  the  control  of  one 
officer,  appointed  by  the  king.  The  building  and  the 
garrisoning  of  frontier  forts  should  be  the  care  of  the 
colonies,  and  they  should  also  supply  presents  for  the 
Indians,  support  Indian  commissaries,  and  find  money 
to  pay  the  salary  of  the  official  who  was  to  serve  as 
commander-in-chief  and  commissary-general  of  the  In- 
dian Department.  The  whole  expense  of  these  estab- 
lishments should  be  apportioned  by  commissioners 
among  the  colonies  according  to  wealth  and  popula- 
tion.180 The  recommendation  was  reinforced  by  a  new 

178  On  the  conference  consult  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  chap.  ii.     Mr. 
Beer  says  of  the  result  of  the  Albany  Congress:     It  "had  not  succeeded  in 
conciliating  the  Indians,  nor  had  it  provided  for  the  joint  management  of  Iji- 
dian  affairs  nor  for  the  strengthening  of  the  frontiers,  which  were  the  chief 
objects  desired  by  the  British  government." 

179  Printed  in  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vi,  903  ff. 

180  Consult  also  Secretary  Robinson's  letter  of  October  26,  1754  in  idem, 
915. 


n8  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

representation  of  the  Board  when  the  report  of  the  Al- 
bany Congress  was  forwarded  to  the  ministry.181 

Had  some  such  plan  as  this  been  adopted,  the  main 
expense  of  the  war  in  America  would  have  fallen  on 
the  colonies;  their  part  in  the  struggle  with  France 
would  have  been  more  energetic  and  honorable;182  and 
a  unified  system  of  Indian  management  and  of  western 
defense  supported  by  the  colonies  themselves  would 
have  been  inaugurated.  Instead  of  adopting  a  policy 
conceived  on  these  lines  successive  ministries  trusted  to 
the  older  method  of  requisition  upon  the  colonies  for 
troops,  a  method  which  brought  only  a  half-hearted  re- 
sponse with  poorly  provided  soldiers,  in  spite  of  the 
annual  supplies  to  the  various  colonies  voted  by  Parlia- 
ment The  British  government,  nevertheless,  was  in 
earnest  and  sent,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of 
America,  large  numbers  of  regular  troops  to  fight  the 
colonial  battles;  and  the  success  of  the  war  must  be 
credited  to  the  valor  and  training  of  the  red-coated 
soldiers  of  the  imperial  army.183 

Although  the  purpose  of  forming  a  comprehensive 
western  policy  was  not  pursued,  one  point  in  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  Board  of  Trade  was  adopted  by  the 
administration  which  began  the  war  for  the  Ohio  Val- 
ley. The  unification  of  the  command  of  the  army  and 
of  the  management  of  the  Indian  policy  seemed  to  be 
imperatively  demanded  by  the  existing  conditions.  The 
war  was  imperial  in  character;  the  western  Indians  had 
been  won  by  the  French  agents  and  even  the  Iroquois 
were  lukewarm.  It  was,  therefore,  determined  to  send 

181  October   29,    1754,    in    New   York    Colonial  Documents,    vol.    vi,    916. 
This  last  contains  a  list  of  the  grievances  suffered  by  the  Indians  at  the  hands 
of  the  colonists. 

182  The  amount  of  assistance  given  by  the  colonies  during  the  war  is  shown 
in  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  270,  footnote  i. 

183  For  a  clear  discussion  of  this,  consult  idem,  chap.  iv. 


one]       IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 119 

to  America  an  officer,  General  Braddock,  who  should 
command  the  military  forces  and  should  take  the  man- 
agement of  the  political  relations  with  the  Indians  out 
of  the  hands  of  the  inefficient  colonial  officials  and  ap- 
point two  superintendents  to  serve  directly  under  him. 
In  the  spring  of  1756,  William  Johnson  was  appointed 
to  oversee  the  relations  with  the  Indians  in  the  North 
and  Edmund  Atkin  to  take  charge  of  the  natives  of  the 
South.  On  account  of  Atkin's  death  John  Stuart  was 
later  selected  to  fill  the  latter  position.  The  possi- 
bility of  concerted  action  along  the  whole  frontier  from 
Canada  to  Louisiana  was  thus  secured.18* 

From  now  on  Lord  Halifax  and  his  companions  in 
the  Board  of  Trade  could  not  complain  of  dearth  of 
information  concerning  the  Indians  and  western  con- 
ditions. Letters  were  sent  by  the  superintendents  of 
Indian  affairs,  the  governors,  and  others.  William 
Johnson,  the  northern  superintendent,  in  particular, 
proved  himself  a  prolific  writer.  The  most  important 
and  comprehensive  of  these  communications  was  the  re- 
port drawn  up  by  Johnson's  secretary,  Wraxall,  on 
January  9,  I7.$6.185  This  is  unquestionably  the  ablest 
paper  on  the  Indian  question  written  during  this  earlier 
period,  in  spite  of  the  author's  partiality  for  his  supe- 
rior; and  its  influence  may  be  traced  in  all  later  com- 
munications and  in  the  final  construction  of  a  definite 

184  For  General  Braddock's  appointment,  see  New  York  Colonial  Docu- 
ments, vol.  vi,  920.  William  Johnson  received  a  commission  as  superintend- 
ent of  the  Six  Nations  and  their  allies  at  first  from  General  Braddock  in  April, 
I7S5>  but  his  appointment  from  the  home  government  was  dated  1756.  See 
idem,  961;  vol.  vii,  35,  40;  Documentary  History  of  Neia  York,  vol.  ii,  650; 
see  also  references  in  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  254,  footnotes  2  and  3. 

iss  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  15.  Unfortunately,  H.  R. 
Mcllvaine's  edition  of  Wraxall's  Abridgment  of  Indian  Affairs  appeared  too 
late  to  be  used  for  this  study.  His  introduction  is  an  admirable  survey  of 
Indian  affairs  previous  to  the  period  covered  by  this  work. 


120  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

policy.  The  paper  laid  particular  stress  upon  the 
fraudulent  purchases  of  lands  from  the  Indians  and  the 
occupation  of  territory  before  such  purchase.  It  recom- 
mended: "That  the  Indians  be  remedied  and  satisfied 
with  regard  to  their  complaint  about  their  lands  .  .  . 
and  that  no  patents  for  lands  be  hereafter  granted  but 
for  such  as  shall  be  bought  in  the  presence  of  the  super- 
intendents at  public  meetings  and  the  sale  recorded  by 
the  Ma[jes]ty's  Seer  [eta]  ry  for  Indian  affairs."  In 
the  course  of  the  narrative  several  purchases  and  grants 
were  mentioned  which  were  extremely  objectionable  to 
the  Indians.  Among  these  were  certain  notorious  ones 
in  New  York,  the  grant  on  the  Ohio  to  the  Ohio  Com- 
pany, and  the  various  patents  to  land  in  the  same  region 
issued  by  the  governor  of  Virginia.186  Another  dis- 
pute that  arose  at  this  time  called  the  attention  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  more  directly  to  the  Indians'  objec- 
tions to  settlements  across  the  mountains;  namely,  the 
disagreement  concerning  the  purchase  of  land  ex- 
tending to  its  western  boundary  by  the  colony  of 
Pennsylvania. 

From  the  many  letters  of  their  superintendents  the 
ministers  learned  that  the  western  Indian  policy  should 
be  more  inclusive  than  they  had  hitherto  thought  neces- 
sary. They  had  sent  generals  and  armies  to  defend  the 
colonies  from  the  French;  they  had  appointed  super- 
intendents to  hold  the  Indians  to  an  alliance  with  the 
English ;  but  they  had  never  attempted  to  interfere  with 
the  colonial  management  of  Indian  lands.187  Here  en- 

186  Lieutenant  Governor  Golden  made  on  March  i,  1762,  a  general  denial 
of  any  fraud  practiced  in  New  York.     See  idem,  490. 

187  See  for  instance  the  communication  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  to  Governor 
Hardy  and  Chief  Justice  De  Lancey,  dated  March  19,   1756,  in  which  they 
refer  to  them  the  Indian  complaints  about  the  fraudulent  purchase  of  lands. 
See  idem,  77,  78. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  121 

tered  a  new  idea  into  their  plans;  the  consideration  of 
justice  to  the  Indians,  the  protection  of  their  hunting- 
grounds  from  fraudulent  purchases,  and  the  prohibi- 
tion of  illegal  encroachments.  Pennsylvania  showed 
the  way.  Her  representatives  took  the  first  definite  step 
to  appease  the  injured  Indians  in  this  particular  by 
making  the  significant  promise  at  the  Treaty  of  Easton, 
in  October,  1758,  that  no  settlements  west  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies  would  be  made  within  the  confines  of  their 
colony.18'  This  was  a  move  in  the  right  direction,  and 
in  the  end  the  example  of  Pennsylvania  was  to  have  a 
far-reaching  effect.  For  the  present,  however,  the 
British  ministry,  though  showing  its  approval  of  the 
general  principle  involved  by  confirming  the  Treaty 
of  Easton,  did  not  extend  its  application  to  the  western 
lands  of  other  colonies.189 

This  action  at  Easton  was  to  be  imitated  immediate- 
ly by  the  imperial  representative  in  the  transmontane 
valley  where  the  Ohio  Company  had  begun  operations 
again.  Colonel  Bouquet,  who  was  now  in  command 
at  Fort  Pitt,  had  signified  his  willingness  to  join  this 
company,  and  the  Virginians  naturally  supposed  that 
no  obstacles  would  be  placed  in  the  way  of  their  colo- 
nizing the  territory  which  the  British  government  had 
authorized  to  be  ceded  to  them.  In  September,  1760, 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Mercer,  a  representative  of  the 
company,  wrote  to  Bouquet  that  he  had  brought  the 
papers  relating  to  the  grant.  The  issue  was  thus  joined. 
The  commandant  had  to  choose  between  the  rights  of 
the  whites  and  those  of  the  Indians.  The  fear  of  rous- 
ing the  latter  to  overt  acts  of  hostility  overcame  Bou- 

188  Canadian  Archives  Report,    1889,   p.   72   ff. ;   Documentary  History  of 
New  York,  vol.  ii,  775,  783;  Gentleman's  Magazine  (1759),  vol.  xxix,  41,  108. 

189  See  Bouquet's  statement  concerning  this,  October  13,  1761,  in  Canadian 
Archives  Report,  1889,  p.  73. 


122  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

quet's  self-interest;  the  agreement  at  the  Treaty  of 
Easton  was  a  precedent;  and  on  October  13,1761,  he 
issued  a  proclamation  prohibiting  for  the  present  all 
settlement  west  of  the  mountains.190 

The  Virginians  felt  themselves  particularly  ag- 
grieved by  this  act  of  Colonel  Bouquet,  for  by  it  not 
only  was  the  Ohio  Company  prevented  from  pursuing 
its  operations,  but  also  it  affected  the  many  individuals 
who  had  received  grants  of  land  and  the  soldiers  who 
had  been  promised  rewards  for  their  services  in  pro- 
tecting the  colony  in  1754.  The  result  was  a  protest 
from  the  governor,  but  Bouquet  answered  that  the  in- 
terested parties  must  obtain  permission  to  make  settle- 
ments from  the  commander-in-chief,  and  that  as  soon 
as  conditions  permitted,  he  would  himself  give  all  such 
settlers  his  protection.  His  intention  was,  as  he  ex- 
plained, to  safeguard  the  rights  of  all.  This  was  also 
the  purpose  of  General  Amherst  in  approving  Bou- 
quet's proclamation.191 

A  petition  to  the  Privy  Council  in  1759  from  the 
assembly  of  Pennsylvania  concerning  disputes  about 
land  with  the  Indians  brought  this  question  again  to 
an  issue  in  the  British  government,  and  the  Lords  of 
Trade,  on  June  i,  made  a  report  in  which  was  dis- 
cussed the  western  problem  with  particular  reference 
to  justice  to  the  Indians.192  They  pointed  out  that  the 
principal  cause  of  all  the  Indian  uprisings  had  been 
the  occupation  of  their  land  by  the  frontiersmen  and 
gave  as  their  opinion  that  "the  frauds  and  abuses,  with 
respect  to  purchases  and  settlements  of  Indian  lands 

190  The  proclamation  and  the  ensuing  correspondence  is  printed  in  Cana- 
dian Archives  Report,  1889,  p.  73  ff.     See  also  petition  of  George  Washington 
et  al.  of  1763  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.1330,  p.  323. 

191  Canadian  Archives  Report,  1889,  p.  73  ff. 

192  Printed  in  Documentary  History  of  New  York,  vol.  ii,  772. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  123 

properly  so  call'd  and  the  fatal  effects  of  such  abuses 
are  not  confined  to  the  province  of  Pennsylvania,  nor 
to  this  particular  tribe  of  Indians;  they  have  been  as 
much  practiced,  complain'd  of,  and  almost  as  severely 
felt  in  every  other  province  and  extend  to  almost  every 
tribe  of  Indians  with  whom  we  have  an  intercourse." 
In  spite  of  this  clear  enunciation  of  the  difficulty  the 
Lords  of  Trade  contented  themselves  with  narrating 
the  facts  without  making  any  definite  recommendation 
to  remedy  the  evil.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  president, 
Lord  Halifax,  was  not  willing  to  check  the^ western 
colonization  even  temporarily,  if  peace  with  the  In- 
dians could  be  maintained.  The  very  next  year  after 
this  report  was  made  he  was  in  favor  of  settlements  ad- 
jacent to  the  Great  Lakes,  "provided  it  be  done  with  a 
proper  regard  to  our  engagements  with  the  Indians,"1'8 
and  if  the  discoverable  information  can  be  depended 
upon,  this  was  the  attitude  of  the  ministry  in  gen- 
eral.194 So  far  were  the  officials  in  America  from  in- 
terpreting the  advice  of  the  Board  of  Trade  as  an  inten- 
tion to  place  a  permanent  prohibition  on  the  making 
of  land  grants  that  General  Jeffrey  Amherst,  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  British  army  in  America,  recom- 
mended several  frontier  settlements,  one  even  as  far 
west  as  Niagara;  and  Lieutenant  Governor  Golden  of 
New  York  on  Amherst's  advice  opened  up  several 
tracts  of  uncleared  land.195 

193  The  grant   in   question  was  on  Lake   Champlain,   but  the  lords  were 
somewhat  mixed   in  their  geography.     See   New   York   Colonial  Documents, 
vol.  vii,  428.     See  also  idem,  437,  where  the  Board  of  Trade  writes  "that  the 
settlement  of  our  frontier  lands  is,  in  the  general  view  of  it,  a  measure  of 
great  public  utility  and  advantage." 

194  The  only  action  of  the  ministry  on  the  complaint  of  the  Delaware  In- 
dians was  to  command  Sir  William  Johnson  to  make  an  examination.    Docu- 
mentary History  of  Neia  York,  vol.  ii,  789. 

195  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  445,  456,  488,  491,  and  par- 
ticularly Amherst's  own  statement  on  p.  508. 


124  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  Board  of  Trade  under  the  presidency  of  Lord 
Halifax,  did  not  go  beyond  this  general  recommenda- 
tion of  a  jmlicy  of  protection  for  the  Indians'  lands 
against  too  eager  settlers.  The  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  of  Easton  was  simply  an  application  of  this 
principle.  In  spite  of  Johnson's  recommendation  that 
boundaries  between  the  several  colonies  and  the  hunt- 
ing lands  of  the  Indians  be  established,106  the  Lords  of 
Trade,  unwilling  to  stop  westward  emigration,  took  no 
steps  to  bring  about  that  result. 

On  March  21,  1761,  Halifax  resigned  to  take  another 
office.  He  was  always  a  seeker  after  personal  power 
and  under  his  administration  the  Board  of  Trade  had 
acquired  considerable  prestige.  When  he  first  came  in- 
to office,  the  imperial  government  knew  almost  nothing 
about  the  relations  with  the  Indians,  about  the  causes 
of  the  failure  to  keep  them  attached  to  the  British 
cause,  or  about  the  problems  of  frontier  defense.  Hali- 
fax had  proved  himself  diligent  in  the  collection  of  in- 
formation on  all  these  subjects  which  had  become  so 
important  on  account  of  the  war.  During  his  presi- 
dency a  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  had  been  sent 
to  America,  the  political  control  of  Indian  affairs  had 
been  imperialized,  and  superintendents  had  been  ap- 
pointed; but  his  recommendations  concerning  the  set- 
tlements upon  the  Indians'  hunting-grounds  were  weak 
and  too  general  in  scope  to  be  looked  upon  as  a  policy 
that  would  at  the  same  time  satisfy  and  reassure  the  In- 
dians and  permit  the  expansion  westward  which  he 
desired. 

The  next  development  in  the  western  policy  was  due 
to  the  Earl  of  Egremont  who  became  secretary  of  state 
for  the  Southern  Department  on  October  9,  1761.  The 

196  Documentary  History  of  Neiv  York,  vol.  ii,  783. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  125 

power  of  the  Board  of  Trade  had  been  previously  re- 
duced so  that  the  secretary  should  have  complete  con- 
trol of  American  affairs.197  The  new  secretary  was 
possessed  of  some  ability,  was  of  Tory  extraction,  and 
described  by  his  enemies  as  deceitful  and  unfaithful. 
He  was  put  forward  by  his  friends  as  a  rival  to  his 
predecessor,  Pitt,198  and  he  was  desirous  of  making  for 
himself  a  reputation  for  energetic  action.  He  seems  to 
have  been  completely  under  the  influence  of  his  more 
capable  brother-in-law,  George  Grenville,  and  always 
acted  in  harmony  with  him. 

It  was  probably  Lord  Egremont's  influence  that  in- 
duced the  Board  of  Trade  to  embody  the  statement  of 
a  "new  policy"  in  a  report  on  the  settlement  of  the  Mo- 
hawk Valley  concerning  which  Lord  Halifax  had  taken 
such  indecisive  action.  This  "new  policy"  was  dif- 
ferent from  that  previously  advocated  which  was  now 
considered  dangerous  to  the  security  and  interests  of  the 
people.199  Its  essence  is  contained  in  the  following 
sentences :  "The  granting  lands  hitherto  unsettled  and 
establishing  colonies  upon  the  frontiers  before  the 
claims  of  the  Indians  are  ascertained  appears  to  be  a 
measure  of  the  most  dangerous  tendency."  This  should 
be  stopped  "until  the  event  of  the  war  is  determined 
and  such  measures  taken  thereupon,  with  respect  to  our 
Indian  allies  as  shall  be  thought  expedient."  This  im- 
portant report  was  referred  to  the  committee  of  the 

197  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  459.     For  a  discussion  of  the 
relation  between  the  secretary  of  state  for  the  Southern  Department  and  the 
Board  of  Trade,  see  page  152. 

198  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  5,  143 ;  Bedford,  Correspondence, 
vol.  iii,  128;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  215,  also  footnote  3; 
Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  55 ;  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt,  vol. 
iii,  108 ;  Dictionary  of  National  Biography. 

199  The  report  is  dated  November  n,  1761,  and  is  found  in  New  York 
Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  472;   also  printed  in  Massachusetts  Historical 
Society,  Collections,  fourth  ser.,  vol.  5x,  441. 


126  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

council  for  plantation  affairs  and  by  them  to  the  Privy 
Council,  where  it  was  confirmed;  but  the  principle, 
which  was  announced  in  regard  to  a  particular  case, 
was  broadened  into  a  general  imperial  program.  The 
Board  of  Trade  was  directed  to  send  instructions  on  the 
subject  to  the  governors  of  the  royal  colonies  where 
the  property  of  the  soil  rested  in  the  king.  The  in- 
structions, drawn  up  December  2,  1761,  mark  a  dis- 
tinct advance  in  the  execution  of  imperialistic  ideas  in 
the  West.200  The  governors  and  other  possible  officers 
were  forbidden  to  "pass  any  grant  or  grants  to  any  per- 
son whatever  of  any  lands  within  or  adjacent  to  the  ter- 
ritories possessed  or  occupied  by  the  said  Indians  or  the 
property  possession  of  which  has  at  any  time  been  re- 
served to  or  claimed  by  them  [the  Indians]."  Thus 
until  new  provisions  were  made  the  only  way  that  titles 
could  be  purchased  from  the  natives  was  by  first  mak- 
ing application  to  the  governor  who  would  transmit  all 
particulars  of  the  application  to  the  Board  of  Trade, 
upon  whose  report  the  king  would  signify  his  pleasure. 
The  purchase  of  lands  from  the  Indians  had  thus  been 
taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  colonies  and  had  become 
a  function  of  the  imperial  government.  To  the  mili- 
tary protection  and  to  the  management  of  the  political 
affairs  of  the  Indians  by  the  British  government  had 
been  added  the  control  of  the  land  purchases.  Future 
colonization  was  to  be  regulated. 

It  was  this  action  of  the  ministry  which  put  a  full  stop 
to  the  operations  of  the  Ohio  Company  and  compelled 
the  governor  and  council  of  Virginia  to  refuse  to  renew 
the  cession  of  land  to  the  Loyal  Company.201  It  also 

200  Printed  in  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  478.     The  action  of 
the  Privy  Council  will  be  found  in  Privy  Council    (Colonial  Series),  Acts, 
1745-1766,  vol.  iv,  494-500. 

201  Ohio  Company  Papers,  vol.  i,  87,  in  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  127 

prevented  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Virginia  mili- 
tia, who  had  enlisted  in  1754  on  the  governor's  promise 
of  land  grants  "west  of  the  Alleghanies  from  entering 
into  their  claims,  for  as  they  wrote,  "upon  application 
to  Your  Majesty's  present  lieutenant  governor  and  coun- 
cil of  the  said  colony  your  memorialists  received  for 
answer  that  they  were  restrained  by  Your  Majesty's  late 
instructions  from  making  any  grants  in  those  parts." 202 
Thus  before  the  treaty  of  peace  was  made  with  France 
certain  principles  of  a  western  policy  had  been  put  in- 
to operation  through  instructions;  but  the  instructions 
to  the  governors  that  were  issued  were  looked  upon  as 
merely  tentative  in  character;  and  it  was  fully  under- 
stood in  political  circles  that  they  would  remain  in  force 
only  until  the  end  of  the  war,  when  time  could  be  found 
to  reconsider  carefully  the  whole  problem  and  to  for- 
mulate a  comprehensive  policy. 

Before  this  consideration  could  be  given,  circum- 
stances forced  from  the  administration  a  decision  on  one 
phase  of  their  program  that  was  to  have  a  far-reaching 
influence  upon  later  events  and  to  affect  the  whole 
western  policy  in  many  ways.  The  exigencies  of  the 
War  Department  were  responsible  for  this  haste.  The 
general  in  America  and  the  ministry  at  home  realized 
that,  after  the  treaty  of  peace  was  made,  a  force  of 
regular  soldiers  would  be  needed  in  the  colonies  not 
only  to  protect  the  country,  particularly  the  new  acqui- 
sitions, from  foreign  invasion  and  from  the  western 
Indians  who  were  known  to  be  too  friendly  to  the 
French,  but  also  to  hold  in  subjugation  the  new  sub- 
jects of  Canada,  Louisiana,  and  Florida.  So  important 
was  this  subject  that  it  was  agitated  in  the  ministry 
soon  after  the  conquest  of  Canada.  In  December,  1761, 

202  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.1330,  p.  328. 


128  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Lord  Egremont  wrote  General  Amherst  to  order  the 
military  governors  to  transmit  an  exact  state  of  the 
country,  a  return  of  forces,  fortifications,  defenses,  etc.203 
In  the  report  of  General  Gage,  governor  of  Montreal, 
it  was  recommended  that  there  be  maintained  small  gar- 
risons at  a  few  western  posts  with  officers  having  judi- 
cial power.204  Such  a  measure  was  so  obviously  neces- 
sary that  there  seems  to  have  been  no  serious  difference 
of  opinion  concerning  it. 

As  soon  as  the  preliminaries  of  the  peace  were  signed 
the  subject  was  more  constantly  in  the  minds  of  the 
ministers.  In  a  letter  transmitting  the  preliminaries, 
Lord  Egremont  instructed  General  Amherst  to  "be 
turning  in  your  thoughts  any  arrangements,  which  may 
appear  to  you  to  be  for  His  Majesty's  service,  and  you 
will  dispose  of  the  forces  under  your  command  in  such 
a  manner  as  you  shall  judge  may  most  facilitate  the 
immediate  execution  of  the  orders,  you  will  prob- 
ably .  .  .  receive  in  consequence  of  the  definitive 
treaty."  205  Which  one  of  the  ministers  was  responsible 
for  the  final  decision  to  maintain  a  force  of  ten  thousand 
soldiers  in  the  colonies  it  is  difficult  to  determine. 
From  Egremont's  letters  to  Amherst  in  the  autumn  and 
winter  it  is  evident  that  the  secretary  for  the  Southern 
Department  had  the  subject  on  his  mind,  and  there  is 
proof  that  a  tentative  decision  had  been  reached  by  De- 
cember, I762.206 

203  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  37,  footnote  I.  The 
reports  of  the  military  governors  are  printed  in  idem,  37  ff. 


205  November  27,  1762,  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.603. 

206  Egremont's  letters  are  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers, 
5.214.     In  a  letter  from  Newcastle  to  Devonshire  on  December  23,  1762,  there 
is  mention  of  a  tentative  plan  for  the  army.     There  was  a  report  in  New  York 
as  early  as  February  24,  1763,  that  ten  thousand  troops  were  to  be  maintained 
in  America.     See  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  21648,  p.  55.    The 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  129 

Two  men  were  responsible  for  the  final  details  of  the 
plan.  These  were  the  secretary  at  war,  Welbore  Ellis, 
and  the  general-in-chief  in  America,  Sir  Jeffrey  Am- 
herst.  Ellis  was  a  man  of  moderate  common  sense  and 
economy,  but  in  no  way  one  of  brilliant  parts.  He  was 
a  "heeler" -no  other  word  expresses  the  relation -of 
Henry  Fox  to  whom  he  owed  his  appointment.207  Fox 
himself  was  not  deceived  about  the  abilities  of  his  fol- 
lower. "Ellis,"  he  wrote  in  his  Memoirs,  "had  by  my 
friendship  and  accident  got  into  a  place  much  above  his 
pretensions  and  he  was  the  only  man  in  England  who 
did  not  think  so." 208  In  spite  of  the  character  of  its  oc- 
cupant the  secretaryship  at  war,  which  under  Pitt  had 
been  completely  subordinated  in  the  ministry,  was 
raised  in  dignity  and  the  holder  of  it  was  given  direct 
access  to  the  king.209 

To  him  was  now  assigned  the  duty  of  deciding  what 
troops  should  be  maintained  in  the  empire;  and  by  Feb- 
ruary 12,  he  had  reached  definite  conclusions  and  wrote 
to  General  Amherst:  "I  think  it  right  to  acquaint  you 
that  His  Majesty's  present  intention  is  to  keep  20  bat- 
talions (a  list  of  which  with  an  account  of  their  in- 
tended establishment  you  have  enclosed)  for  the  ser- 
vice of  North  America  and  the  plantations."  21°  A  few 
days  later  Ellis  laid  his  plan  before  the  principal  sup- 
problem  of  the  army  in  Ireland  was  nearer  solution  in  December  and  January. 
See  Calendar  of  Home  Office  Papers  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  210,  258,  259. 

207  Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  173;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  68,  footnote  2. 

208  Ilchester  and  Stavordale,  Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  Sarah  Lennox,  vol. 

if  IS- 

209  Pitt  told  the  king  in  August,  1763,  according  to  a  report  which  reached 
the  ears  of  Horace  Walpole,  that  "the  secretary  at  war  should  not  be  of  con- 
sequence, as  it  was  now  under  Ellis,  that  clerk  of  Fox,  the  paymaster,  but 
should  depend  on  him  whom  his  Majesty  should  think  proper  to  command 
his  army."- Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  ///.,  vol.  i,  232.     See  also  Grenville, 
Papers,  vol.  ii,  115. 

210  State  Papers  Domestic,  Military  Papers,  4.71,  p.  224. 


130  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

porters  of  the  government,211  and  in  March  brought 
it  before  the  House  of  Gommons.  The  opposition,  par- 
ticularly the  Newcastle  Whigs,  were  intending  to  make 
some  objections;  but  a  speech  by  Pitt  in  favor  of  the 
maintenance  of  the  army  on  a  larger  standing  than 
formerly  stopped  all  opposition.212  At  the  time  the 
proposal  was  made,  there  seems  to  have  been  an  almost 
universal  understanding  that  Great  Britain  would  pay 
for  the  expense  only  during  the  first  year  but  that  there- 
after money  would  be  raised  in  the  colonies  for  the  sup- 
port of  the  troops.213  In  accordance  with  this  decision, 
Ellis  issued  to  Amherst  the  royal  warrant  for  the  re- 
duction of  the  forces  to  the  determined  peace  footing.21* 

211  The  Duke  of  Newcastle  managed  to  obtain  a  copy  of  the  plan,  which 
was  dated   February  17  or  19.     In  it  occur  the  following:     "10,000  men  in 
America,  to  be  paid  by  England.     To  be  opened  by  the  secretary  at  war,  the 
troops  for  N.  America,  will,  it  is  hoped  be  paid,  another  year,  by  the  colonies 
themselves;   And  the  additional   number  proposed  to  be  kept  in  Ireland  be 
provided  for,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Irish  Parliament. "-British  Museum,  Addi- 
tional Manuscripts,   32947,   p.  46.     See   also  Rigby  to  Bedford,   in  Bedford, 
Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  209;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  193. 

212  Rigby  to  Bedford,  March  10,  1763  in  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii, 
218.     Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Collections,  first  ser.,  vol.  vi,  194.     In 
a  letter  of  Newcastle  to  the  Duke  of  Devonshire  of  December  23,  1762,  occurs 
the  following:     "The  duke  [of  Cumberland]  told  me,  the  other  day,  that  the 
ministry  fear'd,  they  should  be  opposed  in  their  army;  and  they  certainly  will. 
If  they  intend  to  have  the  usual  18,000  men,  and  the  invalids  only,  that,  I 
think,  we  should  not  oppose ;  and  so  I  told  the  duke ;  but,  I  find,  they  would 
have  this  number  exclusive  of  the  garrisons  of  Port  Mahon   and  Gibraltar 
with  a  power  to  increase  the  Irish  army  to  whatever  number  they  please; 
besides   12,000  regular  troops   in   North  America." -British   Museum,   Addi- 
tional Manuscripts,  32945,  p.  335. 

213  Besides  references  above,  Annual  Register  (1763),  vol.  vi,  21.     This  is 
from  the  hand  of  an  Old  Whig,  Edmund  Burke,  one  of  the  repealers  of  the 
later  Stamp  Act.     He  wrote:     "For  the  present  these  troops  are  maintained 
by  Great  Britain.     When  a  more  calm  and  settled  season  comes,  they  are  to 
be  paid,  as  is  reasonable,  by  the  colonies  they  are  intended  to  protect."    It  is 
probable  that  even  William  Pitt  entertained  this  belief  at  the  time.     See  W. 
Gordon,  Rise,  Progress,  and  Establishment  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States,   vol.    i,    136,   quoted    in   the    Dictionary    of   National  Biography,    art. 
"Francis  Fauquier." 

214  May  18,  1763,  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  21634,  pp.  241, 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  131 

To  General  Amherst  was  assigned  the  duty  of  de- 
termining the  disposition  of  these  troops.215  Since  this 
distribution  revealed  the  purposes  proposed  by  the  min- 
istry in  maintaining  an  army  in  the  colonies  and  since 
the  manner  of  stationing  the  troops  became  later  an  is- 
sue between  factions,  it  is  necessary  that  certain  of  the 
details  should  be  understood.  In  order  to  defend  such 
an  extensive  territory  from  foreign  and  Indian  attacks 
and  to  hold  in  subjection  the  new  French  and  Spanish 
subjects,216  the  troops  were  to  be  scattered  in  small  de- 

246.  Although  this  important  decision  had  been  already  reached  and  steps 
were  being  taken  to  carry  it  into  execution,  Lord  Egremont,  in  his  letter  of 
May  5,  referred  the  subject  of  the  maintenance  of  an  army  in  the  conquered 
territories  to  the  Board  of  Trade  and  asked  for  a  report.  That  body,  in  the 
report  of  June  8,  reported  that  they  were  not  ready  to  discuss  the  question ; 
but,  on  October  13,  they  took  it  up  and  wrote  the  secretary  at  war  for  in- 
formation. The  latter  answered  on  October  19  and  sent  the  papers  showing 
what  had  been  done.  No  further  action  was  taken  by  tm  Board  of  Trade. 
The  only  explanation  of  this  conflict  lies  in  the  practical  independence  of  the 
various  governmental  departments.  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Doc- 
uments, 94,  102 ;  Board  of  Trade,  Journals,  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 
Office  Papers;  also  Colonial  Office  Papers,  323.17,  p.  17.  It  should  be  noticed 
that  Lord  Shelburne,  while  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  was  informed 
by  Ellis  of  the  details  of  the  arrangements.  See  Ellis  to  Shelburne,  July  31 
in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts. 

215  Ellis's  account  of  the  negotiations  was  as  follows:     General  Amherst 
"had  previous  to  this  [May  18]  a  letter  written  by  me  by  His  Majesty's  com- 
mand  [February  12]  calling  upon  him  for  a  general  military  plan  for  that 
whole  empire  including  the  West  Indies  on  the  establishment  of  ten  thousand 
men  distributed  into  twenty  battalions. 

"This  manner  of  proceeding  is  agreeable  to  what  is  observed  towards  the 
commander-in-chief  in  N.  Britain,  to  whom  always  the  compliment  is  paid 
of  leaving  to  him  to  form  the  plan  of  the  distribution  of  the  troops  allotted 
to  his  command  which  plan  is  sent  by  him  to  the  War  Office  .  .  .  for 
His  Majesty's  correction  or  approbation ;  and  is  then  transmitted  back  to 
him.  .  .  It  seems  reasonable  to  conform  to  that  precedent  in  regard  to  Sir 
J.  Amherst."-  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts.  In  a  debate  on  the  army  bill  January 
26,  1767,  Lord  Granby  stated  that  the  plan  for  the  distribution  of  troops  in 
America  was  the  work  of  General  Amherst.  See  Walpole,  Memoirs  of 
George  III.,  vol.  ii,  293. 

216  Besides  these  purposes  two  others  are  mentioned,  the  protection  of  the 
trade  interests  and  the  maintaining  the  older  colonies  in  a  state  of  constitu- 
tional dependence  upon  Great  Britain.     The  idea  of  using  the  army  to  main- 


132 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

tachments,  the  largest  of  seven  hundred  and  fifty  men 
being  stationed  at  Quebec.  The  centers  of  other  de- 
tachments were  Montreal,  Niagara,  Detroit,  Nova  Sco- 
tia, South  Caroling  Pensacola,  lower  Mississippi,  and 
Saint  Augustine.  In  each  case  the  detachment  was 
distributed  at  several  posts  within  the  district;  for  in- 
stance, the  soldiers  of  the  Detroit  district  were  to  garri- 
son Detroit,  Michillimackinac,  Miami,  and  a  fort  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Illinois ;  the  lower  Mississippi  district  was 
to  be  divided  between  a  fort  at  the  juncture  of  the  Iber- 
ville  and  the  Mississippi,  another  at  the  mouth  of  the 
former  river,  another  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo,  and 
a  fourth  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio.217  The  plan  con- 
templated, as  may  be  seen  from  the  list,  the  erection  of 
several  new  forts  in  the  Mississippi  Valley.  The  advo- 
cate of  the  plan  argued  that  it  was  better  to  colonize 
from  the  extreme  west  ^eastward  rather  than  the"  re- 
verse as  had  been  the  practice  hitherto,  because,  as  he 
pointed  out,  the  boundaries  of  the  territory  would  be  in 
this  way  sooner  protected  against  an  enemy.  The  last 
item  of  the  plan  proposed  two  commanders  for  the 
colonies,  one  to  be  stationed  north  and  the  other  south 
of  the  proprietary  colonies.218 

tain  the  supremacy  over  the  colonies  became  general,  however,  only  at  a  later 
date,  when  it  was  readily  seen  that  the  distribution  of  the  troops  in  small  de- 
tachments would  not  serve  that  purpose.  Mr.  Beer  [British  Colonial  Policy, 
266]  has  reached  a  similar  conclusion. 

217  The  omission  of  Fort  de  Chartres  from  both  the  Detroit  and  the  lower 
Mississippi   districts  is   interesting.     Was  General   Amherst   ignorant  of  the 
existence  of  such  a  fort,  or  did  he  intend  to  abandon  it?     The  probability  is 
that  he  underestimated  its  importance. 

218  This  document  is  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,   The  Critical  Period 
[Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  5.     Its  authorship  and  date  are  doubt- 
ful.    Either  it  was  written  by  General  Amherst  or  was  drawn  up  in  England 
in  accordance  with  his  advice.     It  is  found  among  the  Board  of  Trade  papers 
which  were  examined  May  6.     The   last  clause,  which   is  probably   a   later 
addition,   states   that  the   plan   was   formed   on   the   supposition   that   France 
would  keep  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi,  but  the  writer  has  evidently 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  133 

The  many  issues  that  were  to  be  born  out  of  this  de- 
cision to  maintain  a  standing  army  in  America  were 
concealed  in  the  womb  of  time  from  the  eyes  of  the 
ministry  that  was  responsible  for  the  measure.  They 
could  not  foretell  that  revolutionary  ideas  would  spring 
from  the  effort  to  raise  in  America  the_fiiQds_n_eeded  for 
the  maintenance  of  such  a  force;  nor  was  the  power  of 
divination  given  them  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  future 
struggle  in  the  cabinets  over  the  least  costly  and  best 
method  to  distribute  the  troops ;  nor  could  they  perceive 
in  a  measure  seemingly  so  reasonable  the  germs  from 
which  were  to  develop  two  rival  systems  of  western 
colonial  policy  that  were  almost  to  disrupt  two  adminis- 
trations and  were  to  prevent  that  calm  consideration  of 
the  colonial  problem  which  they  had  so  much  at  heart. 


heard  of  some  rumors,  at  least,  of  the  cession  to  Spain.  England  was  not 
officially  informed  of  this  cession  by  France  until  October,  1763 ;  but  Bedford 
had  suspected  the  cession  during  the  negotiations,  and  Bute  was  certain  of 
it  in  February,  1763.  Hotblack,  "The  Peace  of  Paris,  1763,"  in  Royal  His- 
torical Society,  Transactions,  third  sen,  vol.  ii,  258 ;  Bute's  letter,  February  3, 
1763,  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report,  vol.  xiii,  appendix  vii,  132. 


V.    THE  CHOICE  OF  THE  MAN 

Lord  Shelburne,  influenced  probably  by  the  example  and  the  tra- 
ditionary precepts  of  his  eminent  father-in-law,  appears  early  to  have 
held  himself  aloof  from  the  patrician  connection,  and  entered  public 
life  as  the  follower  of  Bute  in  the  first  great  effort  of  George  III.  to 
rescue  the  sovereignty  from  what  Lord  Chatham  called  "the  Great 
Revolution  families"  -  BENJAMIN  DISRAELI. 

In  the  spring  of  1763  there  ran  through  the  Lon- 
don populace  a  rumor -repeated  incredulously  and  in 
whispers  at  first  but  with  growing  assurance -that  the 
Earl  of  Bute  had  made  up  his  mind  to  lay  aside  the 
honors  and  dignity  of  minister,  while  still  enjoying  the 
full  confidence  of  his  royal  master  and  flushed  with  the 
triumph  of  the  peace  negotiations.  Such  an  action  was 
incomprehensible  to  the  office-loving  politicians  and 
they  could  explain  it  only  as  the  act  of  a  coward  or  of 
one  hopelessly  defeated.  Contemporaries  wrangled 
over  the  cause  of  this  unexpected  resolution  and  histo- 
rians have  debated  it.  There  was,  however,  no  hidden 
mystery  in  the  event.  Long  before  the  announcement 
of  his  decision  Bute  had  determined  that  the  signing  of 
the  treaty  of  peace  should  bring  to  an  end  his  minis- 
terial labors.219  He  had  reluctantly  assumed  the  re- 
sponsibilities of  office;  and  he  now,  his  task  having  been 
performed,  put  them  away  with  a  feeling  of  relief. 

219  Von  Ruville  [in  William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute']  has  proved  that  Bute 
had  long  determined  to  resign.  See  also  Elliot  to  Baron  Mure,  April  7,  1773 
in  Caldwell,  Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications,  vol.  Ixxi],  part  ii,  vol.  i, 
175.  Bute  wrote  to  Mure  on  April  9  that  the  immediate  occasion  of  his 
resignation  was  his  ill  health.  See  idem,  176. 


136  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  great  question  was  who  should  succeed  him? 
The  contemporary  correspondence  proves  that  the  favor- 
ite had,  on  this  occasion,  been  given  a  free  hand  in  the 
selection  of  an  administration  to  carry  out  those  pur- 
poses which  the  royal  advisers  had  held  constantly  in 
mind.  Whatever  else  might  happen,  care  was  to  be 
taken  to  prevent  the  monarchy  from  sinking  again  into 
that  humiliating  subjection  to  the  oligarchy  that  had  ex- 
isted under  the  king's  grandfather.220  Bute's  system,  as 
itwas  called,  did  not  proscribe  any  individual,  provided 
he  was  willing  and  able  to  act  independently;  but  the 
principle  upon  which  the  new  ministry  was  to  be 
chosen,  if  the  ideal  could  be  maintained  in  practice,  pre- 
cluded the  selection  of  ministers  on  account  of  their 
political  affiliations.  Could  Bute  have  controlled  af- 
fairs, he  would  not  have  placated  any  of  the  Whig 
groups  as  such;  but  he  found  it  impossible  to  seduce 
from  their  allegiance  a  sufficient  number  of  individuals 
to  form  a  new  ministry,  and  so  was  obliged  to  yield  to 
the  force  of  circumstances  and  make  an  appeal  to  the 
loyalty  of  certain  of  the  factions. 

His  choice  was  limited.  On  account  of  Pitt's  oppo- 
sition to  the  treaty  of  peace,  his  late  coalition  with  the 
Old  Whigs,  and  the  king's  personal  animosity  to  him  for 
that  reason,  the  Pittites  could  not  be  considered  at  this 
time.221  The  Old  Whigs  and  the  followers  of  Cum- 

220  See    the    correspondence    between    Bute    and    Grenville    in    Grenville, 
Papers,  vol.  ii,  33  ff. ;  and  between  Bute,  Shelburne,  and  Fox  in  Fitzmaurice, 
Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  142  ff.     On  Bute's  resignation  see  particularly  "A 
Letter  from  a  Gentleman  in  Town  to  his  Friend  in  the  Country,"  in  Gentle- 
man's Magazine   (1763),  vol.  xxxiii,  189. 

221  Bute  to  Bedford,  April  2,  1763,  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  223. 
The  history  of  the  negotiations  of  the  spring  of  1763  may  be  found  in  Von 
Ruville,  William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute,  where  are  given  the  references  to  the 
sources.     Consult  also  the  same  author's  William  Pitt,  vol.  iii,  98  ff.,  but  the 
correspondence  of  the  period  should  be  carefully  read.     See  the  "Bibliography" 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  137 

berland  were  equally  out  of  the  question.  Bute's  choice 
of  members  for  the  new  ministry  was,  therefore,  con- 
fined to  the  Bedfords,  the  Grenvilles,  and  the  court  fac- 
tion, and  a  few  detached  men  like  Henry  Fox.  This 
limitation  was  actually  narrower  than  Bute  expected, 
because  Bedford  himself  refused  to  unite  with  the  min- 
istry, though  he  made  no  objection  to  his  followers  tak- 
ing office.222  During  this  crisis  Henry  Fox  and  James 
Oswald  were  the  favorite's  chief  advisers,223  and  he  dis- 
cussed with  them  very  frankly  the  fitness  of  the  possible 
candidates.224  Still  he  took  the  greatest  pains  that  the 
final  decision  should  remain  his,  since  the  augmentation 
of  Fox's  influence  was  not  among  his  plans.  The  final 
determination  reached  was  that  no  one  man  should  be 
named  as  principal  minister,  but  that  the  leadership 
should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  three  men,  George 
Grenville,  Lord  Halifax,  and  Lord  Egremont,  and  that 
for  the  present  the  ministry  be  left  on  the  narrow  basis 
then  existing. 

Although  the  domestic  situation  was  decisive  in  the 
selection  of  the  new  cabinet,  one  other  factor  was  promi- 
nent in  the  minds  of  Bute  and  his  friends.  They  un- 
derstood fully  that  the  most  important  work  to  be  per- 
formed in  the  immediate  future  was  the  formation  of 

at  end  of  this  work.  There  are  some  very  important  letters  on  Bute's  resig- 
nation printed  in  Adolphus,  History  of  England,  vol.  i,  114  ff. 

222  Bedford  was  at  this  time  angry  at  several  members  of  the   ministry 
which  had  negotiated  the  peace,  because  of  the  treatment  he,  as  their  agent  in 
Paris,  had  received.     He  was  particularly  incensed   at  Egremont   and  Bute. 
See  Rigby's  letters  in  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  115,  131.    The  reasons 
advanced  by  Bedford  himself  for  his  refusal  were  his  lack  of  faith  in  the 
strength  of  the  ministry  and  the  hostility  to  himself  of  the  men  who  were  to 
compose  it.     See  idem,  227. 

223  That  is  before  the  issue  about  Fox's  own  office  arose. 

224  See  particularly  the  letters  of  Fox  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne, 
vol.  i,  142  ff. ;  and  of  Bute  and  Oswald  in  Memorials  of  the  Public  Life  and 
Character  of  James  Oswald,  410  ff. 


138  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

a  policy  for  the  newly  acquired  territory,  concerning 
which  one  of  Bute's  advisers  wrote: 

The  settlement  of  America  must  be  the  first  and  principal  ob- 
ject. It  will  certainly  be  the  chief  point,  upon  which  all  future 
opposition  will  attempt  to  throw  its  colours,  and  raise  its  bat- 
tery. It  will  prove,  in  a  word,  the  chief  engine  of  faction.225 

The  selection  of  the  man  best  fitted  to  carry  out  this  im- 
portant duty  was  a  subject  of  much  thought  and  dis- 
cussion. Of  the  "triumvirate"  chosen  to  lead  the  min- 
istry, two,  Lord  Halifax  and  Lord  Egremont,  were 
familiar  with  American  conditions;  but  the  Earl  of 
Bute  was  never  deceived  in  his  estimation  of  their  char- 
acters and  had  no  great  confidence  in  the  abilities  of 
either,  while  the  opinion  of  Fox  regarding  the  two  was 
very  unfavorable.226  The  third,  George  Grenville,  was 
equally  objectionable  since  he  was  interested  only  in 
financial  measures  and  knew  almost  nothing  about  the 
needs  of  the  oversea  dominions.  Another  possible 
candidate  was  the  brilliant  and  erratic  Charles  Town- 
shend  who  was  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade  while 
these  negotiations  over  the  composition  of  the  ministry 
were  being  carried  on.  Although  his  mind  was  com- 
prehensive in  its  reach,  he  was  too  indolent  to  make  a 
close  study  of  conditions,  was  inclined  to  jump  at  hasty 
conclusions,  and  was  in  the  habit  of  vigorously  promot- 
ing ill-digested  plans.  Neither  Bute  nor  Fox  had  any 
confidence  in  his  judgment  and  both  were  desirous  of 
removing  him  from  his  position.227 

Discarding,  then,  these  men  who  were  experienced  in 

225  Memorials  of  the  Public  Life  and  Character  of  James  Oswald,  414. 

226  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelbume,  vol.  i,  143 ;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii, 
208.     In  the  case  of  both  these  references  the  information  rests  on  the  word 
of  Henry  Fox   and  this  should  not  be   relied  upon   alone,  but  Bute's  whole 
course  during  1763  proves  his  distrust  of  the  abilities  of  the  leaders  of  the 
ministry. 

227  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelbume,  vol.  i,  146,  148. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  139 

statecraft,  the  Earl  of  Bute  selected  a  young  and  untried 
man,  but  an  intimate  and  seemingly  loyal  friend,  the 
Earl  of  Shelburne.  The  manner  in  which  Shelburne 
was  forced  upon  an  unwilling  ministry  by  the  king's 
favorite  indicates  that  there  existed  between  patron  and 
protege  a  mutual  understanding  concerning  the  future 
policy  and  a  confidence  in  the  loyalty  of  each  other. 
Lord  Shelburne  was,  from  the  time  of  his  entrance  in- 
to the  administration,  the  true  representative  of  the 
court  faction.228 

The  first  plan  was  to  appoint  Shelburne  to  the  im- 
portant position  of  secretary  of  state  for  the  Southern 
Department  in  place  of  Grenville's  brother-in-law, 
Lord  Egremont.  This  would  have  given  him  com- 
plete control  of  the  American  colonies,  if  the  power  of 
the  Board  of  Trade  should  be  again  subordinated;229 
and  this  was  probably  Bute's  idea,  provided  Fox  read 
correctly  the  mind  of  that  irresolute  politician  when  he 
wrote : 

Let  Lord  Shelburne  succeed  Lord  Egremont.  If,  as  I  hope, 
that  should  drive  Charles  Townshend  from  the  Board  of  Trade, 
let  Oswald  succeed  him,  and  between  Lord  Shelburne  and  Os- 
wald, that  greatest  and  most  necessary  of  all  schemes,  the  set- 
tlement of  America,  may  be  effected.230 

228  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  163,  176;  Memorials  of  the  Pub- 
lic Life  and  Character  of  James  Oswald,  410  ff.     See  also  the  significant  state- 
ment by  Hardwicke  to  Newcastle,   May   13,   1763,   in  Yorke,  Life  of  Hard- 
ivicke,  vol.  iii,  498. 

229  For  these  negotiations  see  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  142  ff., 
163,  169  ff . ;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  33  ff. 

230  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  148,  196.     This  does  not  prove 
that  Bute  indorsed  Shelburne's  plans,  but  taken  in  connection  with  his  praise 
of  Shelburne's  later  report  and  the  fact  that  he  gave  his  confidence  to  Shel- 
burne at  the  time  the  king  and  he  determined  in  August  to  reorganize  the 
ministry  by  bringing   in   Pitt,   the   interpretation   seems   to   be   justified.     See 
page   192.     In  the  controversy  over  the   appointment  of  Shelburne  between 
Bute  and  Grenville,  the  former  gave  out  as  his  final  reason  for  placing  Shel- 
burne in  the  ministry  the  fact  of  his  influence  over  Fox  and  this  was  probably 
one  of  the  determining  causes.     See  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  41. 


140  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Had  this  plan  been  carried  out,  there  would  have  been 
placed  in  charge  of  the  American  departments  two  men 
who  were  in  advance  of  their  age  in  political  thought, 
James  Oswald  being  one  of  the  leaders  in  that  Scottish 
circle  in  which  Adam  Smith  found  such  congenial  en- 
vironment for  the  development  of  his  philosophy. 
This  proposal  for  the  disposition  of  the  American  de- 
partments was  prevented  by  George  Grenville  who 
raised  objections  to  bringing  such  a  young  man  as  Shel- 
burne,  belonging  to  a  family  of  no  great  weight,  into 
the  important  office  of  secretary  of  state.  This  opposi- 
tion to  his  plan  evidently  appeared  to  Bute  insurmount- 
able and  Shelburne  generously  withdrew.  The  resig- 
nation of  Charles  Townshend,  however,  solved  the  dif- 
ficulty by  creating  the  much  desired  vacancy,  and  Shel- 
burne was  immediately  appointed  president  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  with  a  seat  in  the  cabinet,  which  se- 
cured him  an  equal  weight  in  colonial  affairs  with  the 
secretary.231 

To  name  Lord  Shelburne  is  to  name  the  man  who  has 
exercised  greater  influence  on  the  development  of  west- 
ern America  than  any  other  British  statesman,  not  ex- 
cepting even  William  Pitt.  At  three  important  crises  in 
the  history  of  the  West,  Shelburne  occupied  the  place  of 
supreme  influence  over  the  future  of  the  territory.  As 
will  be  seen,  he  materially  assisted  in  laying,  in  1763,  the 
foundations  of  the  British  policy  in  the  great  valley;  in 
1766,  when  he  was  secretary  of  state  for  the  Southern 
Department,  he  carefully  investigated  the  conditions  in 
the  West  and  formulated  a  colonial  policy,  truly  im- 

231  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  173  ff. ;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol. 
ii,  41.  Charles  Townshend  was  regarded  as  particularly  unfitted  for  the  new 
ministry  on  account  of  his  hostility  to  Egremont.  See  Memorials  of  the  Public 
Life  and  Character  of  James  Oswald,  410  ff. ;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George 
HI.,  vol.  5,  210. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 141 

perial  in  character,  which,  though  frustrated  forthwith 
by  the  exigencies  of  politics,  was  the  source  of  all  later 
issues ; 232  finally  and  most  important  of  all,  it  was  Lord 
Shelburne  as  prime  minister  who  determined  the  policy 
of  his  nation  in  the  treaty  of  peace  which  closed  the 
American  Revolution,  and  his  was  the  momentous  de- 
cision that  gave  the  new  nation  the  magnificent  inland 
valley  which  imperial  Britain  had  failed  to  utilize.233 
The  significant  influence  of  Lord  Shelburne  upon  the 
destiny  of  western  America -an  influence  exercised  dur- 
ing a  space  of  twenty  years  and  therefore  beyond  the 
period  covered  in  this  work -will  perhaps  justify  the 
attempt,  made  in  the  following  pages,  to  understand 
his  character,  even  if  his  genius  is  not  of  that  supreme 
kind  that  led  Disraeli,  also  a  prime  minister  of  Great 
Britain,  to  assert  that  he  was  "the  ablest  and  most  ac- 
complished minister  of  the  eighteenth  century."234 

Although  there  is  no  longer  that  dearth  of  informa- 
tion about  Lord  Shelburne,  concerning  which  Disraeli 
complained,  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  discovering 
his  true  nature  are  almost  insurmountable,  since  he 
possessed  one  of  those  positive  characters  which  attracts 
or  repels  contemporaries  with  almost  equal  force,  and 
imposes  on  succeeding  generations  the  task  of  discrim- 
inating between  the  idealization  by  friends  and  the  cari- 
cature by  enemies.  What  manner  of  man  was  he? 
Did  nobility  of  purpose,  lofty  ideals,  and  generosity 
mark  his  course  through  life?  Or  was  he  the  most  in- 
sincere and  cunning  politician  of  his  age,  "a  Cataline 

232  See  chapter  xii. 

233  Phillips,    The    West   in   the  Diplomacy    of  the  American   Revolution, 
passim.     One  proof  that  this  decision  of  his  was  not  "of  necessity"  but  "of 
choice"  may  be  found  in  a  letter  written  by  him  in  1797,  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life 
of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  201,  footnote  z. 

234  Disraeli,  Sybil  or  the  Two  Nations,  19,  but  the  whole  account,  book  i, 
chap,  iii,  should  be  read  for  a  remarkable  estimate  of  Shelburne's  career. 


i42  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

or  a  Borgia,"  a  procurist  of  sinecures  for  his  friends, 
and  the  betrayer  of  the  popular  cause?  In  his  case  as 
in  that  of  Lord  Bute  and  of  many  other  politicians  the 
factious  writings  of  contemporary  politics  have  com- 
pletely obscured  the  true  man.  Fortunately  Shelburne 
in  his  old  age  attempted  to  draw  a  picture  of  his  own 
life ;  and  this  self-revealing  sketch,  though  only  a  frag- 
ment, is  a  rich  source  of  information  about  those  evasive 
spiritual  qualities  which  any  true  portrait  of  him  must 
exhibit.235  Therein  the  reader  may  discover  the  condi- 
tions which  surrounded  him  during  those  adolescent 
years  in  which  were  molded  the  manner  of  his  thought, 
his  ideals  of  life,  and  his  political  tendencies  from 
which  even  in  his  maturity  he  never  completely  eman- 
cipated himself. 

He  was  born  in  Dublin  on  May  20,  1737;  and  his 
boyhood  days  were  spent  within  one  of  those  feudal 
communities,  relics  of  a  former  age  so  common  in 
eighteenth-century  Ireland,  over  which  his  grandfather 
ruled  with  the  same  despotic  power  as  had  his  prede- 
cessors for  hundreds  of  years.  Through  his  grand- 
mother he  was  descended  from  the  famous  Sir  William 
Petty,  the  writer  on  political  economy,  and  in  later  life 
Lord  Shelburne  attributed  to  this  connection  his  intel- 
lectual attainments.  One  important  element  in  his 
political  career  owes  its  origin  to  his  ancestry  and  to  the 
place  of  his  birth.  The  traditions  of  his  early  environ- 
ment were  of  Anglo-Irish  and  Cromwellian  origin;  and 
thus  in  his  youth  his  political  ideas  were  very  signifi- 
cantly differentiated  by  the  influences  surrounding  him 
from  the  common  heritage  of  the  members  of  the  Whig 
oligarchy  whose  families  boasted  of  their  close  historical 

235  This  autobiography  is  printed  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol. 
i,  1-81. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  143 

relations  with  the  glorious  Revolution  of  1688.  This 
dissimilarity  in  inherited  traditions  is  the  explanation 
of  that  lack  of  sympathy  between  Lord  Shelburne  and 
the  members  of  the  Old  Whig  faction  that  prevented 
him  so  frequently  from  making  common  cause  with 
such  men  as  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  and  the  Marquis 
of  Rockingham. 

Lord  Shelburne  in  his  autobiography  complains  of 
his  lack  of  education.  He  was  permitted  by  his  par- 
ents to  run  wild  as  long  as  he  lived  on  his  grandfather's 
Irish  fief;  and  even  when  the  family  moved  to  Lon- 
don, the  fifteen  year  old  boy  was  "suffered  to  go  about, 
to  pick  up  what  acquaintance  offered,  and  in  short  had 
no  restraint  except  in  the  article  of  money." 236  A  year 
after  this  removal  he  was  sent  to  Christ  Church,  Ox- 
ford, where  his  chief  interest  centered  in  the  study  of 
religion  and  the  laws  of  nature;  here  also  he  listened 
with  profit  to  the  lectures  of  the  learned  Blackstone. 
With  his  twentieth  year  the  period  of  formal  instruc- 
tion came  to  an  end.  He  now  entered  the  army  and 
served  in  Germany  under  Wolfe  with  such  credit  that 
he  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  colonel  and  was  ap- 
pointed aide-de-camp  to  the  king.237  He  was  still  very 
young  when  he  was  brought  into  political  affairs  and 
had  never  received  at  any  period  of  his  life  that  strict 
mental  discipline  that  should  have  prepared  him  for 
the  life  of  public  service. 

The  consequences  of  this  inadequate  instruction  dur- 
ing his  youth  were  apparent  throughout  his  life  to  both 
his  friends  and  his  enemies.  One  of  the  former,  Jeremy 
Bentham,  declared  that  "his  head  was  not  clear.  He 
felt  the  want  of  clearness." 238  Lord  Holland's  impres- 

236  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  u. 

237  _  ldem>   82. 

238  Bentham,  Works,  vol.  x,  187.     See  also  116. 


144  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

sions  were  of  a  similar  character:  "In  his  publick 
speeches  he  wanted  method  and  perspicuity,  and  was 
deficient  in  justness  of  reasoning,  in  judgment,  and  in 
taste.  .  .  His  mind  seemed  to  be  full  and  overflow- 
ing, and  though  his  language  was  incorrect  and  con- 
fused, it  was  often  fanciful,  original,  and  happy."239 
This  deficiency  in  education  Lord  Shelburne,  in  a  great 
measure,  overcame  by  his  natural  talents,  the  two  most 
conspicuous  being  imagination  and  industry.  His 
vivid  imagination  enabled  him  to  visualize  without  the 
aid  of  his  poorly  developed  reasoning  powers  the  sys- 
tems of  philosophy  expounded  by  his  numerous  intel- 
lectual friends,  the  first  scientists,  men  of  letters,  and 
leaders  of  thought  of  his  age,  who  were  constant  visit- 
ors at  his  home.  Men  like  Lord  Camden  and  Dun- 
ning, in  politics;  Priestley,  Price,  David  Hume,  and 
Bentham,  in  science;  and  Samuel  Johnson,  Oliver 
Goldsmith,  and  Sir  Joshua  Reynolds  in  arts  and  let- 
ters, were  frequently  his  companions;240  and  by  their 
conversations  his  active  mind  was  constantly  stimulated 
to  such  achievement  as  would  have  been  impossible  for 
him  working  alone.241 

The  inspiration  from  converse  with  such  friends  would 
have  resulted  in  great  superficiality;  and  Lord  Shel- 

239  Holland,  Memoirs  of  the  Whig  Party,  vol.  i,  41.     It  should  be  remem- 
bered that  both  Bentham  and  Lord  Holland  knew  Shelburne  after  his  active 
career  in  politics  was  over,  when  it  is  probable  that  Shelburne  was  depending 
on  a  failing  memory  rather  than  the  active  investigation  and  thought  of  his 
earlier  days. 

240  Fitzmaurice,   Life   of  Shelburne,    vol.    i,    218,    221,   425    ff. ;    Bentham, 
Works,  vol.  x,  101,  236.     Shelburne  had  also  many  friends  on  the  continent. 
Consult   Fitzmaurice,   Lettres    de    fAbbe   Morellet   a   Lord   Shelburne.      Dr. 
Priestley  was  Lord  Shelburne's  librarian  for  a  number  of  years.     See  Rutt, 
Priestley's  Life  and  Correspondence,  passim. 

241  Bentham  writes  that  Shelburne  grasped  a  "scrap  of  an  idea,  and  filled 
it  up  in  his  own  mind  -  sometimes  correctly  -  sometimes  erroneously."-  Works, 
vol.  x,  166. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  145 

burne  would  certainly  have  been  guilty  on  this  charge 
had  he  not  been  endowed  with  a  capacity  for  industry 
in  investigation  not  exceeded  by  any  contemporary 
statesman.  He  has  himself  explained  his  method  in  a 
particular  instance.  When  he  wished  to  discover  some 
means  of  bringing  about  a  reconciliation  with  the  col- 
onies, he  "dedicated  a  great  part  of  his  time,  in  the 
course  of  the  preceding  summer,  to  the  perusal  of 
books,  particularly  to  such  as  treated  of  the  conduct  of 
kingdoms  and  great  states,  in  difficult  and  trying  situa- 
tions. In  those  researches,  he  endeavoured  to  apply 
what  had  happened  in  former  times  to  the  existing  cir- 
cumstances in  which  this  nation  at  present  stood."242 
Research  in  the  documentary  sources  was  characteristic 
of  him  throughout  his  life.  Even  when  he  was  a  young 
man  Lord  Sandwich  asked  him:  "Have  you  done 
with  those  silly  manuscripts?"243  His  collection  of 
manuscripts  in  Lansdowne  House  and  his  library  now 
in  the  British  Museum  prove  that  he  was  untiring  in 
the  search  for  information  on  any  event  in  which  he  was 
interested.  When  he  was  in  the  ministry  he  was  care- 
ful to  hold  his  opinion  in  abeyance  until  there  were  in 
his  hands  full  reports  from  public  and  private  sources 
to  enlighten  him.  Even  while  he  was  in  opposition 
he  did  not  relax  his  energies;  and  it  is  said  of  him  that 
during  Lord  North's  administration,  he  employed  three 
or  four  clerks  to  copy  the  state  papers.244  His  corres- 
pondence was  so  extensive  and  his  information  so  re- 
liable that  the  ministry  frequently  "sent  to  him  for  the 
information  which  the  cabinet  could  not  command."245 
The  chief  intellectual  pursuit  of  Lord  Shelburne  was 

242  Speech  by  Shelburne  in  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xix,  1312. 

243  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  217. 

244  Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  61. 

245  Disraeli,  Sybil  or  the  Tivo  Nations,  21. 


146  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  study  of  modern  history,  both  English  and  con- 
tinental; and  for  the  period  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  he  was  far  better  enlightened  than 
most  of  his  contemporaries.248 

His  encyclopedic  knowledge  procured  him  a  great 
advantage  in  debate,  and  his  speeches  were  illumined 
by  pertinent  allusions  to  historical  events  that  illus- 
trated the  subjects  under  discussion.  He  was  a  learned 
and  courageous  speaker,  however,  rather  than  a  great 
orator.  In  brilliancy  of  idea  and  lucidity  of  expres- 
sion he  was  not  to  be  compared  to  his  leader,  William 
Pitt,  or  in  logical  presentation  of  an  argument  to  Ed- 
mund Burke;  but  in  extent  of  information,  in  fecundity 
of  thought,  and  in  catholicity  of  opinion  he  was  the 
equal  if  not  the  superior  of  both.  His  ideas  were  not 
always  well  arranged,  his  language  was  frequently  in- 
correct and  confused,  and  his  style  diffuse,  but  his  cour- 
age in  attack  and  his  sarcastic  hits  caused  consternation 
among  his  enemies  who  considered  him  one  of  their 
most  formidable  antagonists.247  An  opponent,  Thomas 
Lord  Lyttelton,  in  describing  his  attempt  to  answer 
Shelburne  in  debate  states  that  he  failed  because  "that 

246  In  his  Memoirs  [vol.  ii,  62],  Wraxall  has  presented  the  following  por- 
trait:    "In  his  person,  manners,  and  address,  the  Earl  of  Shelburne  wanted 
no   external    quality   requisite   to   captivate   or   conciliate   mankind.     Affable, 
polite,  communicative,  and  courting  popularity,  he  drew  round  him  a  number 
of  followers  or  adherents.     His  personal  courage  was  indisputable.     Splendid 
and  hospitable  at  his  table,  he  equally  delighted  his  guests  by  the  charms  of 
his  conversation  and  society.     In  his  magnificent  library,  one  of  the  finest  of 
its  kind  in  England,  he  could  appear  as  a  philosopher  and  man  of  letters." 

247  Lord    Shelburne's    speeches    are    inadequately    reported    in    the   Parlia- 
mentary  History    as    is   the    universal    case   during    the    eighteenth    century. 
Jeremy  Bentham  [Works,  vol.  x,  187]  writes  that  he  "spoke  in  the  house  with 
grace  and  dignity,  yet  he  uttered  nothing  but  vague  generalities."     A  study 
of  his  reported  speeches  during  the  period  of  his  strength  does  not  bear  out 
this  opinion.     Very  good  examples  are  offered  in  Parliamentary  History,  vol. 
xviii,  722,  920,  1083 ;  vol.  xix,  850,  1032,  1306.     For  a  very  high  estimate  of 
Shelburne  as  a  speaker  see  Lord  Thurlow's  speech  in  idem,  vol.  xxii,  976. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  147 

noble  lord  took  a  course  so  different  from  his  presup- 
positions, and  displayed  a  degree  of  political  erudition 
so  far  beyond  him"  that  he  was  thrown  into  the  greatest 
confusion.248 

The  lack  of  coherence,  dignity,  and  polish,  so  evident 
in  Shelburne's  speeches,  is  not  found  in  his  written  re- 
ports and  other  state  papers,  which  are  as  regards  both 
literary  form  and  logical  thought  remarkable  produc- 
tions.249 Over  the  wording  and  substance  of  these  he 
expended  infinite  pains,  drawing  upon  the  assistance  of 
his  numerous  clerks  and  friends.  In  order  that  he 
might  hit  upon  the  best  line  of  reasoning  he  frequently 
ordered  several  persons  to  prepare  for  him  papers  of 
the  character  he  was  himself  to  write.  After  his  own 
manuscript  was  completed,  he  was  ever  unwilling  to 
allow  it  to  pass  out  of  his  hands  lest  some  more  felici- 
tous expression  should  occur  to  his  mind  or  some  fur- 
ther information  should  arrive  to  modify  his  opinion. 
This  deliberateness  of  his  in  making  up  his  mind  and  in 
preparing  his  papers  exasperated  all  those  who  were 
compelled  to  work  with  him  and  seriously  impaired  the 
efficiency  of  his  administration  of  a  state  office,  in  spite 
of  the  excellency  of  the  product  of  his  thought  and 
pen.250 

Lord  Holland  considered  that  Shelburne's  greatest 
defect  was  his  "want  of  judgment"  and  that  his  ruling 
vices  were  "an  imperious  temper  and  suspicion."251  In 

248  Frost,  Life  of  Thomas  Lord  Lyttelton,  162.  An  admirer  calls  one  of 
Shelburne's  speeches  a  "model  of  perfect  oratory."  See  Selwyn,  Letters,  186. 

219  See  for  instance  the  report  of  Board  of  Trade  on  June  8,  1763  printed 
in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  97. 

250  In  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  clxviii,  is  a  letter  from  Sergeant  Glyn 
in  which  he  assures  Lord  Shelburne  that  he  (Glyn)  is  careful  to  destroy  all 
evidence  of  the  papers  he  had  prepared.     On  his  deliberateness  see  "Knox 
Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report  on  the  Manu- 
scripts in  various  Collections,  283. 

251  Holland,  Memoirs  of  the  Whig  Party,  vol.  i,  42. 


148 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

his  autobiography  Shelburne  complained  that  he  "got 
little  or  no  knowledge  of  the  world,"252  which  means 
that  his  romantic  ideal  of  honor  unfitted  him  to  make 
his  way  in  the  world  of  intrigue  where  he  found  him- 
self.253 All  those  who  came  to  know  him  intimately 
realized  that  he  was  inspired  by  a  lofty  conception  of 
his  position  and  its  responsibilities.  At  the  beginning 
of  his  career  he  wrote  to  Fox  that  he  thought:  "Men 
of  independent  fortune  should  be  trustees  between  king 
and  people,  and  contrive  to  think  in  whatever  they  do 
to  be  occupied  in  actions  of  service  to  both,  without  be- 
ing slaves  to  either."  Fox,  who  was  particularly  well 
acquainted  with  the  world  of  eighteenth-century  Lon- 
don, advised  him  to  ask  for  a  governmental  position. 
"This  will  lead  directly  to  what  I  suppose  you  aim  at 
and  perhaps  soon.  You'll  never  get  it  from  that 
trusteeship  that  you  spoke  of;  nor  to  say  the  truth 
should  you  get  it  till  you  have  got  rid  of  such,  to  say  no 
worse  of  them,  puerile  notions."254  Shelburne  never 
accepted  this  advice  of  his  cynical  friend  and  it  was  his 
boast  that  he  followed  "measures  not  men." 

Throughout  life  Lord  Shelburne  had  a  reputation 
for  an  insincerity  exceeding  that  of  any  man  of  his 
insincere  age.  Walpole  wrote  that  the  falsehood  of 
Lord  Shelburne  "was  so  constant  and  notorious,  that  it 
was  rather  his  profession  than  his  instrument.  .  . 
He  was  so  well  known  that  he  could  only  deceive  by 
speaking  the  truth." 255  This  accusation  is  repeated 
again  and  again  by  his  contemporaries.256  A  close 
study  of  his  acts  and  of  the  opinions  of  those  who  lived 

252  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  15.     In  this  Walpole  is  in  agree- 
ment.    Last  Journals,  vol.  ii,  466. 

253  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  156. 

254  —  Idem,  112,  113. 

255  Last  Journals,  vol.  ii,  465. 

2nG  See  squib  in  Public  Advertiser  and  other  passages  quoted  in  Fitzmaur- 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  H9 

on  terms  of  intimacy  with  him  does  not  support  this 
charge.  Benjamin  Franklin,  after  mentioning  this 
reputation  for  insincerity,  declared  that  he  never  saw 
any  incident  of  it257  Probably  the  most  unprejudiced 
testimony  in  regard  to  this  phase  of  Lord  Shelburne's 
character  comes  from  Rayneval,  who  was  sent  to  Lon- 
don in  1782,  by  the  French  minister,  Count  de  Ver- 
gennes,  to  discuss  certain  parts  of  the  pending  treaty 
of  peace.  Rayneval  was  a  man  trained  in  the  art  of 
understanding  men,  and  one  of  his  duties  on  this  mission 
was  to  read  the  character  of  the  English  minister.  Af- 
ter having  enjoyed  special  opportunities  of  informing 
himself  he  wrote  to  his  chief  the  following  as  his  ma- 
ture judgment: 

Unless  I  am  entirely  mistaken  he  [Shelburne]  is  a  minister  of 
noble  views  and  character,  proud  and  determined,  yet  with  the 
most  winning  manners.  He  takes  a  broad  view  of  affairs  and 
hates  petty  details.  He  is  not  obstinate  in  discussion,  but  you 
must  convince  him ;  still,  in  more  than  one  instance,  I  have  ob- 
served that  sentiment  more  than  reason  has  influenced  his  mind. 
I  may  add  that  his  friends  and  entourage  do  him  honor.  There 
is  not  an  intriguer  or  doubtful  character  among  them.  A  man 
such  as  I  have  described  is  not  ordinarily  false  or  captious,  and 
I  venture  to  say  that  Lord  Shelburne  is  neither  the  one  nor  the 
other,  whatever  persons  may  say  who  imagine  that  they  know 
him,  but  imagine  wrongly.258 

ice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  387  ff. ;  Elizabeth  Lady  Holland,  Journal,  vol. 
i,  175;  Rose,  Diaries  and  Correspondence,  vol.  i,  25,  27. 

257  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  x,  358.     See  also  the  assertions  of 
others  quoted  by  Lord  Fitzmaurice,  in  op.  cit.    In  a  letter  to  Sir  George  Savile, 
October  28,  1775,  Dr.  Priestley,  who  knew  Lord  Shelburne  intimately,  wrote: 
"I  think  I  may  venture  to  say  that  I  know  Lord  Shelburne  very  well,  and  I 
would  be  very  far  from  leading  Sir  George  Savile  into  a  mistake  with  respect 
to  him.     He  is  by  no  means  that  artful  ambitious  politician  that  he  has  been 
represented.     .     .     You  will  find  him  frank,  plain,  and  open  like  yourself."  - 
"Savile  Foljambe  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Fif- 
teenth Report,  appendix,  part  v,  149. 

258  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  182. 


150  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  reputation  of  any  public  man  is  dependent  on 
such  diverse  elements  and  is  based  on  such  superficial 
information  and  illogical  analyses  that  no  satisfactory 
explanation  of   the  popular  estimate  of  Lord   Shel- 
burne  can  be  made.     The  fact  that,  while  still  a  youth, 
he  was  supposed  to  have  deceived  the  crafty  and  ex- 
perienced Henry  Fox  may  have  offered  sufficient  evi- 
dence to  the  public  for  the  verdict.     When  the  reputa- 
tion was  once  made,   his   excessively  suave   manners 
somewhat  French  in  character  were  an  effective  cause, 
as  his  descendant,  Lord  Fitzmaurice,  points  out,  to 
arouse   universal   suspicion   of   him.     The   following 
slightly  overdrawn  caricature  of  Lord  Shelburne  by 
an  enemy  gives  some  support  to  this  interpretation: 
He  has  the  substantial  precepts  of  the  Earl  of  Chesterfield  for 
ever  in  his  eye,  and  seldom  neglects  the  essential  article  of  a 
splendid  outside.     .     .     Every  syllable  uttered  by  the  Earl  of 
Shelburne,  every  gesture  of  his  body,  and  every  motion  of  his 
face,  are  accompanied  with  a  design  either  to  invite  the  indif- 
ferent, to  conciliate  the  hostile,  or  to  flatter  the  friendly,  by  an 
indefatigable  assiduity,  by  a  politeness  that  preseveres,  and  a 
smile  that  never  ceases.259 

A  further  reason  for  this  distrust,  however,  is  afforded 
in  his  autobiography,  which  reveals  his  unsparing  con- 
tempt for  his  contemporaries,  who  were  moved  ac- 
cording to  his  belief  by  the  basest  of  motives.  This 
belief  expressed  itself  in  a  suspicion  of  his  associates,  in 
whose  words  and  acts  he  was  ever  looking  for  hidden 
motives.  James  Oswald  wrote  of  him,  when  still  a 
young  man:  "You  know  the  jealousy  of  his  temper, 
and  the  impression  he  has  already  been  taught  to  en- 
tertain of  mankind.  He  will  imagine  himself  betrayed 
and  sacrificed  on  all  hands."  26°  Such  a  disposition 

259  [O'Bryen]  A  Defence  of  the  Right  Honorable  the  Earl  of  Shelburne, 
etc.,  to.     This  is  a  satirical  pamphlet  written  in  1783. 

200  Memorials  of  the  Public  Life  and  Character  of  James  Oswald,  415. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  151 

made  frank  dealing  with  him  in  politics  impossible. 
This  suspicious  nature  was  accompanied  by  a  presump- 
tuous faith  in  his  own  supreme  ability  to  save  his  coun- 
try from  the  difficulties  into  which  she  was  rushing.261 
He  confidently  believed  that  the  practice  of  the  eco- 
nomic and  political  principles  forming  his  creed  was 
the  only  means  of  gaining  for  Great  Britain  peace  and 
glory.  His  was  the  hand  to  guide;  but,  since  the  peo- 
ple could  not  understand  what  was  for  their  good,  he 
felt  obliged  to  hide  from  them  the  goal  toward  which 
he  was  leading  them.  Believing  as  he  says  in  his  auto- 
biography that  "Men  require  to  be  bribed  into  doing 
good,  or  permitting  it  to  be  done,"262  he  did  not  dis- 
close to  his  political  allies  the  full  import  of  the  meas- 
ures he  proposed;  and,  when  they  finally  became  con- 
scious of  his  purposes,  they  naturally  overwhelmed  him 
with  reproaches  for  his  deceit. 

Shelburne's  political  principles  will  be  best  under- 
stood through  following  his  course  of  action  as  de- 
scribed in  later  pages;  but,  since  these  were  slowly  de- 
veloped and  material  is  lacking  to  trace  them,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  describe  part  of  his  philosophy  as  if  it 
were  a  constant  determinant  of  his  whole  career.  A 
tendency  to  radicalism,  which  had  marked  him  from  the 
time  of  his  first  entrance  into  public  life,  finally  grew 
into  a  fixed  habit  and  prepared  him  in  his  old  age  for 
the  denouement  of  the  French  Revolution,  the  begin- 
ning of  which,  he,  unlike  Burke,  watched  with  "sin- 
cere delight."  His  closest  associates  were  in  sympathy 
with  his  viewpoint,  and  like  himself  they  must  be  placed 
in  the  advance  guard  of  the  revolutionary  eighteenth 

261  Elizabeth  Lady  Holland  who  knew  him  only  late  in  life  calls  him  a 
"monstrous  compound  of  virtues  and  failings."     His  temper  was  violent,  dis- 
position suspicious.     He  was  impossible  to  live  with  on  terms  of  equality,  but 
was  generous  to  his  friends.     See  Journals,  vol.  i,  175. 

262  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  19. 


152  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

century.  Before  1763  Lord  Shelburne  came  under  the 
influence  of  the  free-trade  ideas  of  Adam  Smith  and 
David  Hume ; 263  and  these  he  always  advocated,  al- 
though, like  Adam  Smith,  he  felt  that  free  trade  be- 
tween the  mother  country  and  her  colonies  should  be 
controlled  in  the  interest  of  each.  His  friendship  for 
Benjamin  Franklin,  his  close  association  with  Benja- 
min Vaughan  and  with  others  of  similar  sentiments 
made  him  a  cordial  sympathizer  with  the  Americans 
and  an  advocate  for  the  development  of  the  colonies.264 
Even  before  he  entered  the  ministry,  he  had  become  in- 
tensely interested  in  the  welfare  of  the  Americans ;  and 
from  him  the  colonists  had  reason  to  expect  the  be- 
ginning of  important  policies.265 

The  position  of  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
which  Lord  Shelburne  accepted  was  far  from  being  a 
sinecure  for  a  man  of  his  industry  and  radical  tenden- 
cies. Perhaps  more  than  in  the  case  of  any  other  of- 
ficial in  the  British  government,  the  holder  of  this  of- 
fice, provided  he  desired  to  be  efficient,  was  forced  in- 
to conflict  for  his  prerogatives  with  other  members  of 
the  administration,  particularly  with  the  secretary  of 
state  for  the  Southern  Department  who  was  at  the  head 
of  the  colonial  administration  and  its  usual  represen- 
tative in  the  cabinet.  Until  the  year  1752  the  colonial 
correspondence  came  to  the  secretary  and  all  colonial 
patronage  was  under  his  control.  Since  he  also  had 
charge  of  the  foreign  relations  with  the  southern  Euro- 
pean nations,  the  home  affairs,  and  the  Irish  govern- 

263  Bentham,  Works,  vol.  x,  187;  Rae,  Life  of  Adam  Smith,  159;  Burton, 
Life  and  Correspondence  of  Hume,  vol.  ii,  163 ;  Parliamentary  History,  vol. 

*ix,  347,  349- 

264  Franklin,  Writings   (ed.  Smyth),  consult  index. 

265  See  particularly  the  letter  of  the  Earl  of  Stirling  to  Lord  Shelburne  in 
Duer,  Life  of  Lord  Stirling,  74. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 153 

ment,  his  weight  in  the  councils  of  the  cabinet  was  such 
that  his  influence  on  the  administration  of  the  colonies 
was  generally  decisive. 

The  Board  of  Trade  which  had  lost  in  prestige  dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  predominance  of  Robert  Wai- 
pole  was  revivified  by  the  exertions  of  Lord  Halifax. 
The  original  purpose  of  the  institution  had  been  two- 
fold :  first,  to  collect  information  on  trade  and  to  make 
recommendations  thereon  to  the  privy  council;  second- 
ly, to  examine  the  laws  passed  by  the  legislatures  of  the 
colonies  and  to  report  on  them.  Here  its  power  ended. 
To  an  ambitious  man  of  Halifax's  stamp  the  position 
afforded  little  opportunity;  so  he  worked  constantly 
for  a  change  in  the  colonial  office.  There  were  many 
reasons  why  this  should  be  done.  The  colonies  were 
growing  in  importance  and  a  greater  supervision  was 
becoming  necessary;  a  divided  administration  was  an 
evil;  and  the  department  of  the  secretary  of  state  for 
the  Southern  Department  was  so  burdened  by  the  work 
of  numerous  affairs  that  it  was  impossible  for  one  man 
to  attend  to  them  properly.  By  an  order  of  council  on 
March  11,  1752,  the  first  step  was  taken  to  obviate  these 
difficulties  by  bringing  greater  unity  into  the  adminis- 
tration and  at  the  same  time  partially  to  satisfy  Hali- 
fax's ambition.266  According  to  the  order  the  Board 
of  Trade  was  to  have  more  particular  charge  of  the 
nomination  of  officers  in  the  colonies,267  to  receive  dis- 
patches at  the  same  time  as  the  secretary  from  the  gov- 
ernors concerning  their  proceedings  and  acts,  and  to 

266  These   details    are   taken    from    a   document   in    Public   Record    Office, 
Colonial  Office  Papers,  216,  pp.  14-18.     Consult  also,  A  Miscellaneous  Essay 
concerning  the  Courses,  etc.;  Kellogg,  "American  Colonial  Charter,"  in  Amer- 
ican Historical  Association,  Report,  vol.  i,  1903  ;  Dickerson,  American  Colonial 
Government,  49;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  192  ff. 

267  At  least  this  would  seem  to  be  the  explanation  of  the  repetition  in  more 
specific  form  of  the  right  of  the  board  to  make  recommendations. 


154  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

conduct  exclusively  the  general  correspondence  with 
the  colonies.268 

This  change  was  not  sufficiently  drastic  to  suit  Hali- 
fax, and  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  took  into  considera- 
tion in  1753  the  creation  of  a  third  secretaryship  of 
state  which  should  have  exclusive  charge  of  colonial 
affairs,269  but  no  change  was  made.  The  subject  came 
up  again  at  the  time  of  the  negotiations  between  Pitt 
and  Newcastle  in  1757,  when  the  latter  promised  Hali- 
fax that  the  new  office  should  be  created  for  him.  Up- 
on Pitt's  refusal  to  have  his  own  office  thus  curtailed, 
Halifax  resigned  from  the  Board  of  Trade,  but  in  the 
fall  was  persuaded  to  take  charge  again  upon  being  ad- 
mitted to  the  cabinet,  which  was  a  decided  advance 
towards  the  acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  colonial 
affairs  to  an  independent  administration.270  On  ac- 
count of  the  war  this  control  of  the  colonies  was  limited, 
however,  by  the  military  authority  which  remained  un- 
der the  management  of  Secretary  Pitt.  In  1761  upon 
the  resignation  of  Lord  Halifax,  the  Board  of  Trade 
was  reduced  to  insignificance  again,  and  for  a  couple 
of  years  the  colonial  administration  was  unified  under 
Lord  Egremont  as  secretary  of  state.*71  With  the  treaty 
of  peace  in  1763  there  was  a  return  to  the  arrangement 
as  it  was  established  under  Halifax,  and  Charles  Towns- 
hend  was  appointed  president.272  This  was  the  arrange- 
ment now  made  for  Lord  Shelburne. 

268 There  were  a  few  exceptions  which  were  well  known:  (i)  a  corres- 
pondence affecting  foreign  relations;  (2)  in  case  of  war.  See  Shelburne  to 
Egremont,  April,  1763  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  5,  193. 

269  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  33029,  p.  104. 

270  Dodington,  Diary,  387,  397;  Lyttelton,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  599,  601 ;  Bed- 
ford,  Correspondence,  vol.  ii,   249;   Halifax  to  Newcastle,  June   16,   1757  in 
British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  32871,  p.  323.     For  a  good  discus- 
sion see  Dickerson,  American  Colonial  Government,  49  ff. 

271  On  March  15,  1761,  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  459. 

272  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  193  ;  Bedford,   Correspond- 
ence, vol.  iii,  210. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  155 

Usually  the  policy  of  the  Board  of  Trade  was  de- 
termined by  the  president,  and  it  is  not  probable  that 
Shelburne's  associates  were  ever  really  influential  in 
formulating  measures.  The  personnel  of  the  Board  in 
1763  did  not  differ  in  character  from  that  of  earlier 
years,  when  it  was  regarded  as  the  best  place  for  young 
men  of  noble  families  to  learn  the  routine  of  public 
business.273  At  this  time  there  sat  with  Shelburne, 
John  Yorke,  a  son  of  the  Earl  of  Harwicke,  Lord  Or- 
well, George  Rice,  one  of  the  king's  friends,274  and 
Bamber  Gascoyne,  a  man  of  force  and  character,  who 
had  been  a  Pittite  but  was  persuaded  to  accept  a  seat  in 
April,  I763.275  The  oldest  member  of  the  Board  was 
Soame  Jenyns,  who  had  been  appointed  in  the  time  of 
Sir  Robert  Walpole's  administration  and  was  affiliated 
with  the  Hardwicke  faction ;  his  was  a  well  known  form 
in  London  both  in  Parliament  and  in  society;  he  was 
a  writer  of  agreeable  verse  and  prose  and  no  doubt  was 
found  useful  in  composing  the  Board's  reports.276 

More  important  than  any  individual  member  of  the 
Board  save  the  president,  was  the  secretary,  John 
Pownall,  an  elder  brother  of  Governor  Thomas  Pow- 
nall.  He  had  held  the  position  since  1745  and  was 
able  by  conforming  to  the  opinions  of  the  succeeding 
ministries  to  retain  it  until  1768,  when  he  was  pro- 
moted to  be  under-secretary  of  state  for  the  American 
Department.  He  made  a  careful  and  painstaking  sec- 
retary, was  discreet  in  his  conversation,  generally 
humble  to  his  superiors,  but  rather  inflated  with  a  sense 
of  his  own  importance  towards  inferiors;  and  he  occa- 

273  Nichol,  Literary  Anecdotes,  vol.  viii,  61,  footnote. 

274  Walpole,  Letters  to  Mann,  vol.  i,  23. 

275  Pitt,   Correspondence,  vol.  ii,  204;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  ///., 
vol.  i,  91,  footnote  2. 

276  Jenyns,  Works,  vol.  i,  p.  xlv  ff. ;  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol. 
i,  46,  note  i ;  Cumberland,  Memoirs,  247. 


156  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

sionally  maintained  opinions  of  his  own  even  against 
those  above  him.  His  long  period  of  service  under 
Halifax,  whose  mannerisms  he  awkwardly  tried  to  imi- 
tate, had  brought  him  in  touch  with  all  phases  of  the 
American  problem,  upon  which  he  had  formed  views 
which  he  was  ready  to  impart  to  councilors  who  were 
not  so  familiar  with  the  business.277 

Peace  had  finally  been  made,  Bute  had  resigned,  and 
a  new  ministry  was  in  power.  The  greatest  task  to  be 
performed  was  the  formation  of  a  comprehensive 
American  policy.  The  success  or  failure  of  the  min- 
isters depended  in  large  measure  upon  their  manner 
of  performing  this  duty;  and  the  king  by  the  advice  of 
his  favorite  had  selected  a  young,  inexperienced,  and 
unknown  man  to  solve  the  complexities  of  this  hydra- 
headed  problem.  What  he  should  do  must  necessarily 
affect  the  whole  future  development  of  the  new  acqui- 
sitions. The  West  had  become  a  real  issue  in  British 
politics. 


277  Poionall,  Thomas,  i  ff. ;  Gentleman's  Magazine  (1795),  vol.  Ixv,  621; 
Cumberland,  Memoirs,  102,  103. 


VI.    THE  FORMATION  OF  THE  POLICY 

We  have  the  management  of  a  great  empire  composed  of  a  vast 
mass  of  heterogeneous  governments,  all  more  or  less  free  and  popular 
in  their  forms,  all  to  be  kept  in  peace  and  out  of  conspiracy  with  one 
another,  and  in  subordination  to  this  country:  while  the  whole  is  per- 
vaded by  the  spirit  of  an  extensive  and  intricate  trading  interest,  al- 
ways qualifying  and  often  controuling  every  general  idea  of  constitu- 
tion and  government.  It  is  a  great  and  difficult  object:  heaven  grant 
that  we  have  wisdom  and  temper  enough  to  manage  it,  as  we  ought.  — 
History  of  the  First  Ten  Years  of  the  Reign  of  George  III. 

The  successive  plans  for  the  organization  of  the  West 
which  were  proposed  by  various  ministries  during  the 
years  preceding  the  American  Revolution  can  be  inter- 
preted only  in  so  far  as  the  student  approaches  them 
with  a  clear  understanding  of  the  decisions  and  the  acts 
of  the  year  1763  which  resulted  from  the  consideration 
of  the  future  of  the  new  acquisitions  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  under  the  leadership  of  Lord  Shelburne.  The 
real  significance  of  the  policy  that  the  latter  promoted, 
however,  is  to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  of  the 
summer  of  that  year  and  not  in  the  consequent  procla- 
mation of  October  7,  which  has  appeared  to  so  many 
historians  to  be  the  final  result  of  his  labor.  The  latter 
important  document  did  not  in  many  ways  correspond 
with  Lord  Shelburne's  intentions,  and  the  responsibility 
for  the  blunders  which  it  contained  must  be  assigned  to 
a  delay  in  its  final  preparation  and  to  the  influence  of 
other  men  with  whom  the  young  president  had  nothing 
in  common. 

The  cabinet  which  Lord  Shelburne  had  joined  was 


158  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

very  far  from  being  harmonious.  Although  Lord  Bute 
had  selected  its  members  in  the  hope  of  promoting  the 
purposes  of  the  king,  he  himself  had  no  confidence  in 
the  triumviri  and,  as  will  be  seen,  began  within  a  few 
weeks  negotiations  to  bring  in  other  men.  This  distrust 
was  justified  by  the  well  known  jealousies  existing 
among  the  ministers.  Grenville  was  always  fearful  of 
the  growing  influence  of  Lord  Halifax,  and  each  of 
these  was  seeking  to  gain  to  his  interests  the  Bedfords. 
Lord  Sandwich,  who  was  an  able  organizer  of  political 
machines,  was  pushing  himself  into  affairs  and  trying  to 
hold  the  balance  of  power  between  his  associates.278  As 
long  as  the  Duke  of  Bedford  held  to  his  refusal  to  enter 
the  ministry,  his  attitude  toward  the  triumvirate  influ- 
enced those  followers  of  his  who  were  serving  the  gov- 
ernment.279 Lord  Shelburne,  who  enjoyed  the  complete 
confidence  of  Lord  Bute  and  was  a  favorite  of  the  closet, 
looked  upon  Halifax  and  Grenville  as  undesirable  asso- 
ciates, and  never  gave  them  his  whole-hearted  support.280 
William  Knox,  who  was  at  this  time  and  later  very 
familiar  with  the  intrigues  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  has 
preserved  the  following  glance  behind  the  curtain: 

278  Consult   particularly   Grenville's   "Diary,"   in   Grenville,  Papers ;    also 
Bedford,    Correspondence.    The    divisions    within    the    ministry    were    well 
known  by  the  members  of  the  opposition.     Lord  Hardwicke's  interpretation 
of  the  situation  was   as  follows:     "The   administration     ...     is  certainly 
divided  into  two  parts,  the  triumvirate  viz.  the  two  Secretaries  and  the  great 
Mr.  Grenville  on  the  one  part,  the  supposed  real  favorites,  my  Lord  Shel- 
burne at  the  head,  Lord  Gower,  Lord  Sandwich,    (and  it  is  supposed)    the 
Duke  of  Bedford,  Rigby  etc.  on  the  other;  and  this  last,  it  is  thought,  has  my 
Lord  Bute's  secret,  and  acts  professedly  under  him  and  for  him."- Hardwicke 
to  Newcastle,  May  13,  1763  in  Yorke,  Life  of  Hardiuicke,  vol.  Hi,  498. 

279  This  unfriendly  feeling  of  Bedford  did  not  end  after  he  joined  the  min- 
istry.    Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  121. 

280  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  147.     Bristol  wrote  Pitt,  on  June 
9,  that  "Lord  Shelburne  is  possessed  of  the  partiality  of  the  closet;  yet  Lord 
Halifax  is  gaining  ground  in  the  opinion  of  it." -Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol. 
ii,  229.     See  also  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  238. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  159 

A  strong  jealousy  of  his  [Shelburne's]  intriguing  and  am- 
bitious spirit  was  entertained  by  both  Lord  Halifax  and  Lord 
Egremont,  but  especially  by  the  latter,  who  was  guided  in  all 
Colonial  affairs  by  Governor  Ellis,  and  whose  influence  Pownall 
could  not  endure.  He  therefore  stimulated  Lord  Lansdown 
[Shelburne]  to  underwork  Lord  Egremont,  while  Ellis  incited 
the  latter  to  thwart  Lord  Lansdown.  I  was  consulted  by  both 
Ellis  and  Pownall,  and  saw  into  the  whole  intrigue.281 

Lord  Shelburne's  favorable  position  in  the  cabinet 
made  him  bold  in  asserting  the  claims  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  to  a  control  of  American  affairs.  The  order  in 
council  that  had  been  passed  in  1752  to  satisfy  the  ambi- 
tion of  Lord  Halifax  was  still  in  force,  having  been 
revived  for  Charles  Townshend.  One  of  the  first  acts 
of  the  new  president  was  the  writing  of  a  letter  to  Lord 
Egremont,  the  southern  secretary,  to  bring  about  a  mu- 
tual understanding  concerning  their  respective  spheres 
of  action.282  He  assumed  that  the  management  of  the 
older  colonies  was  under  him,  but  desired  to  obtain  the 
opinion  of  the  secretary  about  the  control  of  the  new 
acquisitions.  Lord  Egremont  replied  that  he  was  un- 
prepared to  answer  since  he  had  never  read  the  commis- 
sion of  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  at  the  same  time  he 
complained  of  the  great  fatigue  he  had  recently  under- 
gone. In  response  to  this  Shelburne  assured  him  that 
he  would  experience  greater  fatigue,  if  the  affairs  of 
the  colonies  were  to  be  put  in  order.283  It  is  probably 
to  this  dispute  that  reference  was  made  when  it  was  said 
that  Lord  Mansfield  advised  the  king  "to  show  favour 
to  Lord  Shelburne  in  order  to  play  them  one  against 
another."284  Whether  this  is  so  or  not,  Shelburne  actu- 

281  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical   Manuscripts  Commission,  Reports 
on  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  vol.  vi,  282.     See  also  Yorke,  Life  of 
Hardwicke,  vol.  iii,  514, 

282  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  192  ff. 

283  —  Idem,   194. 

284  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  238. 


160  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ally  managed  the  American  affairs  as  an  independent 
department;  and  "he  made  it  a  point,  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, to  keep  all  the  official  business  transacted  there 
[the  Board  of  Trade]  as  much  a  secret  as  possible  from 
the  secretary  of  state."285 

The  problem  of  the  settlement  of  the  new  acquisitions 
was  brought  to  an  issue  by  a  letter  dated  May  5,  1763, 
from  Lord  Egremont.286  Two  questions  seemed  to  the 
secretary  of  particular  importance. 

By  what  regulations,  the  most  extensive  commercial  advantages 
may  be  derived  from  those  cessions,  and  how  those  advantages 
may  be  rendered  most  permanent  and  secure  to  His  Majesty's 
trading  subjects. 

These  involved  a  further  analysis. 

1st.  What  new  governments  should  be  established  and  what 
form  should  be  adopted  for  such  new  governments?  and  where 
the  capital,  or  residence  of  each  governor  should  be  fixed  ? 

2dly.  What  military  establishment  will  be  sufficient?  What 
new  forts  should  be  erected?  and  which,  if  any,  may  it  be  ex- 
pedient to  demolish  ? 

3dly.  In  what  mode  least  burthensome  and  most  palatable  to 
the  colonies  can  they  contribute  towards  the  support  of  the  ad- 
ditional expence,  which  must  attend  their  civil  and  military 
establishment,  upon  the  arrangement  which  Your  Lordships 
shall  propose? 

The  secretary,  in  explaining  the  purport  of  these 
questions,  drew  the  attention  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  to 
the  privileges  reserved  to  the  French  by  the  capitula- 
tion, and  in  order  that  they  might  determine  intelligent- 
ly how  far  it  would  be  expedient  to  depart  from  the 
forms  of  the  French  government  in  Canada,  he  inclosed 
the  reports  of  the  British  officers  concerning  the  present 

285  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xix,  509.     Walpole  also  wrote  that  Shel- 
burne  "affected  to  act  minister."     See  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol. 
i,  227. 

286  Printed  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  93   ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  161 

conditions.287  The  second  question  involved  the  protec- 
tion of  the  colonies  not  only  against  European  powers 
but  also  against  the  Indians,  partial  provision  for  which 
had  already  been  provided  by  the  secretary  at  war. 
The  government,  according  to  Egremont,  had  deter- 
mined to  conciliate  the  Indians  by  protecting  their 
property  and  persons,  and  to  secure  to  them  the  posses- 
sion of  their  hunting-grounds,  which  should  not  be  open 
to  settlement  until  fair  purchase  thereof  had  been  made. 
The  secretary  then  passed  to  the  question  of  the  fisheries 
and  of  Florida.  Concerning  the  latter  he  desired  in- 
formation about  the  climate  and  the  soil.  The  land  on 
the  Mississippi  was  also  to  be  considered  and  the  ques- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  navigation  of  the  river  to  be 
discussed.  The  secretary  realized  that  the  determina- 
tion of  all  these  points  would  require  time,  but  he  re- 
quested that  the  Lords  of  Trade  send  a  partial  report 
as  soon  as  convenient. 

A  careful  reading  of  this  letter  reveals  the  minister's 
consciousness  of  those  concrete  issues  inherent  in  the 
formulation  of  a  western  policy  that  were  to  divide  fac- 
tions, when  the  announcement  of  plans  should  bring 
into  sharper  relief  the  partisan  and  financial  interests. 
Before  entering  upon  the  account  of  the  Board  of 
Trade's  answer,  therefore,  a  statement  of  the  different 
viewpoints  which  were  finally  developed  among  pol- 
iticians and  financiers  will  give  a  better  understanding 
of  the  purposes  of  Lord  Shelburne  and  his  colleagues 
and  the  significance  of  their  decisions. 

In  the  various  attempts  to  solve  the  problem  of  the 
West  and  Canada  between  the  years  1763  and  1774,  five 
crucial  issues  were  raised  upon  which  every  ministry 

287  Reports  of  Murray,  Burton,  and  Gage.  These  are  printed  in  Shortt 
and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  37  ff. 


1 62  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

was  obliged  to  express  its  view.  First  of  all  came  the 
difficulty  growing  out  of  the  presence  of  the  military 
force  which  it  had  already  been  determined  to  maintain 
in  America.  Passing  over  the  question  as  to  whether 
it  was  wise  to  keep  such  a  force  in  the  colonies,  upon 
which  there  were  two  opinions,288  an  issue  was  clearly 
and  definitely  raised  over  the  method  of  distributing 
the  troops.  Should  they  be  concentrated  in  the  eastern 
settlements  or  scattered  according  to  General  Amherst's 
plan  at  posts  throughout  the  West?  The  anti-expan- 
sionists favored  the  former,  the  radical  expansionists, 
the  latter. 

A  second  issue  grew  out  of  the  attempt  to  organize 
Indian  affairs.  Some  of  the  imperialists  desired  to 
create  a  strong,  independent,  centralized  department 
for  the  management  of  the  Indians.  Those  of  more 
moderate  views  favored  the  subordination  of  the  de- 
partment to  the  military  authority.  Others -and  this 
group  included  both  imperialists  and  those  indifferent 
to  imperial  organization -preferred  to  leave  all  the  re- 
lations with  the  Indians  to  be  managed  by  the  colonies. 

One  phase  of  the  organization  of  Indian  affairs  be- 
came itself  of  such  importance  as  to  form  a  separate 
issue.  There  was  practically  no  disagreement  about 
the  necessity  of  running  a  boundary  line  between  the 
land  open  for  settlement  and  the  Indian  hunting- 
grounds;  but  the  establishment  of  the  line,  whether  at 
the  Appalachian  divide  or  farther  to  the  westward  be- 

288  Many  colonists  came  to  consider  the  maintenance  of  troops  in  America 
wrong,  and  there  were  some  advocates  of  withdrawing  them  in  Great  Britain. 
Among  these  was  Dr.  John  Mitchell  who  supported  such  a  measure  in  his 
Present  State  of  Great  Britain  and  North  America.  This  was  published  in 
1767,  but  part  of  it  at  least  was  written  at  the  time  of  the  discussion  of  the 
Stamp  Act.  This  thought  was  also  expressed  in  Parliament  in  1767.  See 
W.  S.  Johnson,  "Letters,"  in  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Collections, 
fifth  ser.,  vol.  ix,  229. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  163 

came  an  important  question,  as  did  also  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  meaning  of  the  line,  whether  or  not  it  created 
a  permanent  Indian  reservation  never  to  be  entered  by 
white  settlers. 

If  the  Indian  boundary  line  was  to  be  unchangeable, 
then  settlements  in  the  far  West  could  not  be  made,  and 
such  was  the  opinion  of  the  conservative  anti-expan- 
sionists among  the  politicians.  Their  opponents  took 
issue  with  them  on  this  subject  and  urged  the  promotion 
of  colonization.  These  latter  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes:  the  moderate  expansionists  wished  to  permit 
settlements  to  be  extended  gradually  under  the  super- 
vision of  imperial  agents;  whereas  the  radical  expan- 
sionists were  not  willing  that  any  check  should  be 
placed  upon  the  rapid  movement  of  the  population  into 
the  newly  acquired  territory. 

The  issue  raised  over  Canada  turned  on  the  form  of 
government:  whether  it  should  be  modeled  on  that  of 
the  British  colonies  with  an  elective  assembly  and  Eng- 
lish law,  or  whether  the  French  system  should  be  fol- 
lowed. By  the  former  the  immigration  of  English- 
speaking  settlers  would  be  encouraged  and  the  Protes- 
tant religion  might  be  promoted.  Many  other  questions 
were,  in  the  course  of  time,  to  arise  out  of  the  attempt 
to  solve  the  many-sided  Canadian  problems  and  will  be 
discussed  in  their  proper  connections. 

In  spite  of  the  latitude  in  the  discussion  of  the  future 
of  the  new  acquisitions  assumed  to  be  granted  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade  by  the  secretary  of  state's  letter,  there 
is  to  be  read  between  its  lines  the  political  principle 
which  was  to  limit  whatever  recommendations  might 
be  made  by  the  subordinate  department.  In  the  cab- 
inet there  were  united  three  factions,  the  Grenvillites, 
the  adherents  of  the  court,  and  the  Bedfordites,  who 


164  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

were  all  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  developing  a  well- 
organized  imperial  machinery  for  the  control  of  de- 
pendencies ;  and  this  belief  they  had  determined  to  put 
to  the  test  in  the  American  colonies.  Acting  upon  their 
principle  of  concentration  they  had  already  reached 
certain  decisions  concerning  the  future  character  of  the 
western  policy. 

Quite  in  accordance  with  their  political  creed  had 
been  their  concurrence  in  the  decision  to  maintain  a 
military  force  in  America,  the  commander  of  which 
would  in  many  ways  limit  the  local  autonomy  of  the 
colonies,  and  in  the  further  determination  to  meet  the 
increased  expense  entailed  by  such  an  establishment  by 
some  form  of  colonial  tax.  There  is  sufficient  evidence 
in  the  ministerial  correspondence  and  their  later  recom- 
mendations to  prove  that  they  had  no  intention  of  dis- 
carding the  imperial  department  of  Indian  affairs;  but 
rather  that  they  were  thinking  of  strengthening  it  in 
order  to  protect  the  Indian  hunting-grounds  from  en- 
croachment by  the  frontiersmen.  That  policy  of  prior 
purchase  before  permission  of  settlement  which  had 
been  announced  by  Lord  Egremont  in  letters  to  the 
governors  was  to  be  maintained  and  western  settlements 
were  to  be  permitted  only  after  the  above  requirement 
was  fulfilled.  Other  opinions  of  the  triumvirate,  more- 
over, are  to  be  discerned.  They  were  expecting  both  to 
open  up  for  immediate  colonization  certain  portions  of 
the  country  and  to  create  new  colonies,  for  which  pur- 
pose they  regarded  the  land  ceded  by  Spain  as  offering 
certain  advantages.  What  they  intended  to  do  with  the 
Mississippi  Valley  is  not  discoverable,  although  it  may 
be  judged  that  they  viewed  it  favorably  as  a  place  for 
trade  and  possibly  for  settlement.  Certainly  there  is 
nothing  to  show  the  contrary.  The  ministerial  opinion 
about  Canada  was  still  in  a  state  of  flux  but  there  was 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  165 

the  feeling  that  no  complete  change  in  the  conditions 
left  by  the  French  should  be  made. 

From  the  above  review  of  that  part  of  the  western 
colonial  policy  which  had  already  been  determined,  it 
appears  that  the  broad  outlines  had  been  fixed  and  that 
there  was  little  for  Lord  Shelburne  to  do  except  to  fill 
out  the  details  or  else  to  reject  the  ministerial  plans  and 
evolve  an  entirely  new  one.  With  that  thoroughness 
that  he  exhibited  throughout  life,  the  youthful  president 
of  the  Board  of  Trade  began  a  careful  study  of  all  avail- 
able sources  of  information,  seeking  particularly  in  the 
archives  of  his  own  department.  Here  were  deposited 
the  numerous  letters  and  reports  from  the  superintend- 
ents of  Indian  affairs,  the  colonial  governors,  and  others. 
Especially  interesting  to  Shelburne  was  the  report  of 
the  Albany  conference  and  Franklin's  recommenda- 
tions for  future  western  colonies,  and  he  had  copies  of 
these  and  of  many  other  documents  made  for  his  own 
library.289 

The  Board  of  Trade  had  also  been  collecting  mate- 
rial upon  the  subject  of  this  very  report  before  Shel- 
burne became  president.  At  his  instigation  letters  were 
now  sent  to  several  prominent  men  who  were  familiar 
with  conditions  in  America  to  ask  for  information  and 
advice  on  the  subject.  In  the  Lansdowne  Manuscripts 
have  been  preserved  copies  of  the  answers,  but  unfortu- 
nately in  the  great  majority  of  cases  there  is  no  indica- 
tion as  to  the  author  or  the  date  of  the  various  docu- 
ments.290 The  advice  was  so  varied  that  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  generalize  concerning  it;  but  on  the  whole 

289  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Fifth  Report,  appendix,  217. 

290  Lansdowne   Manuscripts,    vol.   xlviii.     Public   Record   Office,    Colonial 
Office  Papers,  323.16,  pp.  189-201.     One  of  the  men  consulted  at  the  time  was 
undoubtedly  William  Knox.     See  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manu- 
scripts  Commission,  Report  on  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  vol.  vi, 
282. 


i66 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

the  writers  may  be  divided  into  two  groups.  The  first 
group  feared  the  spread  of  the  colonies  westward  for 
reasons  that  were  to  be  put  forward  with  more  and  more 
boldness  as  time  passed.  The  arguments  remind  one 
forcibly  of  those  advanced  two  years  before  in  favor  of 
the  retention  of  Guadaloupe  rather  than  of  Canada  and 
were  based  on  the  older  principle  which  estimated  the 
value  of  colonies  in  terms  of  raw  products  of  great  bulk, 
requiring  many  ships  to  transport.  Inland  colonies, 
they  wrote,  would  not  be  able  to  afford  to  pay  the  high 
cost  of  carriage  either  of  their  own  or  of  the  British 
products  and  would,  therefore,  soon  begin  to  manufac- 
ture for  themselves.  After  that  occurred,  independ- 
ence must  soon  follow.291 

Many  of  the  papers,  however,  took  for  granted  that 
the  colonies  would  extend  themselves  into  the  interior. 
The  writers  accepted  Franklin's  argument  that  the  dif- 
fusion of  population  over  a  large  area  would  prevent 
the  colonists  from  turning  to  manufacturing,292  as  well 
as  his  argument  concerning  the  easy  transportation  of 
products  from  beyond  the  Alleghanies.293  This  ques- 
tion of  the  transportation  of  goods  from  the  interior  to 
the  coast  was  later  one  of  particular  interest  to  every 
ministry,  and  investigations  of  the  various  routes  over 
the  mountains  and  down  the  Mississippi  were  being 
continually  made.  Suggestions  for  colonization  were 
very  general  among  these  letters  to  the  Board  of  Trade. 
One  writer,  who  thought  that  the  southern  colonies  were 
more  profitable  than  the  northern,  suggested  a  new  col- 
ony at  Natchez.294  Another  writer  recommended  the 

291  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  445. 

292  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  55  ff.     See  particularly  Lans- 
doivne Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  523. 

MS  — Idem,  59  ff. 
523  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  167 

division  of  Canada  into  two  provinces,  the  westernmost 
to  include  the  Great  Lakes  region.295 

The  recommendations  concerning  Canada  were  also 
varied.  Most  of  the  writers  desired  to  see  the  Protes- 
tant religion  gradually  extended  in  this  territory  and 
suggested  some  method  by  which  this  might  be  accom- 
plished. One  of  these  advocated  the  erection  of  a 
Protestant  capital  for  the  province  at  Point  Levis  or  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Sorel,296  while  two  writers  desired  the 
division  of  the  province  into  two  parts  with  capitals  at 
Quebec  and  Montreal.  Only  one  of  these  advisers  of 
the  Board  of  Trade  was  of  the  opinion  that  nothing  was 
to  be  feared  from  Catholicism,2"  but  another  was  afraid 
of  French  law  even  and  thought  that  all  the  old  inhab- 
itants should  be  obliged  to  take  out  new  grants  of  land 
according  to  the  English  method.298 

Florida  was  the  least  known  part  of  the  new  acqui- 
sitions, and  for  that  reason  the  Board  of  Trade  made 
particular  efforts  to  collect  information  about  it.  The 
various  writers  to  whom  requests  were  sent  acknowl- 
edged their  ignorance  of  the  subject,  but  united  in  their 
glowing  accounts  of  the  land.  For  the  most  part  they 
were  familiar  with  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  and 
compared  the  climate  and  soil  with  those  colonies,  but 
gave  the  advantage  in  these  to  Florida.299  They  also 

295  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  323.16,  pp.  189-201.     See 
on  this  plan,  PownalPs  draft  of  a  report,  Lansdoiane  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlix, 
333- 

296  Lansdoiane  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  523.     Public  Record  Office,  Colo- 
nial Office  Papers,  323.16,   p.   189. 

297  Lansdovjne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  26. 

298  —  Idem,  vol.  xlviii,  407. 

299  Letter  of  John  Walker,  March  12,  1763;  "Hints  respecting  the  Settle- 
ment of  Florida,"  no  date;  "Account,"  by  J.  Blackwell,  no  date,  but  late  in 
1763 ;  "Thoughts  concerning  Florida,"  no  date,  but  probably  summer  of  1763  ; 
Governor  Grant  to  John  Pownall,  July  30,  1763  ;  all  in  idem,  vol.  xlviii. 


1 68  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

took  occasion  to  expatiate  on  the  value  of  the  trade  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  These  accounts  fell  in  with  the 
theory  that  the  southern  colonies  were  more  profitable 
than  the  northern,  and  there  was  no  objection  to  Florida 
on  account  of  the  difficulties  of  trade.  Therefore  from 
the  first  there  was  every  desire  to  open  the  land  for 
settlement. 

The  question  of  the  form  of  constitution  for  the  new 
colonies  was  also  a  subject  of  discussion,  and  there  is 
apparent  a  preference  for  the  constitutions  of  Nova 
Scotia  and  Georgia,  which  were  more  dependent  on  the 
crown  and  freer  from  forms  of  republicanism.300 

With  these  suggestions,  which  on  the  whole  were  not 
of  great  value,  the  Board  of  Trade  began  to  formulate 
a  policy.  Exactly  what  the  opinions  of  Lord  Shel- 
burne  were  during  the  summer  of  1763  can  not  be  dis- 
covered on  account  of  the  lack  of  information  and  be- 
cause the  policy  toward  the  West  had  practically  been 
developed  by  other  men.  His  policy  of  three  years 
later  when  he  came  again  into  a  ministry  with  very 
different  colleagues  is  easily  determined,  but  it  might 
lead  to  wrong  conclusions  if  inferences  drawn  from  his 
acts  of  the  later  period  were  used  to  explain  his  earlier 
opinions.301  In  1767  he  was  most  certainly  opposed  to 
many  of  the  measures  advocated  by  his  colleagues  of 
1763,  but  during  the  intervening  years,  when  he  was  a 
close  adherent  of  William  Pitt,  his  whole  attitude 

300  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  26 ;  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 
Office  Papers,  323.16,  p.  189.     Also  John  Pownall  writes  the  same,  see  Lans- 
do<wnf  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlix,  333. 

301  In  my  essay,  "The  Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763"   [Michigan 
Pioneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xxxvi,  21]  I  was  forced  by  lack  of 
other  sources  of  information  to  make  just  such  inferences.     Since  that  time  I 
have  learned  that  Shelburne's  colleagues  of  1763  held  the  same  opinions  as 
he  did  on  most  of  the  questions  discussed  in  that  essay,  and  I  must  give  them 
greater  credit  and  him  less  for  the  development  of  the  policy  towards  the 
West. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  169 

towards  the  colonial  conditions  must  have  undergone 
many  changes.  It  may  certainly  be  assumed,  however, 
that  those  broad  principles  of  free  trade  that  he  had 
learned  from  conversations  with  Adam  Smith  and  Ben- 
jamin Franklin  were  the  foundation  upon  which  he 
built.  He  had  also  been  persuaded  that  the  colonies 
must  inevitably  expand  westward  and  that  such  expan- 
sion would  be  for  the  interests  of  the  mother  country. 
He  was  so  anxious  to  obtain  Franklin's  advice  upon  the 
subject  of  his  report  that  he  asked  Thomas  Cummings 
to  request  Franklin  for  his  thoughts  on  the  best  policy 
to  be  pursued  toward  the  new  acquisitions,  but  Cum- 
mings neglected  to  do  this.302 

After  a  careful  consideration  of  Lord  Egremont's 
letter,  Shelburne  realized  the  impossibility  of  attempt- 
ing to  include  in  his  first  report  answers  to  all  the  ques- 
tions propounded.  The  first  duty,  therefore,  was  to 
decide  on  definite  limits.  Three  of  the  subjects  pro- 
pounded to  him  were  far  reaching  in  character  and 
involved  policies  touching  intimately  the  internal  wel- 
fare of  America;  these  were  the  maintenance  of  an 
army,  the  regulations  of  the  Indian  trade,  and  the  pos- 
sible contribution  by  the  colonies  to  the  proposed  im- 
perial establishment.  The  Board  of  Trade  had  not  yet 
been  informed  of  the  final  decision  of  the  ministry  con- 
cerning the  disposition  of  troops  and  even  later  thought 
that  this  subject  was  open  to  discussion  by  them.  With- 
out further  information  on  these  three  complicated  sub- 
jects Lord  Shelburne  was  not  ready  to  set  forth  an 
opinion;  and  therefore,  in  his  report  the  discussion  of 

302  American  Philosophical  Society,  Franklin  Papers,  vol.  i,  81.  Through- 
out 1763  Benjamin  Franklin  was  very  friendly  to  the  king's  successive  admin- 
istrations. He  evidently  favored  Lord  Bute  and  thought  well  of  the  govern- 
ment of  the  "triumvirate."  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth],^^^  iv,  181, 
206,  212. 


i?o  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

these  was  postponed  to  a  future  time,  and  a  request  was 
made  that  power  be  granted  to  correspond  with  the 
general-in-chief  and  the  superintendents  of  Indian  af- 
fairs concerning  them.303  Permission  to  correspond  only 
with  the  latter  was  granted  by  the  cabinet,  and  immedi- 
ately the  board  sent  off  letters  to  obtain  the  needed  infor- 
mation, but  before  answers  arrived,  the  ministerial 
situation  in  England  had  been  greatly  changed  and  it 
was  left  to  a  new  president  to  formulate  these  remaining 
phases  of  the  policy.30* 

In  the  limited  form  of  Shelburne's  report  there  were 
comprehended  only  two  broad  subjects  touching  the 
West:  the  pacification  of  the  Indians  by  assuring  to 
them  their  hunting-grounds,  a  point  upon  which  Egre- 
mont  had  laid  great  stress,  and  the  erection  of  new 
colonies.  Unquestionably  to  the  ministry  and  the 
Board  of  Trade  the  former  subject  appeared  the  more 
vital,  since  the  Indians  had  exhibited  their  hostility  to 
the  British  during  the  past  war  and  rumors  had  reached 
England  of  that  continued  discontent  which  had,  even 
while  the  subject  was  being  considered  in  England, 
broken  out  in  the  war  of  the  Conspiracy  of  Pontiac. 
It  was  quite  evident  that  Egremont's  imperial  control 
of  the  sale  of  Indian  lands  with  slight  modifications 
would  meet  this  need.  This  could  be  accomplished  by 
the  establishment  of  a  boundary  line,  beyond  which  the 
territory  should  be  maintained  for  the  present  as  a  large 

303  See  report,  printed  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents, 
97.     The  refusal  of  the  Board  of  Trade  to  answer  these  questions  can  not 
be  used  to  prove  that  Shelburne  and  his  associates  disapproved  either  of  the 
maintenance  of  a  military  force  in  America  or  of  contributions  in  some  form 
from  the  older  colonies.     In  fact  the  report  leaves  on  the  mind  the  opposite 
impression,  for  the  Lords  of  Trade  evidently  intended  that  a  military  force 
for  defense  should  be  kept  up  and  must,  therefore,  have  realized  that  money 
for  this  ea^nse  must  be  found. 

304  -^llfei 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  171 

Indian  reservation  where  land  could  be  purchased  only 
by  the  crown  through  the  imperial  officials  in  America. 
There  was  no  thought  in  Shelburne's  mind,  when  he 
Ik  determined  upon  the  erection  of  an  Indian  reservation, 
that  the  westward  expansion  of  the  colonies  should  be 
permanently  prohibited  by  the  measure;  he  was  too 
ardent  an  expansionist  to  harbor  such  a  thought.  He 
found,  however,  that  there  was  a  party  even  in  the 
Board  of  Trade  that  wished  to  secure  by  this  means 
other- ends  than  the  good  will  of  the  natives.  John 
Pownall,  the  secretary,  who  wrote  the  original  draft  of 
the  report  believed  that  the  Indian  reservation  should 
be  made  permanent  and  argued  at  length  that  there  was 
great  danger  of  fostering  independence  in  the  colonies 
by  permitting  them  to  extend  their  frontiers  farther 
westward.305  It  has  been  seen  also  that  in  some  of  the 
answers  to  the  inquiries  of  the  Board  of  Trade  this  idea 
had  been  advanced.  Shelburne  did  not  countenance 
any  such  idea  and  took  care  that  in  his  communications 
on  the  subject  there  was  no  ground  for  an  inference  so 
diametrically  opposed  to  his  own  principles.  The  final 
report  of  June  8  was  drawn  up  in  such  a  way  that  there 
was  no  clause  in  it  that  could  be  twisted  into  meaning 
that  the  future  western  advance  of  the  colonies  was  to 
be  prohibited.306  The  barrier  between  the  colonies  and 

305  This  draft  is  found  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlix,  333.  It  is  of 
great  interest  since  the  principles  upon  which  it  is  based  are  quite  distinct 
from  those  embodied  in  the  final  report. 

806  After  recommending  that  civil  governments  be  established  in  certain 
places,  the  Lords  of  Trade  wrote  that  no  civil  government  was  needed, 
"where  no  perpetual  residence  or  planting  is  intended."  Mention  was  then 
made  of  Newfoundland  and  of  Senegal  on  the  African  coast,  where  it  was 
expected  that  settlers  could  not  be  induced  to  go;  but  in  writing  of  the  Indian 
reservation,  they  likewise  thought  that  there  was  no  need  of  a  civil  establish- 
ment here,  "where  no  settlement  by  planting  is  intended,  immediately  at  least, 
to  be  attempted"  [italics  added].  In  the  answer  of  Lord  Egremont  on  July 
14,  the  same  guarded  language  is  used.  See  Shortt  and  Doughty,-  Constitu- 


172  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  Indians  could  be  legally  passed  by  colonists,  when 
the  government  had  satisfied  the  Indians  by  purchase 
of  land  in  the  reservation.  Thus  the  Indian  boundary 
would  be  slowly  abolished  by  the  gradual  extension  of 
the  old  colonies  or  the  erection  of  new  ones.307  Yet,  at 
the  same  time,  the  Indians'  rights  were  protected  by  the 
empire. 

Having  determined  on  this  policy,  the  next  step  was 
to  decide  the  location  of  the  boundary  line.  On  this 
subject  John  Pownall  had  made  up  his  mind;  and  very 
probably,  since  he  had  been  long  familiar  with  the  con- 
ditions, his  was  the  plan  that  was  accepted  by  his  asso- 
ciates. He  proposed  making  in  general  the  Appala- 
chian Mountains  the  line  between  the  older  colonies 
and  the  Indians;  but  at  three  points  the  line  would  not 
follow  the  divide,  because  both  the  Iroquois  and  the 
southern  Indians  had  possessions  to  the  east  which 
must  be  guarded,  while  the  colony  of  Virginia  had 
already  made  settlements  in  the  upper  Ohio  Valley, 
which  the  Board  of  Trade  had  every  intention  of  pro- 
moting.308 The  final  report  did  not  designate  the  boun- 
dary line  so  exactly  but  an  accompanying  map  marked 

tional  Documents,  102,  108.  In  my  essay,  "Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of 
1763"  [Michigan  Pioneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xxxvi,  21],  there 
will  be  found  all  the  arguments  for  the  interpretation  in  the  text.  In  this 
volume  the  same  are  presented,  but  are  more  scattered. 

307  It  is  not  evident  which  was  preferred  at  this  time. 

sos  That  this  was  the  intention  of  the  final  report  is  also  proved  by  a  com- 
munication from  Pownall  to  Lord  Shelburne,  the  date  of  which  must  have 
been  soon  after  the  report  was  accepted  by  the  ministry.  He  wrote  to  ask  if 
"it  will  not  be  advisable  to  send  immediate  directions  to  the  governors  of 
Nova  Scotia,  New  York,  Virginia,  and  South  Carolina  to  lay  out  5  or  6 
townships  of  100,000  each  in  each  province,  vizt. 

".  .  .  In  Virginia -5  in  the  Forks  of  the  Ohio  between  the  main  branch 
of  the  Ohio  and  the  great  Conoway  River.  .  . 

"These  Townships  to  be  set  apart  and  reserved  for  the  settlements  of  such 
officers  and  common  soldiers  and  sailors  as  have  been  engaged  in  the  king's 
service  etc."    This  suggestion  was  acceptable  to  Shelburne.     See  Lansdowne 
Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  i. 
i 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  173 

it  clearly.309  The  northeast  and  southern  limits  of  the 
Indian  reservation  were  definitely  fixed  by  the  territory 
included  in  the  new  colonies. 

Lord  Shelburne  also  gave  his  attention  to  another 
difficulty  in  this  western  situation,  that  which  arose 
from  the  encroachment  upon  the  Indians'  lands  by  the 
frontiersmen.  If  this  advance  guard  of  American  civ- 
ilization could  not  be  restrained  from  the  lawless  occu- 
pation of  unpurchased  territory,  the  policy  of  running 
a  boundary  line  must  prove  a  failure.  The  young  pres- 
ident of  the  Board  of  Trade  had  reason  to  be  optimistic 
about  the  success  of  his  experiment,  however,  since  he 
did  not  have  behind  him,  as  a  warning,  the  disgraceful 
failure  of  the  United  States,  often  repeated,  to  protect 
by  the  same  futile  method  the  rights  of  the  natives. 
The  situation  as  it  had  developed  was  very  critical. 
The  old  colonies  were  becoming  populous  and  free  land 
was  no  longer  plentiful  owing  to  the  large  tracts  that 
were  held  for  speculative  purposes.  Conditions,  there- 
fore, were  crowding  the  pioneer  home-seekers  westward 
upon  the  Indians'  hunting-grounds,  and  the  peace  of 
the  border  was  thus  in  continual  jeopardy.  Lord  Shel- 
burne saw  clearly  that  some  of  this  frontier  population 
must  be  diverted  immediately  towards  less  dangerous 
territory  than  the  mountain  region  and  that  space  for 
settlement  must  be  provided  for  future  comers.  He 
never  was  a  believer  in  coercion  to  attain  purposes 
which  might  better  be  accomplished  by  an  appeal  to 
self-interests.  Nova  Scotia  and  the  proposed  new  col- 
onies of  East  and  West  Florida  had  abundance  of  unoc- 
cupied land  which  could  be  offered,  Shelburne  thought, 
on  such  terms  as  would  prove  attractive  to  those  in  im- 
mediate need  of  homes,310  and  provision  for  the  future 

309  Careful  search  has  been  made  for  this  map  but  without  success. 

310  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  103,  in.     In  the  Lans- 


174 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

requirements  of  settlers  could  be  made  by  the  purchase 
of  land  in  the  Indian  reservation.  In  this  manner  all 
possible  difficulties  inherent  in  the  situation  would  be 
overcome. 

The  subject  of  new  colonies  received  very  careful  in- 
vestigation. It  was  evident  that  these  could  be  located 
only  where  there  was  no  danger  of  disturbing  the  rights 
of  the  Indians.  The  territory  that  fulfilled  this  condi- 
tion was  limited  to  those  regions  where  settlements  had 
already  been  started  by  France  and  Spain;  but  even  in 
these  there  might  be  other  considerations  of  moment. 
The  contemporary  opinion  of  Canada  as  a  possible 
place  for  colonization,  for  instance,  was  by  no  means 
favorable  and  conditions  existing  there  required  most 
careful  examination.  The  territory  contained  already 
a  French  population  of  about  eighty  thousand,  whose 
rights  and  privileges  were  secured  under  the  treaty  of 
peace.  The  Lords  of  Trade  thought  it  improbable 
that  the  English  immigrants  would  for  generations 
equal  in  number  the  French  population;  and  they, 
therefore,  decided  that  justice  and  common  fairness 
demanded  the  segregation  of  the  new  British  subjects  in 
order  that  they  might  both  enjoy  their  own  laws  and  be 
held  in  subjection  by  the  British  troops.311  For  this 

downe  Manuscripts  [vol.  xlviii,  387]  is  a  paper  on  "The  Importance  of 
settling  Nova  Scotia.'' 

311  The  full  significance  of  this  interpretation  will  be  seen  in  the  later 
discussion  of  the  proclamation  of  1763.  The  determination  of  the  policy  must 
be  based  on  Pownall's  draft  of  the  report,  the  report  of  June  8  [Shortt  and 
Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  104],  and  the  omission  of  the  Canadian 
province  as  a  place  for  possible  settlement  in  the  communication  of  August  5. 
See  idem,  in.  In  the  report  the  increase  of  the  English  population  in  Can- 
ada is  proposed  but  this  is  not  urged  on  August  5.  In  a  report  on  the  best 
means  of  settling  the  new  colonies,  made  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  November 
3,  1763,  the  following  strengthens  this  interpretation:  "And  as  to  Your 
Majesty's  government  of  Quebec,  which  has  already  upwards  of  eighty  thou- 
sand inhabitants,  it  does  not  appear  to  us  particularly  necessary,  to  make  any 
other  provision  for  its  further  settlement,  or  to  offer  any  other  encourage- 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  175 

reason  the  proposed  province  of  Quebec  was  limited  on 
the  West  by  a  line  drawn  from  where  the  forty-fifth 
parallel  crossed  the  Saint  Lawrence  to  Lake  Nipissing. 
The  northern  boundary  fell  short  of  the  Hudson's  Bay 
Company's  territory  and  the  southern  was  formed  by 
the  older  colonies ;  in  other  words,  the  colony  was  lim- 
ited to  the  valley  of  the  Saint  Lawrence.312  On  account 
of  the  nature  of  the  population  and  in  order  to  secure 
the  French  "in  all  the  Titles,  Rights  and  Privileges 
granted  to  them  by  Treaty"  the  proposed  government 
was  to  consist  of  a  governor  and  council  appointed  by 
the  king.  The  discussion  of  what  provisions  "adapted 
to  the  different  circumstances  and  situation  of  this"  col- 
ony should  be  adopted,  was  postponed  until  the  gov- 
ernor's commission  and  instructions  should  be  drawn  up. 
The  only  other  territory  which  could  be  immediately 
opened  to  settlement  was  that  ceded  by  Spain  and  that 
part  of  the  French  cession  which  lay  around  Mobile. 
In  this  region  there  was  no  large  foreign  population  to 
be  considered,  and  on  account  of  the  proximity  of  New 
Orleans  and  the  West  Indies  it  was  expected  that  the 
Spaniards  and  French  would  prefer  to  emigrate  rather 
than  remain  under  a  foreign  flag.  It  was  also  supposed 
that  there  had  already  been  acquired  from  the  Indians 
by  the  former  owners  a  large  tract  that  might  be  im- 
mediately utilized  by  settlers.  The  Lords  of  Trade 
decided  to  recommend  that  two  colonies,  East  and 
West  Florida,  be  created  there.  The  men,  who  it  was 
thought  knew  the  region  assured  them  that  the  land  was 
fertile  and  capable  of  maintaining  a  large  population. 
Other  attractions  also  must  be  noted.  The  Floridas 

ments,  for  the  present,  than  what  are  contained  in  the  draft  of  the  instruc- 
tions, etc." -Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.563,  p.  121. 

312  A  map  of  the  new  colonies  is  printed  in  Howard,  Preliminaries  of  the 
Revolution,  in  Hart,  American  Nation,  vol.  viii,  4. 


176  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

could  produce  semitropical  products  which  the  prevail- 
ing colonial  theory  estimated  as  the  most  valuable  for 
the  mother  country.  Since  the  new  colonies  were  sit- 
uated on  the  sea  coast,  they  would  not  be  objectionable 
to  that  party  which  held  inland  colonies  as  both  un- 
profitable and  dangerous;  and  their  proximity  to  the 
Spanish  possessions  seemed  to  promise  a  valuable 
trade.313  The  form  of  government  for  these  colonies 
was  to  be  like  that  of  Quebec,  a  governor  with  a  legisla- 
tive council;  but  the  reason  for  this  decision  was  that 
they  had  too  small  a  population  to  permit  representa- 
tion.314 

In  the  formulation  of  the  policy  thus  outlined  Lord 
Shelburne  had  followed  the  outlines  which  had  been 
set  for  him  by  his  predecessors,  and  apparently  no  op- 
portunity had  been  granted  him  to  mark  out  new 
courses  of  colonial  development,  since  the  influence  of 
the  triumvirate  was  sufficiently  strong  to  prevent  any 
radical  departure  from  precedent.  That  there  was  dis- 
agreement between  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
and  his  colleagues  in  the  ministry  has  already  been 
shown,  but  there  is  no  indisputable  source  of  informa- 
tion to  connect  such  political  disagreements  with  the 
development  of  the  western  policy.  As  far  as  the  con- 
temporary sources  go,  the  final  plan  as  outlined  above 
represented  the  ideas  of  all  parties. 

One  unconnected  piece  of  information  coming  from 
later  years  gives  the  lie  to  this  apparent  harmony  and 
reveals  clearly  how  widely  separated,  even  at  this  early 
date,  were  the  principles  espoused  by  Lord  Shelburne 
from  those  maintained  by  such  men  as  George  Gren- 
ville  and  his  supporters.  That  Shelburne  was  a  radical 

313  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlviii,  46,  57,  63,  621. 

314  Report  of  June  8,  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  104. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  177 

has  already  been  shown;  and  there  is  proof  that  this 
radicalism  of  his  made  its  appearance  in  the  summer  of 
1763  in  a  discussion  about  the  form  of  government  to 
be  inaugurated  in  the  new  colonies.  Shelburne  always 
despised  that  petty  influence  which  is  obtained  by  the 
control  of  patronage  and  for  that  reason  was  in  favor 
of  such  a  reform  of  all  the  colonial  constitutions  that 
sinecures  and  patronage  might  be  abolished  and  a  more 
democratic  organization  be  substituted.313  It  was  quite 
in  keeping  with  this  principle  that  he  said  in  Parlia- 
ment in  the  year  1778 :  "The  paltry  governors  and  low 
views  of  patronage,  must  be  given  up ;  they  never  were 
useful,  never  could  be  well  asserted."  It  was  in  this 
same  speech  that  he  lifted  the  curtain  that  covers  the 
doings  of  the  ministry  of  the  triumvirate  when  they 
were  determining  the  course  to  be  followed  towards 
the  new  acquisitions.  He  explained  to  the  House  of 
Lords  that  he  had  in  1763  believed  in  the  above  prin- 
ciple and  had  wished  that  the  governors  of  the  new 
colonies  should  be  elected  by  the  people.816  If  his  views 
had  been  accepted,  there  would  have  been  established 
in  the  Floridas  a  local  autonomy  similar  to  that  in  Con- 
necticut. 

There  were  several  men  in  the  cabinet  who  must  have 
been  opposed  to  such  a  radical  measure,  but  Lord  Shel- 
burne ascribed  the  defeat  of  his  proposal  to  George 
Grenville;  and  it  is  most  likely  that  this  scion  of  the 
Grenville  family,  which  always  fattened  on  patronage 

315  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  8r. 

316  Franklin,   Writings    (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  x,  332.     The  evidence  that  this 
speech  was  made  is  trustworthy.     It  may  be  questioned,  however,   whether 
Shelburne's  memory  of  what  his  earlier  opinion  was  can  be  accepted.     Still 
three  years  later  he  was  in  favor  of  reforming  all  the  colonial  charters  so  that 
they  might  be  made  more  democratic.     In  this  view  he  was  supported  by  the 
Pittites,  his  associates  at  that  time,  as  is  shown  in  the  later  narrative.     See 
chapters  x  and  xii. 


i?8  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

and  sinecures,  would  oppose  most  firmly  a  change  in 
the  method  of  selecting  officers  that  would  in  any  way 
decrease  his  power.  Unfortunately  there  is  no  infor- 
mation on  the  subject  of  this  controversy  except  this 
casual  reference  to  it  in  later  years  by  Lord  Shelburne; 
but  this  short  account  arouses  the  curiosity  and  brings 
to  the  mind  questions  that  can  not  be  answered.  Were 
any  of  those  disagreements  in  the  cabinet,  noticed  in 
the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  caused  by  the  radical 
proposals  of  the  young  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade? 
Is  it  possible  that  Lord  Shelburne's  failure  to  persuade 
his  colleagues  to  adopt  his  views  on  the  subject  of  the 
form  of  government  prepared  his  mind  for  his  later 
resignation?  Would  the  king,  Lord  Bute,  and  the 
court  faction  have  supported  such  a  democratic  prin- 
ciple even  if  it  were  proposed  by  their  own  representa- 
tive in  the  ministry? 

On  June  8,  1763,  Lord  Shelburne  and  his  colleagues 
embodied  their  ideas,  stripped  of  all  radicalism,  in  a 
report  to  the  king.  This  was  received  with  favor  by 
the  men  of  influence  and  power.  Lord  Bute  called  it 
"excellent"  and  his  opinion  coincided  with  that  of  the 
king  himself  who  was  strongly  in  favor  of  westward 
expansion.317  The  ministry  was  also  satisfied  both  with 
its  recommendations  and  with  its  implied  intention  of 
opening  up  the  West  to  settlement  in  the  future.  Lord 
Halifax  had  always  fostered  the  westward  movement 
and  never  changed  his  mind  as  to  its  necessity.  Almost 
on  his  death-bed  he  declared,  "that  he  was  of  the  same 

317  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  196.  Two  years  later,  when  this 
same  ministry  had  failed  to  put  in  execution  a  policy  that  would  make  use 
of  the  great  West,  the  king  complained  to  the  Duke  of  Cumberland  that  "no 
proper  disposition,  or  at  least  no  satisfactory  one  [had  been]  made  of  the  new 
acquisitions."  See  Newcastle,  Narrative  of  the  Changes  in  the  Ministry 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  sen,  vol.  lix],  n. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  179 

opinion  then,  as  he  had  always  been,  that  it  was  the  in- 
disputable policy  of  this  kingdom,  to  encourage  settle- 
ments over  the  Allegany  mountains ;  and  by  that  means, 
prevent  the  Americans  from  establishing  manufactories 
among  themselves."318  Lord  Egremont  also  had  al- 
ways expected  that  such  a  policy  would  be  followed. 
The  third  member  of  the  "triumvirate,"  George  Gren- 
ville,  unlike  his  associates,  had  never  served  in  a  de- 
partment dealing  with  American  affairs,  and  was, 
therefore,  very  ignorant  of  the  conditions  prevailing 
in  the  colonies.319  He  was  a  man,  however,  of  very 
decided  opinions  and  on  this  particular  point  was  in 
full  harmony  with  his  colleagues  and  the  Board  of 
Trade.  In  a  pamphlet  either  written  or  inspired  by 
him  it  is  asserted :  "that  it  will  hereafter  appear  desir- 
able to  pass  these  boundaries  [Indian  boundary  line] 
upon  many  occasions  and  to  make  settlements  in  remote 
countries,  for  particular  purposes;  but  this  should  al- 
ways be  a  measure  of  government,  prudently  concerted, 
and  cautiously  executed;  not  left  to  the  decision  of  a 
single  governor,  but  much  less  to  the  interested  views 
of  any  individual  or  sett  of  individuals."320 

In  accordance  with  the  decision  of  the  cabinet,  the 

318  Statement  for  the  Petitioners  in  the  Case  of  the   JValpole  Company 
Grant  (pamphlet  without  title-page),  28. 

319  William  Knox,  one  of  Grenville's  closest  friends,  is  the  authority  for 
this  statement.     Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papers,  vol.  ii,  32. 

320  Regulations  lately  made  concerning  the  Colonies  and  the  Taxes  imposed 
upon  them,  considered,  20-21.     Further  evidence  is  contained  in  the  following: 
"The  late  Mr.  Grenville,  who  was,  at  the  time  of  issuing  this  proclamation 
[of  1763],  the  minister  of  this  kingdom,  always  said,  that  the  design  of  it 
was  totally   accomplished,   so  soon   as   the  country  was   purchased   from   the 
natives ;   and  for  that  reason,  and  from  a  thorough  conviction,  that  it  was 
the  true  policy  of  Great  Britain  to  encourage  settlements  on  the  Ohio,   and 
not  to  confine  them  to  the  eastern  side  of  the  Allegany  mountains,  he  early 
became  one  of  Mr.  Walpole's  company;  and  earl  Temple  now  represents  and 
holds  his  share  therein,  for  the  use  of  his  son."  -  Statement  for  the  Petitioners 
in  the  Case  of  the  JValpole  Company  Grant,  28. 


i8o  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Earl  of  Egremont  on  July  14,  wrote  to  the  Lords  of 
Trade  that  their  recommendations  had  been  approved 
by  the  king,  and  he  instructed  them  to  draw  up  the  nec- 
essary papers  for  the  new  governors,  named  at  this  time, 
and  additional  instructions  to  the  governors  of  the  older 
colonies,  concerning  the  granting  of  land.321 

On  one  point  only  was  there  a  criticism  of  the  report. 
This  concerned  the  Indian  reservation.  Lord  Egre- 
mont, writing  for  the  cabinet,  pointed  out  that  no  means 
of  preserving  order  or  of  proving  dominion  in  this 
region  was  provided,  so  that  it  might  become  the  refuge 
of  criminals  or  be  taken  possession  of  by  some  foreign 
nation.  The  ministry  proposed  that  the  reservation  be 
placed  under  the  control  of  the  government  of  the  prov- 
ince of  Quebec,  unless  the  Board  of  Trade  should  sug- 
gest some  better  method.322  There  is  nothing  to  show 
that  Lord  Egremont  and  his  colleagues  had  any  ulterior 
motive  in  this  suggestion.323  The  criticism  was  a  just 
one,  even  more  just  than  Lord  Egremont  himself  real- 
ized, as  later  ministries  were  to  find  out.  This  weak- 
ness in  the  government  of  the  West,  due  to  a  lack  of 
judicial  authority,  was  the  cause  of  many  difficulties 
until  it  was  corrected  in  the  Mutiny  Act  of  I765.32* 
The  injustice  of  governing  the  French  villages  by  the 
arbitrary  military  power  was  to  continue  longer  and 

321  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  108. 
322_uem>  Io8> 

323  Yet  it  is  possible  that  the  cabinet  felt  that  the  West  could  be  best  pro- 
tected against  the  encroachments  of  the  frontiersmen  by  the  government  of 
Quebec;  and  even  that  it  might  be  easier  to  coerce  the  colonies  to  obedience 
by   such   an   arrangement;   but   there   is   nothing   in   the   available   historical 
sources  to  prove  that  such  was  the  intention.     It  seems  more  reasonable  to 
suspect  that  the  influence  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  or  other  trading  com- 
panies was  behind  this  recommendation  of  Egremont's,  but  no  confirmation 
of  such  a  suspicion  has  been  found. 

324  Discussed  later,  page  205. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS i^t 

was  not  brought  to  an  end  until  the  passage  of  the  Que- 
bec Act  in  I774.325 

The  Lords  of  Trade  were  unwilling  to  accept  the 
secretary's  recommendation  and  on  August  5  set  forth 
their  objections  to  such  an  addition  to  the  power  of  the 
governor  of  Quebec.326  They  feared,  first,  that  at  some 
future  time  France  might  argue  that  such  an  extension 
of  the  province  of  Quebec  was  an  acknowledgment  of 
her  earlier  contention  to  the  dominion  of  the  whole 
West  through  the  occupation  of  Canada;  and  second, 
that  it  would  give  the  northern  province  the  advantage 
in  the  fur  trade;  and  third,  that  the  governor  of  Canada, 
on  account  of  the  number  of  troops  within  his  province, 
would  become  virtually  the  military  governor  of  Amer- 
ica.327 They,  therefore,  proposed  that  a  commission  for 
the  government  of  the  Indian  reservation  be  issued  to 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  troops.  This  recom- 
mendation was  carried  out  and  the  whole  West  was 
placed  under  the  military  authority.328 

325  This  whole  question  of  the  status  of  the  West  is  ably  discussed  in  Car- 
ter, Great  Britain  and  the  Illinois  Country,  chap.  ii. 

326  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  no. 

327  The  result  of  this  decision  may  be  studied  in  Carter,  Great  Britain  and 
the  Illinois  Country,  chap.  ii. 

328  The  cabinet  agreed  to  this  recommendation.     See  Shortt  and  Doughty, 
Constitutional  Documents,   113.     No  commission   to  the   general   giving  him 
such  extended  jurisdiction,  however,  has  been   found;   but  in  a   letter  from 
General   Amherst,  August   24,   1763,   occurs   the  following:     "The   Secretary 
of  State  having  signified  to  me,  that  as  my  commission  under  the  great  seal, 
of  commander  in  chief  of  all  His  Majesty's  forces  in  North  America,  includes 
Florida,  and  the  country  ceded  by  Spain,  on  the  continent,  and  likewise  the 
country  ceded  by  France  on  the  left  side  of  the  Mississippi ;  it  is  the  king's 
pleasure  I  should  give  the  necessary  orders  to  the  officers  commanding  the 
troops    destined    for    those    places." -Public    Record    Office,    Colonial    Office 
Papers,  323.17,  p.  49.     It  is  probable,  however,  that  the  above  refers  only  to 
a  military  power  over  the  two  Floridas.     The  whole  question  of  what  was 
actually  done  is  difficult  to  answer.     See  Carter,  Great  Britain  and  the  Illi- 
nois Country,  chap.  ii. 


182  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

Part  of  the  comprehensive  colonial  policy  had  now 
been  formulated  and  accepted  by  the  British  ministry, 
and  there  remained  only  the  drafting  of  the  commis- 
sions and  instructions  to  the  governors  by  which  means 
it  had  been  determined  to  put  the  plan  into  operation. 
Undoubtedly  this  would  have  been  done  in  either  July 
or  August,  had  not  two  events  intervened.  The  first  was 
the  arrival  of  the  news  that  the  western  Indians  were  in 
arms,  and  the  second  was  that  well  known  political  dis- 
turbance of  August  which  culminated  in  the  futile  nego- 
tiations to  bring  William  Pitt  into  the  ministry.  This 
delay  in  announcing  the  plans  for  the  West,  which  was 
caused  by  these  two  events  occurring  in  places  so  far 
distant  from  each  other,  was  to  exercise  a  very  material 
influence  upon  the  form  of  the  policy  itself. 


VII.    PROCLAMATION  OF  OCTOBER  7,  1763 

The  only  object  of  attention,  which  seemed  left  to  Great  Britain, 
was  to  render  these  acquisitions  as  beneficial  in  traffic,  as  they  were 
extensive  in  territory.  An  immense  waste  of  savage  country  was 
evidently  to  a  commercial  nation  no  great  object  for  the  present;  but 
it  was  a  considerable  one  in  hope.  —  Annual  Register. 

The  British  ministry  had,  thus,  in  a  comparatively 
short  time,  considering  the  complexities  of  the  task, 
worked  out  a  partial  policy  that  would  satisfy  the  pres- 
ent need  for  promoting  the  interests  of  the  expanding 
colonies  and  for  protecting  the  rights  of  the  Indians. 
In  the  middle  of  July  it  was  the  purpose  of  the  ministry 
immediately  to  execute  their  plan  by  issuing  instruc- 
tions to  the  governors  of  both  the  new  colonies  and  the 
old.  This  they  failed  to  do.  Since  the  immediate  oc- 
casion of  the  change  in  their  plans  was  the  receipt  of 
alarming  news  of  events  in  the  colonies,  a  brief  account 
of  these  distant  happenings  must  break  the  thread  of  the 
narrative  of  ministerial  action. 

During  those  very  weeks  that  the  Lords  of  Trade 
were  so  diligently  collecting  information  on  the  West 
and  sifting  the  evidence  contained  in  the  various  memo- 
rials submitted  to  them,  there  were  occurring  in  that 
distant  region  some  of  the  most  stirring  and  bloody 
scenes  ever  chronicled  in  western  history.329  The  out- 

329  For  the  purposes  of  this  chapter  Parkman's  brilliant  account  of  the 
Indian  war,  which  followed  the  French  and  Indian  War,  has  been  found 
sufficient,  and  the  reader  is  referred  to  his  two  volumes  on  the  Conspiracy  of 
Pontiac.  Other  volumes  consulted  are  Wisconsin  Historical  Collections,  vol. 
xviii,  and  Michigan  Pioneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xxvii. 


184  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

break  of  the  Indian  war  known  as  the  Conspiracy  of 
Pontiac  was  the  fruit  of  those  feelings  of  resentment 
which  had  been  bred  in  the  hearts  of  the  Indians  by  the 
wrongs  practiced  upon  them  by  the  colonists,  wrongs 
which  Sir  William  Johnson  had  been  pointing  out  for 
years.  In  a  great  measure  the  struggle  was  the  logical 
consequence  of  the  badly  organized  Indian  manage- 
ment that  had  been  pursued  by  the  colonies  and  had  not 
been  adequately  corrected  by  the  mother  country. 

Chief  among  the  abuses  were  those  committed  by  the 
British  and  American  traders  who  were  too  anxious  to 
squeeze  out  the  utmost  farthing  of  profit  and  employed 
all  manner  of  trickery  to  gain  their  ends.  The  Indians' 
excessive  love  of  liquor  offered  to  the  unscrupulous 
traders  all  too  easy  a  means  of  gaining  an  advantage. 
Major  Rogers  in  his  tragedy  of  Ponteach  did  not  find 
it  necessary  to  exaggerate  in  writing  the  following  de- 
scription of  practices  in  the  West,  which  he  put  into  the 
mouth  of  one  of  his  characters :  33° 

A  thousand  opportunities  present 

To  take  advantage  of  their  ignorance; 

But  the  great  engine  I  employ  is  rum, 

More  pow'rful  made  by  certain  strength 'ning  drugs, 

This  I  distribute  with  a  lib'ral  hand, 

Urge  them  to  drink  till  they  grow  mad  and  valiant; 

Which  makes  them  think  me  generous  and  just, 

And  gives  full  scope  to  practice  all  my  art. 

I  then  begin  my  trade  with  water'd  rum, 

The  cooling  draught  well  suits  their  scorching  throats. 

Their  fur  and  peltry  come  in  quick  return; 

My  scales  are  honest,  but  so  well  contriv'd, 

That  one  small  slip  will  turn  three  pounds  to  one; 

Which  they,  poor  silly  souls!  ignorant  of  weights 

And  rules  of  balancing,  do  not  perceive. 


330  The  quotation  is  from  the  first  act,  first  scene.     This  tragedy,  edited 
by  Allan  Nevins,  has  recently  been  reprinted  by  the  Caxton  Club. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 185 

The  superintendents  of  Indian  affairs,  the  military  offi- 
cers, and  the  ministers  knew  that  such  practices  were 
common.  The  following  quotation  is  a  typical  expres- 
sion of  opinion  in  the  contemporary  correspondence  on 
this  subject.  It  is  taken  from  a  letter  to  General  Am- 
herst  from  Lord  Egremont: 381 

I  can't  however  help  mentioning  to  you  one  circumstance  on  this 
head,  which  is  so  generally  affirmed  and  credited,  that  I  fear 
there  must  be  too  much  foundation  for  it:  it  is  said  that  the 
Indians  are  disgusted  and  their  minds  alienated  from  His 
Majesty's  government,  by  the  shamefull  manner  in  which 
business  is  transacted  between  them  and  our  traders,  the  latter 
making  no  scruple  of  using  every  low  trick  and  artifice  to  over- 
reach and  cheat  those  unguarded  ignorant  people. 

This  utter  disregard  of  the  rights  of  the  natives  was  sure 
to  reap  its  reward.  There  had  been  attempts  by  several 
of  the  colonies  to  secure  better  conditions,  but  the  range 
of  the  traders  was  too  extended  and  their  paths  too  far 
removed  from  the  oversight  of  the  officers  of  the  law  for 
such  local  regulations  to  hold  them  in  check. 

Closely  connected  with  the  acts  of  the  traders  as  a 
cause  of  the  Indians'  discontent  was  trie  decision  of  the 
British  government  that  it  was  useless  to  waste  much 
money  on  gifts  to  the  Indians.  The  policy  of  the  min- 
istry at  the  close  of  the  war  was  economy,  and  one  means 
of  practicing  this  was  by  the  curtailment  of  the  Indian 
expenses.  The  need  of  presents  had  been  appreciated 
during  the  continuance  of  the  war,  but  now  that  Great 
Britain  was  supreme  there  appeared  to  the  average 
Englishman  little  necessity  of  propitiating  the  savages 
who  had  been  allies  of  the  French.  General  Amherst 
was  largely  responsible  for  this  attitude.  He  despised 

331  December  12,  1761,  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  v,  153.  Sir  William 
Johnson's  letters  to  the  ministry  are  full  of  complaints  against  the  traders. 
New  York  Colonial  Documents,  passim.  See  particularly  vol.  vii,  953  ff. 


\ 


i86  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  Indians  and  their  power.  When  informed  of  the 
displeasure  of  the  Indians  on  learning  of  the  cession  of 
the  West  to  Great  Britain,  he  wrote  that  it  little  mat- 
tered what  the  Indians  thought,  for  it  was  to  their  in- 
terest to  keep  quiet.  Thus  Amherst,  safely  seated  in 
New  York,  was  expressing  his  contempt  for  the  Indians, 
all  unconscious  that,  twenty- four  hours  before,  the  Brit- 
ish soldiers  in  Detroit  had  seen  gathering  around  them 
that  horde  of  red  men  under  Chief  Pontiac  who  were 
determined  to  drive  the  British  out  of  the  West.332 

Far  more  important  than  traders'  tricks  and  British 
Vv*parsimony  was  the  encroachment  of  the  settlers  on  the 
Indians'  hunting-grounds.  In  this  the  land  speculator 
was  particularly  guilty,  for  he  carried  into  his  bartering 
for  Indian  lands  the  low,  cunning  tricks  of  the  traders. 
The  Indians  of  the  East  had  already  suffered  severely; 
the  Iroquois  had  made  many  complaints  of  the  frauds 
practiced  upon  them;  and  now  the  western  Indians  saw 
the  settlers  pouring  across  the  mountains  and  filling  up 
the  lands  granted  by  crown  or  colony  to  promoters  or 
else  occupying  them  without  any  legal  justification 
whatever.  The  Indians  found  themselves  face  to  face 
with  that  calamity  which  so  many  of  their  eastern 
brothers  had  suffered.  No  wonder  their  fears  were 
aroused  by  the  insidious  tales  of  the  French  fur  trader 
as  he  told  them  of  English  plans  to  drive  out  all  the 
forest  children  and  to  settle  their  lands  with  English 
farmers.  Their  untutored  minds  now  understood  that 
the  fall  of  the  French  meant  for  them  the  loss  of  the 
only  power  outside  themselves  that  could  stop  this  west- 
ward march.  Unwilling  to  believe  in  their  complete 

332  Amherst  to  Croghan,  May  10,  1763  in  British  Museum,  Additional 
Manuscripts,  21634,  P-  233.  The  contemporary  criticisms  of  Amherst's  In- 
dian policy  are  numerous.  See  an  interesting  letter  from  a  gentleman  in 
Montreal,  November  i,  1763  in  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xxiv,  185. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  187 

desertion  their  ears  listened  eagerly  to  the  fanciful  tale 
of  the  French  traders  that  the  great  king  was  sending 
an  army  to  the  Mississippi  Valley  to  win  back  his  lost 
territory,  and  they  believed  that  in  attacking  the  British 
posts  they  were  only  preparing  the  way  for  the  return 
of  their  beloved  French  father. 

The  uprising  broke  out  in  early  May.  Pontiac  had 
created  among  the  tribes  of  the  Old  Northwest  a  great 
confederacy  which  even  one  tribe  of  the  Six  Nations 
joined.  The  British  were  little  prepared  for  the  unex- 
pected attack.  General  Amherst,  misled  by  his  con- 
tempt for  the  natives,  had  expected  to  hold  the  vast 
western  country  in  check  by  garrisons  of  a  few  soldiers 
scattered  in  far  separated  posts.  During  May  and  June 
one  post  after  another  was  attacked.  Through  treachery 
or  force,  Michillimackinac,  St.  Joseph,  Miami,  Ouiate- 
non,  Sandusky,  and  other  small  forts  yielded  to  the  In- 
dians. Only  Detroit  and  Fort  Pitt  were  able  to  with- 
stand the  enemy.  Within  the  space  of  a  few  weeks  the 
whole  West  was  lost. 

The  first  news  of  the  Indian  war  reached  General 
Amherst  at  New  York  on  June  6;  but  he  did  not  think 
of  it  as  of  much  consequence,  and  only  six  days  later 
was  he  made  aware  of  the  general  character  and  seri- 
ousness of  the  outbreak.333  On  the  eleventh  and  twenty- 
seventh  of  June  he  wrote  to  Secretary  Egremont  con- 
cerning the  revolt;  probably  others  had  written  earlier 
than  the  commandant.  The  news  proved  to  the  Lords 
of  Trade  that  the  announcement  of  their  intention  to 
protect  the  Indians  in  their  rights  had  been  too  long 
delayed.334 

333  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  21634,  pp.  262,  268.     On  June 
16,  Amherst  received  a  letter  from  Sir  William  Johnson  giving  further  news. 
Parkman,  Conspiracy  of  Pontiac,  vol.  i,  317,  footnote  i. 

334  It  has  been  impossible  to  find  the  exact  date  upon  which  the  news  of 


i88  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  very  first  explanation  of  the  outbreak  was  that  it 
was  due  to  the  encroachment  on  the  lands  of  the  In- 
dians.335 The  Lords  of  Trade  could  not  have  been  sur- 
prised at  this  since  they  had  been  frequently  warned  of 
what  must  be  the  consequence  of  the  poorly  devised 
land  policy  of  the  colonies.  The  evil  they  had  been  led 
to  fear  had,  however,  already  occurred,  and  their  only 
hope  was  that  they  might  alleviate  the  suffering  some- 
what by  an  early  announcement  of  their  beneficent  in- 
tentions toward  the  Indians.  The  usual  and  rather 
indirect  method  of  accomplishing  this  by  sending  in- 
structions to  the  governors  was  hardly  adequate  in  the 
crisis,  so  they  proposed  to  the  ministry  on  August  fifth 
that  a  proclamation  by  the  king  be  immediately  pre- 
pared. Two  subjects  only  were  proposed  to  be  so  an- 
nounced :  the  reservation  of  the  Indian  grounds  as  indi- 
cated in  their  report  on  June  8,  and  the  inducements  to 
be  offered  settlers  in  various  places.336  It  was  hoped 
that  the  announcement  of  the  boundary  would  allay  the 
fears  of  the  Indians,  and  that  by  skillfully  picturing  the 
attractions  of  other  places  for  settlement  the  pioneers 
might  be  drawn  away  from  the  frontier.  The  Board  of 
Trade,  therefore,  proposed  to  include  in  the  proclama- 
tion a  statement  of  the  advantages  to  be  offered  in  the 

the  Indian  outbreak  reached  England.  In  the  letter  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
of  August  5,  there  is  a  general  reference  to  Indian  troubles  that  probably  re- 
fers to  such  information.  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents, 
in.  By  the  thirteenth,  Amherst's  letters  of  June  n  and  27  had  certainly 
been  received.  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  540.  Since  the 
change  of  plan  of  August  5  is  very  marked  and  can  only  be  due  to  the  news 
of  the  Indian  outbreak,  it  is  safe  to  conclude  that  the  news  reached  England 
during  the  first  days  of  Auguft  or  the  end  of  July. 

335  So  it  is   explained  in  the   Gentleman's  Magazine,   August,   1763    [vol. 
xxxiii,  413]. 

336  Lords  of  Trade  to  Egremont,  August  5,  1763  in  Shortt  and  Doughty, 
Constitutional  Documents,  in.     The  Board  of  Trade  intended  that  the  Indian 
boundary  line  should  be  the  same  that  they  had  indicated  in  their  previous 
report.     See  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  535. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  189 

new  colonies  of  the  Floridas  and  in  the  old  colony  of 
Nova  Scotia  to  which  the  ministry  was  particularly 
favorable.  The  French  province  of  Quebec  was  not 
included  among  the  places  to  be  offered  for  settlement, 
since  it  had  not  yet  been  decided  how  far  English  settle- 
ment there  should  or  could  be  encouraged.3" 

The  importance  of  this  recommendation  must  have 
been  evident  to  all,  yet  no  attention  was  paid  to  it  for 
over  a  month.  This  momentous  delay  was  due  to  the  un- 
stable position  of  the  triumvirate  ministry  which  seemed 
on  the  point  of  dissolution  at  the  very  moment  that  the 
communication  of  the  Board  was  being  prepared.  Thus 
the  political  negotiations  of  this  time  affected  indirectly 
the  western  colonial  policy;  and  they  also  reveal,  when 
rightly  interpreted,  the  attitude  towards  America  of 
both  the  king  and  the  man  who  wielded  the  power  be- 
hind the  throne.  This  summer's  politics  in  London 
was,  therefore,  very  closely  related  to  the  events  of  the 
great  inland  valley  across  the  ocean. 

The  ministry  of  the  triumvirate  had  been  chosen  by 
the  Earl  of  Bute  simply  as  a  makeshift  until  a  stronger 
administration  could  be  formed.  Two  methods  of 
bringing  this  about  seemed  feasible:  the  existing  min- 
istry could  be  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  the  Duke 
of  Bedford  and  of  members  of  the  Old  Whig  coalition; 
or,  an  entirely  new  administration  could  be  inaugurated 
with  Pitt  as  prime  minister.  The  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  the  first  was  the  declared  hostility  of  Bedford  to  the 
favorite  and  the  impossibility  of  detaching  individuals 
from  their  allegiance  to  a  faction.  The  king's  opposi- 
tion to  what  he  would  regard  as  a  purely  party  admin- 
istration seemed  to  make  the  second  method  almost  im- 
possible, particularly  if  Pitt  should  insist  on  bringing 

337  For  a  discussion  of  this  omission  see  page  206  ff. 


190  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

in  the  Old  Whigs  with  whom  he  was  at  the  time  closely 
united.  Furthermore,  Pitt  had  gained  the  personal  dis- 
pleasure of  the  king  through  Lord  Temple's  support  of 
John  Wilkes,  the  writer  of  the  notorious  North  Briton.336 
These  latter  difficulties  did  not  appear  insurmount- 
able to  Lord  Bute.  In  the  early  days  of  June,  about 
two  months  after  the  formation  of  the  Grenville  min- 
istry, negotiations  to  secure  the  services  of  Pitt  and 
some  of  the  Old  Whigs  were  begun  with  the  Marquis 
of  Rockingham,  but  they  were  without  success.339  A 
little  later  there  was  an  attempt  to  induce  some  of  the 
Old  Whigs  to  join  the  ministry  without  Pitt,  but  the 
noble  chiefs  were  too  sure  of  an  ultimate  victory  to  dis- 
solve their  union.340  At  the  beginning  of  August  the 
king  had  fully  determined  to  make  a  change  in  the  min- 
istry, and  Lord  Bute  pressed  the  negotiations  in  earnest. 
Exactly  what  he  hoped  to  accomplish  it  is  difficult  now 
to  discover;  but  probably  his  statement  to  his  agent  in 
these  negotiations,  the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
Lord  Shelburne,  is  very  near  the  truth.  After  the  under- 
taking had  ended  in  failure  he  wrote: 

I  scorn  to  deny  that  I  was  of  opinion  that  Mr.  Pitt's  coming 
into  ministry  with  a  few  of  the  other  party  would,  with  the 
king's  friends  who  had  supported  his  measures,  have  made  a 
strong  and  permanent  government,  would  have  put  an  end  to 

ass  These  possibilities  are  discussed  at  length  by  Von  Ruville  in  his  essay 
William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute,  chap.  v.  The  king's  feelings  against  Pitt  and 
Temple  on  account  of  Wilkes  is  seen  in  a  letter  of  Lord  Hardwicke,  May  13, 
1763  in  Harris,  Life  of  Hardwicke,  vol.  iii,  351 ;  also  in  Yorke,  Life  of  Hard- 
*uicke,  vol.  iii,  495. 

339  Newcastle  to  Hardwicke,  June  9,  1763  in  "Newcastle  Papers,"  in  British 
Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  32949,  p.  70,  quoted  by  Von  Ruville,  op.  cit., 
71,  footnote  10;  partially  printed  in  Yorke,  op.  cit.,  503.  Pitt's  own  feelings 
at  this  moment  prevented  such  a  coalition  as  was  proposed.  Newcastle,  on 
June  30,  wrote  Hardwicke  that  Pitt  said  "that  he  never  would  have  anything 
to  do  with  my  Lord  Bute."  See  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  169. 

840  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  191 ;  Harris,  Life  of  Hardivicke,  vol.  iii, 
369  ff. ;  Yorke,  Life  of  Hardivicke,  vol.  iii,  512  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  191 

all  the  violence  of  party,  and  given  the  best  of  sovereigns  a 
quiet  and  easy  reign.3*1 

The  negotiations  were  opened  with  the  Bedfords  and 
Pitt,  but  the  duke  still  nursed  his  enmity  to  the  favorite, 
and  Pitt  objected  to  all  those  who  assisted  in  making 
the  peace,  particularly  Bedford,  so  that  the  attempt  at 
reconciling  differences  seemed  doomed  to  failure.  The 
death  of  the  Earl  of  Egremont  on  August  21  by  making 
vacant  the  position  of  the  secretary  of  state  for  the 
Southern  Department  changed  the  situation  very  great- 
ly, and  a  union  of  forces  seemed  more  nearly  attainable. 
The  ensuing  negotiations  were  brought  to  an  issue  by  a 
conference  between  Pitt  and  the  king  on  August  27. 
For  a  moment  it  looked  as  if  George  III.  might  see  in- 
augurated his  ideal  ministry  with  a  "broad  bottom;" 
but,  pledged  as  Pitt  was  to  the  Newcastle  faction,  he 
found  it  impossible  to  accede  at  this  time  to  the  king's 
plans,  and  the  negotiations  were  broken  off.342 

Although  the  attempt  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the 
political  alignment  was  a  failure,  it  has  a  most  impor- 
tant bearing  on  the  interpretation  of  the  colonial  policy 
held  by  the  king  and  his  most  intimate  associates.  At 
this  time  and  for  several  years  later,  the  ideal  govern- 
ment which  the  king  held  constantly  in  view  was  one 
with  a  "broad  bottom"  under  the  leadership  of  William 

341  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  207. 

342  For  these  famous  negotiations  the  following  volumes  may  be  consulted: 
Bedford,   Correspondence,   vol.   iii;    Pitt,    Correspondence,  vol.   ii;   Walpole, 
Memoirs  of  George  ///.,  vol.  i,  286  ff. ;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  120,  191  ff. ; 
Burton,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Hume,  vol.  ii,  161  ff. ;  Fitzmaurice,  Life 
of  Shelburne,  vol.  i;  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  170  ff. ;  Harris, 
Life  of  Hardiuicke,  vol.  iii,  376  ff. ;  Yorke,  Life  of  Hardiuicke,  vol  iii,  459  ff. ; 
Grafton,  Autobiography,  29 ;  Ellis,  Original  Letters,  second  ser.,  vol.  iv,  467. 
Newcastle's  notes  in  the  British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  32951,  pp. 
101,  192.     The  best  discussion  of  the  whole  affair  is  in  Von  Ruville,  William 
Pitt  und  Graf  Bute,  74  ff.,  and  the  same  author's  William  Pitt,  vol.  iii,  n6  ff. 
In  many  ways  the  earlier  essay  by  Von  Ruville  is  more  satisfactory  than  the 
later  and  larger  work. 


i92  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Pitt.  One  of  the  principal  negotiators  between  Pitt 
and  the  king  was  Lord  Shelburne,  who  was  known  to  be 
most  favorable  to  the  interests  of  the  colonies.  Had 
Pitt  been  persuaded  to  enter  the  ministry  in  1763  the 
next  decision  on  the  American  question  would  have 
been  made  by  two  radicals,  and  George  III.  would 
have  found  it  acceptable. 

The  failure  left  the  king  no  choice  except  to  purchase 
the  support  of  the  Duke  of  Bedford.  By  nature  the 
duke  was  "hot,  hasty,  and  violent  and  intentionally  very 
honest"  as  Lord  Holland  described  him,  but  he  was  al- 
ways surrounded  by  a  set  of  office-seekers  of  the  worst 
type  whose  influence  was  strong.  Their  popular  appel- 
lation, the  "Bloomsbury  gang,"  indicates  their  reputa- 
tion among  the  public.  Besides  the  influence  exercised 
by  his  associates  upon  him,  Bedford's  opinion  was 
warped  by  his  wife,  an  ambitious  woman,  who  could 
persuade  the  duke  to  undertake  what  his  own  better 
judgment  opposed.343  His  political  career  had  been 
formerly  identified  with  that  of  Henry  Fox,  now  Lord 
Holland.  Both  had  belonged  to  the  faction  led  by  the 
Duke  of  Cumberland  until  the  question  of  the  peace  be- 
came an  issue.  Bedford's  union  with  Bute  at  that  time 
drove  him  from  the  councils  of  his  earlier  associates; 
but  he  was  soon  joined  in  his  new  allegiance  by  his  for- 
mer comrade  in  politics,  who  was  persuaded  by  the 
prime  minister  to  lend  his  influence  in  forcing  the  peace 
through  Parliament.  During  the  negotiations  with 
France,  Bedford  became  exceedingly  hostile  to  both  the 
favorite  and  Lord^  Holland  and  for  that  reason  refused 
to  enter  the  Grenville  cabinet,  although  he  permitted 
some  of  his  followers  to  do  so.344  After  the  failure  of 

343"Lord  Holland's  Memoirs,"  in  Ilchester  and  Stavordale,  Life  and  Letters 
of  Lady  Sarah  Lennox,  vol.  i,  81. 

344  Albemarle,  Rockingham   Memoirs,  vol.   i,   177;   Walpole,  Memoirs  of 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 193 

the  August  negotiations  with  Pitt,  the  Duke  of  Bedford 
was  in  a  very  favorable  position  to  make  the  conditions 
under  which  he  would  engage  in  the  ministry,  and  the 
first  one  was  that  the  Earl  of  Bute  should  leave  the 
court  and  cease  to  have  any  communication  with  the 
king.345  Lord  Holland  was  also  proscribed,  although 
many  of  his  creatures  remained  in  the  less  important 
offices  of  the  government. 

By  the  accession  of  Bedford  and  the  expulsion  of 
Bute  from  the  court  the  members  of  the  cabinet  were 
freed  from  an  irritating  and  undignified  subserviency 
and  they  arrogantly  thought  that  their  parliamentary 
support  was  strong  enough  to  permit  them  to  follow  an 
independent  course.  For  almost  two  years  they  were 
successful  in  holding  their  positions,  but  the  actual 
power  they  wielded  offered  little  food  for  their  conceit. 
This  was  due  to  the  attitude  of  the  king  towards  them, 
which  had  formerly  been  tolerant  but  was  now  defiant. 
George  III.  never  entertained  a  high  opinion  of  either 
the  ability  or  the  honesty  of  the  Grenville-Bedford  fol- 
lowing and  he  long  nursed  his  resentment  against  them 
for  the  humiliating  condition  of  excluding  from  his 
presence  the  Earl  of  Bute,  in  whose  advice  he  still  had 
confidence.  The  arrogance  of  their  demeanor  also 
awakened  in  his  breast  the  fear  of  being  reduced  by 
their  alliance  to  that  same  impotence  in  governmental 

George  HI.,  vol.  i,  206,  227;  "Lord  Holland's  Memoirs,"  in  Ilchester  and 
Stavordale,  Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  Sarah  Lennox,  vol.  i,  81. 

345  There  is  some  obscurity  about  this  demand,  on  account  of  the  attempt 
of  all  parties  to  hide  it;  but  the  contemporary  sources  support  the  statement 
in  the  text.  Sandwich  on  September  26,  wrote  to  Bedford  that  "the  retiring 
[of  Bute]  from  the  king's  presence  and  councils  is  an  absolute  condition  on 
which  this  administration  stands."-  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  250. 
See  also  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  ii,  206.  In  1765  Bedford  reminded  the  king 
that  he  had  entered  the  ministry  upon  the  condition  of  the  retirement  of  Lord 
Bute,  a  condition  proposed  by  the  king.  See  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol. 
iii,  280. 


194  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

affairs  that  his  immediate  predecessors  had  experienced. 
From  this  humiliation  he  was  saved  by  his  own  faction, 
whose  votes  in  Parliament  he  could  withhold  at  any 
time  from  the  support  of  the  ministry."6  The  king's 
experience  during  the  period  of  the  Grenville-Bedford 
regime  justified  in  his  own  eyes  his  entrance  into  the 
field  of  politics  with  his  own  group  of  followers,  since 
he  found  in  them  a  counterpoise  to  the  influence  of  the 
cabinet. 

In  this  struggle  for  predominance  the  monarch  had 
one  signal  advantage  over  his  opponents;  their  forces 
were  divided  by  jealousies.  George  Grenville  was  am- 
bitious to  be  the  real  leader  and  to  this  the  others  ob- 
jected. Halifax  and  Sandwich  the  two  secretaries  of 
state,  were  trying  to  create  another  triumvirate,  while 
Bedford  was  never  willing  to  be  ignored.  The  Lord 
Chancellor  Henley  was  playing  a  lone  hand  and  was 
ready  to  leave  his  colleagues  the  moment  he  saw  it 
would  be  for  his  personal  advantage.347  The  result  of 
this  lack  of  mutual  confidence  weakened  the  power  of 
the  cabinet  and  encouraged  the  king  in  his  belief  that  a 
change  might  be  made  at  any  moment. 

While  these  political  negotiations  and  new  align- 
ments were  engrossing  the  attention  of  the  politicians, 
the  letter  of  Lord  Shelburne  and  his  associates  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  pointing  out  that  some  decisive  action 
in  Indian  affairs  was  imperative  and  recommending 
that  an  announcement  of  the  imperial  government's  in- 
tention to  protect  the  Indian  lands  should  be  made  by  a 

346  The   king  complained   to  the   Duke  of   Cumberland   that  the  ministry 
"treated  him  personally  ill;  that  they  forced  him  to  do  everything  they  would, 
and  some  things  His  Majesty  did  not  like;  that  reversions,  pensions,  etc.,  to 
support  themselves,  were  all  they  had  in  view."  -  Newcastle,  Correspondence 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  10. 

347  Grenville's  diary  in  Grenville,  Papers  reveals  the  existing  jealousies; 
see  in  particular  vol.  ii,  219,  221.     The  Bedford  Correspondence  should  also 
be  consulted. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  195 

proclamation  remained  unanswered.  Such  a  decisive 
measure  could  not  be  attempted  by  a  ministry  tottering 
on  the  brink  and  therefore  a  month  and  a  half  elapsed 
before  any  decision  was  reached. 

The  man  who  had  been  responsible  for  the  formula- 
tion of  the  policy  and  understood  all  its  phases  was  not 
to  guide  the  pen  that  wrote  the  final  announcement. 
Lord  Shelburne  had  been  most  intimately  associated 
with  the  August  negotiations.  Lord  Bute  had  selected 
him,  as  both  a  close  friend  and  a  representative  of  his 
politics,  to  make  the  overtures.  The  young  lord,  who 
had  begun  his  political  career  by  hostility  to  the  Great 
Commoner,  had,  like  Lord  Bute,  reached  an  opinion 
that  a  strong  ministry  could  be  formed  only  by  Pitt. 
The  failure  of  the  negotiations  was  to  him  a  bitter  dis- 
appointment, and  he  saw  such  evidences  of  great  deceit, 
that  he  felt  he  could  no  longer  act  with  his  former  col- 
leagues.348 On  September  2,  he  resigned  and  for  the 
moment  retained  the  regard  of  both  the  king  and  Lord 
Bute.  The  latter  wrote  to  him  that  the  king  was  only 
provoked  at  the  time  of  his  resignation,  which  may  be 
interpreted  to  mean  that  there  was  no  objection  in  the 
royal  mind  to  Shelburne's  policies.349  From  this  time 
dates  Shelburne's  allegiance  to  William  Pitt,  of  whom 

348  On  August  30,  Shelburne  wrote  Pitt  to  congratulate  him  on  the  close 
of  the  negotiations,   "which  carried  through  the  whole  of  it  such   shocking 
marks  of  insincerity,   and,  if  it  had  taken   another  turn,   must  have   laid   a 
weight  on  his  shoulders  of  a  most  irksome  nature,  on  account  of  the  peculiar 
circumstances   attending   it."  -  Pitt,   Correspondence,   vol.   ii,   242.     The   exact 
meaning  of  these  oracular  words  has  never  been  fully  explained.     Pitt's  ex- 
planation  of  Shelburne's   resignation   was:     "That   my  Lord   Shelburne   had 
declared,  that  the.occasion  of  his  quitting  was,  that  he  [Lord  Shelburne]  had 
given  it,  as  his  opinion,  to  the  king,  that  it  was  necessary  for  His  Majesty's 
service,  that  Mr.  Pitt  should  be  taken  in;  that  things  could  not  go  on,  in  the 
hands  they  were,   and  that  therefore,   when  that  negotiation   miscarried,   he 
thought  he  could  not,  in  honor,  continue  in  employment;  and  act  with  or  under 
my  Lord  Halifax  and  Mr.  Grenville."  -  Newcastle's  notes  in  British  Museum, 
Additional  Manuscripts,  32951,  p.  192. 

349  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  207  ff. 


ig6  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

he  became  a  most  devoted  follower;  and  after  the  death 
of  that  statesman  he  himself  became  the  leader  of  the 
faction. 

Shelburne's  successor  in  the  presidency  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  was  the  Earl  of  Hillsborough  who  was  to  play 
such  a  conspicuous  part  in  colonial  affairs  and  whose 
influence  and  associations  have  been  so  frequently  mis- 
understood that  it  is  necessary  to  examine  carefully  the 
kind  of  man  he  was.  The  gossipy  Wraxall  whose  curi- 
osity about  so  many  lesser  lights  of  British  politics  has 
preserved  for  us  many  a  valuable  pen  picture,  has 
drawn  in  broad  lines  the  lineaments  of  this  politician. 
He  wrote: 

The  Earl  of  Hillsborough  was  a  man  of  elegant  manners, 
and  wanted  neither  ability  nor  attention  to  public  business;  but 
his  natural  endowments,  however  solid,  did  not  rise  above 
mediocrity.  He  had  owed  his  political  as  well  as  personal  ele- 
vation in  life  more  to  his  good  sense,  penetration,  suavity,  and 
address,  than  to  any  intellectual  superiority.  At  St.  James's  he 
was  more  at  home  than  at  Westminster,  and  might  rather  be 
esteemed  an  accomplished  courtier  than  a  superior  minister. 
His  mind  was  indeed  highly  cultivated,  but  it  seemed  to  be 
rather  the  information  of  a  gentleman  than  the  knowledge  of  a 
statesman.350 

This  picture  is  borne  out  in  general  by  the  testimony 
of  other  contemporaries;  but  his  opponents  called  his 
lack  of  political  knowledge,  ignorance,  and  his  suavity 
and  address,  deceit.851  King  George  III.,  after  having 
experienced  his  arbitrariness  in  many  offices,  refused 
to  approve  his  appointment  as  lord-lieutenant  of  Ire- 
land, because  he  did  "not  know  a  man  of  less  judgment 
than  Lord  Hillsborough."352  In  Parliament  he  did 

350  Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  381. 

351  Walpole,  Last  Journals,  vol.  i,   169;  Franklin,  Writings    (ed.  Smyth), 
vol.  vi,  98. 

352  George  III.  to  Robinson,   October   15,   1776   in  Historical  Manuscripts 
Commission,  Tenth  Report,  part  vi,  15. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 19? 

not  shine.  His  speeches,  so  far  as  they  may  be  judged 
from  imperfect  reports,  were  not  poorly  composed,  but 
his  arguments  were  rather  impudent  than  pointed.  His 
close  association  with  those  boon  companions,  Henry 
Fox,  the  witty  Dodington,  and  the  elegant  Halifax,  had 
not  fitted  him  to  grapple  with  difficult  and  delicate 
problems  and  had  developed  an  indifference  to  moral 
obligations  and  a  belief  in  the  necessity  and  justness  of 
the  arts  of  deception  in  the  game  of  politics.  He  was 
never  accused  of  neglecting  his  official  duties,  but  he 
never  exhibited  the  energy  of  Shelburne  in  collecting 
information  upon  which  to  base  his  judgment.353  This 
lack  of  knowledge  he  strove  to  hide  by  such  obstinacy 
in  clinging  to  an  opinion  once  formed  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  reason  with  him. 

The  Earl  of  Hillsborough's  political  associations, 
during  the  reign  of  George  II.  had  been  with  the  Cum- 
berland faction,  but  like  many  others  of  his  comrades  he 
had  retained  most  friendly  relations  with  the  Leicester 
House  group.  He  had  formed  intimate  friendships 
with  Bubb  Dodington,  Henry  Fox,  Lord  Barrington, 
and  George  Grenville,  and  had  won  the  confidence  of 
William  Pitt.  With  the  accession  of  George  III.  he 
may  be  counted  among  the  independent  Whigs  who  had 
associated  their  fortunes  closely  with  that  of  the  king. 
He  remained,  however,  always  very  closely  connected 
with  Henry  Fox,  who  was  very  fond  of  him  as  a  man.884 

353  \yraxall    informs   us   that   Hillsborough   was   greatly   embarrassed    in 
1781,  when  called  upon  to  justify  his  measures  recommended  for  Bengal,  by 
his  ignorance  of  names,  places,  and  circumstances.     Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol. 
i,  382.     For  another  picture  of  Hillsborough,  see  W.  S.  Johnson,  "Letters," 
in  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Collections,  fifth  ser.,  vol.  ix,  252,  262. 

354  Lord  Holland  to  Selwyn,  August  16,  1765  in  Jesse,  G forge  Seliayn  and 
his  Contemporaries,  vol.  i,  393.     Dodington's  Journal  contains  the  best  account 
of  Hillsborough's  early  associations.     See  particularly,   303-305.     For  his  re- 
lations with  Cumberland,  see  Riker,  Henry  Fox,  First  Lord  Holland,  vol.  i, 
359,  and  passim. 


igS THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

His  attachment  to,  and  admiration  for,  George  Gren- 
ville  was  genuine;  and,  several  years  after  that  states- 
man's death,  Hillsborough  took  occasion  in  a  speech  in 
Parliament  to  pronounce  a  eulogy  upon  him.355  His 
appointment  in  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry  was  due 
to  his  intimate  friendship  with  Lord  Halifax  whom  he 
had  assisted  in  Ireland  in  1761.  Halifax  no  doubt  was 
glad  to  secure  a  friend  in  a  position  so  closely  associated 
with  the  secretary  of  state  for  the  Southern  Depart- 
ment, a  position  to  which  he  himself  had  been  trans- 
ferred at  the  time  of  the  reorganization;  and  Grenville 
made  no  objection  to  this  appointment  of  a  friend  of 
Halifax,  since  the  latter  could  not  be  counted  among 
the  Bedford  faction.356 

Nothing  in  the  past  career  of  Lord  Hillsborough  had 
fitted  him  particularly  for  the  position  to  which  he  was 
now  called.  Although  he  had  served  in  several  gov- 
ernmental positions,  he  had  never  held  an  office  which 
dealt  with  the  colonial  problems;357  and,  except  for  pos- 
sible conversations  with  Lord  Halifax,  there  is  nothing 
to  show  that  he  had  ever  given  any  thought  to  the  de- 
pendencies. His  first  duty  in  the  new  office,  when  he 
took  his  seat  on  September  28,  was  to  superintend  the 
preparation  of  one  of  the  most  important  state  docu- 
ments concerning  America  ever  promulgated  by  the 
British  government.358  Lord  Shelburne's  recommenda- 

355  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xviii,  1268. 

356  For  the  intimacy  of  Halifax  and   Hillsborough  see  Cumberland,  Me- 
moirs,  183;   Walpole,  Memoirs  of   George  III.,  vol.   i,   in.     Lord   Holland 
wrote  in  1765:     "Lord  Hillsborough  cannot  be  placed  to  my  account:  Lord 
Halifax  brought  him  in,  in  1763.     He  was  very  well  with  the  last  ministry; 
too  wise  to  be  of  their  opinion,  and  they  had  been  wiser  had  they  consulted 
him;   but  in  a  political  inquisition  he  could  not  be  found  under  my  name, 
though  he  loves  me,  and  I  love  him  very  well."- Jesse,  George  Seltuyn  end 
his  Contemporaries,  vol.  i,  393. 

357  Dictionary  of  National  Biography,  vol.  ix,  878. 

358  Hillsborough  was  in  Ireland  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  on  Septem- 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 199 

tion  that  a  proclamation  be  prepared  to  quiet  the  fears 
of  the  Indians  had  lain  on  the  table  since  the  fifth  of 
August,  and  during  the  intervening  period  more  com- 
plete news  of  the  successful  uprising  of  the  Indians  had 
been  received.  Action  must  be  taken  at  once. 

Before  Lord  Hillsborough  took  his  seat  the  ministry 
had  determined  to  follow  Shelburne's  advice.  Such 
changes  in  policy  as  may  be  noticed  were  due  to  Lord 
Halifax,  southern  secretary,  who  was  esteemed  for  his 
knowledge  of  American  affairs,  but  concerning  whom 
a  very  competent  witness,  Richard  Jackson,  wrote  to 
Benjamin  Franklin  that  there  was  probably  no  one 
more  "unfit."359  Responsibility  for  the  later  blunders 
may  be  written  down  as  his.  On  September  19,  Lord 
Halifax  sent  an  order  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  that  a  proc- 
lamation should  be  prepared.  The  conception  of  the 
use  to  which  such  an  announcement  could  be  put,  how- 
ever, had  been  somewhat  altered  with  consequences 
little  anticipated  by  the  ministers.  In  his  letter,  Hali- 
fax did  not  insist  on  the  union  of  the  Indian  reservation 
with  the  province  of  Quebec  which  had  been  recom- 
mended by  Lord  Egremont;  but  he  did  think  that  the 
proclamation  could  be  made  a  convenient  vehicle  for 
informing  the  colonists,  as  well  as  the  Indians,  of  all  the 
parts  of  the  western  policy  upon  which  the  ministry  had 
reached  a  decision.  Thus  the  document  was  to  include 
much  more  than  the  two  points  recommended  by  Shel- 
burne.  Halifax  enumerated  these  as  follows: 

1.  To  make  known  the  establishment  and  limits  of  the  four 
new  colonies,   and   the  additions  made  to  the  governments  of 
Newfoundland,  Nova  Scotia,  and  Georgia. 

2.  To  declare  the  constitution  of  the  new  governments,  as 

her  9,  and  the  Board  of  Trade  Journals  show  that  he  took  his  seat  on  Sep- 
tember 28.  The  board  had  not  met  since  August  5. 

359  Jackson  to  Franklin,  December  27,  1763  in  Franklin  Papers,  vol.  i,  85. 


200  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

established  for  the  present,  and  intended  in  future,  and  the  gen- 
eral powers  which  the  governors  will  have  of  granting  lands 
within  them. 

3.  To  prohibit  private  purchases  of  lands  from  Indians. 

4.  To  declare  a  free  trade  for  all  His  Majesty's  subjects 
with  all  the  Indians,  under  licence,  security,  and  proper  regula- 
tions. 

5.  To  impower  all  military  officers  and  agents  for  Indian 
affairs,  within  the  reserved  lands,  to  seize  such  criminals,  and 
fugitives,  as  may  take  refuge  in  that  country,  and  to  send  them 
to  be  tried  in  any  of  the  old  colonies  (if  that  can  legally  be 
done)  or  else  to  that  government,  from  which  they  respectively 
fled.380 

Fortunately  for  the  new  president  he  was  not  com- 
manded to  formulate  a  new  policy,  but  only  to  incorpo- 
rate in  a  proclamation  decisions  already  reached,  with 
which  the  ministers  and  his  colleagues,  particularly  the 
secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  were  familiar  and  on 
which  they  were  agreed.  Moreover  much  of  his  work 
had  already  been  done  by  his  predecessor.  All  through 
the  month  of  August,  while  the  London  populace  were 
speculating  on  the  meaning  of  those  negotiations  with 
William  Pitt  which  were  so  openly  conducted,  Lord 
Shelburne  had  found  time  in  the  midst  of  his  political 
activities  to  give  close  attention  to  the  needs  of  the  trans- 
atlantic dominions.  The  wording  of  the  proclamation, 
which  he  had  recommended  on  August  5,  appeared  to 
him  to  be  the  most  important  business  of  his  office,  and 
upon  this  he  worked  with  his  customary  care  without, 
however,  calling  his  colleagues  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
to  his  assistance.  Before  his  resignation  the  proclama- 
tion as  he  had  conceived  it  was  written ;  and  Lord  Hills- 
borough,  on  assuming  his  duties,  found  this  first  draft 
already  completed  and  made  it  the  nucleus  to  which  the 
other  clauses  were  added.361 

360  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  112. 

861  In  my  essay  on  the  "Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763"  [Michigan 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  201 

Halifax's  letter  of  instructions  was  read  by  the  new 
president  on  September  28,  the  first  day  he  took  his  seat; 
and  within  twenty-four  hours  such  additions  to  Lord 
Shelburne's  draft  had  been  made  as  were  required  by 
the  ministry.  There  were  a  few  changes  from  the  re- 
port of  June  8.  It  had  been  Shelburne's  intention  to 
inaugurate  the  governments  of  the  new  colonies  through 
the  instructions  to  the  governors,  which  had  not  been 
written  as  yet.  Halifax's  command  that  there  be  in- 

Ploneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xxxvi,  21],  I  advanced  the  hypothesis 
that  the  core  of  the  proclamation,  the  subjects  of  the  Indian  reservation  and 
of  the  inducements  to  settlers,  had  been  written  either  by  Shelburne  or  under 
his  supervision.  The  speed  with  which  the  proclamation  was  prepared,  the 
fact  that  these  articles  were  carefully  drawn  in  accordance  with  his  views 
supported  that  hypothesis.  This  belief  was  also  held  in  certain  ministerial 
circles.  Edward  Thurlow,  who  as  attorney-general,  made  a  very  careful 
examination  of  the  documents  in  the  case,  said  in  Parliament  during  the  de- 
bate on  the  Quebec  Act:  "It  [the  proclamation  of  1763]  certainly,  likewise, 
was  not  the  finished  composition  of  a  very  considerable  and  respectable  per- 
son, who  I  will  not  name  [Lord  Shelburne],  but  went  unfinished  from  his 
hands,  and  remained  a  good  while  unfinished  in  the  hands  of  those  to  whom 
it  was  consigned  afterwards." -Cavendish,  Government  of  Canada:  Debates 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  1774,  p.  29.  Colonel  Barre,  Lord  Shelburne's  in- 
timate friend,  interpreted  Thurlow's  statement  as  follows:  "He  says  it  was 
left  in  an  office;  it  was  left  a  sketch,  and  that  sketch  was  unfinished;  it  was 
left  by  one  noble  lord,  and  taken  up  by  another,  who  thought  proper  to  make 
considerable  additions  to  it." -Idem,  38.  Barre  objected  to  Thurlow's  his- 
tory of  the  proclamation  but  in  no  place  denied  the  above  statement.  That 
Shelburne  did  prepare  a  draft  is  supported  by  the  following  note  by  Lord 
Hardwicke  made  on  a  report  of  C.  Yorke  and  De  Grey  (no  date  but  1766). 
"I  am  told  Lord  Shelburne  took  this  proclamation  on  himself;  that  he  had 
left  a  draught  of  it  in  the  office.  This  seems  strange,  yet  [?]  nobody  before 
guest  it.  H."- "Hardwicke  Papers,"  in  British  Museum,  Additional  Manu- 
scripts, 35914,  p.  149.  The  existing  draft  of  the  document  offers  no  evidence 
on  the  subject.  This  was  written  by  one  hand  and  none  of  the  corrections 
are  unmistakably  in  Shelburne's  handwriting.  According  to  Mr.  Hubert  Hall, 
formerly  of  the  Colonial  Office,  who  has  made  for  me  a  careful  comparison 
of  the  various  handwritings  involved,  the  body  of  the  draft  is  by  John 
Pownall's  clerk,  the  queries  were  written  by  the  attorney-general,  Charles 
Yorke,  and  the  corrections  on  the  draft  are  in  the  handwriting  of  Pownall. 
The  insertion,  "as  near  as  may  be  of  England,"  is  very  similar  to  the  hand- 
writing of  Shelburne,  but  it  is  not  likely  to  be  his.  Hillsborough  did  not 
place  pen  to  the  draft.  The  form  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  influence  of 
Pownall,  who  was  accustomed  to  make  a  digest  of  the  contents  of  any  pro- 
posed paper  before  handing  it  to  a  clerk.  See  Cumberland,  Memoirs,  186. 


202  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

eluded  in  the  proclamation  an  announcement  of  the 
government  "as  established  for  the  present  and  intended 
in  the  future"  necessitated  certain  determinations  be- 
yond those  of  the  previous  report.  There  were  in  con- 
sequence included  in  the  proclamation  those  sentences 
which  held  out  to  future  settlers  the  hope  of  the  inaugu- 
ration of  a  representative  assembly  in  a  short  period  of 
time.362 

A  change,  equally  important,  was  made  in  the  Indian 
boundary  line.  It  had  been  proposed  to  survey  a  line 
through  the  forests  and  mountains  in  such  a  way  that  it 
would  surround  with  the  imperial  protection  the  In- 
dian lands  east  of  the  mountains  but  would  open  to  set- 
tlement the  lands  of  the  upper  Ohio,  where  already  a 
number  of  villages  were  formed.  It  was  not  until  after 
this  proposal  was  made  that  it  was  learned  that  the 
whole  West  was  echoing  with  the  war  whoop,  that  the 
most  daring  pioneers  had  been  driven  back  by  the  In- 
dians drunk  with  blood,  and  that  the  frontiers  of  the 
colonies  were  threatened  by  the  horrors  of  savage  war- 
fare. This  was  not  the  time  to  parley  about  the  rights 
of  individuals  or  of  land  companies.  There  was  no 
opportunity  now  for  peacefully  running  a  line  by  sur- 
veyor's chain.  To  satisfy  the  Indians  a  conspicuous 
and  tangible  boundary  must  be  announced.  This  might 
be  a  tentative  line  in  the  minds  of  the  king's  ministers, 
but  to  the  Indians  it  must  appear  as  fixed  and  immu- 
table as  the  ground  for  which  they  were  fighting.  Such 
a  boundary  was  offered  by  the  Appalachian  divide. 
The  English  settlements  had  only  reached  the  eastern 
slopes  for  the  most  part,  and  relatively  speaking  only  a 
few  of  the  bolder  pioneers  had  crossed  the  mountains. 

362  The  proclamation  has  been  frequently  printed.  See  Shortt  and  Doughty, 
Constitutional  Documents,  119. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 203 

Two  years  before  while  the  French  and  Indian  War 
was  still  undecided,  a  secretary  of  state  had  chosen  the 
same  line  to  pacify  the  Indians'  fears.  The  mountains 
could  again  be  used  for  the  same  purpose;  and  so  the 
Board  of  Trade  wrote  down  this  conspicuous  landmark 
to  separate  the  settlements  from  the  Indian  hunting- 
grounds.  In  this  way  the  Allegheny  Mountains  be- 
came the  temporary  Indian  boundary  line.365  The  In- 
dian lands  lying  to  the  east  of  this  line  were  protected 
by  other  clauses  in  the  proclamation  which  forbade  the 
purchase  of  any  Indian  lands  except  through  qualified 
imperial  officers. 

>>  The  proclamation  was  now  hurried  through  to  its 
final  form.  On  October  i  it  was  referred  to  the  attor- 
ney-general for  his  opinion,  and  after  receiving  a  few 
verbal  corrections  by  him  and  the  Lords  of  Trade,  it 
was  considered  on  the  fifth  by  the  Privy  Council ;  and 
the  draft  for  the  king's  signature  was  ready  the  next 
day.  The  king  himself  dated  it  October  7,  1763.  The 
sailing  of  the  New  York  packet  was  postponed  until  the 
eleventh  so  that  the  printed  copies  of  the  document 
could  be  sent  to  America  without  delay. 

Since  no  correction  in  the  wording  was  made  after 
the  third  of  October,  the  total  time  occupied  in  drafting 
this  proclamation  was  six  days.  Although  rather  an 
unusual  accomplishment  for  the  British  governmental 
machinery  during  the  eighteenth  century,  the  shortness 
of  the  time  in  writing  the  proclamation  is  not  the  point 
to  be  here  considered.  Lord  Hillsborough  in  later 

363  In  an  essay  on  the  "Genesis  of  the  Proclamation  of  1763"  [Michigan 
Pioneer  and  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xxxvi,  21],  I  have  mustered  the  proof 
of  the  tentative  character  of  this  line.  Although  more  proof  is  advanced  in 
this  narrative  than  in  the  essay,  yet  the  form  of  the  latter  was  such  that  the 
proofs  could  be  grouped  together  more  definitely  and  concretely.  To  it  those 
readers  who  have  doubts  on  this  point  are  referred. 


204  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

years  posed  as  an  authoritative  interpreter  of  the  docu- 
ment, because  he  had  presided  at  the  Board  of  Trade 
at  the  time  it  was  composed.  Six  days  were  sufficient 
to  write  a  document  after  the  subject  matter  was  deter- 
mined, but  it  was  a  very  short  time  for  a  man  unfamiliar 
with  colonial  problems  to  form  a  policy.  Of  all  the 
men  engaged  on  the  production  of  this  important  docu- 
ment, the  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade  was  probably 
the  least  able  to  interpret  its  clauses.  He  came  in  the 
course  of  time  to  know  it  well  and  to  place  his  own  con- 
struction on  its  terms,  but  in  forming  his  interpretation 
he  was  influenced  by  its  consequences  rather  than  by  its 
antecedents.  Of  the  genesis  and  the  original  purposes 
of  its  various  provisions,  he  was  and  remained  ignorant, 
obstinately  so. 

There  were  four  unintended  provisions  in  the  proc- 
lamation.864 One  of  these  was  an  error  due  to  ignorance 
of  conditions,  and  the  others  were  committed  because 
the  one  who  planned  the  policy  was  replaced  by  a  man 
unfamiliar  with  its  various  phases.  The  error  due  to 
ignorance  of  conditions  became  in  time  one  of  consider- 
able importance  and  trouble  to  successive  ministries  and 
was  not  finally  corrected  until  the  passage  of  the  Que- 
bec Act  of  1774.  How  superficial  was  the  knowledge 
of  the  West  possessed  by  the  British  people  has  already 

so*  The  Board  of  Trade  thought  they  had  committed  one  mistake  which 
is  not  here  included.  In  letters  of  Governor  Johnstone  they  were  incorrectly 
informed  that  the  thirty-first  parallel  of  latitude  chosen  for  the  northern 
boundary  of  West  Florida  was  south  of  some  important  settlements,  even 
Mobile  being  north  of  it.  This  report  was  probably  the  result  of  intrigues 
of  land  speculators,  who  wished  to  settle  along  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi. 
On  March  23,  1764,  the  Board  of  Trade  recommended  that  the  northern 
boundary  be  established  by  the  parallel  passing  through  the  mouth  of  the 
Yazoo  River  and  this  was  approved  by  the  Privy  Council.  Acts  of  the 
Privy  Council,  vol.  iv,  668.  See  a  complete  account  in  Carter,  "Some  Aspects 
of  British  Administration  in  West  Florida,"  in  Mississippi  Valley  Historical 
Review,  vol.  5,  364. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  205 

been  shown,  but  that  hardly  accounts  for  the  oversight 
of  the  ministry  in  not  taking  measures  to  establish  some 
form  of  civil  government  in  the  French  settlements 
situated  within  the  Indian  reservation.  Yet  no  such 
provision  was  made.  In  all  the  correspondence  about 
the  western  policy,  these  French  villages  were  com- 
pletely ignored,  though  it  must  have  been  known  that 
they  actually  existed,  since  garrisons  had  been  sent  to 
occupy  many  of  them.  Absurd  as  it  may  seem,  the  most 
probable  explanation  is  that  the  ministers  were  expect- 
ing that  all  the  French  would  move  across  the  Missis- 
sippi and  all  the  Spaniards  of  Florida  would  take 
refuge  in  some  of  the  Spanish  colonies.365 

The  second  mistake  was  closely  allied  to  this.  The 
proclamation  provided  for  the  arrest  by  military  officers 
and  Indian  agents  of  all  criminals  who  should  flee  from 
justice  into  the  Indian  reservation,  but  no  thought  was 
taken  of  the  possibility  of  crimes  being  committed  with- 
in the  region  itself,  and  no  means  of  punishing  such 
criminals  were  provided.  Lord  Egremont  in  his  letter 
of  July  14  to  the  Board  of  Trade  had  pointed  out  the 
need  of  some  jurisdiction  over  this  vast  territory,  and 
Shelburne  had  proposed  placing  it  under  the  govern- 
ment of  the  commander-in-chief.  This  was  probably 
done,  but  no  powers  other  than  military  seem  to  have 
been  given  the  general.366  Another  explanation  is,  how- 

305  Egremont  to  ,  March  16,  1763,  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 

Office  Papers,  323.16,  p.  205.  As  late  as  May  24,  1764,  the  Lords  of  Trade 
were  surprised  to  learn  from  Governor  Murray  of  Quebec  that  there  were 
French  settlements  within  the  Indian,  reservation  and  ordered  the  governor 
to  report  thereon.  See  Board  of  Trade,  Journal,  in  Public  Record  Office, 
Colonial  Office  Papers,  391.76,  p.  231. 

366  Lord  Halifax,  in  his  letter  of  September  19,  concurred  with  the  recom- 
mendation of  Shelburne  provided  it  seemed  necessary.  General  Amherst 
wrote  on  August  24,  1763,  that  his  commission  included  the  lands  ceded  by 
Spain  and  France  except  Quebec.  See  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office 
Papers,  323.17,  p.  49.  Compare  footnote  328. 


206  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ever,  possible.  In  the  next  chapter  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  Board  of  Trade  planned  to  place  the  Indian  reser- 
vation under  the  government  of  the  Indian  Department, 
and  it  is  probable  that  some  such  idea  was  already  un- 
der consideration,  and  this  may  explain  why  no  provi- 
sion for  courts  of  justice  was  made  in  the  proclamation. 
It  is  more  probable,  however,  that  in  the  disarrange- 
ment of  affairs  brought  on  by  the  ministerial  changes 
the  subject  of  the  administration  of  justice  in  the  West 
was  forgotten.  In  the  spring  of  1765  General  Gage 
became  aware  of  the  gravity  of  this  omission  and 
brought  it  to  the  attention  of  Lord  Halifax,  who  incor- 
porated a  clause  in  the  Mutiny  Act  of  that  year  to 
remedy  the  difficulty.  By  it  all  persons  were  author- 
ized to  arrest  criminals  and  the  military  officers  were 
empowered  to  send  them  to  the  nearest  province  for 
trial.367 

The  third  error  was  of  minor  importance.  It  was 
the  intention  of  the  ministry  that  by  the  proclamation 
grants  of  land  should  be  assured  to  the  officers,  soldiers, 
and  sailors,  who  had  served  in  America  and  were  resid- 
ing there ;  but  the  clause  was  so  clumsily  drawn  that  the 
gift  was  limited,  so  far  as  the  navy  was  concerned,  to 
those  who  had  served  at  the  time  of  taking  Louisburg 
and  Quebec.368 

The  fourth  blunder  was  serious  and  of  far-reaching 
consequence  and  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  replacing 
of  Lord  Shelburne  by  Lord  Hillsborough.  It  has  al- 
ready been  pointed  out  that  the  former  had  carefully 
planned  to  secure  to  the  French-Canadians  the  priv- 

367  For  correspondence  concerning  the  subject  see  Calendar  of  Home  Office 
Papers  of  George  III.,  vol.  i,  529,  534. 

368  Halifax  to  the  attorney-general,  October  13,  1763  in  idem,  314.     Hali- 
fax himself  was  responsible,  in  the  first  place,  for  this  error.     See  his  letter 
of  September  19  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  121. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  207 

ileges  promised  by  the  treaty  of  peace.  The  boundaries 
of  the  province  were  drawn  so  that  the  new  subjects 
would  be  segregated,  their  laws  could  be  continued  in 
force,  and  a  government  suited  to  their  needs  could  be 
established.  Both  the  boundaries  of  the  French  prov- 
ince and  the  form  of  its  government  were  to  be  an- 
nounced in  the  commission  and  instructions  to  the  gov- 
ernor. When  Shelburne  proposed  the  issuance  of  a 
proclamation  offering  inducements  to  settlers  in  terri- 
tory remote  from  the  western  frontier,  he  was  careful 
to  leave  out  the  name  of  the  French  province  from 
among  those  which  were  open  to  settlement.361 

This  plan  was  completely  reversed  by  the  proclama- 
tion. The  decision  of  the  ministry  to  include  in  that 
document  several  other  subjects  besides  those  that  had 
been  proposed  was  responsible  for  the  blunder.  The 
original  intention  had  been  to  draw  an  attractive  pic- 
ture of  the  advantages  offered  settlers  in  Nova  Scotia 
and  the  Floridas.  It  was  therefore  to  be  expected  that 
the  protection  of  English  law  would  be  emphasized.  At 
the  last  minute  the  Board  of  Trade  added  still  another 
feature  by  promising  that  a  representative  assembly 
would  be  shortly  inaugurated.  This  was  completely  in 
accord  with  Shelburne's  intentions  for  the  Floridas. 
The  mistake  was  made  when  there  was  included  in  the 
proclamation  the  announcement  of  the  boundaries  of 
the  province  of  Quebec  with  its  eighty  thousand  French- 
Canadians.  By  this  inclusion  all  those  alluring  prom- 
ises made  to  new  settlers  were  put  in  force  in  the  north- 
ern province.  Legally  English  law  supplanted  French 
law.370 

369  Shortt   and   Doughty,    Constitutional  Documents,    104,    in.     Pownall's 
draft  of  a  report,  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlix,  333. 

370  This  explanation  was  first  advanced  in  my  essay  on  the  "Genesis  of 
the  Proclamation  of  1763  ;"  and  a  careful  examination  of  the  same  material 


208  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

In  order  to  make  this  blunder  more  complete  the 
ministers  ordered  the  clerk  of  the  Board  of  Trade  to 
copy  the  commission  and  instructions  usually  sent  to  the 
governors  of  the  other  provinces;  and  without  minutely 
studying  them  to  see  if  they  would  suit  the  extraordi- 
nary conditions  of  the  province  of  Quebec,  they  were 
sent  to  Governor  Murray.371  It  is  not  strange  that  the 
latter,  with  the  proclamation  and  his  commission  and 
instructions  before  him,  decided  much  against  his  better 
judgment  that  English  law  was  to  be  the  rule  in  the 
province.  Acting  in  accordance  with  that  interpreta- 
tion the  regular  English  courts,  procedure,  and  law 
were  introduced.372 

As  soon  as  Lord  Mansfield,  one  of  the  king's  confiden- 
tial advisers,  heard  of  this  result  of  the  proclamation, 
he  wrote:  "Is  it  possible  that  we  have  abolished  their 
laws,  and  customs,  and  forms  of  judicature  all  at  once? 
a  thing  never  to  be  attempted  or  wished.  The  history 
of  the  world  don't  furnish  an  instance  of  so  rash  and  un- 

which  I  then  used  and  other  documents  since  made  accessible  to  me  have 
confirmed  me  in  this  opinion.  James  Marriott,  later  advocate-general,  one 
of  the  ablest  and  most  learned  lawyers  of  this  time,  after  carefully  examin- 
ing the  documents  in  the  case  had  reached  a  similar  conclusion,  when  he 
wrote:  "that  the  reflection  never  entered  the  thoughts  of  the  drawers  up 
of  this  proclamation,  that  Canada  was  a  conquered  province,  full  of  inhabi- 
tants, and  already  in  the  possession  of  a  legal  establishment."  -  Shortt  and 
Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  314. 

371  Printed  in  idem,  126,  132.     The  acts  of  the  Privy  Council  passing  these 
are  printed  in  idem,  124  ff. 

372  The   ordinance   of   September    17,    1764,   is   printed   in   idem,    149.     In 
Governor  Carleton's  report  of  November  20,  1768,  occurs  the  following  sen- 
tence:    "By  these  two  ordinances,  which  have  been  transmitted  to  your  Majes- 
ty and  never  disallowed,   and   are  therefore  supposed  to  have  received   the 
sanction  of  your  Majesty's  royal  approbation,  the  Canadian  laws  and  customs 
have  been  generally  supposed  to  be  abolished,  and  the  English  law  and  cus- 
toms to  have  been  introduced  in  their  stead,  and  the  judges  of  your  Majesty's 
courts  of  judicature  in  this  province  have  conceived  themselves  to  be  in  con- 
science  bound   to    administer   justice    according   to   the   laws   of  England."  - 
Idem,  232, 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  209 

just  an  act  by  any  conqueror  whatsoever;  much  less  by 
the  Crown  of  England,  which  has  always  left  to  the 
conquered  their  own  laws  and  usages,  with  a  change 
only  so  far  as  the  sovereignty  was  concerned." 37S  Lord 
Northington  who,  as  lord  chancellor,  had  placed  the 
great  seal  upon  the  commission  to  the  governor  of 
Canada,  when  he  realized  the  conditions  that  had  been 
created  by  the  act  of  himself  and  his  associates,  called 
the  proclamation  a  "very  silly  one." 374  Edward  Thur- 
low,  when  attorney-general,  said,  in  1774:  "If  it  is  to 
be  considered  as  importing  English  laws  into  a  country 
already  settled,  and  habitually  governed  by  other  laws, 
I  take  it  to  be  an  act  of  the  grossest  and  absurdest  and 
crudest  tyranny,  that  a  conquering  nation  ever  prac- 
ticed over  a  conquered  country."375 

Such  severe  criticism  of  the  measure  and  the  con- 
sciousness that  a  horrible  blunder  had  been  committed 
caused  those  who  were  responsible  for  it  to  try  to  hide 
their  identities.  No  one  was  willing  to  acknowledge 
himself  the  writer  of  the  proclamation.376  Explana- 
tions of  all  kinds  were  made,  the  most  plausible  being 
that  the  proclamation  was  addressed  only  to  prospec- 
tive settlers  who  were  assured  the  protection  of  Eng- 
lish law.377  Lord  Hillsborough  tried  in  1768  to  throw 
all  the  blame  on  the  men  in  Canada  who  interpreted  the 
proclamation  by  asserting  that  as  a  member  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  he  knew  that  "it  never  entered  into 

373  Mansfield  to  Grenville,  December  24,  1764,  in  Grenville,  Papers,  vol. 
ii,  476. 

374  Albernarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  353. 

375  Cavendish,    Government  of   Canada:   Debates   of  the  House   of  Com- 
mons, 1774,  p.  29. 

376  Thurlow's  statement,  idem. 

377  There  is   an   excellent  summary  of  the  various   interpretations   in  the 
"Report  of  Attorney  General  Edward  Thurlov.-,"  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Con- 
stitutional Documents,  307. 


210  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

our  idea  to  overturn  the  laws  and  customs  of  Canada, 
with  regard  to  property,  but  that  justice  should  be  ad- 
ministered agreeably  to  them."378 

These  explanations  served  only  to  cover  up  the  blame 
or  to  set  aside  the  obvious  meaning  of  the  proclamation 
and  of  the  governor's  commission  and  instructions. 
The  wrong  that  had  been  inflicted  on  the  French- 
Canadians  could  not  in  this  way  be  corrected.  The 
blunder  which  concerned  Canada  and  the  blunders  in 
regard  to  the  West  formed  a  perplexing  question  for 
every  later  ministry.  Minister  after  minister  consid- 
ered the  problems,  but  for  one  reason  or  another  no 
decisive  step  was  taken.  The  Canadians  and  the 
French  settlers  of  the  West  continued  to  suffer  for  over 
ten  years  from  the  blunders  of  their  masters.  For 
these  years  the  correction  of  the  mistakes  of  October  7, 
1763,  formed  a  part  of  every  western  policy  that  was 
laid  before  a  British  cabinet. 


378  Hillsborough  to  Carleton,  March  6,  1768,  in  Idem,  207.  He  cited  as  a 
similar  case  the  county  of  Kent  and  many  other  parts  of  England,  "where 
Gavel-kind  Borough-English  and  several  other  particular  customs  prevail." 


VIII.    THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE 
INDIAN  DEPARTMENT 

The  peltry  or  skin  trade,  my  lords,  is  a  matter  which  I  presume  to 
affirm  is  of  the  last  importance  to  the  trade  and  commerce  of  the 
colonies  and  this  country.  The  regulation  of  this  business  has  cost 
His  Majesty's  ministers  more  time  and  trouble  than  any  one  matter  I 
know  of.  -  LORD  SHELBURNE. 

Although  much  had  been  accomplished  during  the 
summer  and  fall  of  1763,  still  the  proclamation  of  Oc- 
tober 7  had  constructed  only  the  framework  of  a  west- 
ern policy;  and  the  haste  of  its  final  announcement  had 
given  to  it  the  character  of  a  temporary  structure 
erected  by  workmen  for  some  ephemeral  celebration 
and  intended  to  be  rebuilt  in  more  permanent  material 
and  in  a  grander  style.  Many  parts  of  the  future  policy 
still  remained  to  be  determined.  Besides  the  establish- 
ment of  a  proper  boundary  line  in  accordance  with  the 
original  purposes  of  the  Board  of  Trade's  report  of 
June  8,  there  was  need  of  a  decision  on  such  vital  issues 
as  the  colonization  of  the  West  and  the  organization  of 
the  Indian  trade.  The  former  was  to  prove  to  be 
throughout  the  years  preceding  the  Revolutionary  War 
the  most  perplexing  and  embarrassing  of  problems; 
and  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry,  like  many  of  their 
successors,  shrank  from  bringing  it  to  an  issue,  involv- 
ing as  it  did  the  financial  interests  of  so  many  influen- 
tial politicians.  On  the  subject  of  the  management  of 
the  Indian  trade  they  proved  themselves  more  bold, 
and  in  accord  with  their  predisposition  for  orderliness 


212 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

and  the  centralization  of  powers  they  worked  out  a 
most  consistent  imperial  system  which  they  thought 
would  prove  a  panacea  for  the  evils  suffered  by  the 
wards  of  the  nation. 

The  ministry  after  the  Duke  of  Bedford  had  joined 
it  was  still  in  favor  of  utilizing  the  new  acquisitions  by 
colonization.  This  was,  in  fact,  expected  of  them. 
They  had  all  taken  upon  their  shoulders  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  territory  ceded  by  France  in  the  treaty  of 
peace;  they  had  preferred  the  West  to  the  tropical 
islands;  they  had  all  argued  that  within  those  primeval 
forests  would  be  found  the  wealth  and  glory  of  im- 
perial Britain.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  that  the  five 
men  who  formed  the  guiding  committee  of  the  cabinet 
had  changed  their  opinions  since  the  time  they  had  so 
openly  defended  their  choice  in  Parliament.  Gren- 
ville,  Henley,  and  Halifax  had  always  ranged  them- 
selves on  the  side  of  the  western  expansionists  and  re- 
mained firm  in  this  conviction  throughout  their  lives. 
The  two  Bedfordites,  Bedford  and  Sandwich,  although 
they  had  opposed  the  demand  for  the  cession  of  Canada, 
did  not  at  this  time  or  later  try  to  prevent  the  movement 
of  the  settlements  to  the  west  of  the  mountains.  The 
opinion  of  the  new  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
Lord  Hillsborough,  in  spite  of  a  boldness  of  speech  and 
an  obstinacy  of  mind,  is  always  difficult  to  discover, 
but  at  this  particular  period  of  his  career  he  placed 
himself  on  record  as  favoring  a  gradual  westward  ex- 
tension of  the  frontier  line. 

With  such  a  unanimity  of  opinion  prevailing  it  might 
be  expected  that  the  ministry's  first  object  would  be  to 
promote  rapidly  the  building  up  of  the  transmontane 
region.  This  undoubtedly  was  their  intention;  and  the 
Board  of  Trade  under  the  new  president  took  the  ques- 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  213 

tion  of  attracting  settlers  into  the  new  provinces  under 
their  immediate  consideration.  By  November  3, 
another  report  limited  to  the  ways  and  means  of  colo- 
nization was  ready.  The  Lords  of  Trade  were  of  the 
opinion  that  no  special  effort  should  be  made  to  attract 
colonists  to  the  province  of  Quebec,  since  eighty 
thousand  French  settlers  were  already  living  there;  but 
they  did  recommend  that  attention  should  be  centered 
on  the  two  Floridas.  The  report  proposed  that  the 
method  of  township  settlements  used  in  the  northern 
colonies  be  adopted  and  urged  that  moneyed  men  be 
encouraged  to  purchase  large  tracts  on  condition  of 
colonizing  them  with  British  or  foreign  Protestant 
people.879  To  promote  the  recommendation  in  this  re- 
port there  was  inserted  in  the  London  Gazette  of  No- 
vember 22  an  advertisement  of  the  lands  and  of  the  con- 
ditions of  sale.380  Although  the  expectations  of  speedy 
settlement  were  not  immediately  realized,  the  ministry 
kept  this  purpose  steadily  in  mind  and  in  time  many 
men,  among  whom  were  several  noblemen,  made 
investments  in  Florida  lands,  particularly  in  East 
Florida.881 

The  eyes  of  the  cabinet  were  also  turned  to  the  upper 
Mississippi  Valley  and  they  were  ready  to  take  under 

379  Board  of  Trade,  Journals,  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers, 
391.69,  pp.  312-314- 

380  Scot's  Magazine,  vol.  xxv,  627;  Carter,  "Some  Aspects  of  British  Ad- 
ministration in  West  Florida,"  in  Mississippi  Valley  Historical  Review,  vol. 

i,  S^S- 

381  The  following  names  of  Englishmen  belonging  to  ministerial  and  allied 
circles  have  been  noted  among  the  speculators  in  American  lands:   Lord  Eg- 
lington,  Lord  Dartmouth,  Lord  Holland,  Lord  Stirling,  Lord  Egmont,  Lord 
Adam  Gordon,  Lord  Temple,  Charles  Townshend,  George  Grenville,  Thomas 
Pitt,  Sir  Jeffrey  Amherst.     This  list  could  be  greatly  enlarged.     See  Town- 
shend to  Dartmouth,  April  9,  1766,  "Dartmouth  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical 
Manuscripts  Commission,  Fourteenth  Report,  appendix  x,  vol.  ii,  40.     George 
Croghan  found  that  the  English  were  new  land  mad  when  he  was  in  England 
in  1764.     See  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xii,  127. 


2i4  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

advisement  the  possibility  of  beginning  some  kind  of 
establishment  in  the  region  that  was  already  known  in 
London  by  the  name  of  the  Illinois  country.  Several 
far  western  settlements  had  already  been  proposed,  as 
has  been  seen,  and  there  were  others  in  the  process  of 
being  formed.  Whether  the  ministerialists  were  in- 
fluenced by  any  of  these  projects  is  not  known,  for  the 
only  information  about  their  mental  attitude,  at  this 
moment,  toward  western  expansion  is  contained  in  a 
letter  from  George  Croghan,  Sir  William  Johnson's 
deputy.382  He  was  in  London  during  the  winter  and 
spring  of  1764  and  wrote  that  his  opinion  about  erect- 
ing a  colony  in  the  Illinois  was  desired  by  Lord  Hali- 
fax. In  June,  when  he  was  called  before  the  Board  of 
Trade,  he  took  on  himself  the  responsibility  for  such  a 
proposal  and  supported  it  by  a  memorial.383  None  of 
the  schemes  for  western  settlement,  however,  met 
with  any  decisive  encouragement  from  the  ministry  in 
spite  of  their  own  favoring  opinion  and  of  pressure 
from  the  king  who  was  desirous  of  seeing  the  fruits 
from  his  treaty  of  peace.384 

There  were  many  reasons  for  indecision.  What  to 
do  next  was  a  perplexing  problem.  The  news  of  the 

382  George  Croghan  wrote  from  London,  March  10,  1764,  that  "there  is  a 
talk  of  setleing  a  colony  from  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  to  the  Ilonies  which  I 
am  tould  Lord  Hallifax  will  desier  my  opinion  of  in  a  fwe  [sic]  days."- 
Idem,  vol.  viii,  202;  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  Critical  Period  (Illi- 
nois Historical  Collections,  vol.  x),  222. 

sss  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  602 ;  Board  of  Trade,  Journal, 
in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  391.76,  p.  258.  The  memorial 
is  undated.  There  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  Croghan  had  such  a  colony  in 
mind,  when  he  left  America.  In  fact  he  went  to  England  to  represent  other 
interests  and  did  not  actively  promote  such  a  colony  until  two  years  later. 
His  letter  of  March,  quoted  in  previous  note,  seems  to  indicate  a  project  in 
which  he  was  not  personally  interested.  It  is  probable  that  the  Englishmen 
back  of  the  project  persuaded  Croghan  to  advocate  it. 

384  Newcastle,  Correspondence  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser., 
vol.  lix],  ii.  See  also  Charles  Yorke's  "Journal,"  in  Harris,  Life  of  Hard- 
loicke,  vol.  Hi,  450. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  215 

Indian  war  had  become  more  alarming  since  the  au- 
tumn, and  it  was  evident  that  the  principal  cause  for 
the  outbreak  had  been  the  encroachments  of  the  colo- 
nists upon  the  land  of  the  Indians  who  were  fearful  lest 
the  whole  West  should  soon  be  filled  with  the  settle- 
ments of  the  white  men.  The  continuance  of  the  war 
was  not  without  its  influence  on  the  ministers.  Rich- 
ard Jackson,  who  stood  very  close  to  Grenville  at  this 
time,  wrote  Benjamin  Franklin  that  American  affairs 
were  in  a  critical  state  and  that  the  time  was  not  pro- 
pitious for  making  proposals  about  new  colonies.385 
Probably  the  real  reason  for  the  inactivity,  however,  is 
to  be  found  in  the  ministers'  ambition  to  make  a  record 
for  economy.  Grenville  prided  himself  on  his  finan- 
cial management.  A  prematurely  bold  western  policy 
would  add  materially  to  the  already  heavy  burden  of 
maintaining  the  army,  and  this  could  only  be  justified 
after  the  plans  for  raising  a  revenue  in  America  had 
been  put  in  operation. 

Although  there  may  have  been  in  1764  two  opinions 
about  the  value  of  western  colonization,  there  was  no 
disagreement  about  the  other  problem  of  the  West- 
the  need  of  regulating  the  fur  trade.  The  war  had  been 
partly  undertaken  for  the  sake  of  securing  this,  and  no 
member  of  the  ministry  was  hardy  enough  to  risk  the 
hostility  of  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  by  argu- 
ing that  it  was  not  valuable.  In  Canada  and  the  Great 
Lakes  region,  Great  Britain  had  secured  control  of  the 
best  available  fur-producing  territory  in  North  Amer- 
ica. It  was  estimated  that  the  peltry  exported  from 
Canada  during  the  French  regime  averaged  one  hun- 
dred forty  thousand  pounds  annually,386  and  it  was 

385  December  7,  1763,  in  Franklin  Papers,  vol.  i,  85. 

386  General  Murray's  report,  June  5,  1762,  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Con- 
stitutional Documents,  57. 


216 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

hoped  that  under  the  better  business  methods  of  the 
British  traders  the  volume  would  increase  enormously. 
Up  to  the  period  when  the  Board  of  Trade  began  to 
investigate  the  status  of  the  fur  trade,  no  measures  con- 
cerning it  had  been  promulgated  by  the  imperial  gov- 
ernment. The  superintendents  of  Indian  affairs  had 
been  appointed  primarily  to  have  general  oversight 
over  the  political  relations  existing  between  the  colonies 
and  the  natives ;  and  only  occasionally,  and  then  by  or- 
der of  the  commander-in-chief,  who  found  their  in- 
fluence with  the  Indians  very  useful,  did  they  assume  a 
right  to  interfere  with  the  activities  of  the  traders. 
Military  necessity  was  their  excuse  for  exceeding  their 
powers.  The  British  government  had  endowed  them 
with  no  such  authority  nor  had  any  ministry  as  yet 
shown  an  inclination  to  interfere  with  the  colonial  regu- 
lations or  to  imperialize  this  particular  branch  of  In- 
dian affairs.387  Yet  the  fur  trade  was  considered  in 
political  circles  one  of  the  paramount  western  issues 
and  was  the  occasion  of  many  heated  controversies  both 
in  the  ministry  and  in  Parliament.  In  this  connection 
the  testimony  of  Lord  Shelburne  is  illuminating.  He 
had  followed  with  great  care  the  development  of  a 
western  policy  from  the  time  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  and 
his  experience  led  him  in  1775  to  describe  the  impor- 
tance of  the  subject  in  the  following  words : 

387  Sir  William  Johnson  issued  to  the  military  officers  of  the  various  west- 
ern posts  instructions  concerning  the  Indian  trade,  which  were  approved  by 
General  Amherst.  See  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xxiv,  113,  vol.  v,  122;  New 
York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  960.  The  following  expresses  Johnson's 
conception  of  his  office.  "The  nature  of  my  office  is  expressed  in  general 
terms  in  his  Majesty's  commission  to  me,  but  the  intent  and  meaning  of  the 
government  relative  thereto  is  more  particularly  signified  in  the  several  letters 
I  have  received  from  the  Lords  of  Trade  who  consider  it  as  the  sole  and  only 
channel  through  which  Indian  affairs  of  what  nature  soever  are  to  be  trans- 
acted, and  for  that  purpose  that  I  am  to  be  supported  by  authority  in  all 
matters  relative  thereto  in  which  the  good  of  his  Majestys  service  is  any  wise 
concerned. " -Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xxiv,  158. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  217 

The  peltry  or  skin  trade,  my  lords,  is  a  matter  which  I  presume 
to  affirm  is  of  the  last  importance  to  the  trade  and  commerce 
of  the  colonies  and  this  country.  The  regulation  of  this  busi- 
ness has  cost  His  Majesty's  ministers  more  time  and  trouble 
than  any  one  matter  I  know  of.388 

The  question  of  the  control  of  the  trade  was  a  part 
of  the  larger  problem  of  the  regulation  of  all  Indian 
relations  and  at  the  time  of  the  issuance  of  the  procla- 
mation the  ministry  felt  the  need  of  fuller  information 
on  the  subject  before  making  a  definitive  announce- 
ment. For  that  reason  they  had  limited  themselves  to 
the  mere  assertion  of  the  freedom  of  trade  and  of  the 
necessity  for  all  traders  to  obtain  licenses  from  their 
respective  governors  and  to  give  security  that  they 
would  obey  such  rules  as  should  be  made  in  the  future.389 
A  basis  was  thus  laid  for  the  later  development  of  im- 
perial regulations.  When  the  discussion  of  these  was 
taken  up,  there  was  brought  to  a  direct  issue  the  two 
opposing  views  of  the  imperialists  and  the  anti-imperial- 
ists, of  those  who  thought  that  there  should  be  created  a 
complicated  imperial  machinery  to  insure  good  order 
on  the  frontier  and  those  who  preferred  to  leave  to  the 
local  authorities  the  control  of  the  West.  There  arose 
out  of  the  issue  thus  formed  many  important  questions. 
Should  the  offices  of  superintendents  of  Indian  affairs 
be  retained  or  abolished?  Should  the  fur  trade  be 
placed  under  such  superintendents?  What  was  to  be 
the  relation  of  these  officers  to  the  colonial  governors? 
Should  the  Department  of  Indian  Affairs  be  independ- 
ent of,  or  subordinate  to,  the  military  power?  What 
regulations  for  the  trade  should  be  made?  Should  the 
colonial  laws  on  the  subject  be  abolished  or  accepted  as 
the  basis  for  imperial  regulations?  On  all  these  sub- 
jects the  proclamation  had  made  no  announcement,  ex- 

388  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xviii,  673. 

389  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  122. 


2i8  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

cept  the  hint  that  at  some  future  time  rules  would  be 
published. 

The  two  superintendents  had,  on  the  whole,  proved 
themselves  very  useful,  and  there  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  much  objection  to  continuing  them,  although 
it  is  possible  that  Lord  Shelburne  had  considered 
abolishing  their  offices  in  the  summer  of  1763  as  he  did 
in  1767.  Certainly  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry 
never  entertained  such  a  proposal ;  on  the  contrary  they 
were  among  those  who  thought  that  conditions  de- 
manded a  strengthening  of  the  department.  The  proc- 
lamation had  given  the  governors  the  right  of  issuing 
trade  licenses  and  did  not  confer  a  similar  privilege  on 
the  superintendents,  so  that  the  latter  had  now  little 
power  to  interfere  with  the  activities  of  the  traders, 
whose  trickery  was  a  constant  source  of  irritation  to  the 
Indians.  The  imperially-minded  ministers  wished  to 
reform  these  conditions  by  extending  the  protecting 
hand  of  the  empire  to  the  most  western  tribes.  In  this 
wish  they  had  the  support  of  the  two  men  best  informed 
on  the  subject.  Sir  William  Johnson  and  John  Stuart, 
the  superintendents,  were  convinced  by  their  personal 
interests  and  by  their  knowledge  of  the  chaotic  condi- 
tions existing  in  the  West  that  the  imperialization  of 
Indian  affairs  was  the  only  cure  that  would  prove 
efficacious.  Opposed  to  such  a  drastic  measure  were 
the  trading  classes  of  the  colonies,  particularly  those  in 
Canada  and  Virginia,  who  preferred  those  looser 
methods  hitherto  prevailing  which  permitted  the  ut- 
most freedom  to  the  men  of  the  frontier.39( 

Besides  this  expansion  of  their  power  over  the  traders 
and  the  Indians,  the  superintendents  were  also  seeking 

390  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  passim;  but  particularly  vol. 
viii,  655;  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  vi,  154. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  219 

to  shake  off  the  irksome  restraint  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army.  Their  offices  had  been  originally 
established  by  the  order  of  General  Braddock;  and  af- 
ter the  incumbents  had  received  their  appointments 
from  England,  they  still  remained  dependent  on  the 
military  department,  which  exercised  an  irritating 
supervision  through  the  power  of  approving  expendi- 
tures.391 Sir  William  Johnson  had  continual  bicker- 
ings over  the  management  of  his  office  with  General 
Shirley,  but  the  disagreement  between  the  two  super- 
intendents and  Sir  Jeffrey  Amherst  was  still  greater  and 
threatened  to  become  even  worse.  The  general  never 
understood  the  character  and  the  strength  of  the  Indians 
and  the  importance  of  preserving  their  good  will.  His 
desire  for  the  economical  administration  of  his  office 
led  him  to  cut  down  first  of  all  the  expenses  of  the  In- 
dian Department  by  stopping  all  presents  to  the  tribes. 
The  outbreak  of  the  Indian  war  seemed  to  justify  the 
criticisms  of  his  methods  by  the  superintendents;  and 
when  General  Amherst  returned  to  England,  he  found 
that  his  former  standing  as  an  authority  on  all  American 
subjects  was  greatly  diminished.392 

When  Johnson  learned  from  the  letter  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  of  August  5,  I763,393  that  the  question  of  the 
management  of  Indian  affairs  was  under  discussion  and 
that  his  opinion  was  desired,  he  prepared  a  long  memo- 
rial on  the  subject  and  proposed  a  rather  indefinite  plan 
for  the  future  management  of  his  department,  being 

391  All  bills  of  the  Indian  Department  were  submitted  to  the  commander- 
in-chief.     The  military  officers  at  the  various  posts  had  direction  of  the  ex- 
penses  of   the   deputy   Indian   agents.     See   New   York   Colonial  Documents, 
vol.  vii,  569. 

392  This  was  also  due  to  the  fact  that  Amherst  was  one  of  Pitt's  generals. 
For  this  whole  paragraph  see  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  viii,  23,   169,  202, 
212;  vol.  ix,  19. 

393  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  535. 


220  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

careful  not  to  expose  his  wishes  on  paper.394  This  was 
unnecessary  because  the  paper  was  to  be  presented  by 
his  faithful  follower  and  deputy  agent,  George  Crog- 
han,  who  was  going  to  England  on  his  private  busi- 
ness.395 In  letters  of  introduction  to  Lord  Halifax  and 
Thomas  Pownall,  which  Johnson  gave  Croghan,  the 
former  complained  of  the  policy  which  had  been  fol- 
lowed as  a  result  of  General  Amherst's  orders  and  ex- 
pressed the  wish  that  a  more  liberal  program  might  be 
adopted.396 

Croghan  found  on  his  arrival  in  England  that  the 
ministers  were  in  no  hurry  to  push  a  consideration  of 
American  affairs.  They  felt  that  their  own  position 
was  too  insecure,  expected  throughout  the  winter  to  be 
superseded,  and  finally  they  feared  to  bring  their  Amer- 
ican measures  to  a  vote  in  Parliament  The  delay  ex- 
asperated the  irascible  Irish  agent,  and  on  March  10, 
1764,  he  wrote  Johnson: 

The  pople  here  spend  thire  time  in  nothing  butt  abuseing  one 
another  and  striveing  who  shall  be  in  power  with  a  view  to 
serve  themselves  and  thire  frends,  and  neglect  the  publick. 
Itt  was  butt  yesterday  that  your  state  of  Indian  affairs  was  read 
att  the  Board  of  Trade  tho  I  deliverd  itt  the  I3th  of  Last 
Month.397 

394  Dated  November  18,  1763;  wrongly  dated  in  New  York  Colonial  Docu- 
ments, vol.  vii,  572.     For  Johnson's  real  opinion  the  correspondence  of  Crog- 
han noted  below  should  be  consulted. 

395  This  was  the  ostensible  reason  for  going;  but  Croghan's  acts  in  Eng- 
land prove  that  he  was  the  representative  of  Johnson.     General  Amherst  used 
his  influence  to  prevent  Croghan's  departure.     See  idem,  vol.  vii,  569,  581; 
Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  vii,  178.     Croghan  also  went  as  the  representative 
of  the  merchants  who  had  suffered  losses  during  the  Indian  war.     They  were 
petitioning  for  compensation.     See  idem,  vol.  xxiv,  190,  191. 

396  —  Idem,  vol.  vii,  215,  218.     Besides  these  Johnson  gave  Croghan  letters 
to  Lord  Hillsborough,  John  Pownall,  and  others.     See  idem,  vol.  viii,  169. 

397 — Idem,  vol.  viii,  202;  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  Critical 
Period  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  222.  Croghan's  orthography 
is  remarkable. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  221 

The  ministry  was,  however,  favorable  to  a  central- 
ized form  of  government  and  was  ready  to  approve  of 
Johnson's  recommendation  of  an  independent  depart- 
ment with  a  separate  fund.  Croghan  found  Lord  Hali- 
fax particularly  friendly  to  the  superintendent's  ideas,398 
and  Lord  Hillsborough  was  not  opposed  to  them. 
Many  friends  throughout  the  winter  used  their  in- 
fluence to  forward  the  wishes  of  the  superintendents; 
but  it  was  not  until  early  summer,  after  the  adjourn- 
ment of  Parliament,  that  the  Board  of  Trade  took  the 
subject  of  the  management  of  Indian  affairs  into  serious 
consideration.  Between  June  7  and  15,  1764,  the  let- 
ters from  the  two  superintendents,  Johnson  and  Stuart, 
were  read,  Croghan  was  examined,  and  a  plan  for- 
mulated.399 This  was  copied  and  ready  for  distribution 
by  July  10.  Its  final  form  was  no  doubt  due  to  Lord 
Halifax  and  Lord  Hillsborough,  but  the  ideas  em- 
bodied in  it  were  brought  by  Croghan  from  America. 
Colonial  diplomacy  and  Grenville-Bedfordism  had 
united  and  triumphed. 

As  formulated,  the  plan  proposed  an  Imperial  De- 
partment of  Indian  Affairs  which  should  be  independ- 
ent both  of  the  military  commander  and  of  the  colonial 
governments.  For  purposes  of  administration  the  tribes 
were  grouped  in  two  districts,  a  northern  and  a  south- 

398  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  viii,  202;  vol.  ix,  19.     See  also  Thomas  Har- 
ris's letter  to  Johnson,  March  13,  1764,  in  idem,  vol.  viii,  212.     John  Pownall, 
the  secretary  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  had  in  mind  a  plan  which  might  provide 
an  office  for  his  brother,  the  governor,   according  to  Croghan's  information. 
See  idem,  vol.  ix,  53. 

399  Board  of  Trade,  Journals,  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Pa- 
pers.    The  plan  was  first  considered  December  6,  1763,  then  on  January  16, 
and  then  not  again  until  June.     Croghan  to  Johnson,  July  12,  1764,  in  John- 
son Manuscripts,  vol.  ix,  132.     The  plan   is  printed  in  New  York   Colonial 
Documents,  vol.  vii,  637;  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  433; 
and  Alvord  and  Carter,   The  Critical  Period  [Illinois  Historical  Collections, 
vol.  x],  273. 


222  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

ern,  the  Ohio  River  being  approximately  the  boun- 
dary,400 and  over  each  of  these  there  was  to  be  a  super- 
intendent. The  northern  district  was  to  be  divided  in- 
to three  subdistricts  and  the  southern  into  two,  in  charge 
of  each  of  which  a  deputy  was  to  be  appointed.  Ac- 
cording to  the  plan  the  subdivisions  of  the  two  southern 
subdistricts  should  follow  the  limits  of  the  various 
tribes,  whereas  the  northern  subdistricts  were  divided 
into  small  areas  within  each  of  which  a  trading  post 
was  to  be  established.  Within  each  of  the  smaller  sub- 
divisions the  superintendents  should  be  represented  by 
a  commissary  who  should  be  assisted  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  duties  by  an  interpreter  and  a  smith.  Ac- 
cording to  the  list  of  tribes  attached  to  the  report  this 
would  create  thirteen  such  subdivisions  in  each  of  the 
districts.401  The  department  was  to  be  given  complete 
control  of  all  public  Indian  affairs,  and  the  military  of- 
ficers and  governors  were  to  be  forbidden  to  hold  meet- 
ings with  the  Indians  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
superintendents;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  latter 
should  act  and  advise  with  the  governors. 

The  main  purpose  of  these  regulations  was  to  secure 
the  protection  of  the  Indians  from  traders,  settlers,  and 
land  speculators.  The  traders  were  to  be  obliged  to 
take  out  licenses  as  hitherto  from  the  governors  and  at 
the  same  time  to  name  the  posts  or  Indian  towns  where 
they  intended  to  trade  and  to  give  bond  that  they  would 
abide  by  the  regulations.  Upon  entering  the  Indian 

400  The  Board  of  Trade  preferred  the  grouping  by  tribes  to  a  geographi- 
cal division.  See  their  letter  in  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  635. 

*oi  —  Idem,  vol.  vii,  635,  973.  The  intended  posts  were  La  Baye,  Michill- 
imackinac,  Detroit,  Illinois  (Fort  de  Chartres),  Ouiatenon,  Miami,  Niagara, 
Oswego,  Pittsburgh,  Checoutemi  (in  Canada),  Fort  Cumberland,  Fort  Fred- 
erick, Fort  Halifax  (last  two  in  Nova  Scotia).  In  the  list  sent  by  the  Board 
of  Trade  in  1764,  Ouiatenon  is  not  named,  but  Sir  William  Johnson  in  his 
list  includes  it,  but  omits  Pittsburgh  and  Fort  Cumberland. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  223 

country  all  traders  would  pass  directly  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  Indian  office,  and  were  to  be  compelled  to 
present  their  licenses  to  the  commissaries  of  the  posts  or 
tribes.  The  latter  were  empowered  to  establish  the 
tariffs  on  the  goods  to  be  sold,  to  prevent  the  sale  of 
rum,  swan  shot,  and  rifled  barrelled  guns,  and  to  estab- 
lish limits  beyond  which  the  trade  was  under  no  cir- 
cumstances to  be  permitted.  For  the  maintenance  of 
order  at  the  post,  the  commissaries  should  exercise  the 
power  of  justices  of  the  peace  and  try  all  civil  suits  be- 
tween traders  or  between  traders  and  Indians,  and  in 
criminal  actions  they  were  to  be  authorized  to  commit 
for  trial.  In  cases  involving  more  than  ten  pounds 
sterling,  appeal  might  be  taken  to  the  superintendents, 
who  should  possess  final  jurisdiction.  In  all  suits  the 
testimony  of  Indians  was  to  be  taken. 

For  the  protection  of  the  Indian  hunting-grounds 
from  settlers  and  land-jobbers,  the  same  prohibitions 
concerning  the  purchase  of  lands,  as  were  contained  in 
the  proclamation,  were  repeated.     The  Lords  of  Trade 
were  persuaded  to  put  into  effect  the  plan  of  running 
such  a  boundary  between  the  settlements  and  the  In} 
dian  hunting-grounds,  that  the  territory  of  the  Iroquois 
and  of  the  Cherokee  east  of  the  mountains  might  b( 
marked  off  and  that  the  land  around  the  upper  Ohi( 
might  be  immediately  opened  for  settlement,  thus  pro-' 
viding  for  westward  expansion.     It  was  expected  that  aj 
sum  of  money  would  be  appropriated  to  execute  this 
proposal.402     This  was  entirely  in  keeping  with  Shel- 
burne's  purposes  of  the  previous  summer.     There  was 
some  discussion  on  this  subject,  because  some  members 
of  the  Board  of  Trade  thought  that  the  purchase  of  land 

402  At  least,  such  was  Croghan's  impression.     See  Johnson  to  Gay,  April  6, 
1768,  in  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xvi,  65. 


224  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

would  be  a  recognition  of  the  legal  ownership  of  the  In- 
dians and  would  make  void  the  claim  that  the  West  lay 
in  the  royal  domain,  created  by  the  treaty  of  peace. 
This  opinion  was,  however,  given  up,  and  the  project 
of  a  boundary  line  was  incorporated  in  the  plan.  It 
was  probably  the  intention  that  the  land  thus  opened  to 
settlement  by  this  boundary  should  not  be  granted  by 
the  governors  of  the  royal  colonies,  but  should  be  sold 
in  small  plots  by  the  imperial  government.403 

The  western  colonial  policy  had  now  been  rounded 
out.  Its  character  was  truly  imperial  and  would  have 
created,  if  put  into  operation,  a  highly  centralized  gov- 
ernment in  the  Mississippi  Valley.  Through  the  Mili- 
tary Department  the  arm  of  the  empire  had  been 
stretched  out  over  this  newly  acquired  territory  and  was 
limiting  in  many  ways  the  colonial  administration. 
Should  this  Indian  Department  be  inaugurated  with  its 
autocratic  authority  intrusted  to  two  superintendents, 
who  were  to  be  responsible  only  to  the  ministry,  the 
power  of  the  colonies  must  have  been  still  further  cir- 
cumscribed. In  the  end  no  such  system  in  its  entirety 
was  authorized,  but  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry 
should  be  credited  with  a  serious  attempt  to  solve  the 
difficult  and  complex  problem  of  the  West;  and  what- 
ever one's  opinion  of  the  results  may  be,  it  must  be  ac- 
knowledged that  they  had  boldly  faced  the  difficulties 
and  had  devised  a  comprehensive  imperial  program 
with  provision  for  most  of  the  possible  exigencies. 

The  great  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  inaugurat- 
ing such  a  system  was  the  cost,  which  was  estimated  at 
twenty  thousand  pounds.  In  order  to  meet  this  expense, 
it  was  planned  to  lay  a  tax  on  the  fur  trade.  To  do  this 
would  have  required  an  act  of  Parliament,  but  the  min- 

403  This  was  Croghan's  interpretation.  Croghan  to  Johnson,  July  12, 
1764,  in  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  ix,  132. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  225 

istry  never  saw  the  time  when  they  dared  to  bring  their 
plan  to  such  an  irrevocable  issue;  and  while  they  were 
still  hesitating,  they  were  dismissed. 

The  western  policy  had  not  occupied  exclusively  the 
thought  of  the  ministers.  It  had  been  recognized  in 
governmental  circles  that  the  old  colonies  themselves 
presented  a  very  difficult  and  delicate  problem.  The 
constitutions  of  most  of  these  had  been  formed  during 
the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  future  importance  of 
the  colonial  possessions  was  little  understood.  Reck- 
lessly imperial  rights  had  been  granted  away  to  cor- 
porations and  individuals  with  the  result  that  the  mother 
country  found  herself  ruling  over  practically  free  com- 
munities whose  governments  were  ill  adapted  to  the 
unity  of  an  empire,  as  it  was  conceived  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  To  most  of  the  British  politicians  some  ma- 
terial alteration  in  the  constitutions  of  these  various 
royal,  charter,  and  proprietary  colonies  seemed  neces- 
sary to  make  them  an  integral  part  of  the  whole.  Many 
proposals  for  such  changes  were  made,  but  since  they 
were  never  carried  out  and  did  not  affect  the  western 
policy,  they  need  not  be  discussed  here.  It  would  have 
been  a  bolder  and  more  harmonious  ministry  than  any 
that  governed  the  empire  of  George  III.,  that  would 
have  dared  attempt  such  fundamental  changes,  for  at 
no  time  were  the  minds  of  the  men  in  political  circles 
united  on  the  best  method  of  procedure.  On  the  one 
side  were  the  Bedfords  with  a  belief  in  the  complete 
subordination  of  the  colonies,  and  at  the  other  extreme 
was  Lord  Shelburne  advocating  an  autonomy  as  com- 
plete as  that  of  Connecticut  but  with  a  more  consistent 
democracy.  Between  the  two  views  there  was  no  rec- 
onciliation possible.  The  ministers  also  realized  that 
the  discussion  of  the  subject  would  raise  a  dangerous 


226  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

issue  between  the  home  government  and  the  colonies. 
The  only  course  open  was  to  avoid  in  the  future  the  mis- 
takes of  the  past,  when  new  colonies  were  to  be  formed. 

The  imperial  policy  which  had  been  decided  upon 
entailed  a  larger  expenditure  for  the  colonial  govern- 
ment than  had  been  customary.  The  army  alone  cost 
two  hundred  twenty  thousand  pounds  annually  more 
than  before  the  war.  The  first  cost  of  the  new  colonies 
also  fell  upon  the  mother  country.  To  the  eighteenth- 
century  statesman  it  seemed  only  just  that  part  of  this 
extra  burden  should  be  shifted  to  the  colonies.  This 
was  felt  to  be  particularly  the  case  with  the  expense 
of  the  army  and  of  the  Indian  management,  in  both  of 
which  the  colonies  seemed  to  be  most  directly  interested 
and  from  which  they  were  to  derive  the  benefit.  When 
such  a  revenue  was  first  suggested  in  the  winter  of  1762- 
1763  and  even  later  when  under  discussion,  there  was 
no  objection  and  even  the  colonists  appeared  to  feel  the 
force  of  the  reasoning.404 

If  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry  was  to  put  into 
operation  all  the  phases  of  their  imperial  policy,  it  was 
of  the  utmost  importance  that  this  new  source  of  revenue 
should  be  immediately  drawn  upon.  At  the  various 
stages  in  the  development  of  their  comprehensive  pro- 
gram there  had  doubtless  been  some  general  under- 
standing as  to  its  character  among  the  members  of  the 
steering  committee;  still,  on  account  of  their  mutual 
jealousy  there  could  not  have  been  much  interference 
from  other  ministers  with  the  work  of  the  secretary  of 
state  and  his  assistant,  the  president  of  the  Board  of 
Trade.  The  finding  of  the  money  to  finance  the  various 

404  It  is  not  my  intention  to  write  the  history  of  the  Stamp  Act,  particularly 
as  this  has  been  done  so  satisfactorily  by  Mr.  Beer,  in  his  British  Colonial 
Policy,  IJ54.-I765.  Its  interest  in  this  narrative  lies  in  the  fact  that  an  issue 
was  raised  by  it  which  obscured  the  other  colonial  questions. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  227 

operations  such  as  supporting  the  army,  establishing 
the  new  colonies,  and  the  creation  of  an  independent 
Indian  Department  was  the  duty  of  other  offices,  those 
of  the  first  lord  of  the  treasury  and  of  the  chancellor 
of  the  exchequer,  both  of  which  positions  were  held  by 
George  Grenville.  He  had  never  been  in  a  ministerial 
position  which  had  made  it  necessary  for  him  to  apply 
his  strictly  legal  mind  to  the  details  of  colonial  affairs 
and  for  that  reason  had  never  mastered  the  complexi- 
ties of  American  geography  or  politics.405  In  financial 
affairs,  however,  he  was  a  man  of  ability  and  in  this  in- 
stance he  was  ready  to  assume  the  responsibility  for  a 
measure  which  had  devolved  upon  him  by  the  decisions 
of  his  predecessors  and  of  his  colleagues;  even  the 
details  of  the  notorious  Stamp  Act  and  of  the  other 
financial  measures  which  were  adopted  to  raise  the  re- 
quired revenue,  were  in  all  probability  not  his  own 
work.406  There  was  practically  no  opposition  to  Gren- 
ville's  bills,  since  all  factions  readily  believed  in  the 
necessity  of  them.  In  fact  so  universal  was  this  belief 
that  the  agents  of  the  colonies,  who  were  given  an  op- 

405  William  Knox  wrote  thus  of  him:    "He  was  not  well  acquainted  with 
the  internal  state  of  Ireland,  and  he  knew  still  less  of  the  circumstances  of 
the  American  colonies,  and  every  encouragement  that  he  thought  either  ought 
to  receive,  had  no  other  reference  than  the  increase  of  the  trade  or  revenue 
of   this   country."  -  Extra    Official   State  Papers,   vol.    ii,    32.     In   Albemarle, 
Rockingham  Memoirs  [vol.  i,  249]  is  preserved  that  famous  remark  of  Lord 
Essex's,  so  often  quoted  by  historians:     "Mr.  Grenville  lost  America  because 
he  read  the  American  dispatches,  which  his  predecessors  had  never  done." 
This  is  one  of  those  quotable  phrases  that  seem  to  sum  up  a  whole  epoch  and 
contains  as  little  truth  as  similar  ones.     American  affairs  had  become  so  im- 
portant long  before  the  Grenville  ministry  that  ministers,   such   as  Halifax 
and  Egremont,  had  devoted  most  of  their  time  to  studying  the  dispatches. 

406  por  these  various  acts,  see  "Considerations  on  the  trade  and  finances 
of  this  kingdom,  etc.,"  in  Scarce  and  Interesting  Tracts,  vol.  ii,  144;   Beer, 
British  Colonial  Policy,  passim.     In  1777  Jenkinson,  who  was  in  close  touch 
with  Grenville  during  the  time  of  the  latter's  ministry,  declared  emphatically 
that  the  Stamp  Act  was  not  originated  by  Grenville.     See  Parliamentary  His- 
tory, vol.  xix,  268. 


228  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

portunity  to  point  out  objections,  kept  silent  until  word 
of  the  tumultuous  reception  of  the  stamp  tax  in  America 
was  received  in  England.  The  idea  of  colonial  taxa- 
tion was  connected  specifically  with  the  support  of  the 
military  establishment  and  not  with  that  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  Indian  Affairs,  but  the  issue  which  was  raised 
by  its  promulgation  involved  all  parts  of  the  imperial 
policy  which  the  ministers  were  intending  to  inaugu- 
rate. So  acrimonious  and  tumultuous  was  the  turmoil 
raised  by  the  questions  of  taxation  and  of  representation 
that  the  burden  of  the  discussion  was  shifted  from  the 
comprehensive  program  to  these  particular  phases  of  it. 
Upon  an  incident  of  the  colonial  policy  there  was 
formed  a  battle  line  and  by  the  smoke  of  the  engagement 
the  original  purposes  of  the  ministry  were  so  obscured 
that  only  occasionally  did  a  later  minister  catch  a  clear 
view  of  what  the  real  issue  should  have  been. 


IX.    THE  PLANS  OF  THE  OLD  WHIGS 

The  unsettled  state  of  the  ministry,  ever  since  the  Parliament  rose, 
has  stopped  all  proceeding  in  publick  affairs,  and  ours  amongst  the 
rest;  but,  change  being  now  made,  we  shall  immediately  proceed,  and 
with  the  greater  chearfulness,  as  some  we  had  reason  to  doubt  of  are 
removed,  and  some  particular  friends  are  put  in  place.  —  BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN. 

King  George  III.,  grown  weary  of  Grenville's  tire- 
some sermons  and  still  nursing  his  resentment  against 
the  Bloomsbury  Gang  for  their  banishment  of  Lord 
Bute,  had  been  waiting  for  some  time  for  an  opportune 
moment  to  dismiss  his  ministers.  The  reasons  he  as- 
signed for  this  decision  were:  his  fear  of  their  purposes, 
their  general  incompetency,  the  discontent  they  had 
aroused  in  America,  and  their  failure  to  make  a  proper 
disposition  of  the  new  acquisitions.407  After  making  up 
his  mind  the  king,  with  a  complete  disregard  of  his 
solemn  promise,  had  recourse  to  the  advice  of  the  Earl 
of  Bute.  The  latter,  still  confident  in  his  own  political 

407  In  his  complaint  of  the  ministry,  the  king  told  the  Duke  of  Cumber- 
land that  he  "found  nothing  done ;  North  America  greatly  discontented,  and 
no  proper  disposition,  or  at  least  no  satisfactory  one,  made  of  the  new  ac- 
quisitions there."  -  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new 
ser.,  vol.  lix],  n.  The  king  also  told  Charles  Yorke  that  the  ministry  had 
neglected  "the  colonies  and  the  new  conquests."  -  Charles  Yorke's  "Journal," 
in  Harris,  Life  of  Hardivicke,  vol.  iii,  450.  Grenville  told  William  Knox 
that  the  king's  explanation  of  the  dismissal  was  that  "he  [the  king]  under- 
stood a  plan  was  formed  to  give  the  law  to  him.  .  .  The  Regency  Bill  no 
part  of  the  reason  for  his  dismission."  -  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical 
Manuscripts  Commission,  Report  on  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  vol. 
vi,  251.  The  same  explanation  is  in  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iii,  213.  See  also 
Stuart  Mackenzie's  account  in  Caldwell,  Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications], 
part  ii,  vol.  ii,  36. 


23Q THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

judgment,  felt  certain  that  the  time  was  now  ripe  for 
the  inauguration  of  a  "broad  bottom"  ministry  with  Pitt 
at  its  head,  the  coveted  ideal  which  he  had  so  signally 
failed  to  secure  in  the  summer  of  I763.408  His  plan  was 
similar  to  his  former  one,  the  union  of  the  Old  Whigs 
and  of  the  followers  of  Pitt  with  the  court  faction.  The 
monarch's  consent  to  a  return  of  the  Whig  oligarchy 
was  announced  by  the  employment  of  the  Duke  of 
Cumberland  as  a  negotiator.409 

The  king  and  his  favorite  were  in  the  conception  of 
their  plan  misled  by  a  fundamental  misunderstanding 
of  the  situation.  They  knew  that  the  Old  Whig  faction 
needed  and  desired  the  support  of  Pitt,  and  from  Pitt's 
demands  in  the  summer  of  1763  they  naturally  conclud- 
ed that  he  was  willing  to  act  in  unison  with  the  Whig 
lords  and  would  come  into  the  ministry  upon  the  ac- 
ceptance of  his  former  conditions.  In  this,  however, 
they  deceived  themselves.  Pitt's  political  views  were 
based  on  principles  so  widely  separated  from  those  ad- 
vocated by  the  followers  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  and 
the  Marquis  of  Rockingham  that  it  was  only  under 
stress  of  circumstances  that  he  could  bring  himself  to 
act  with  them,  and  he  never  could  have  become  a  col- 
league in  a  ministry  that  stood  exclusively  on  their  plat- 
form. The  Old  Whigs  demanded  the  control  of  gov- 
ernment by  the  revolutionary  families  such  as  had  ex- 

408  Although   for  the   interpretation   of  British  colonial   policy,   these  ne- 
gotiations of  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1765  are  very  important,  it  is 
impossible  to  enter  into  the  details  here.     The  best  narratives  of  events  may 
be  found  in  the  Duke  of  Cumberland's  statement,  in  Albemarle,  Rockingham 
Memoirs,  vol.  i,  185  ff. ;  Newcastle,  Narrative;  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol. 
iii,  278  ff. ;  Lyttelton,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  676 ;  Harris,  Life  of  Hardivicke,  vol. 
iii,  4. 11  ff . ;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iii,  39  ff.,  14.3  ff . ;  Grafton,  Autobiography, 
45.  51;  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  66  ff. ;  consult  Von  Ruville, 
William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute,  and  also  the  same  author's  William  Pitt. 

409  A  list  of  the  ministers  proposed  in  the  June  conference  may  be  found 
in  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iii,  201. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  231 

isted  in  the  time  of  Robert  Walpole.  These  were  to 
them  the  good  old  days  they  wished  to  bring  back. 
Pitt's  eyes  were  turned  towards  a  future  when  internal 
peace  should  be  established  by  the  annihilation  of 
parties  and  factions.  He  would  make  Bolingbroke's 
dream  a  reality.  The  Old  Whigs  stood  for  the  main- 
tenance of  existing  conditions  in  the  home  administra- 
tion, in  the  imperial  organization,  and  in  the  govern- 
ment's relation  to  the  business  of  the  large  corporations. 
Conservatism  was  their  motto.  Pitt  was  a  radical  and 
demanded  reform  in  every  direction.  His  mind  con- 
ceived a  world  empire  with  a  modern  organization 
wherein  special  interests,  whether  financial  or  political, 
would  cease  to  exercise  an  overwhelming  influence. 

The  personal  factor  was  also  a  powerful  one  in  Pitt's 
decision  not  to  unite  at  this  time  with  his  former  asso- 
ciates. Although  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  had  been  his 
principal  supporter  in  his  great  war  ministry,  Pitt  had 
never  learned  to  trust  him.  This  distrust  of  the  crafty 
leader  of  the  oligarchy  seemed  amply  justified  by  his 
desertion  in  1761,  a  circumstance  which  Pitt  never  for- 
gave nor  forgot.  The  political  supremacy  of  Lord  Bute 
and  the  treaty  of  peace  had  thrown  Pitt  and  Newcastle 
together  in  opposition  for  a  few  months,  at  which  time 
there  occurred  those  famous  negotiations  of  August, 
1763.  Since  that  date  Pitt  had  been  withdrawing  him- 
self from  that  uncongenial  alliance  and  had  more  than 
once  asserted  in  Parliament  that  .he  was  unconnected. 
His  personal  dislike  of  the  duke  was  again  in  the 
ascendency.410 

410  The  letters  in  Pitt's  Correspondence  for  the  year  1765  prove  this  with- 
out a  question  of  a  doubt.  See  particularly  Pitt  to  Nuthall,  December  10,  in 
idem,  vol.  iS,  345 ;  Pitt  to  Shelburne,  December,  1765,  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of 
Shelburne,  vol.  i,  256.  In  the  next  chapter  it  will  be  shown  more  fully  how 
different  were  the  platforms  of  the  Pittites  and  of  the  Old  Whigs. 


232  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

One  other  factor  in  the  failure  to  form  a  coalition 
ministry  should  be  noticed.  Pitt  required  at  this  time 
the  cordial  support  of  his  close  ally  and  brother-in-law, 
Lord  Temple,  if  he  were  to  take  office.  Their  es- 
trangement for  several  years  from  Temple's  brother, 
George  Grenville,  had  cemented  their  union  still  fur- 
ther; but  just  at  the  time  of  these  negotiations  a  recon- 
ciliation between  the  brothers  took  place,  which  aroused 
in  Lord  Temple  certain  "delicacies,"  due  to  a  dislike  to 
supplant  so  near  a  relative  or,  perhaps,  to  the  hope  of 
becoming  the  leader  of  a  reunited  faction,  in  which  Pitt 
would  not  exercise  the  supreme  power.411  Besides  his 
"delicacies"  Lord  Temple  had  retained  a  stronger  pre- 
judice to  the  Earl  of  Bute  and  his  followers  than  had  his 
brother-in-law  so  that  he  was  unwilling  to  enter  into  a 
ministry  supported  by  that  influence.412 

The  failure  of  these  negotiations  with  Pitt,  which 
lasted  from  May  to  July,413  and  the  king's  personal  dis- 
like of  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry  forced  him  final- 
ly to  call  to  office  the  Old  Whigs.  This  faction  was 
passing  at  this  moment  through  a  period  of  rejuvenes- 
cence. Through  the  recent  death  of  Lord  Hardwicke 
one  connection  with  its  reactionary  past  had  been  sev- 
ered; and  the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  though  ready  as  ever 
for  office  at  any  price,  was  no  longer  universally  and 
unquestioningly  looked  upon  as  the  sole  dispenser  of 
favors  and  the  only  safe  guide  to  political  preferment. 

411  This  is  Lord  Lyttelton's  opinion,  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  681.     See  also  Von 
Ruville,  IVilliam  Pitt,  vol.  iii,  151. 

412  Newcastle,   Narrative    [Camden    Society,    Publications,   new    set.,   vol. 
lix],  13. 

413  There  were  two  distinct  negotiations  with  Pitt,  and  attempts  were  also 
made  to  form  a  ministry  out  of  scattered  elements.     After  the  failure  of  the 
first  overtures  to  Pitt,  the  king  was  obliged  to  retain  the  Grenville-Bedford 
ministers  under  conditions  which  made  him  still  more  anxious  to  free  him- 
self from  them. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  233 

To  take  the  place  of  these  older  leaders,  there  had  arisen 
to  influence  in  the  council  young  men  with  high  ideals 
and  with  an  enthusiasm  that  was  causing  new  warm 
blood  to  course  through  the  hardening  arteries  of  the 
ancient  coalition.  Under  the  influence  of  this  new  life, 
an  idealism  that  was  conservative  in  clinging  to  a  tradi- 
tion of  a  glorified  past  and  yet  was  progressive  in  its 
anticipation  of  the  coming  age  of  reform  was  replacing 
the  "standpat"  Whiggism  of  the  Pelhams  and  the 
Yorkes.  Still  the  Old  Whigs  had  not  developed  during 
the  short  period  of  exclusion  from  office  any  leaders  of 
great  power  or  personal  magnetism  such  as  ruled  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Pittites;  and  the  new  administration, 
formed  by  them  in  July,  1765,  was  remarkable  for  the 
youth  and  the  lack  of  experience  of  the  men  composing 
it  rather  than  for  the  wisdom  and  grandeur  of  its  pur- 
poses and  accomplishments. 

The  Marquis  of  Rockingham,  who  must  from  now 
on  be  regarded  as  the  leader  of  his  faction,  was  selected 
as  the  chief  minister  in  the  cabinet.  He  was  a  compara- 
tively young  man  possessed  of  mediocre  talents,  inex- 
perienced in  official  duties,  adverse  to  mental  labor,  and 
better  known  on  the  turf  than  in  politics.  On  the  other 
hand  he  was  honest,  of  good  ideals,  at  least  steadfast  in 
purpose,  if  not  stubborn.  His  political  platform  was 
inherited  from  Robert  Walpole  and  the  Pelhams,  and 
he  advocated  the  predominence  of  Parliament  under  the 
Whig  nobles  of  his  alliance  and  the  non-disturbance  of 
existing  rights.414  The  other  members  of  the  ministry 
were  for  the  most  part  educated  in  this  traditional  creed 
of  the  Whig  oligarchy  and  had  little  in  common  with 

414  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  ///.,  vol.  ii,  139;  Albemarle,  Rocking- 
ham Memoirs,  vol.  i,  140;  Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  349;  Dictionary  of  Na- 
tional Biography. 


234  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  radicalism  of  the  Pittites  or  with  such  Toryism  as 
was  to  be  found  in  the  court  faction.  The  new  secre- 
tary of  state  for  the  Southern  Department  was  General 
Conway.  He  was  notoriously  a  man  of  indecision,  and 
was  wavering  at  this  very  moment  between  his  alle- 
giance to  the  Old  Whigs  and  his  admiration  for  Wil- 
liam Pitt.  Every  decision,  painfully  reached  by  his  un- 
stable mind,  must  be  credited  to  the  influence  of  Horace 
Walpole.  Conway  possessed  no  special  knowledge  of 
colonial  affairs  -  a  fact  doubly  important  since  these  were 
to  reach  a  crisis  under  his  administration.  If  Conway 
were  to  be  secretary,  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham's  se- 
lection of  a  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade  should  have 
been  carefully  considered.  The  first  candidate  picked 
out  for  this  position  was  the  Earl  of  Shelburne,  a  choice 
that  was  dictated  solely  by  the  desire  to  secure  the  co- 
operation of  the  latter's  friend,  William  Pitt;  but  the 
Pittites  were  not  selling  their  services  to  what  they  re- 
garded as  a  reactionary  administration.415  Upon  the 
refusal  of  Lord  Shelburne,  the  Old  Whigs  appointed 
one  of  their  own  number,  Lord  Dartmouth. 

The  character  of  Lord  Dartmouth,  on  account  of  the 
simplicity  of  its  lines,  offers  few  difficulties  to  the  his- 
torian. Like  many  of  his  associates  in  the  ministry,  he 
was  relatively  a  young  man,  having  just  passed  his 
thirty-fourth  birthday,  and  like  most  of  them,  also,  he 
was  wholly  inexperienced  in  public  affairs,  this  being 
his  first  ministerial  position.  His  speeches  in  Parlia- 
ment, where  he  had  consistently  spoken  on  the  side  of 
the  Old  Whigs,  had  won  for  him  a  good  reputation ;  but 
the  chief  impression  made  by  his  personality  upon  his 
contemporaries  was  one  of  great  piety,  honesty  of  pur- 

415  Fitzmau rice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  231  ff . ;  Albemarle,  Rockingham 
Memoirs,  vol.  i,  234  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  235 

pose,  and  mildness  of  manners.  The  novelist,  Richard- 
son, is  reported  to  have  said  that  Lord  Dartmouth 
would  be  similar  to  the  character  of  Sir  Charles  Grandi- 
son,  if  he  were  not  a  Methodist.  The  poet  Cowper  al- 
luded to  him  in  "Truth"  as  "one  who  wears  a  coronet 
and  prays."416  The  Countess  of  Huntingdon,  enthusi- 
astic Methodist,  regarded  him  as  the  fittest  person  to 
continue  her  work  in  case  of  her  death.417  Such  char- 
acterizations reveal  very  amiable  virtues  but  they  be- 
long to  the  private  life  rather  than  to  the  public ;  and  it 
was  the  fate  of  this  nobleman  at  two  critical  periods  in 
the  history  of  the  British  empire  to  be  called  to  impor- 
tant public  offices,  in  which  he  did  not  win  the  favor- 
able opinion  of  his  contemporaries.  He  proved  him- 
self to  be  lacking  in-  force  of  character  by  consenting  to 
father  measures  proposed  by  men  whose  motives  were 
at  least  doubtful,  and  to  be  wanting  in  administrative 
ability  and  constructive  leadership.  He  was  often 
chosen  on  account  of  his  reputation  for  honesty  and 
piety  to  defend  measures  during  their  passage  through 
Parliament,  but  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  one  states- 
manlike measure  for  which  he  was  responsible.  Wrax- 
all,  who  reflects  fairly  well  the  contemporary  opinion 
concerning  public  men,  dismisses  Lord  Dartmouth  with 
these  words  of  contempt:  "In  his  public  character, 
whether  in  or  out  of  Parliament,  he  attracted  no  share 
of  general  attention,  and  lays  claim  to  no  place  in  the 
history  of  his  time."418  Throughout  his  life  he  was  re- 
garded by  Americans  with  particular  favor  and  was 
esteemed  a  friend  of  the  colonies.  This  was  very  evi- 
dent at  the  time  of  his  later  appointment  in  1772,  when 

416  Southey,  Life  of  Cowper  (1836),  vol.  i,  243,  quoted  in  Walpole,  Me- 
moirs of  George  HI.,  vol.  i,  200,  footnote. 

417  Life  and  Times  of  Selina,  Countess  of  Huntingdon,  vol.  ii,  12. 
418Wraxall,  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  415. 


236  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

letters  from  all  parts  of  the  oversea  dependencies  were 
written  him  in  congratulation  of  his  promotion.419  Lord 
Dartmouth,  though  below  the  average  of  his  associates 
in  intelligence,  represented  in  his  virtues  and  faults  the 
type  of  the  Rockingham  ministry.  It  consisted  of 
amiable  and  honorable  young  men  whose  ideals  and 
policies  were  in  a  plastic  stage  of  growth,  but  whose 
heritage  and  training  still  held  them  bound  to  the  polit- 
ical practices  and  teachings  of  the  past  as  expounded  by 
such  trained  manipulators  as  the  dukes  of  Cumberland 
and  Newcastle.420 

The  most  important  act  of  this  ministry  was  the  re- 
peal of  the  stamp  tax,  the  announcement  of  which  had 
been  received  with  an  outburst  of  hostile  criticism  by 

e  Americans.  An  unanticipated  issue  that  was  to  be- 
come a  permanent  cause  of  irritation  was  thus  raised  be- 
tween the  colonies  and  the  mother  country  and  appeared 
so  momentous  to  the  minds  of  the  British  politicians  that 
the  critical  situation  in  the  West  was  often  totally  ob- 
scured. Over  this  issue  factions  in  Parliament  were 
divided.  Even  among  the  supporters  of  the  ministry 
there  was  a  difference  of  opinion.  The  chief  adviser, 
the  Duke  of  Cumberland,  was  opposed  to  the  abroga- 
tion of  the  tax,  but  his  death,  although  a  disaster  to  the 
ministry  in  other  particulars,  made  it  possible  for  them 
to  determine  on  a  radical  measure  for  the  relief  of  the 
colonies.  The  Yorkes  were  in  sympathy  with  the  duke's 
position  and  did  what  they  could  to  obstruct  the  con- 

419  Besides  the  above  references  consult  the  Dictionary  of  National  Bio- 
graphy, art.  "William  Legge,  2d,  Earl  of  Dartmouth." 

420  The  Duke  of  Newcastle  in  spite  of  his  complaints  of  neglect  exercised 
very  considerable  influence  upon  the  course  of  events.     See  Newcastle,  Nar- 
rative [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix].     The  former  Cum- 
berland faction  was  already  practically  disintegrated  and  the  members  who 
were  still  loyal  were  closely  allied  with  the  Old  Whigs. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  237 

templated  action.421  On  the  other  hand  Rockingham 
and  his  two  secretaries  of  state  were  in  favor  of  an  im-  • 
mediate  repeal  accompanied  with  an  act  declaring  the 
supremacy  of  Parliament  over  the  colonies,  although 
probably  they  would  not  have  dared  to  advocate  so  bold 
a  course,  had  they  not  received  the  enthusiastic  support 
of  the  Pittites.422 

Of  vital  interest  to  the  administration  was  the  attitude 
of  the  court  faction  upon  which  the  ministry's  majority 
in  Parliament  depended  and  from  which  two  of  the 
leaders  in  the  House  of  Lords  were  chosen.423  Two 
reasons  may  be  ascribed  for  the  opposition  of  the  king's 
followers  to  the  repeal  of  the  tax.  Their  policy  from 
the  first  had  been  to  build  up  the  dignity  of  the  mon- 
archy and  to  emancipate  the  royal  power  from  the  con- 
trol of  the  Old  Whig  families.  The  Stamp  Act  had 
been  approved  by  the  king,  was  part  of  his  imperial 
policy,  and,  therefore,  it  would  in  a  very  real  sense 
weaken  his  prestige  to  take  a  step  backwards.  The 
second  reason  was  more  fundamental.  The  members  of 
the  court  faction  had  pledged  themselves  to  prove  the 
value  of  the  acquisition  of  the  West  and  thereby  to 
justify  the  treaty  of  peace.  This  could  only  be  accom- 
plished by  spending  money  in  America  to  maintain  the 
western  posts  and  to  subsidize  the  government  of  the 
new  provinces.  The  opinion  in  political  circles  was  al- 
most universal  that  America  should  contribute  from  its 
resources  to  this  imperial  policy,  and  the  adherents  of 

421  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  285,  290,   310;   Fitzmaurice, 
Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  259. 

422  In  1779  the  king  told  his  ministers  that  the  Rockinghams  did  not  wish 
"to  repeal  the  act  untill  Lords  Chatham  and  Cambden  made  their  declara- 

tions."  -  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report  4>~6d~t**vJW 
on  the  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  260. 

423  Lords  Northington  (Henley)  and  Egmont,  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Cam- 
den  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  42. 


238  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  court  like  all  other  expansionists  thought  that  Par- 
liament could  never  be  persuaded  to  undertake  a  broad 
gauged  western  policy,  unless  a  fund  was  raised  in  the 
colonies.424  For  these  reasons  and  others  of  less  moment 
most  of  those  who  were  devoted  to  the  king  were  gen- 
erally opposed  to  the  repeal,  but  favored  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  act.425 

The  party  of  Pitt  also  suffered  in  strength  from  the 
struggle.  Lord  Temple  who  had  always  remained  a 
faithful  colleague  of  the  Great  Commoner  preferred  on 
this  issue  to  side  with  his  brother,  George  Grenville. 
The  rest  of  the  faction,  however,  accepted  the  American 
point  of  view,  disbelieved  in  taxation  without  represen- 
tation, and  spoke  strongly  in  favor  of  the  relief  meas- 
ure and  against  the  declaratory  act.  It  was  Pitt's  posi- 
tiveness  on  this  occasion  which  persuaded  the  ministers 
to  take  a  firm  stand.  Throughout  the  fall  and  winter 
the  latter  were  hoping  and  expecting  that  the  popular 
statesman  would  place  himself  at  their  head,  and  they 

424  This  danger  was  very  real.     The  Earl  of  Hardwicke,  an  Old  Whig 
whose  views  were  similar  to  those  of  the  court  faction,  wrote  his  brother, 
Charles  Yorke,  that  if  the  Stamp  Act  was  repealed  and  the  colonies  refused 
to  supply  money  for  the  troops,  it  would  be  best  to  withdraw  them.     This 
would  have  meant  the  abandonment  of  the  whole  western  policy.     See  Albe- 
marle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  310.     After  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act, 
Lord  Harrington  drew  up  a  paper  on  the  disposition  of  troops,  in  which  it 
was  proposed  practically  to  abandon  the  West.     See  page  249.     In  1767  Mr. 
Grenville  made  a  motion  in  Parliament  looking  to  the  same  end.     See  Cald- 
well,  Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications'},  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  106. 

425  It  is  worth  noting  that  Blackstone,  a  Tory,  was  in  favor  of  the  repeal. 
Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  198.     A  friend  of  Lord  Bute  wrote 
on  January  25,  1766,  as  follows:     "The  violent  Pittites  are  for  an  immediate 
repeal  of  the  stamp  duty,  and  declaring  an  act  of  Parliament  illegal.     .     . 
The   opposition   are   for  declaring  the  American   rebells,   and   treating  them 
accordingly.     The  more  moderate  part  of  government  wish  to  preserve  the 
dignity  of  Parliament,   and  our  internal  jurisdiction  over  the  colonies,  even 
to  taxation."- Caldwell,  Papers   [Maitland   Club  Publications},  part  ii,  vol. 
ii,  63.     In  the  above  statement  the  "Opposition"  refers  to  the  factions  of  Gren- 
ville and  Bedford,  and  "the  more  moderate"  to  the  Old  Whigs  and  the  court 
faction. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 239 

therefore  permitted  him  to  lay  down  for  them  their 
policy.  The  triumph  of  the  administration  really  re- 
dounded to  the  credit  of  Pitt.426 

The  alignment  of  the  factions  on  the  issue  was  such 
that  a  repeal  of  the  act  was  impossible  unless  George 
III.  could  be  persuaded  to  drive  the  court  followers  to 
the  support  of  the  cabinet.  The  king  himself  had  not 
been  pleased  with  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry's 
colonial  policy  or  rather  failure  to  take  definite  action, 
but  he  did  feel  keenly  the  need  of  funds  for  his  plan  of 
imperial  organization.  He  preferred,  as  he  himself 
said,  a  modification  of  the  Stamp  Act,  but  when  the  hot 
heads  of  the  opposing  parties  pushed  the  question  to  an 
issue  between  enforcement  and  repeal,  he  gave  his  con- 
sent to  the  latter.427  Having  reached  this  decision  the 
king  was  expected  by  his  ministers  to  compel  his  fol- 
lowers to  cast  their  votes  accordingly.  Unfortunately 
for  his  reputation  for  sincerity,  George  III.  was  not  able 
to  do  this,  because  the  court  faction  lacked  that  soli- 
darity so  characteristic  of  its  rivals.  There  appeared  in 
this  Parliament  a  small  group  of  men  calling  them- 
selves "King's  Friends"  who  were  always  willing  to 
subordinate  their  own  opinions  to  their  master's;428  but 
the  rest  of  the  faction  was  more  independent.  Even 
Lord  Bute,  who  controlled  a  large  number  of  votes,  as- 

426  Consult  particularly  Grafton,  Autobiography,  and  Newcastle,  Narrative 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix]  ;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shel- 
burne,  vol.  i,  254  ff.     In  her  introduction  [page  n]  to  the  Newcastle,  Nar- 
ratives,  Miss  Bateson    also  gives   full   credit  to  Pitt   for  the   repeal   of  the 
Stamp  Act.     The  king  himself  said  later  that  the  issue  was  made  by  Pitt. 
See  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Report  on 
Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  260.     See  also  Caldwell,  Papers   [Mait- 
land  Club  Publications],  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  60. 

427  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  301  ff. ;  Newcastle,  Narrative 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  49. 

428  John    Home   to   Baron   Mure,   January   5,    1766,    in    Caldwell,   Papers 
[Maitland  Club  Publications],  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  57. 


240  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

serted  that  he  would  maintain  for  himself  "an  entire  in- 
dependency to  vote  and  judge  as  a  Peer  in  Parlia- 
ment."429 King  George,  fearing  a  possible  dismem- 
berment of  his  faithful  band  of  followers,  let  it  be 
known  that  he  would  not  make  the  issue  a  test  of  loyalty 
to  himself,  and  many  of  his  adherents  determined  to 
vote  against  the  measure.  On  learning  this  Lord  Rock- 
ingham  insisted  that  the  king  make  an  unequivocal 
statement  that  he  favored  the  repeal.430  The  result  of 
these  irreconcilable  reports  about  the  monarch's  opinion 
was  thus  described  by  an  observer:  "These  things  are 
observed;  and  many,  who  would  wish  to  know  the 
king's  secret  wishes,  and  act  accordingly,  are  quite 
puzzled  what  to  believe."431 

With  the  help  of  George  III.  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp 
Act  was  finally  railroaded  through  Parliament;432  but 
the  struggle  left  indelible  marks  on  imperial  politics. 
The  opponents  of  the  repeal,  the  Bedfords,  the  Gren- 
villes,  and  many  of  the  court  faction,  were  convinced 
that  a  grave  mistake  had  been  made  in  bending  before 

I  the  storm;  and  from  this  time  on  they  were  always 
ready  to  promote  measures  tending  toward  the  subor- 

429  Rouet  to  Baron  Mure,  February  22,  1766,  in  Caldwell,  Papers  [Mait- 
land    Club    Publications'},    part    ii,    vol.    ii,    75.     During    this    winter    Lord 
Bute    and    his    friends    acted    as    an    independent    faction,    much   to   the   sur- 
prise of  their  opponents  who  had  hitherto  regarded  them  as  individuals  form- 
ing part  of  the  court  faction.     See  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society, 
Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  62. 

430  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  300  ff. ;  Newcastle,  Narrative 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  49  ff. 

431  Rouet  to  Baron  Mure,  February  18,  1766;  Caldwell,  Papers  [Maitland 
Club  Publications'],  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  73. 

432 The  Duke  of  Grafton  wrote:  "I  must  not  conceal  from  you  that  the 
repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  went  heavily  down  with  those,  who  passed  under 
the  denomination  of  king's  friends;  and  tho'  most  of  them  voted  for  the 
repeal,  yet  it  was  done  with  so  bad  a  grace,  that  they  could  not  help  seizing 
an  opportunity  by  which  they  might  affront  an  administration  growing  every 
day  up  to  popularity,  and,  at  the  same  time,  make  their  own  consequence 
appear."  -  Grafton,  Autobiography,  68. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  241 

dination  of  colonies  and  to  interpret  as  sinister  all  events 
which  took  place  in  the  oversea  dominions.  It  became 
almost  impossible  for  a  ministry  to  be  formed  capable 
of  considering  the  colonial  problems  in  a  dispassionate 
and  purely  objective  manner,  because  many  factions 
were  pledged  by  their  prejudices  to  ungenerous  treat- 
ment of  the  dependencies  and  in  every  faction  there 
were  many  individuals  who  shared  the  same  sentiment 

Although  the  provisions  of  the  Stamp  Act  did  not 
directly  affect  the  West,  the  indirect  effect  of  the  repeal 
finally  became  of  stupendous  significance;  the  imperial 
government  had  renounced  a  supply  of  money  which 
had  been  set  aside  for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  for 
the  opening  up  of  new  districts  in  the  great  valley  for 
settlement.  Furthermore  the  furor  which  had  been 
aroused  in  America  by  the  tax  proved  the  impracti- 
cability of  raising  money  by  similar  means  for  organiz- 
ing the  Indian  trade  along  the  lines  of  Hillsborough's 
plan.  Thus  the  whole  Grenville-Bedford  imperial 
policy  had  to  be  completely  revised. 

Three  courses  were  open  to  the  ministry:  they  could 
find  other  means  than  a  colonial  tax  by  which  to  raise 
the  fund  so  much  needed  for  the  development  and  pro- 
tection of  the  West;  or  they  might  abandon  all  hope  of 
imperial  control  of  that  region  and  leave  its  destiny  to 
fate  and  the  rapaciousness  of  the  Americans;  or  they 
might  attempt  to  prevent  all  western  complications  and 
thereby  to  cut  down  expenses  by  prohibiting  the  colo- 
nists from  crossing  the  mountains. 

The  Rockingham  ministers  were  inclined  to  follow 
a  laissez-faire  system  of  political  philosophy;  and  it 
might,  therefore,  have  been  expected  that  the  second 
course  would  have  been  looked  upon  with  favor;  and 
within  limits  they  must  have  believed  that  westward  ex- 


242  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

pansion  was  inevitable.  They  were  persuaded,  how- 
ever, that  when  it  was  an  accomplished  fact,  the  colo- 
nies, just  as  the  ripened  pear  falls  from  the  tree,  would 
inevitably  sever  their  connection  with  the  mother 
country.433  William  Burke,  who  had  been  chosen  as 
under-secretary  by  General  Conway,  had  preached  this 
doctrine  during  the  peace  negotiations  and  for  that 
reason  had  urged  the  retention  of  Guadaloupe  rather 
than  Canada.434  Although  the  ministers  held  this 
opinion  they  realized  that  it  would  be  unstatesmanlike 
to  act  upon  it  or  even  to  fail  to  put  forth  every  effort 
to  postpone  the  inevitable  moment  of  separation.  The 
evidence,  at  least,  seems  to  prove  that  the  majority  were 
in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  the  third  course  and  were 
willing  to  make  an  effort  to  stay  the  movement  of  the 
settlements  westward  by  the  erection  of  a  permanent  In- 
dian reservation  in  the  heart  of  America.43' 

During  the  period  of  the  Rockingham  administra- 
tion the  question  of  the  West  came  up  several  times  for 
consideration.  A  little  over  a  month  after  the  min- 
isters took  office,  letters  from  America  forced  on  the  at- 
tention of  the  Board  of  Trade  the  subject  of  the  settle- 
ment of  pioneers  on  the  territory  around  the  upper 

433  This  belief  explains  their  attitude  during  the  Revolutionary  War. 

434  See  Remarks  on  the  Letter  address'd  to  Two  Great  Men,  50.     Consult 
also  chapter  ii. 

435  An  opponent  suggests  that  they  were  very  uncertain  what  to  do:  "the 
change  of  circumstance   in   the   colonies  suggests   an   alteration:  but  is  that 
alteration  to  be  made?     Are  we  still  to  protect  their  extended  frontier?     Or 
are  the  troops  to  be  removed  into  other  parts?     Or  are  they  to  be  entirely 
withdrawn?"- Whateley,  "Considerations  on  the  Trade  and  Finances  of  this 
Kingdom,"  in  Scarce  and  Interesting  Tracts,  vol.  ii,  161.     On  this  subject  the 
opinion  of  the  Old  Whigs  was  divided  as  on  every  subject.     Secretary  Con- 
way  was  in   1765   opposed   to   western   colonies.     See   Franklin,    Works    (ed. 
Bigelow),  vol.  iv,  417.     On  March  27,  1766,  he  declared  to  Gage  that  the  fur 
trade  was  the  "principal  benefit  in  view"  in  the  West.     On  the  other  hand 
Lord   Dartmouth  was   definitely   in   favor   of   settlements   in   the   West     See 
Conway  to  Gage,  Library  of  Congress  Manuscripts. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 243 

waters  of  the  Ohio.  The  cabinet  naturally  enough  de- 
sired to  make  a  record  for  efficiency.  The  proclama- 
tion of  1763  had  closed  the  land  west  of  the  Alleghan- 
ies  to  settlement,  and  now  it  was  learned  that  emigrants 
were  flocking  into  the  region.  The  Old  Whigs  did  not 
understand  that  this  proclamation  was  issued  as  a  tem- 
porary measure  and  was  to  be  followed  by  the  gradual 
opening  up  of  the  West;  and  therefore,  instead  of 
changing  the  pronouncement  so  as  to  permit  settlement 
under  conditions  that  had  at  least  been  under  consider- 
ation by  their  predecessors,  the  new  ministers'  sole  idea 
was  to  enforce  the  letter  of  the  law.  On  the  twentieth 
of  August  the  Board  of  Trade  took  the  subject  under 
consideration  and  consulted  Mr.  Thomas  Penn.436 
Their  final  recommendation  resulted,  on  October  3,  in 
instructions  to  the  governors  of  Virginia  and  Pennsyl- 
vania that  such  emigration  must  be  "suppressed"  and 
the  settlers  removed.437  General  Gage  was  asked  to  as- 
sist and  sent  a  detachment  of  troops  to  drive  the  inter- 
lopers from  the  region,  but  he  found  that  this  could 
not  be  accomplished  on  account  of  their  numbers.438 

In  November  the  Board  of  Trade  was  confronted  by 
the  same  question  in  another  form.  It  has  already  been 
seen  that  there  were  within  the  Indian  country  several 
French  settlements  which  had  been  left  by  the  procla- 
mation of  1763  without  a  civil  government  of  any  form. 
Naturally  those  who  were  interested  in  western  lands 
thought  that  these  places  were  the  most  likely  to  be 
opened  up  for  settlement  by  the  government;  their 
strategic  position  had  been  already  proved  by  the 
French;  the  population  already  existing  in  them  must 

436  Board  of  Trade,  Journals,  under  dates. 
487  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.1333,  p.  49. 
438  Facts  and  Observations  respecting  the  Country  granted  to  his  Majesty 
by  the  Six  Nations,  etc.,  5. 


244  _  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  _  [vol. 

be  provided  with  some  form  of  government.  It  was 
further  argued  that  the  immigration  of  whites  into  these 
villages  would  not  arouse  the  hostility  of  the  Indians 
who  had  been  accusomed  to  the  presence  of  Europeans 
there  for  years. 

Detroit  was  most  advantageously  situated  of  all  the 
French  posts  to  secure  the  control  of  the  fur  trade,  since 
it  commanded  the  Great  Lakes  and  one  of  the  most 
frequented  routes  to  the  Mississippi  waters.  The  land 
around  the  village  was  fertile  and,  as  time  has  proved, 
capable  of  supporting  a  large  population.  At  this  time 
the  French  population  numbered  about  six  hundred  all 
told;  their  chief  occupation  was  hunting  and  the  fur 
trade.  These  owed  the  king  of  England,  as  successor 
to  the  French  monarch,  quitrents  and  fines  of  aliena- 
tion.*39 In  the  village  was  stationed  a  British  garrison 
with  a  commandant,  who  exercised  some  sort  of  civil 
administration  without  formal  warrant  of  law. 

General  Amherst  had  in  1762  selected  this  place  as 
the  seat  of  a  future  colony  and  had  recommended  it  to 
the  ministry.440  He  was  probably,  therefore,  the  one 
who  first  conceived  the  project,  and  the  later  proposal 
by  British  officers  was  no  doubt  an  outgrowth  of  his 
idea.441  On  May  8,  1765,  Major  Thomas  Mant442  with 


439  por  laud  jn  tne  village  the  quitrent  was  two  sols  per  foot  frontage  and 
for  agricultural  land  one  sol  quitrent  and  forty  sols  rent  with  one  quarter  of 
wheat  per  arpent  frontage.     The  alienation  fine  was  one-twelfth  of  amount 
paid,   from  which  the   king  generally   remitted   a   third.     See   "State  of  the 
King's  Rights,  etc.,"  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ivii. 

440  Amherst  to  Egremont,  November  30,  1762,  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts, 
vol.  xlviii,  417. 

441  He  was  called  in  to  advise  the  Board  of  Trade  on  the  later  proposal. 
See  Board  of  Trade,  Journal,  November  14,  1765. 

442  Thomas   Mant   described   himself   as   having   served   as    an   assistant- 
engineer  at  the  siege  of  Havana  in  1762  and  as  major  of  brigade  to  Colonel 
Dudley  Bradstreet  in   1764;   but  his   name  does   not   appear  in   any  British 
"Army  List."     He  was  a  writer  on  military  subjects.     His  best  known  work 
was  the  History  of  the  Late  War  in  America  including  the  Campaigns  against 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  245 

fifty-nine  other  officers,  who  had  served  under  Colonel 
Bradstreet  in  the  Indian  War,  petitioned  the  king  that 
they  be  permitted  to  transport  to  Detroit  six  hundred 
twenty-four  families,  each  to  receive  one  hundred  fifty 
acres  of  land.  It  was  further  petitioned  that  the  pro- 
moters receive  as  compensation  for  this  service  land 
in  proportion  to  the  number  of  families  enlisted  by 
each.443  This  petition  was  referred  by  an  order  in 
council  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  who  did  not  take  it  un- 
der advisement  until  after  the  Rockingham  ministry 
was  established.  During  November  the  Board  re- 
ported that  the  promotion  of  such  a  western  settlement 
would  be  premature  until  a  decision  had  been  reached 
upon  a  general  plan  for  the  West  which  was  then  be- 
ing formulated.  Furthermore  the  Lords  of  Trade  did 
not  think  that  they  had  power  to  grant  lands  in  that 
region,  since  it  was  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  procla- 
mation of  1763.  There  appears  to  have  arisen  during 
the  discussion  of  this  petition  strenuous  opposition  to 
the  promotion  of  any  settlements.  Arguments  that  are 
already  familiar  were  again  brought  forward;  the  pro- 
posed colony  was  too  far  inland  to  have  easy  access, 
no  staple  commodity  could  be  produced  there,  the 
colonists  would  be  obliged  to  set  up  manufactures 
for  themselves,  and  would  finally  throw  off  their 
dependence.444 

The  foregoing  decisions  indicate  that  the  ministers 
had  not  yet  developed  a  western  policy,  but  that  they 
had  in  mind  a  plan  for  the  West,  with  which  the  grant- 
ing of  the  petition  for  lands  around  Detroit  might  prove 

his  Majesty's  Indian  Enemies  (London,  1772).  See  Dictionary  of  National 
Biography,  art.  "Thomas  Mant." 

443  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  323.18,  pp.  393-404;  Privy 
Council   (Colonial)  Acts,  vol.  iv,  567. 

444  Dartmouth  Manuscripts,  undated  document. 


246  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

to  be  incompatible.  What  was  this  general  plan?  Did 
the  Old  Whigs  work  out  a  western  policy  similar  in 
scope  and  character  to  that  advocated  by  the  Grenville- 
Bedford  ministry?  Unfortunately  these  questions  can 
not  be  answered  categorically.  The  Marquis  of  Rock- 
ingham  and  his  colleagues  were  not  granted  the  op- 
portunity to  place  themselves  on  record  concerning  the 
disposition  of  the  West;  and,  so  divided  was  the  leader- 
ship in  the  faction,  it  is  possible  that  no  definitive  an- 
swer could  have  been  given  by  them  to  the  question  of 
the  above  mentioned  petitioner,  Thomas  Mant: 

Why  have  we  been  at  so  much  expence  to  conquer  this  country, 
if  we  do  not  pursue  the  means  to  make  it  beneficial  ?  Without 
the  acquisition  of  subjects  with  territory,  and  the  encourage- 
ment of  trade  to  a  commercial  nation,  territory  can  be  of  no 
benefit.445 

Although  there  is  no  authoritative  statement  by  the 
Old  Whigs  on  the  subject  of  a  western  policy,  a  plan  for 
the  transmontane  region  was  actually  drawn  up  by  a 
member  of  their  ministry  and  undoubtedly  became  a 
subject  of  discussion.  This  was  the  work  of  the  secre- 
tary at  war,  Lord  Barrington,  who  during  a  long  and 
unmerited  political  career  became  occasionally  an  in- 
fluence in  the  councils  of  various  administrations.  His 
formulation  of  a  plan  for  the  disposition  of  the  military 
forces  in  America,  at  this  time,  was  to  become  the  plat- 
form of  many  politicians  and  even  of  some  factions, 
since  he  was  able  to  find  words  to  express  the  nebulous 
ideas  on  economy,  on  coercion  of  dependencies,  and  on 
western  expansion  that  were  current  in  those  political 
circles  which  were  hostile  to  the  colonies.  No  one 
would  assert  that  he  was  in  1765  a  member  of  the  inner 
circle  of  the  Old  Whigs  or  that  he  had  the  right  to 
speak  for  them.  Still  the  slightest  knowledge  of  his 

445  Mant  to  Dartmouth,  April  30,  1766,  in  Dartmouth  Manuscripts. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 247 

career  shows  that  his  ideas  were  not  altogether  foreign 
to  theirs. 

Before  the  withdrawal  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle 
from  the  ministry  in  1762,  Lord  Barrington  had  been  a 
faithful  follower  of  that  nobleman,  and  he  continued 
to  be  on  terms  of  personal  and  social  intimacy  with  him 
after  that  event;446  but  Barrington,  like  the  notorious 
Vicar  of  Bray,  was  never  a  candidate  for  martyrdom 
and  preferred  holding  office  to  following  his  leader  in- 
to the  opposition.  Henry  Fox's  contemptuous  descrip- 
tion of  him  as  "a  frivolous  little  minded  man"  is  sup- 
ported by  his  own  confession:  "My  invariable  rule 
therefore  is,  to  ask  nothing,  to  refuse  nothing,  to  let  others 
place  me,  and  to  do  my  best  wherever  I  am  placed." 
By  such  complacency  he  managed  to  hold  office  in  many 
ministries,  irrespective  of  their  complexion.  From 
July,  1765,  till  December,  1778,  he  held  the  office  of 
secretary  at  war  by  the  favor  of  his  royal  master,  though 
it  was  said  of  him  that  he  was  "hated  by  army"  and 
proved  himself  to  be  "ignorant  of  military  affairs."448 
There  is  one  point  in  his  favor;  he  was  not  conceited 
and  could  see  the  humorous  side  of  his  own  success 
as  a  placeman.  Several  years  before  this  period 
he  announced  to  a  friend:  "The  same  strange  for- 
tune .  .  .  has  made  me  chancellor  of  the  ex- 
chequer. It  may  perhaps  at  last  make  me  pope.  I 

446  This  is  evident  from  his  letters  printed  in  Ellis,  Original  Letters,  sec- 
ond  ser.,  vol.   iv,  430,  457.     See  also  Barrington,  Life  of  Lord  Barringion, 
sec.  iv.     In  1755  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  called  Barrington  "the  most  declared 
friend  of  mine."     See  Riker,  Henry  Fox,  First  Lord  Holland,  vol.  i,  339. 

447  Ellis,  Original  Letters,  second  ser.,  vol.  iv,  433.     Henry  Fox  described 
him  as  "a  frivolous,   little  minded   man,   is   not  honester  or   abler   than   his 
predecessor  [Legge],  but  is  devoted  to  the  D.  of  Newcastle,  and  has  no  other 
patron  to  look  up  to;  he  will  therefore  do  very  well  in  this     .     .     .     insig- 
nificant employment.     .     .     He  has  no  regard  to  truth. "-Ilchester  and  Stavor- 
dale,  Life  and  Letters  of  Lady  Sarah  Lennox,  vol.  i,  40. 

448Almon,  Anecdotes  of  Pitt,  vol.  iii,  253. 


248 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

think  I  am  equally  fit  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  church, 
as  of  the  exchequer." 449  In  spite  of  his  earlier  loyalty 
to  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  he  can  not  be  counted  as  an 
out  and  out  Old  Whig  but  rather  one  of  those  members 
of  the  court  faction  with  Old  Whig  antecedents  and 
principles,  which  could  be  discarded  at  the  king's  de- 
sire; and  it  was  at  his  royal  master's  expressed  wish  that 
he  was  given  and  accepted  his  position  in  the  Rocking- 
ham  ministry.450  Too  much  stress  should  not  be  placed 
on  this  last  fact,  however,  for  his  training  had  been  in 
the  school  of  Newcastle  and  the  principles  he  avowed 
were  not  dissimilar  to  those  of  his  teacher;  and,  as  will 
be  seen,  the  policy  he  advocated  was  not  that  promoted 
by  the  court  faction  with  which  he  had  recently  af- 
filiated himself.  For  these  reasons  it  seems  possible 
that  his  western  policy  was  inspired  by  his  long  asso- 
ciation with  the  Old  Whigs  and  by  his  present  co- 
operation with  them. 

The  opposition  of  the  Rockinghams  to  their  predeces- 
sors would  have  made  them  dubious  about  promoting  a 
policy  which  had  the  Grenville-Bedford  hall-mark, 
particularly  when  such  a  course  would  entail  an  in- 
creased expense.  Their  policy  must  now  be  one  of  re- 
trenchment in  colonial  expenses,  and  this  fell  in  with 
their  general  attitude  of  indifference  to  measures  look- 
ing towards  the  settlement  of  the  West.  It  must  be 
remembered  also  that  their  opposition  to  the  treaty  of 
peace  had  been  based  on  a  low  estimation  of  the  value 
of  the  new  acquisition;  and  they  could  not  afford  to 
disprove  their  former  opinion.  Since  Hillsborough's 
plan  for*  the  management  of  the  Indians  had  not  been 
adopted,  there  was  no  need  of  an  immediate  decision 

449  Ellis,  Original  Letters,  second  ser.,  vol.  iv,  433. 

450  Harrington,  Life  of  Lord  Harrington,  96  ff. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  249 

concerning  the  trade.  The  whole  military  arrange- 
ment, which  was  so  closely  united  with  the  imperial 
plan,  was,  however,  in  existence  and  was  costing  the 
empire  large  sums  of  money.  It  was,  therefore,  in  this 
direction  that  retrenchment  seemed  most  urgent  and 
feasible,  and  the  problem  naturally  fell  to  the  office  of 
secretary  at  war.  On  May  10,  1766,  the  report  of  Lord 
Barrington  was  ready,451  but  the  cabinet  never  acted  up- 
on it  so  far  as  is  known;  and  their  own  position  was  so 
precarious  at  the  time  that  it  would  have  been  fool- 
hardy for  them  to  have  made  such  drastic  changes  in 
the  western  policy  as  were  recommended.452 

The  fundamental  conceptions  of  the  report  were  that 
there  was  plenty  of  unoccupied  land  east  of  the  moun- 
tains for  all  possible  immigration  for  ages,  so  that,  even 
should  the  West  be  opened  up,  there  would  not  be  suf- 
ficient people  to  colonize  it;  that  the  cost  of  land  car- 
riage was  so  great  and  the  passages  so  difficult  that  com- 
munication with  the  mother  country  could  not  be  con- 
tinued; that  it  was  intended  by  the  proclamation  of 
1763  to  maintain  this  whole  territory  as  an  Indian  res- 
ervation, dedicated  to  the  fur  trade.543  Having  stated 
these  principles  which  Lord  Barrington  regarded  as 
axioms,  he  turned  to  the  discussion  of  the  costly  disposi- 

451  Lord   Harrington's   plan   is   printed   in   Alvord    and   Carter,    The  new 
Regime    [Illinois   Historical   Collections,   vol.   xi],   234.     Careful    search    has 
been  made  for  evidence  that  the  cabinet  ever  considered  the  plan  but  none 
has  been  found. 

452  A  few  days  before  the  date  of  the  report,  the  Duke  of  Grafton,  secre- 
tary of  state  for  the  Northern  Department  wrote:    "The  weakness  of  the 
cabinet   as  now  composed,   the  great  bodies  of  men   not  included,  many  of 
ability,  with  a  large  share  of  those  of  property    (even  supposing  Mr.  Pitt 
and   his  friends  neuter)    present  immediately  such   a  determin'd   opposition, 
that  no  point  essentially  right  for  this  country  can  be  carried  through  with 
certainty  by  administration."  -  Grafton  to  Conway,  April  22,  1766,  in  Grafton, 
Autobiography,  72. 

453  It  has  been  seen  that  the  decisions  of  the  Rockingham  ministry  pointed 
to  a  similar  conception  of  the  proclamation. 


250 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

tion  of  the  troops  in  scattered  garrisons,  and  showed 
how  such  expenses  were  not  justified.  The  frontier 
garrisons  were  no  longer  needed  as  posts  for  communi- 
cation, since  the  French  had  been  driven  across  the 
Mississippi.  The  Indians'  methods  of  warfare  were 
so  different  from  those  of  Europeans  that  forts  could 
not  keep  them  in  subjection  and  were,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  causes  of  irritation,  because  they  had  not  been 
destroyed  according  to  promise.  A  third  argument 
which  had  been  advanced  for  the  maintenance  of  in- 
terior forts,  namely  that  they  contributed  to  the  British 
trade  and  prevented  that  of  the  French,  did  not  seem  to 
Lord  Barrington  to  be  well  founded.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  British  enjoyed  practically  the  whole  Indian 
trade  except  that  on  the  Mississippi  which  was  not  of 
much  account  and,  therefore,  might  as  well  be  aban- 
doned to  the  French.  For  the  traders  to  go  among  the 
Indians  was  unnecessary;  it  would  be  far  better  to  com- 
pel the  Indians  by  their  wants  to  come  to  the  settle- 
ments, where  the  trade  could  be  conducted  under  the  in- 
spection of  proper  imperial  officials.  Barrington  as- 
serted further  that  even  if  the  maintenance  of  garrisons 
in  the  West  served  the  interests  of  trade,  the  expense 
should  not  fall  on  the  mother  country  but  on  the  colo- 
nies ;  and  that  if  any  colony  should  get  into  war  with  the 
Indians,  it  should  be  compelled  to  assume  the  respon- 
sibility, and  if  necessary,  to  request  and  to  pay  for  mili- 
tary assistance  from  Great  Britain. 

The  secretary  at  war  was  not  in  favor  of  the  abandon- 
ment of  all  forts,  but  proposed  that  thirty  men  be  main- 
tained at  Oswego,  forty  at  Niagara,  seventy  at  Detroit, 
and  forty  at  Michillimackinac,  a  garrison  consisting  of 
less  than  a  regiment  at  Pensacola,  and  a  small  garrison 
at  Fort  de  Chartres  in  the  Illinois  country.  The  great 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  251 

body  of  troops  in  America  should  be  concentrated  in 
Canada,  Nova  Scotia,  and  East  Florida,  where  the  ex- 
pense of  supporting  them  would  be  much  less  than  at 
present  and  where  they  could  be  easily  moved  against 
foreign  foes  or  the  colonies,  should  they  be  required. 

Thus  there  was  placed  over  against  the  western  policy 
embodied  in  the  proclamation  of  1763  and  the  Gren- 
ville-Bedford  plan  for  the  management  of  Indian  af- 
fairs, another  and  radically  different  policy  which  con- 
templated the  maintenance  "for  ages"  of  an_extensive 
Indian  reservation  in  the  heart  of  North  America  and 
the  stoppage  of  all  future  settlement  at  the  Appalachian 
range  of  mountains. 

The  hour  of  the  Rockingham  ministry  was  drawing 
to  its  close.  This  administration  had  never  been  strong, 
and  in  May  it  was  weakened  by  the  resignation  of  the 
Duke  of  Grafton  who  had  remained  in  office  only 
because  he  expected  that  Pitt  would  be  called  to  the 
head  of  the  government.  He  was  now  firmly  per- 
suaded that  this  change  would  never  take  place  and  that 
Lord  Rockingham  had  abandoned  all  idea  of  asking 
the  cooperation  of  the  Great  Commoner.  Under  this 
condition  the  Duke  of  Grafton  felt  that  his  honor  re- 
quired his  resignation  from  the  office  of  secretary  of 
state  for  the  Northern  Department.454 

General  Conway  was  transferred  to  the  vacated  office ; 
and  the  Duke  of  Richmond,  a  young  man  without  ex- 
perience, was  appointed  to  the  Southern  Department. 
At  about  the  same  time  a  reorganization  of  the  Amer- 
ican Department  was  projected.  It  was  another  effort 
to  do  away  with  the  division  of  the  administration  be- 
tween two  offices,  the  southern  secretaryship  and  the 

454  Grafton,  Autobiography,  63  ff. ;  Newcastle's  Narrative  [Camden  So- 
ciety, Publications,  new  sen,  vol.  lix],  57  ff. 


252  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Board  of  Trade.  As  has  been  seen,  the  functions  and 
powers  of  the  two  offices  had  been  regulated  at  each 
ministerial  change  according  to  circumstances.  Us- 
ually, but  not  always,  the  Board  of  Trade  was  subor- 
dinated to  the  secretaryship.  The  Old  Whigs,  particu- 
larly the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  had  been  in  favor  of  mak- 
ing the  president  of  the  Board  a  third  secretary;  and 
now  some  of  the  Rockinghams  undertook  to  accomplish 
this  reform;  but,  on  account  of  opposition,  possibly  from 
the  king,  the  attempt  was  not  successful,  the  only  change 
being  that  the  president,  Lord  Dartmouth,  was  granted 
those  powers  formerly  exercised  by  Lord  Halifax.455 
Since  the  information  on  this  proposed  reorganization 
of  the  American  Department  is  meager,  it  is  impossible 
to  determine  whether  the  project  was  leveled  at  the  in- 
activity of  General  Conway  or  at  the  plan  of  Lord  Bar- 
rington,  or  whether  it  was  preliminary  to  a  careful  con- 
sideration of  the  whole  colonial  policy  by  Lord  Dart- 
mouth who  was  known  to  favor  western  expansion. 

On  July  30,  1766,  the  Rockingham  ministry  was  dis- 
missed by  his  majesty.  The  king  had  always  stood  in 
fear  of  their  traditional  politics;  and,  when  they  re- 
fused to  "broaden  the  bottom"  of  the  administration  by 
the  admission  of  members  of  the  court  faction  to  office 
after  the  resignation  of  the  Duke  of  Grafton,456  he  de- 

455  Chesterfield  to  Dartmouth,  May  14,   1766;   Dartmouth  to  Chesterfield, 
May  25 ;  Rockingham  to  Dartmouth,  July  25,  all  in  Dartmouth  Manuscripts. 
See  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix], 
69,  96 ;   and  Historical  Manuscripts  Commission,  Reports,  vol.  xv,  appendix, 
part  i,  in,   179,  182.     When  Dartmouth  first  took  office,  Lord  Hillsborough 
urged  him  to  demand  that  his  position  should  be  created  similar  to  that  of 
first  lord  of  treasury  or  he  would  suffer  continued  disappointment  and  prob- 
ably  disgrace.     See   idem,   179.     A   correspondent   of   Lord    Stirling   thought 
that  full  arrangements  for  the  creation  of  the  secretaryship  for  the  colonies 
had  been  made  at  the  close  of  the  Rockingham  ministry,  but  he  was  probably 
misinformed.     See  Duer,  Life  of  Lord  Stirling,  84. 

456  They  were  also  very  hostile  to  two  of  the  "King's  Friends,"  the  Earl 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 253 

termined  to  get  rid  of  them.  The  particular  issue  that 
was  used  as  an  excuse  for  this  dismissal  was  closely  re- 
lated to  that  of  the  western  colonial  policy. 

A  condition  more  perplexing  than  the  Stamp  Act 
had  been  inherited  by  the  ministry  from  their  predeces- 
sors in  office.  The  introduction  of  British  law  into  the 
newly  created  province  of  Quebec,  which  it  has  been 
pointed  out  was  the  most  serious  blunder  in  the  procla- 
mation of  1763,  had  thrown  the  political,  legal  and 
social  life  of  that  community  into  confusion.457  Gov- 
ernor Murray,  acting  on  his  instructions  and  advised  by 
his  council,  organized  the  machinery  for  the  admin- 
istration of  the  law  in  accordance  with  British  prec- 
edents. By  the  supposition  that  the  legal  disabilities 
of  Roman  Catholics  in  England  extended  to  the  colo- 
nies, the  French  were  practically  shut  out  from  partici- 
pation in  the  government.  The  few  hundred  English 
speaking  subjects  appreciated  the  material  advantages 
in  this  situation  and  systematically  used  the  law  courts 
to  assist  them  in  the  process  of  exploiting  Canada.  Par- 
ticularly was  the  English  law  of  debt  by  which  the  poor 
debtor  could  be  thrown  into  prison -a  law  much  more 
tyrannical  than  that  of  the  French -abused  by  the  un- 
scrupulous among  the  English ;  and  since  Roman  Catho- 
lic lawyers  were  not  permitted  to  practice  in  the  law 
courts,  the  French  had  practically  no  protection.  Gov- 
ernor Murray,  who  did  his  best  to  guard  those  under 
his  charge  from  persecution,  has  pictured  the  imbecili- 
ties and  tyrannies  of  the  first  few  years  of  British  ad- 
ministration in  the  following  words: 

of  Eglington  and  Jeremiah  Dyson.  See  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  So- 
ciety, Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  72. 

457  Although  the  king's  right  to  change  the  laws  in  this  manner  was  dis- 
puted by  contemporaries  and  later  writers  the  famous  decision  of  Lord  Mans- 
field in  Campbell  v.  Hall  in  1774  [printed  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitu- 
tional Documents,  366]  upholds  such  a  right  as  exercised  in  the  proclamation. 


254  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  improper  choice  and  the  number  of  the  civil  officers  sent 
over  from  England  increased  the  disquietude  of  the  colony. 
Instead  of  men  of  genius  and  untainted  morals,  the  reverse  were 
appointed  to  the  most  important  offices,  under  whom  it  was 
impossible  to  communicate  those  impressions  of  the  dignity  of 
government  by  which  alone  mankind  can  be  held  together  in 
society.  The  judge  pitched  upon  to  conciliate  the  minds  of 
seventy-five  thousand  foreigners  to  the  laws  and  government  of 
Great  Britain,  was  taken  from  a  gaol,  entirely  ignorant  of  civil 
law  and  the  language  of  the  people.  The  attorney  general, 
with  regard  to  the  language,  was  no  better  qualified.  The 
offices  of  the  secretary  of  the  province,  register,  clerk  of  the 
council,  commissary  of  stores  and  provisions,  provost  marshal, 
etc.,  were  given  by  patent  to  men  of  interest  in  England,  who 
let  them  out  to  the  best  bidders,  and  so  little  considered  the 
capacity  of  their  representatives  that  not  one  of  them  under- 
stood the  language  of  the  natives.  .  .  The  heavy  tasks,  and 
the  rapacity  of  the  English  lawyers,  was  severely  felt  by  the 
poor  Canadians.458 

To  the  chaos  of  the  civil  administration  there  was 
added  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  ecclesiastical  es- 
tablishment. No  authoritative  assertion  concerning  the 
status  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  and  its  various  in- 
stitutions had  as  yet  been  announced.  A  clause  in  the 
treaty  of  peace,  drawn  in  very  ambiguous  terms,  de- 
clared that  the  Canadians  might  practice  their  religion 
"as  far  as  the  laws  of  Great  Britain  permit."459  This 
statement  of  toleration  was  by  no  means  so  generous  as 
the  Canadians  had  a  right  to  expect  from  the  terms  of 
the  capitulation  of  Montreal  in  i76o;460  and  their  pub- 
lic and  private  interests  forced  them  to  keep  up  an 
agitation  for  a  less  restricted  exercise  of  their  wor- 

458  Murray  to  Shelburne,  August  20,  1766,  printed  in  Kingsford,  History 
of  Canada,  vol.  v,  188.     The  best  source  of  information  concerning  the  evils 
following  upon  the  proclamation  is  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Docu- 
ments, passim. 

459  Treaty,  art.  iv,  in  idem,  86. 

460  Articles  xxvii-xxxv,  in  idem,  25. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  255 

ship  and  a  greater  assurance  of  their  rights  in  their 
church  property  until  a  more  tolerant  policy  should  be 
inaugurated. 

Only  a  beginning  in  granting  relief  to  the  French- 
Canadians  was  made  by  the  Grenville-Bedford  admin- 
istration.461 The  vital  question  whether  the  new  sub- 
jects were  liable  to  the  same  disabilities  and  penalties 
as  the  Roman  Catholics  in  England  was  submitted  to 
the  attorney- general  and  solicitor-general,  who  report- 
ed that  in  their  opinion  such  was  not  the  case.462  Al- 
though there  seems  to  have  been  little  dissent  from 
this  opinion,  the  dismissal  of  the  ministry  the  next 
month  delayed  all  action  on  the  subject  for  over  a 
year.463  The  religious  problem  was  a  difficult  and  even 
more  perplexing  one  and  every  administration  hesitated 
to  take  definitive  action  in  regard  to  it,  fearing  that  an 
attempt  to  carry  out  a  system  of  real  toleration  would 
be  an  occasion  of  harsh  criticism  from  the  opposition 
and  the  ardent  Protestants.  The  Grenville-Bedford 
ministry,  however,  began  an  investigation  of  the  subject 
by  asking  the  opinion  of  the  Archbishop  of  York,  who 
on  April  n,  1764,  returned  a  long  paper  entitled: 
"Thoughts  upon  the  Ecclesiastical  Establishment  in 

461  The  principal  complaint  of  the  Canadians  was  read  January  7,  1765. 
See   Shortt   and   Doughty,   op   cit.,   156   ff.     On   page   163,   footnote   i    of   the 
same,  the  editors  have  printed  "instructions  to  Murray"  in  which  the  governor 
is  informed  that  the  proclamation  of  1763   "Shall  not  operate  to  take  away 
from  the  native   inhabitants  the  benefit  of  their  own   laws  and  customs   in 
cases  where  titles  to  land,  and  the  modes  of  descent,  alienation  and  settlement 
are  in  question,  nor  to  preclude  them  from  that  share  in  the  administration 
of  judicature."     The  editors  think  these  instructions  were  sent  to  Governor 
Murray  in  1764,  but  they  were  not  drawn  up  until  1766  and  were  never  sent, 
as  the  narrative  of  events  will  show. 

462  —  Idem,  171.     This  report  was  made  in  June,  1765. 

463  Instructions   drawn   in   accordance  with   this   opinion   were   signed   on 
February  17,  1766,   and  an  ordinance  permitting  Roman  Catholics  to  sit  on 
juries  and  act  as  attorneys,  etc.,  was  passed  in  Quebec  on  July  i,  in  the  said 
year.     See  idem,  173,  footnote  i. 


256 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

Canada."     This  the  Board  of  Trade  utilized  to  formu- 
late a  plan,  formally  dated  May  30,  I765.464 

The  plan  was  based  on  the  belief  that  in  the  course  of 
years  the  religion  of  the  French  Canadians  could  be 
changed,  but  that  for  the  immediate  future  a  mild 
policy  should  be  followed  in  order  that  all-healing  time 
might  work  its  perfect  cure.  Meantime  there  was  need 
of  someone  to  ordain  priests  and  to  act  as  a  guide  for 
the  parishes  and  as  a  center  for  the  ecclesiastical  admin- 
istration. For  these  purposes  a  "superior"  was  to  be 
appointed  by  the  king  and  supported  out  of  the  se- 
questered revenues  of  the  seminaries  of  Quebec  and 
Montreal,  but  carefully  prohibited  from  assuming  the 
pomp  and  insignia  of  the  episcopal  office.  The  parish 
priests  were  to  receive  the  customary  tithes,  from  which 
Protestants  were  to  be  exempted ;  and  it  was  hoped  that 
this  exemption  might  be  a  potent  evangelist  for  Prot- 
estantism. All  the  orders  of  monks  and  nuns  should 
be  abolished,  the  Jesuits  at  once,  the  others  gradually, 
and  the  sequestered  revenues  were  to  be  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gospel 
in  Foreign  Parts,  to  whom  also  should  be  assigned  all 
the  Indian  missions.  Protestant  parishes  and  schools 
were  to  be  established  and  the  church  buildings  should 
be  open  for  the  services  of  both  denominations. 

Since  time  was  not  granted  for  the  Grenville-Bedford 
ministry  to  inaugurate  their  benevolent  policy  of  toler- 
ation with  its  dash  of  conversion,  they  left  it  as  a  legacy 
to  their  former  opponents  to  reject  or  to  accept,  as  their 
wisdom  might  dictate.  The  experience  of  the  new  min- 
isters could  not  suggest  a  wiser  plan.465  Their  known 

464  Both  papers  may  be  found  in  Lansdo<wne  Manuscripts,  vol.  lix.     The 
plan  was  somewhat  modified  in  1767,  and  the  two  forms  should  not  be  mixed. 

465  In  a  report  on  September  2,  1765,  the  Board  of  Trade  refers  to  the 
Grenville-Bedford  plan  for  the  organization  of  ecclesiastical  affairs  in  such  a 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  257 

weakness  in  Parliament  and  the  closet  made  them  fear 
to  bring  the  question  to  an  issue  where  their  support 
of  toleration  for  Roman  Catholics  might  alienate  many 
of  their  followers.  The  traditional  platform  of  the 
Old  Whigs  could  not  thus  be  repudiated  without  dan- 
ger. Yet  the  administration's  sense  of  justice  in  regard 
to  the  Canadians  was  really  touched.  Edmund  Burke, 
in  particular,  pleaded  with  the  Marquis  of  Rocking- 
ham  in  behalf  of  the  newly  acquired  subjects,  and  his 
advocacy  of  their  cause  was  successful.  The  ministers 
determined  to  inaugurate  in  a  partial  manner  the  recom- 
mendations of  their  predecessors,  but  in  order  that  no 
capital  might  be  made  out  of  it  by  the  opposition,  they 
decided  to  maintain  the  most  profound  secrecy.  The 
Reverend  Olivier  Briand  was  permitted  to  pass  from 
Quebec  to  France  where  at  Amiens  he  was  consecrated 
bishop  of  Quebec,  and  in  the  spring  of  1766  he  returned 
to  Canada  as  "Superintendent  of  the  Clergy"  with  a 
salary  of  two  hundred  pounds  a  year.466  The  first  step, 
although  a  timid  one,  towards  religious  toleration  in 
Canada  had  been  taken;  and  not  the  least  significant 
fact  about  it  was  that  it  was  taken  by  an  Old  Whig 
ministry.  This  beginning  foreshadowed  the  bolder  act 
of  1774. 

The  civil  condition  of  the  new  province  was  also 
seriously  considered  by  the  Rockinghams  and  the  whole 
subject  was  referred  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  which  on 
September  2,  1765,  made  two  reports.  One  of  these 
was  limited  to  the  civil  affairs  of  the  colony.467  Its  con- 
way  as  to  adopt  it  as  their  own.  See  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Conttitutional  Doc- 
uments, 171. 

4GG  This  was  all  done  very  secretly  and  only  by  the  connivance  of  the 
ministers.  As  far  as  is  known  there  was  not  issued  a  patent  or  warrant  for 
the  exercise  of  his  functions.  The  whole  account  of  this  appointment  is  based 
primarily  on  Maseres,  Occasional  Essays,  364  ff. 

*67  Printed  in  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  171. 


258  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

tents  show  that  the  Lords  of  Trade  had  been  impressed 
by  the  complaints  of  the  English  speaking  citizens  of 
Canada  against  Governor  Murray  and  were  ready  to 
further  their  interests  even  at  the  possible  expense  of  the 
French-Canadians.  They  recommended  that  the  gov- 
ernor be  recalled  to  England  to  render  an  account  of  the 
colony  and  that  a  lieutenant-governor  be  appointed  to 
fill  his  place,  temporarily  at  least.  Their  second  sug- 
gestion is  an  excellent  example  of  the  Old  Whig  ad- 
herence to  the  traditional  forms.  All  the  older  colo- 
nies had  assemblies,  therefore  Quebec  should  have  one. 
The  Board  accordingly  recommended  the  division  of 
the  colony  into  three  districts,  wherein  they  "appre- 
hend there  would  be  found  a  sufficient  number  of  per- 
sons in  each  county  qualified  to  serve  as  representatives 
[i.e.  Protestants],  and  in  the  choice  of  whom  all  the 
inhabitants  of  each  county  might  join."  According  to 
this  opinion  Roman  Catholics  might  act  as  electors  un- 
der the  laws. 

The  second  report  was  much  longer.467a  It  was  a  con- 
sideration of  the  ordinances  establishing  the  judicial 
system,  that  had  been  passed,  in  1764,  by  the  governor 
and  council  of  the  colony.  To  enter  into  the  minutiae 
of  this  discussion  seems  unnecessary,  but  certain  broad 
principles  of  the  report  are  of  interest.  The  Board  re- 
garded the  exclusion  of  Roman  Catholics  from  partici- 
pating as  jurors  and  attorneys  in  the  courts  as  very  un- 
just and  unreasonable,  and  they  thought  that  all  law 
suits  involving  property  acquired  prior  to  the  conquest 
should  be  decided  by  the  French  usages  and  laws.  On 
account  of  the  above  reasons  and  because  the  language 
of  the  ordinance  establishing  the  courts  was  so  very  loose 
and  indefinite  the  Lords  of  Trade  advised  that  it  be 

467a  Canadian  Archives,  vol.  Q  i8A,  p.  131. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  259 

disallowed  and  that  another  ordinance  be  issued,  fol- 
lowing an  outline  which  they  themselves  suggested. 

These  two  recommendations  were  not  drastic  and 
were,  with  some  important  exceptions,  acceptable  to  the 
ministry.  Since  action  was  impossible  without  en- 
lightenment from  the  law  officers,  the  whole  subject 
was  referred  to  them  for  an  opinion.  One  step  could, 
however,  be  easily  taken.  In  February  of  the  next  year 
the  Privy  Council  instructed  Governor  Murray  to  pass 
an  ordinance  admitting  the  Roman  Catholics  to  full 
and  equal  participation  in  the  law  courts,  and  this  was 
done  in  July.488 

This  act  and  that  of  permitting  Bishop  Briand  to  go 
to  Quebec  as  "superintendent"  were  the  only  Canadian 
policies  actually  inaugurated  by  the  Rockingham  min- 
istry. This  was  in  no  way  the  fault  of  the  leaders.  In 
fact  it  was  their  decision  concerning  the  remainder  of 
the  Canadian  problem  that  was  the  occasion  of  their 
final  dismissal.  Since  their  policy  in  regard  to  Que- 
bec became  such  a  distinct  political  issue  and  since  they 
were  the  most  bitter  opponents  of  a  bold  measure  on 
the  same  subject,  passed  through  Parliament  by  a  subse- 
quent ministry,  their  ideas  of  a  government  for  this  dif- 
ficult colony  are  of  profound  interest. 

A  preliminary  measure  of  importance  taken  by  the 
ministry  was  the  recall,  on  April  i,  of  Governor  Mur- 
ray, who  had  been  notified  to  prepare  for  such  action  in 
the  preceding  autumn,  and  the  appointment  of  Colonel 
Guy  Carleton  as  lieutenant-governor.  A  few  weeks 
previously  excellent  men  had  been  selected  for  the  posi- 
tions of  chief  justice  and  attorney-general  in  the  persons 
of  William  Hey  and  Francis  Maseres.  The  selection 

468  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  172,  173,  footnote  i. 
The  history  of  the  Privy  Council's  action  on  these  various  measures  may  be 
followed  in  Privy  Council  (Colonial)  Acts,  vol.  iv,  696,  698. 


26o THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

of  these  officers  was  above  criticism,  and  all  three  from 
this  time  on  gave  their  attention  to  the  needs  of  the 
colony  and  were  taken  by  successive  ministers  as  ad- 
visers in  all  matters  pertaining  to  Quebec.  In  par- 
ticular the  new  governor  exercised  a  decisive  influence 
upon  the  policy  finally  adopted  in  1774. 

The  newly  appointed  officers  made  a  careful  study  of 
the  condition  of  the  colony;  and  one  of  them,  at  least, 
Maseres,  a  man  of  very  positive  convictions  and  ever 
hopeful  of  finding  a  panacea  to  cure  the  evils  of  society, 
drew  up  after  some  consultation  with  his  colleagues,  a 
bill  for  establishing  the  government  of  Quebec.  For 
this  he  wrote  an  introduction,  and  the  whole  was 
privately  printed  for  distribution  to  members  of  the 
administration.469  His  main  purpose  was  to  metamor- 
phose the  French  civilization  of  Canada  in  its  social, 
economic,  and  religious  aspects  into  the  English  as 
rapidly  as  was  consistent  with  justice  and  kindness. 
This,  he  knew,  could  not  be  accomplished  at  once,  so 
that  meanwhile  some  form  of  toleration  to  Roman 
Catholicism  must  be  permitted;  but  he  had  a  firm  con- 
viction that  toleration  should  not  be  introduced  in  a 
secret  and  almost  underhanded  way,  such  as  was  the 
connivance  at  the  appointment  of  a  religious  superin- 
tendent of  Quebec.  Maseres  realized  that  reforms  in 
the  government  must  also  be  made.  First  of  all  he 
wished  to  correct  the  wrong  committed  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  English  law  into  the  colony  and  advocated  the 
revival  of  parts  of  the  French  code.  He  pointed  out 
that  the  colonists  were  not  ready  for  a  legislative  as- 

469  Maseres,  Considerations  on  the  Expediency  of  Procuring  an  Act  of 
Parliament  for  the  Settlement  of  the  Province  of  Quebec  (London,  printed  in 
April,  1766).  This  was  later  printed  (1809)  by  Maseres  in  his  Occasional 
Essays  with  some  account  of  its  fate.  In  his  later  explanation  Maseres  is 
careful  to  state  that  neither  Carleton  nor  Hey  had  carefully  read  the  bill, 
although  they  accepted  it  as  likely  to  focus  the  discussion  of  the  ministers. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  261 

sembly  and  that  the  governor  and  council  must,  there- 
fore, be  empowered  to  make  laws  and  to  raise  money 
by  taxation.  In  his  opinion  the  king  did  not  possess  the 
power  to  legalize  such  radical  changes,  both  religious 
and  civil,  and  for  that  reason  he  urged  the  administra- 
tion to  bring  the  whole  subject  of  the  Canadian  govern- 
ment and  religion  before  Parliament  in  order  that  the 
necessary  reforms  might  be  legally  enacted. 

In  Maseres's  bill  the  plan  of  Attorney-general  Yorke 
and  Solicitor-general  Grey  in  regard  to  the  law  was 
adopted.  These  two  officials  had  taken  under  their 
consideration  the  report  on  the  law  courts  made  by  the 
Board  of  Trade  on  September  2,  1765;  and  on  April 
14,  1766,  returned  to  the  Privy  Council  the  results  of 
their  labors.  They  were  decidedly  of  the  opinion  that 
in  many  cases  general  maxims  common  to  English  and 
French  law  could  be  used,  that  in  particular  cases  re- 
lating to  titles  of  land,  descent,  alienation,  etc.,  the 
French  law  should  be  the  rule,  and  that  for  criminal 
cases  the  English  law  should  be  introduced.470  The  re- 
sult of  such  a  plan  would  have  been  a  somewhat  com- 
posite civil  law  that  could  have  been  developed  only  in 
a  long  period  of  time. 

The  issue  that  had  been  made  by  this  report  and  the 
pamphlet  by  Maseres  turned  upon  the  question  of  the 
best  method  of  introducing  the  contemplated  reforms. 
Maseres  had  declared  himself  emphatically  for  an  act 
of  Parliament  and  his  colleagues  in  the  Quebec  gov- 
ernment seem  to  have  agreed  with  him  in  this.  The 
majority  of  the  ministry,  however,  did  not  dare  bring 
the  question  to  so  direct  an  issue.  Led  by  Charles 
Yorke,  the  attorney-general,  they  decided  to  take  upon 

470  Shortt  and  Doughty,  Constitutional  Documents,  174.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  the  report  undertakes  to  interpret  the  proclamation  of  1763  as 
meaning  substantially  what  the  authors  recommended. 


262  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

themselves  the  responsibility  and  by  instructions  to  Gov- 
ernor Carleton  to  bring  about  such  changes  as  were  ad- 
visable.*71 They  gave  up  the  idea  of  calling  an  as- 
sembly as  impracticable  under  the  circumstances  and 
determined  to  allow  the  governor  and  council,  as  con- 
stituted in  1763,  to  remain  the  only  legislative  body.472 
They  adopted  the  recommendations  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  concerning  changes  in  the  law  courts  and  that  of 
the  attorney-general  and  solicitor-general  in  regard  to 
the  law,  and  ordered  the  former  to  draw  up  instructions 
to  the  governor  embodying  these  ideas. 

The  report  on  the  instructions  was  made  by  the  Board 
of  Trade  on  June  24-473  Among  the  first  provisions 
was  the  following:  "It  is  Our  Royal  Will  and  Plea- 
sure, that  all  and  every  the  ordinances  enacted  and  pub- 
lished by  you  for  the  establishment  of  judicature,  courts, 
offices  and  officers,  be  and  they  are  hereby  abrogated 
and  repealed."  The  governor  was  then  instructed  to 
have  courts  established  on  the  plan  and  principle  that 
were  laid  down  in  the  instructions.  On  the  juries  in 
criminal  cases  both  the  old  and  the  new  subjects  were 

4T1  Maseres,  Occasional  Essays,  364  ff. 

472  This  is  proved  by  their  agreement  in  June,  on  the  new  instructions  to 
be  sent  the  governor.     Among  the  Dartmouth  Manuscripts  of  this  year  is  the 
draft  of  a  bill   entitled:     "An  Act  for  granting  for   a   limited  time  therein 
mentioned  powers  of  legislation  to  the  governor  and  council  of  His  Majesty's 
province  of  Quebec  for  the  time  being."     The  copy  in  my  possession  was 
made  from  Dartmouth  Manuscripts,  1757-1772,  vol.  i,  in  the  Canadian  Ar- 
chives.    It  is  without  date.     As  is  indicated  it  confers  on  the  governor  and 
council  the  power  to  make  laws.     This  power  was  to  be  conferred  only  for 
the  period  of  fourteen  years.     Thirteen  members  of  the  council  would  make  a 
quorum    for   this    purpose.     There    can    be    little    doubt    that    this    bill    was 
drawn  up  at  this  time  for  discussion. 

473  This   has   never  been   printed.     It   is   found   in   Public   Record   Office, 
Colonial   Office  Papers,   43.1,    p.    311.     Other   copies   with    emendations    and 
notes,  probably  by  Charles  Yorke,  are  in  British  Museum,  Additional  Manu- 
scripts, 35914,  p.  158,  and  idem,  35914,  p.  191.     (These  are  in  the  Hardivicke 
Manuscripts  and  have  many  emendations).     See  idem,  32982,  p.  6,  and  idem, 
33030,  p.  272.     These  last  are  among  the  Newcastle  Manuscripts. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  263 

to  sit.474  The  French  Catholics  were  to  be  "admitted 
indiscriminately  with  the  rest  of  our  subjects,  not  only 
into  the  commissions  of  the  peace,  but  also  to  the  execu- 
tion of  all  such  offices,  functions  and  duties,  (those  of 
judges  in  the  superior  and  circuit  courts  only  excepted) , 
as  are  incident  to  the  several  courts  and  constitutions." 
A  statement  of  the  law  to  be  followed  in  these  courts, 
in  general  accord  with  the  law  officers'  recommenda- 
tions was  also  included. 

The  Rockingham  ministry  was  thus  committed  to  a 
Canadian  policy  which  would  leave  the  executive  and 
legislature  as  they  had  been  constituted  in  1763,  would 
establish  a  new  civil  code  based  upon  general  maxims 
and  the  French  and  English  law,  would  leave  the  Eng- 
lish criminal  law  in  force,  and  would  permit  a  partial 
toleration  of  Roman  Catholicism.  The  majority  of  the 
cabinet  were  preparing  to  establish  these  reforms  by 
royal  fiat  rather  than  by  act  of  Parliament  but  in 
this  they  were  stopped  by  the  minority  consisting  of 
one  influential  officer,  Lord  Chancellor  Northington 
[Henley]. 

Northington  was  an  ill-balanced  man,  whose  strong 
mind  had  been  weakened  by  constant  use  of  intoxicants, 
under  the  influence  of  which  he  usually  was.  His 
habits  made  him  very  irregular  in  the  discharge  of  such 
humdrum  duties  as  reading  dispatches  and  sitting  in 
cabinet  meetings.  As  a  result,  when  he  did  attend  the 
meeting  to  pass  upon  the  new  instructions  to  be  sent 
Colonel  Carleton,  he  had  not  for  months  paid  the  least 
attention  to  the  Canadian  situation  and  was  entirely  ig- 
norant of  the  intentions  of  his  colleagues.  He  was 
never  slow  in  making  up  his  mind,  however,  and  after 

474  In  case  the  trial  concerned  individuals  of  only  one  race,  the  jury  was 
to  be  drawn  from  that  race. 


264  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

listening  impatiently  to  the  reading  of  the  instructions 
immediately  gave  vent  to  his  scorn  of  the  whole  proj- 
ect. He  doubted  whether  the  crown  could  empower 
Roman  Catholics  to  act  as  justices  of  the  peace  and 
judges,  since  in  his  opinion  the  penal  laws  extended  to 
Canada;  he  was  sure  that  the  French  law  must  remain 
in  force  until  it  was  altered  by  act  of  Parliament;  in 
fact  the  whole  principle  upon  which  the  instructions 
were  based  was  untenable.  When  Lord  Dartmouth 
mildly  protested  that  Lord  Northington  himself  had, 
in  1763,  signed  very  similar  instructions  to  Governor 
Murray,  his  retort  was  that  he  could  not  undertake  to 
be  responsible  for  every  paper  he  signed,  that  he  did 
not  even  read  them,  and  that  he  had  always  disapproved 
of  the  government  of  Quebec.  When  someone  argued 
that  the  laws  had  actually  been  changed  by  the  procla- 
mation of  1763,  the  lord  chancellor,  who  must  himself 
have  had  some  hand  in  adopting  that  important  docu- 
ment, was  not  silenced  but  exclaimed:  "I  know  that, 
and  a  very  silly  proclamation  it  was."475 

The  meeting  broke  up  without  reaching  a  decision, 
but  the  ministers  continued  to  confer  on  the  question 
for  several  days  without  the  presence  of  the  lord 
chancellor.  The  latter,  however,  was  busy  with  another 
plan.  He  had  been  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  over- 
throw his  colleagues  and  seized  upon  this  disagree- 
ment as  the  occasion.  He  told  the  king  that  the  Rock- 
ingham  administration  could  not  go  on  in  its  weakened 
condition,  and  urged  him  to  send  for  Pitt.  This  was 
done.478  In  July,  1766,  after  about  one  year  of  service, 

475  Lord  Hardwicke's  "Memorial,"  and  the  Duke  of  Richmond's  "Journal," 
in  Albemarle,  Rocking/tarn  Memoirs,  vol.   i,   349-355;   Newcastle,  Narrative 
[Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  76. 

476  \Valpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  237.     There  are  many  ac- 
counts of  the  dismissal  of  the  Rockinghams  to  be  found  in  the  volumes  to 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 265 

Lord  Rockingham  and  his  associates  were  dismissed, 
and  William  Pitt  was  called  to  be  prime  minister. 

Thus  ended  the  ministry  of  the  Old  Whigs.  The 
oft  quoted  encomium  by  their  talented  writer,  Edmund 
Burke,  was  in  many  ways  justified;  they  were  honor- 
able young  men  with  good  intentions.  Many  of  their 
acts  were  worthy  of  praise,  but  this  praise  must  be 
tempered  somewhat  with  the  realization  that  some  of 
their  acts  like  their  virtues  were  of  the  negative  kind. 
They  had  undone  the  mistakes  of  their  predecessors, 
but  of  broad  affirmative  statesmanship  they  showed 
hardly  a  sign.  Their  western  policy,  so  far  as  it  is  re- 
vealed, was  reactionary,  their  toleration  of  Roman 
Catholicism  in  Canada  was  secretive,  and  their  pro- 
posed civil  reforms  for  that  colony  they  feared  to  bring 
into  the  light  of  discussion  in  Parliament.  Their  work 
was,  however,  unfinished  and  this  may  be  offered  as 
their  excuse.  No  time  was  granted  even  to  round  out 
their  half-formulated  plans.  Like  their  predecessors 
they  had  labored  on  that  comprehensive  colonial  policy, 
so  much  needed  by  the  empire,  and  like  them  they  were 
compelled  to  pass  the  unsolved  problem  on  to  other 
men  who  believed  in  very  different  principles. 


which  reference  has  been  so  often  made.  A  narrative  not  so  well  known  is 
that  of  Mr.  Mackenzie's  Caldwell,  Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications],  part 
ii,  vol.  ii,  90.  Coming,  as  it  does,  from  the  brother  of  Lord  Bute,  it  is  a 
source  of  great  weight.  The  reason  for  Lord  Northington's  anger  at  his  col- 
leagues is  stated  to  have  been  caused  by  alterations  in  the  Quebec  instruc- 
tions, which  he  had  made,  but  which  were  changed  without  his  knowledge. 


X.    THE  CHATHAM  MINISTRY 

Is  not  this  magnificent?  A  senate  regulating  the  eastern  and 
western  worlds  at  once!  The  Romans  were  triflers  to  us;  and  yet 
our  factions  and  theirs  are  as  like  as  two  peas."  —  HORACE  WALPOLE. 

The  tracing  of  the  course  of  Pitt's  politics  from  his 
entrance  into  public  life  till  the  time  of  his  last  min- 
istry offers  one  of  the  most  difficult  and  fascinating 
problems  in  the  history  of  eighteenth-century  England. 
This  pompous,  theatrical,  and  capable  egoist,  who  had 
the  assurance  to  believe  that  he  alone  could  steer  the 
ship  of  state  and  save  it  from  the  threatening  storms  of 
internal  factions  and  external  enemies,  could  never  be 
enlisted  in  the  service  of  the  vested  interests  which  had 
so  long  commanded  the  British  empire.  His  attitude 
towards  his  associates  was  arrogant,  his  manner  was 
conceited.  No  system  of  politics  would  satisfy  him 
unless  he  was  the  base,  support,  and  roof,  so  that  the 
crowd  of  petty  contemporary  politicians  surrounding 
him  were  never  able  to  secure  his  assistance  in  building 
their  Lilliputian  structures.  It  was  Pitt's  egoism  which 
made  him  so  uncongenial  a  colleague  and  it  is  this  same 
characteristic  that  explains  his  political  tergiversations 
during  the  early  years  of  the  reign  of  George  III.  No 
combination  was  proposed  within  which  he  was  offered 
freedom  to  put  in  execution  his  noble  but  frequently 
fantastic  ideas. 

Pitt  had  been  raised  to  the  climax  of  his  power  dur- 
ing the  Seven  Years'  War  by  an  alliance  between  his 
own  followers,  the  Leicester  House  faction,  and  the 


268  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

great  Whig  families  that  followed  the  Duke  of  New- 
castle. When  these  same  politicians  refused  in  1761 
to  follow  longer  his  lead  in  the  management  of  the  war, 
he  resigned,  and  was  thrown  into  opposition  where  he 
was  soon  joined  by  his  former  colleagues,  the  Old 
Whigs.  In  1763  he  was  expecting  to  rise  to  another 
triumph  with  these  associates,  so  that  in  his  August 
conference  with  the  king  he  talked  rather  arrogantly 
of  the  revolutionary  families.  In  1765  he  was  talking 
more  faintly  of  these  great  nobles  and  finally  refused  to 
enter  into  alliance  with  them.  By  1766  his  conception 
of  his  political  duties  had  been  completely  metamor- 
phosed and  the  youthful  enthusiasm  with  which  he  had 
perused  the  writings  of  Bolingbroke  returned  in  full 
flood.  He  was  again  dreaming  of  a  united  country  un- 
der a  "patriot  king,"  when  "there  should  neither  be  any 
exclusion  of  any  man  of  ability  and  integrity,  nor  any 
listing  under  any  banner  whatsoever."477  Combina- 
tions of  factions  formed  solely  to  control  patronage  and 
to  secure  votes  in  Parliament  should  be  debarred  from 
politics  in  the  future.  By  a  process  of  rejuvenescence 
Pitt  had  reached  back  to  a  political  attitude  of  mind 
which  was  in  full  harmony  with  that  of  the  king  and 
his  favorite.  In  certain  phases  of  his  imperial  plans 
he  found  himself  also  in  more  complete  accord  with 
the  desires  of  the  court  faction  than  with  any  other 
group  of  politicians.  The  Bedfordites,  the  Old  Whigs, 
and  the  broken  circle  of  the  followers  of  the  late  Duke 
of  Cumberland  were  all  frightened  at  the  thought  of 
change  and  were  not  ready  to  pledge  themselves  to  pro- 

477  Grafton,  Autobiography,  89.  The  king  in  a  letter  to  Pitt,  July  29, 
writes:  "As  I  know  the  Earl  of  Chatham  will  zealously  give  his  aid  to- 
wards destroying  all  party  distinctions,  and  restoring  that  subordination  to 
government,  which  can  alone  preserve  that  inestimable  blessing,  liberty,  from 
degenerating  into  licentiousness." -Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  21. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  269 

mote  an  active  program  in  either  America  or  East  In- 
dia, whereas  both  the  Pittites  and  the  court  faction  had 
visions  of  an  empire  extending  its  power  to  all  parts  of 
the  globe  and  bringing  peace  and  good  rule  to  mankind. 
United  by  the  same  extravagant  idealism  in  home 
and  imperial  affairs,  there  was  no  reason  why  the  two 
parties  should  remain  in  hostile  camps.  During  the 
spring  of  1765  Pitt  gave  unmistakable  indications  in  his 
speeches  that  a  rapprochement  might  soon  be  expected; 
on  March  11,  he  spoke  in  eulogy  of  the  Earl  of  Bute; 
and  later  he  asserted  that  the  best  possible  administra- 
tion could  be  formed  only  by  uniting  those  who  were 
beloved  by  the  people  with  those  who  had  the  confi- 
dence of  the  court.478  The  event  which  these  utterances 
foreshadowed  occurred  on  July  30,  when  a  ministry 
representing  the  ideal  of  the  period  replaced  that  of  the 
Old  Whigs.  The  nucleus  of  the  new  administration 
was  composed  of  the  Pittites,  namely  Pitt  (or  Lord 
Chatham  as  he  must  now  be  called) ,  the  Duke  of  Graf- 
ton,  the  Earl  of  Shelburne,  Lord  Granby,  Lord  Cam- 
den,  and  General  Conway,  the  last  named  having  final- 
ly decided  to  forswear  his  older  allegiance.479  As  has 
been  seen  this  was  numerically  the  weakest  of  the  fac- 
tions and  required  the  support  of  two  other  groups  to 
carry  measures  safely  through  Parliament.480  This 

478  Report  of  Prussian   minister,   Bouderin,   in   Prussian  archives,   quoted 
in  Von  Ruville,  William  Pitt  und  Graf  Bute,  105,  footnote  27;  but  the  whole 
argument  of  Von  Ruville  should  be  read;   also  Von  Ruville,   William  Pitt, 
vol.  iii,  176. 

479  There  are  some  references  to  Lord  Chancellor  Northington  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Pitt  faction,  but  his  whole  career  places  him  more  properly  in  the 
court  faction.     Grafton,  Autobiography,   135.     General   Conway  had   always 
acted  up  to  this  time  with  the  Old  Whigs,  but  by  his  acts  in  the  Chatham 
ministry  he  severed  his  connection  with  them.     Like  the  Duke  of  Grafton  and 
Lord   Camden  he  still  later  left  even  the  Pittites  and  partially  at  least  be- 
came a  member  of  the  court  faction. 

480  Albemarle,  Rockingliam  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  34. 


270  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

condition  made  it  impossible  for  the  newly  created  Earl 
of  Chatham  in  composing  his  ministry  to  maintain  his 
lofty  disdain  of  political  affiliations.  Despite  his  belief 
that  "faction  will  not  shake  the  closet  nor  gain  the  pub- 
lick,"  the  demands  of  practical  politics  laid  upon  him 
the  necessity  of  seeking  alliances.481  The  king's  command 
could  be  counted  upon  to  deliver  the  votes  of  his  follow- 
ers, and  the  support  of  the  Old  Whigs  was  bought  by 
the  appointment  of  some  of  them  to  office.482  Thus  com- 
posed the  ministry  might  prove  a  very  workable  system, 
and  it  partially  represented  the  "broad  bottom"  idea  so 
grandiloquently  prophesied.  ^ 

The  platform  on  which  the  Chatham  ministry  stood 
was  one  demanding  reform  in  many  lines.  The  foreign 
policy  was  to  be  revolutionized  by  the  formation  of  an 
alliance  of  England,  Prussia,  and  Russia  as  an  offset  to 
the  Franco-Spanish  family  compact.  The  territorial 
possessions  of  the  East  India  Company  were  to  be  taken 
over  by  the  imperial  government  so  that  the  immense 
riches  of  the  far  East  would  flow  into  the  treasury  to 
pay  the  debt  of  Great  Britain  and  relieve  the  people 
of  taxes.  The  problem  offered  by  the  new  possessions 
in  America  was  to  be  considered  seriously  and  a  pro- 
gressive policy  inaugurated.  To  all  these  planks  the 
king  gave  his  cordial  consent. 

The  ideals  that  floated  in  Lord  Chatham's  mind 
could  not  be  realized  but  they  were  of  noble  character 
and  were  accepted  by  his  colleagues  with  a  religious 
fervor.  His  closest  associate  and  adviser,  Lord  Shel- 
burne,  has  left  a  carefully  considered  description  of  the 

481  Grafton,  Autobiography,  107. 

482 They  were:  Duke  of  Portland,  Lord  Chamberlain,  Earl  of  Besbor- 
ough,  Cofferer,  Lord  Monson,  chief  justice  in  Eyre,  Sir  Charles  Saunders, 
Sir  William  Meredith,  and  Admiral  Keppel,  all  on  the  admirality  board. 
See  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  12. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  271 

lofty  principles  which  guided  the  Chatham  of  this  era: 

The  ministry  of  1 766  was  formed  of  those  who  recognized  that 
the  Hanover  family  was  become  English,  and  the  old  mode  of 
false  government  worn  out  and  seen  through.  It  was  pro- 
posed no  longer  to  sacrifice  all  merit  and  worth  in  army,  navy, 
church  and  state,  to  the  miserable  purpose  of  corrupting  a  ma- 
jority of  the  House  of  Commons,  but  that  the  Crown  should 
trust  to  the  rectitude  of  its  own  measures,  taking  care  by  a 
scrupulous  regard  to  merit  and  a  just  distribution  of  honors,  to 
secure  a  general  conviction  of  its  good  intentions,  and  under 
that  conviction  to  restore  the  constitution.483 

In  their  home  politics,  in  their  plans  fpr  the  reorgani- 
zation of  East  India,  and  in  their  purposes  toward 
America  the  ministers  embodied  in  their  platform  the 
noblest  ideals  of  their  day.  In  any  interpretation  of; 
the  imperial  policy  of  the  reign  of  George  III.,  there- 
fore, this  platform  should  be  selected  as  the  standard 
toward  which  politics  had  been  previously  developing, 
perhaps  unconsciously,  and  from  which  later  events, 
forced  a  departure. 

The  history  of  the  foreign  policy  and  of  the  plan  for 
East  India,  proposed  by  Lord  Chatham,  does  not  be- 
long to  the  present  discussion  except  in  so  far  as  the 
pursuit  of  the  second  wrought  changes  in  the  ministry 
itself.  "The  East  India  Company"- to  quote  Lord 
Clive's  golden  description  that  must  have  aroused  to 
activity  the  most  sluggish  brain -"are  at  this  time  sover- 
eigns of  a  rich,  populous,  fruitful  country,  in  extent 
beyond  France  and  Spain  united:  they  are  in  possession 
of  the  labour,  the  industry,  the  manufactures  of  twenty 
millions  of  subjects;  they  are  in  the  actual  receipt  of 
between  five  and  six  millions  a  year;  they  have  an  army 
of  fifteen  thousand  men;  the  revenues  of  Bengal  are 
very  little  short  of  four  millions  sterling  a  year;  out  of 

483  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  402. 


272  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

which  revenue,  the  company,  clear  of  all  expences, 
receive  £1,600,000  a  year."484  In  the  company  that 
exercised  the  power  over  this  empire  there  developed 
two  parties,  one  anxious  to  maintain  and  extend  the  ter- 
ritorial possessions,  the  other  to  limit  the  activities  of 
the  company  to  trade  and  to  place  the  territory  under 
the  control  of  the  government.  In  1765  these  two  par- 
ties had  struggled  for  ascendency  in  the  board  of  direct- 
ors; and  the  former  with  the  help  of  the  Grenville- 
Bedford  administration  had  been  successful  and  sent 
Clive  to  India  again.  The  Chatham  ministry,  or  rather 
the  Pittite  members  of  it,  supported  by  a  large  number 
of  the  directors  and  proprietors  of  the  company,  were 
in  favor  of  the  other  alternative,  namely  the  assumption 
of  the  territorial  possessions  by  government.  Their 
extravagant  idea  of  the  far  reaching  consequences  of 
such  a  measure  was  later  expressed  by  one  of  them: 
"If  the  king  had  continued  his  confidence  in  the  sound 
part  of  his  administration  in  1767,  the  East  Indies  might 
have  proved  the  salvation  of  this  country,  without  in- 
jury to  the  company  or  to  any  individual,  and  .  .  . 
peace  might  have  been  preserved  in  Europe  and  in 
America." 485 

Within  the  cabinet  itself  there  was  an  irreconcilable 
division  of  opinion  upon  this  issue,  General  Conway 
and  Charles  Townshend,  chancellor  of  the  exchequer, 
being  particularly  opposed  to  such  drastic  measures. 
Both  men  were  undoubtedly  influenced  by  their  long 
association  with  the  Old  Whigs  who,  on  account  of  their 
relation  to  the  trading  classes  and  their  own  proprietary 

484  Cavendish,  Debates  of  the  House  of  Commons  during  the  Thirteenth 
Parliament,  260. 

485  Shelburne  to   Chatham,   February  3,   1775,   Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shel- 
burne,  vol.  i,  469.     See  also  the  letters  on  the  subject  in  Pitt,  Correspondence, 
vol.  iii,  59  if.;  Grafton,  Autobiography,  passim. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 273 

interests  in  this  company  and  similar  monopolies,  were 
steadfast  in  their  opposition  to  all  attacks  on  vested  in- 
terests. The  determination  of  Lord  Chatham  and  his 
associates  to  investigate  the  East  India  Company  with 
the  view  of  obtaining  what  they  considered  the  govern- 
ment's rights  probably  was  one  of  the  influential  factors 
in  a  decision  that  had  far  reaching  consequences  upon 
the  destinies  of  the  Chatham  ministry  and  their  plans; 
the  Old  Whigs,  unable  to  lend  their  support  to  measures 
so  contrary  to  their  principles,  seized  upon  the  first 
opportunity  and  resigned.486  After  this  defection  near 
the  close  of  November,  1766,  the  administration  was 
opposed  by  an  alliance  of  the  Bedfordites,  the  Gren- 
villites,  and  the  Old  Whigs,  whose  followers  in  the  two 
houses  almost  equalled  in  number  the  ministerial  forces. 
In  order  to  overcome  the  parliamentary  weakness  due 
to  this  defection,  Chatham  tried  throughout  the  fall  to 
attach  to  himself  the  Bedfordites  with  whom  he  was  on 
better  terms  at  this  time  than  with  the  followers  of  Lord 
Rockingham.  He  was  apparently  prepared  to  open  up 
many  places  to  them  and  even  to  admit  to  the  cabinet 
the  Duke  of  Bedford.  The  king's  fear  and  dislike  of 
this  latter  nobleman  defeated  this  purpose  since  it  was 

486  The  resignation  occurred  in  November.  The  reason  usually  assigned  - 
and  undoubtedly  a  determining  factor  also  -  was  the  transference  of  Lord 
Edgecombe  to  another  position,  but  their  determined  opposition  to  the  East 
Indian  Company  measures  of  the  government,  which  had  been  decided  upon 
before  the  resignations,  furnishes  proofs  for  the  statement  in  the  text.  In  a 
letter  to  Sir  Horace  Mann,  dated  December  8,  1766,  a  few  days  after  the 
resignations,  Horace  Walpole  wrote  that  this  opening  of  the  East  India 
question  was  the  direct  occasion  of  the  resignations.  See  Walpole,  Letters, 
vol.  v,  31;  also  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  278;  Albemarle, 
Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  25;  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society, 
Publications,  new  sen,  vol.  lix],  97;  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  126,  130, 
footnote  i;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iii,  345,  389;  Jesse,  Memoirs  of  George 
III.,  vol.  i,  390;  Grafton,  Autobiography,  103,  106.  For  the  later  opposition 
of  the  Old  Whigs,  see  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xvi,  359,  405;  Grenville, 
Papers,  vol.  iii,  281. 


274 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

impossible,  in  opposition  to  the  monarch,  to  take  into 
the  ministry  a  sufficient  number  to  satisfy  the  rapacious- 
ness  of  the  Bloomsbury  Gang.487 

Without  such  aid  and  in  spite  of  the  obstructions  of 
Conway  and  Townshend,  the  administrative  forces 
might  have  been  able  still  to  have  carried  out  the  Pitt 
policies,  had  the  leader  himself  continued  in  good 
health.  Chatham's  eloquence,  although  confined  to  the 
House  of  Lords,  would  have  echoed  throughout  Great 
Britain  and  would  have  strengthened  the  allegiance  of 
his  weaker  followers;  but  it  was  silenced  all  too  soon. 
The  prime  minister's  health  was  undermined  by  the 
gout,  and  the  mental  effort  required  to  form  the  min- 
istry completely  broke  down  his  strength.  By  the  end 
of  the  year  1766,  only  a  few  months  after  taking  office, 
he  was  a  physical  wreck  and  never  after  that  was  of  the 
least  assistance  to  his  colleagues.  After  his  departure 
from  London,  he  withdrew  completely  from  business 
alleging  his  sickness  as  an  excuse.  From  the  isolation 
of  the  sick-room,  over  which  Lady  Chatham  stood 
guard,  the  entreaties  of  the  king  and  his  colleagues 
failed  to  draw  him.  Again  and  again  the  Duke  of 
Grafton  and  the  Earl  of  Shelburne  made  futile  efforts 
to  see  him.  Even  the  king  sent  messengers  without 
success.  Letters  were  written  and  Lady  Chatham  an- 
swered them;  Lord  Chatham  was  not  to  be  disturbed. 
The  cabinet  remained  in  ignorance  of  his  plans  and 

A.OO 

purposes. 

The  nominal  leader  of  this  decapitated  ministry  was 
the  Duke  of  Grafton,  pliant  in  the  closet,  a  follower  of 

487  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  283  ;  Grafton,  Autobiography, 
106;   Bedford,   Correspondence,   vol.   iii,    348   ff.,   355;   Almon,   Anecdotes  of 
Pitt,  vol.  ii,  106  ff. 

488  Grafton,  Autobiography,  no;   Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  170,  256, 
and  many  other  places. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  275 

Chatham,  broad-minded,  and  at  heart  a  friend  of  Amer- 
ica. His  companions  of  the  cabinet  exhibited  the  wid- 
est divergencies  of  opinion  among  themselves.  The 
vacillating  Conway  still  looked  longingly  at  his  former 
friends,  the  Rockingham  Whigs,  never  felt  at  ease  in 
his  service  to  a  ministry  to  which  they  were  in  opposi- 
tion, and  often  voted  with  them.489  Lord  Shelburne, 
who  was  the  real  representative  of  Chatham,  was  hardly 
on  speaking  terms  with  many  of  his  associates,  frequent- 
ly absented  himself  from  cabinet  meetings,  and  was 
distrusted  by  all,  including  the  king  who  had  at  first 
received  his  return  to  office  in  a  kindly  spirit.490  The 
brilliant,  volatile  Charles  Townshend  continued  to  jus- 
tify his  reputation  for  instability  and  frequently  sup- 
ported the  opposition.491 

In  order  to  understand  the  ill  considered  measures 
and  the  unfulfilled  promises  of  the  Chatham  ministry, 
this  headless  and  divided  condition  must  be  constantly 
borne  in  mind.  After  setting  out  on  its  course  under 
the  most  favorable  conditions  of  court  favor  and  pop- 
ular approval,  it  was  finally  wrecked  on  account  of  the 

489  \Valpole,  Memoirs  of  George  ///.,  vol.  ii,  273. 

490  In  speaking  to  Newcastle  of  this  appointment  of  Lord  Shelburne,  the 
king  said:     "He  will  make  a  very  good  one"   [i.e.,  secretary  of  state].     See 
Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  90; 
but  see  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  248,  and  Fitzmaurice,  Life 
of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  280  for  opposite  view.     For  Shelburne's  relation  to  his 
colleagues,  see  the  letter  of  the  king  to  Chatham,  May  30,  1767,  in  Pitt,  Corre- 
spondence, vol.  iii,  260;  also  Charlemont  to  Flood,  April  9,  in  idem,  vol.  iii, 
240,  footnote  i. 

491  Townshend  had  been  brought  in  through  the  influence  of  the  Duke  of 
Grafton  against  the  wishes  of  Lord  Chatham,  but  he  was  not  admitted  to 
the   cabinet   until    just   previous   to    Chatham's    long   sickness.     See    Grafton, 
Autobiography,  92,  105.     Burke's  famous  characterization  of  Townshend  may 
be  found  in  his  Speech   on  American    Taxation,   and  Fox's  in  Fitzmaurice, 
Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  193.     Walpole's  opinion  may  be  found  in  his  Me- 
moirs of  George  III.,  vol.  iii,  72,  where  in  a  note  is  another  interesting  de- 
scription of  the  erratic  minister. 


276  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

mutiny  of  the  crew  and  of  the  failure  of  the  command- 
ing officer.  Not  one  of  the  many  proposed  plans  of 
reform  was  carried  to  a  successful  completion.  Over 
the  most  important  measure,  that  concerning  the  East 
India  Company,  battle  after  battle  was  waged  with  the 
vested  interests  and  after  long  delay  a  compromise  very 
favorable  to  the  company  was  the  result.  This  subject, 
like  that  of  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act,  divided  fac- 
tions by  thrusting  into  politics  an  issue  involving  those 
great  principles  which  drive  to  partisanship;  and  it  is 
possible  to  catch  now  and  then  through  the  smoke  of 
factional  war  a  glimpse  of  the  battalions  of  real  parties 
falling  into  their  future  formations.  Years  were  to 
elapse  before  broad  principles  based  on  the  rights  of 
humanity  would  attain  social  force  sufficient  to  break 
those  bonds  of  family  pride  and  clannish  self-interest 
which  held  together  the  great  factions ;  but  in  the  case 
of  the  struggle  over  the  East  India  Company's  posses- 
sions, it  is  possible  to  perceive  their  final  destruction. 

The  policy  of  the  American  colonies  was  to  meet  a 
worse  fate  than  that  of  the  far  East.  Lord  Shelburne 
had  been  chosen  by  Chatham  as  the  man  best  fitted  to 
solve  that  difficult  problem,  and  by  the  previous  reor- 
ganization of  the  Board  of  Trade  every  opportunity  was 
given  him  to  develop  his  own  policy.  Ever  since  Lord 
Halifax  had  raised  this  latter  body  to  influence  in  the 
molding  of  the  British  colonial  policy,  the  greatest  lack 
of  unity  in  the  administration  of  America  had  pre- 
vailed. Two  offices  of  almost  equal  power,  the  secre- 
taryship of  the  Southern  Department  and  the  Board  of 
Trade  were,  on  account  of  jealousy,  always  working 
against  each  other.  Both  Lord  Shelburne  and  Lord 
Hillsborough  who  had  been  chosen  as  Lord  Dart- 
mouth's successor  had  experienced  the  disadvantages  of 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  277 

this  system.  It  was,  therefore,  agreeable  to  all  con- 
cerned when  Hillsborough  preferred  that  the  Board  of 
Trade  be  stripped  of  the  powers  which  had  recently 
been  granted  to  it  and  be  limited  to  the  simple  duty  of 
drawing  up  reports.  Accordingly  it  was  under  condi- 
tions which  left  the  complete  control  of  colonial  affairs 
in  the  hands  of  Secretary  Shelburne  that  Lord  Hills- 
borough  accepted  the  subordinate  office.492 

Shortly  after  assuming  his  new  duties,  Lord  Shel- 
burne turned  his  attention  to  the  colonies  and,  as  was  his 
habit,  he  first  made  a  memorandum  of  the  elements  in 
the  problem  to  be  studied.  This  analysis  of  his  affords 
a  glimpse  into  his  mind  at  the  time  when  he  undertook 
this  important  labor.493 

Things  to  be  considered  of  in  North  America. 

1st.  What  have  been  the  measures  pursued  to  this  time  in 
general. 

2ndly.  What  really  ought  to  be  done  to  advance  the  settle- 
ment of  it?  Maintain  the  government  and  secure  the  depend- 
ance. 

3rdly.  What  stands  now  proposed  by  different  parts  of  gov- 
ernment. 

The  first  can  be  learnt  only  by  time  and  reading  everything 
thats  to  be  met  with  de  die  in  diem. 

The  second  follows  the  first,  is  matter  which  requires  cool 
judgement  and  thorough  reflection.  The  3rd.  stands  thus- 

ist.  A  Plan  of  Ld  Barringtons  for  a  disposition  of  troops 
and  reduction  of  forts.  This  has  been  sent  to  General  Gage 
and  is  returned  with  remarks.  Sr  Jeffrey  Amherst  entirely 
disapproved  this  plan. 

492  Hillsborough  to  Grenville,  August  6,  1766,  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iii, 
294;    Hillsborough  to   Sheburne,   August   14,    1766,   in  Public  Record   Office, 
Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.216,  p.  18;  Privy  Council  minute,  August  6,  1766,  in 
idem,  30.     Lord  Chatham  took  great  credit  to  himself  for  this  arrangement 
of  "the  most  critical  office  in  the  kingdom,  so  happily  fixed,  through  and  by 
my  channel."  -  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  116.     Lord  Barrington  declared 
that  Hillsborough  did  not  like  the  position.     See  idem,  138,  footnote  i. 

493  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  xlix,  17. 


278  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

2ndly.  The  Indian  plan  proposed  by  Ld  Hillsborough  — 
when  at  the  Board  of  Trade  formerly  and  was  renewed.  It 
has  been  sent  over  America.  The  papers  lately  sent  to  the 
office  from  the  Board  of  Trade  take  notice  of  it. 

3rdly.  A  general  plan  of  reduction  of  American  expences 
proposed  by  Mr  Townsend  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  re- 
ducing the  general  national  current  expences  against  Parlia- 
ment and  of  the  enormity  of  late  draughts  from  America.494 
To  judge  of  this  the  expence  of  America  must  be  stated  —  How 
incurred  ?  What  the  expence  of  particular  services  have  been  ? 
and  what  they  are  likely  to  continue?  Who  has  the  power  of 
drawing?  and  who  is  depended  on  for  checking  them?  Then 
and  only  then  a  proper  judgement  can  be  formed.  But  in  the 
meantime  they  must  be  considered  without  loss  of  time  as  well 
as  the  two  first  heads,  that  whatever  can  or  is  fitting  to  be  im- 
mediately done  may  be  prepared  for  decision  and  likewise  let- 
ters may  be  wrote  to  the  king's  servants  in  America  to  apprise 
them  in  general  of  the  disposition  of  government,  what  is  likely 
to  be  done  and  also  to  make  such  enquiries  of  them  as  may  be 
necessary  either  to  judge  of  these  plans  or  form  others  which 
the  distance  of  America  and  the  length  of  time  required  to  wait 
for  answers  makes  it  essential  to  do  without  delay.495 

Having  thus  outlined  the  problem  to  his  own  satis- 
faction he  began  his  investigations.  It  was  to  be  almost 
a  year  before  he  had  collected  his  data  and  had  matured 
his  plan,  and  even  then  the  ill  considered  action  of  a 
colleague  in  the  ministry  hastened  the  announcement  of 
the  policy  which  had  been  taking  form  in  his  mind. 
Hasty  conclusions  were  not  one  of  his  weaknesses.  In 
spite  of  a  quick  imagination -perhaps  because  he  was 
conscious  of  his  imagination -he  was  deliberate  and 
careful.  His  correspondence  during  the  period  of  his 
ministry  was  enormous.498  He  wrote  to  all  those  whose 

494  This  has  not  been  found.     It  was  probably  drawn  up  under  the  Rock- 
inghara  ministry  and  supplemented  Lord  Barrington's  report. 

495  The  rest  of  the  notes  do  not  concern  us  here. 

496  Through  the  courtesy  of  the  Most  Honorable  the  Marquess  of  Lans- 
downe  and  through  the  generosity  of  the  graduate  school  of  the  University  of 
Illinois,  I  have  been  able  to  have  copies  of  this  correspondence  made  for  me. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  279 

opinion  might  be  of  value.  From  all  the  governors 
and  other  officials  he  collected  information.  From 
travelers  he  asked  advice.  His  knowledge  of  the  sub- 
ject was  increased  by  conversation  with  everybody.  He 
was  constantly  in  personal  touch  with  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin and  Richard  Jackson.  His  secretary,  Maurice 
Morgann,  made  most  careful  investigations  of  the  vari- 
ous phases  of  the  problem.  In  the  end  he  became  bet- 
ter informed  on  all  aspects  of  the  colonial  policy  than 
any  minister  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Before  following  his  numerous  letters  across  the  sea 
and  elsewhere,  it  will  be  better  to  understand  Lord 
Shelburne's  own  conception  of  the  relation  and  value 
of  the  colonies  to  Great  Britain.  The  material  for  this 
period  of  his  career  is  very  complete  and  therefore 
there  is  little  danger  of  drawing  wrong  conclusions  as 
would  have  been  the  case  had  such  an  examination  of 
the  sources  been  made  for  the  time  when  he  was  presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  Trade.497  /  According  to  his  view 
the  colonies  were  dependencies  of  Great  Britain,  not 
"constituent  parts  of  the  Empire,"  and  were  planted  in 
order  to  increase  the  commerce  and  wealth  of  the 
mother  country.  Over  such  dependencies  the  Parlia- 
ment had  unlimited  power  even  to  do  unjust  things  but 

497  The  available  sources  are  the  following:  A  paper  against  the  Stamp 
Act  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixxxv,  71  (the  marginal  notes  on  this 
paper  are  in  the  handwriting  of  Sergeant  Glyn,  and  it  is  probable  that  this 
is  one  of  the  papers  that  he  wrote  for  Lord  Shelburne.  Taper  indorsed, 
"Reasons  for  not  diminishing  American  expenses  this  year,"  dated  March  30, 
1767,  idem,  102,"  Paper  on  errors  of  Great  Britain  and  means  of  punishing 
the  colonies  for  resistance  in  1766",  idem,  81.  This  paper  follows  very  closely 
the  reasoning  in  a  letter  written  by  Maurice  Morgann,  private  secretary  to 
Lord  Shelburne,  April,  1767  [idem,  vol.  xlix,  711],  and  may  have  been  writ- 
ten by  Morgann  himself  at  the  suggestion  of  Lord  Shelburne,  as  Lord  Fitz- 
maurice  suggests,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  315,  Shelburne's  speeches  as  re- 
ported in  Parliamentary  History.  The  paper  dated  March  30  may  be  found  in 
Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi], 
536  ff. 


28o THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

should  limit  itself  to  doing  only  that  which  was  right, 
and  Shelburne's  conception  of  right  gave  to  it  more 
binding  power  than  law.  It  was  bounded  by  the  Brit- 
ish constitution  and  by  the  general  "idea  of  equity  and 
justice,  which  are  the  regulations  of  a  much  higher 
legislature."  The  right  of  the  mother  country  em- 
powered her  to  enforce  such  laws  as  were  calculated  to 
attain  the  ends  for  which  the  colonies  were  founded. 
As  far  as  she  was  concerned  these  ends  were  the  en- 
joyment of  exclusive  trade,  if  it  seemed  best  to  make  it 
exclusive;  and  in  the  sale  of  her  commodities  the 
mother  country  was  to  see  her  single  advantage.  The 
prerogative  of  Great  Britain  rested  in  the  very  nature 
of  the  relation.  On  the  other  hand  the  colonies  were 
subjects  of  Great  Britain  and  as  such  should  enjoy  the 
liberties  belonging  to  that  condition,  one  of  which  was 
the  levying  of  taxes  only  by  their  representatives.  The 
mother  country  obtained  by  exclusive  trade  some  of  the 
wealth  of  the  colonists,  and  part  of  the  profits  from  this 
was  paid  into  her  treasury  by  her  traders  and  manufac- 
turers. In  return  for  the  privilege  of  exclusive  trade, 
it  was  the  duty  of  Great  Britain  to  foster  the  colonies, 
promote  their  welfare,  and  protect  them  from  their 
enemies.  To  accomplish  this  their  constitutions  should 
be  made  more  liberal,  their  self-government  more  real, 
and  only  such  funds  drawn  from  them  to  assist  the 
mother  country  as  may  be  paid  by  them  in  seeking  their 
own  interests  or  are  freely  voted  by  their  representa- 
tives. The  relation  existing  between  the  two  parts  of 
the  empire  was  very  delicate  and  might  be  easily  sev- 
ered by  injustice  on  the  part  of  the  mother  country;  but 
if  this  did  not  happen,  the  colonists  would  raise  Great 
Britain  to  the  "utmost  height  of  power." 

In  order  to  collect  the  necessary  information  con- 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  281 

cerning  America  Shelburne  wrote,  on  December  11,  a 
circular  to  each  governor,  in  which  he  requested  "an 
exact  estimate  of  the  annual  charge  of  maintaining  and 
supporting  the  entire  establishment"  of  the  colony,  dis- 
tinguishing the  different  funds  and  for  what  services 
they  were  appropriated.  Also  he  desired  that  there  be 
transmitted  to  him  at  the  same  time  an  account  of  the 
manner  of  imposing  quitrents,  the  arrears  then  out- 
standing, the  method  by  which  land  was  granted,  and 
the  number  of  grants.498 

The  future  plan  already  taking  form  in  his  mind  is 
revealed  by  the  following  letter  to  General  Gage,  of 
the  same  date: 

I  write  to  acquaint  you  of  three  very  material  points,  which 
are  thought  to  require  the  deliberation  of  the  king's  servants  in 
order  to  their  being  laid  before  him. 

ist.  A  proper  system  for  the  management  of  the  Indians, 
and  for  the  carrying  on  the  commerce  with  them  on  the  most 
advantageous  footing. 

2nd.  The  most  eligible  manner  of  disposing  of  the  troops; 
as  well  for  convenience  as  for  offence  and  defence. 

3rd.  A  reduction  of  the  contingent  expenses  of  the  estab- 
lishment in  North  America,  and  the  raising  an  American  fund 
to  defray  American  expenses  in  part  or  in  whole. 

As  so  much  depends  upon  the  happy  regulation  of  these  dif- 
ferent articles,  they  require  to  be  well  weighed  before  a  final 
resolution  can  be  taken  upon  them,  and  as  the  king  is  desirous 
that  they  shall  be  regulated  with  all  dispatch  that  is  consistent 
with  securing  both  the  permanence  and  honor  of  his  govern- 
ment, and  the  prosperity  of  his  American  subjects,  every  light 
and  information  which  can  be  added  to  those  we  are  already 
possessed  of,  will  be  duly  attended  to. 

You  will  therefore  pay  the  utmost  attention  to  these  three 
points,  and  from  time  to  time  transmit  such  information  and 
reflections  upon  them  as  shall  occur  to  you. 

498  Printed  in  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  880.  Shelburne 
supplemented  this  letter  by  one  on  January  13,  asking  for  a  statement  of  the 
fees  demanded  by  offices  for  making  out  grants  of  land.  See  idem,  889. 


282  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

In  regard  to  the  first  article,  that  of  the  Indian  affairs,  a 
plan  formed  some  time  ago  has  been  under  deliberation.499  As 
this  plan  was  transmitted  to  all  the  governors  in  North  Amer- 
ica for  their  opinions,  it  must  have  fallen  within  your  observa- 
tion. Many  articles  in  it  however  appearing  not  so  well  cal- 
culated for  the  end  proposed  as  could  be  wished,  and  several 
others  being  rather  detrimental  to  it,  there  is  a  necessity  either 
of  reforming  it,  or  of  substituting  another  in  its  place.  But  it 
is  to  me  matter  of  doubt  whether  any  method  of  managing  In- 
dians can  be  found  preferable  to  that  of  leaving  the  trade  of  each 
province  to  the  particular  care  of  that  province,  under  some  gen- 
eral rules  and  restrictions  to  which  all  the  provinces  must  be 
subject  in  general. 

A  plan  drawn  up  by  Lord  Harrington  has  been  some  time 
under  consideration  for  quartering  the  troops.  This  matter 
will  be  fully  discussed  here,  but  as  it  is  possible  that  in  the  end 
His  Majesty  may  leave  it  in  great  measure  to  your  prudence 
and  judgment,  you  will  lose  no  time  to  consider  this  point  fully. 
In  the  meantime  it  is  His  Majesty's  desire,  that  in  any  changes 
of  the  present  disposition  you  have  occasion  to  make,  regard  be 
had  to  make  the  military  as  little  burdensome  to  the  inhabitants 
as  possible,  by  disposing  them  preferably  among  the  young  col- 
onies, where  in  many  respects  they  must  be  considered  as  advan- 
tageous rather  than  in  His  Majesty's  more  settled  colonies, 
except  where  they  are  desired,  or  in  your  opinion  wanted. 

The  third  article  is  that  of  the  greatest  consequence,  and 
therefore  merits  the  most  particular  and  mature  consideration. 

The  forming  an  American  fund  to  support  the  exigencies  of 
government  in  the  same  manner  as  is  done  in  Ireland,  is  what  is 
so  highly  reasonable  that  it  must  take  place  sooner  or  later. 
The  most  obvious  manner  of  laying  a  foundation  for  such  a 
fund  seems  to  be  by  taking  proper  care  of  the  quitrents,  and  by 
turning  the  grants  of  lands  to  real  benefit,  which  might  tend  to 
increase  rather  than  diminish  the  powers  of  government  in  so 
distant  a  country. 

You  must  be  sensible  that  very  great  abuses  have  taken  place 
in  both  respects  which  cry  aloud  for  redress. 

Proper  regulations  for  these  purposes  might  be  a  means  of 


499  This  refers  to  Lord  Hillsborough's  plan. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  283 

preventing  Indian  disturbances  in  future,  which  now  in  great 
measure  arise  from  individuals  possessing  themselves  of  their 
lands  without  the  knowledge  of  government. 

It  is  far  however  from  His  Majesty's  intention  that  any 
rigour  should  be  exercised  in  respect  of  quitrents  long  due,  but 
nothing  can  be  more  reasonable  than  that  the  proprietors  of 
large  tracts  of  land  (which  ought  by  the  terms  of  the  respective 
grants  to  have  been  cultivated  long  since)  should  either  pay 
their  quitrents  punctually  for  the  time  to  come,  or  relinquish 
their  grant  in  favour  of  those  who  will. 

As  to  the  manner  of  making  out  grants  of  land  for  the  fu- 
ture, I  could  wish  to  have  the  best  information  possible,  so  that 
such  a  system  might  be  adopted  for  that  purpose,  particularly  in 
the  new  and  conquered  provinces,  as  would  at  the  same  time 
serve  to  promote  the  good  of  the  colonies,  and  lighten  the  bur- 
den which  lies  upon  the  mother  country.500 

The  answers  to  his  questionaire  reached  Lord  Shel- 
burne  during  the  early  months  of  1767  and  disclosed  a 
chaotic  condition  in  the  methods  of  granting  land  and 
of  collecting  the  quitrents.501  From  New  England, 
Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey,  no  quitrents 
were  collected  by  the  crown,  since  the  power  of  grant- 
ing land  rested  in  the  colonial  governments.  Liberal 
terms  had  been  granted  to  settlers  in  the  new  colonies 
of  East  and  West  Florida  and  in  Nova  Scotia,  but  these 
had  been  established  too  recently  for  their  experience 
to  be  of  any  value.502  This  left  only  five  royal  colonies 
whose  returns  might  offer  data  from  which  inferences 
might  be  drawn.  Governor  Moore  of  New  York  re- 
ported that  land  was  granted  for  two  shillings  and  six 
pence  sterling  per  hundred  acres;  but  that  large  tracts 

500  Printed  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  305-307- 

501  This  account  is  drawn  from  the  official  returns  made  by  the  governors. 
See  Lansdoiune  Manuscripts,  vols.  Iv  and  Ivi. 

502  The  terms  in  East  and  West  Florida  were  one  halfpenny  per  acre  an- 
nually two  years  after  the  grant  was  made.     In  Nova  Scotia  the  fee  was  one 
farthing  per  acre. 


284  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

of  land  had  been  given  away  for  which  no  quitrent  had 
been  collected.  The  payments  were  always  four  or  five 
years  in  arrears  and  up  to  1765  the  amount  collected  an- 
nually had  not  been  sufficient  to  meet  the  king's  war- 
rants for  £460  drawn  against  them.503  The  reports 
from  Georgia  and  the  two  Carolinas  were  even  more 
discouraging.  The  governor  of  South  Carolina  re- 
ported that  the  rent  roll  was  not  even  in  existence  and 
nobody  knew  how  much  was  due  or  who  should  pay. 
The  conditions  were  somewhat  better  in  Virginia.  The 
fee  here  was  five  shillings  for  fifty  acres  and  one  shilling 
quitrent;  but,  by  collusion  between  friends  to  defraud 
the  government,  many  escaped  payment;50*  still  the 
total  sum  collected  was  at  least  appreciable.  From  all 
the  colonies  the  crown  collected  less  than  £16,000  in 
quitrents  a  year.  Not  a  large  sum  even  when  other 
sources  of  income  from  America  were  added  to  set  over 
against  £420,453  which  the  chancellor  of  the  exchequer 
calculated  as  the  annual  expense  of  the  American  colo- 
nies to  Great  Britain.505 

The  present  state  of  the  quitrents  concerned  only  the 
lands  east  of  the  mountains,  but  the  knowledge  gained 
would  be  of  value  in  any  plan  for  the  future  develop- 
ment of  the  West.  Even  more  directly  bearing  on  the 
western  problem  was  the  experience  of  the  new  colonies 
of  East  and  West  Florida  and  the  somewhat  older 
colonies  of  Nova  Scotia  and  Georgia.  As  yet  these 
were  all  an  expense  to  the  crown  and  there  was  no  par- 
ses New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  900,  901. 

504  The  following  figures  are  from  Public  Record  Office,   Colonial  Office 
Papers,  5.1330. 

In  1761   Quitrents  collected  £6400.         18  s          4  d 

netted  government      4396          17  9 

In   1762  collected  11672  i  n 

netted  8923          18  6 

905  Lansdoiune  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ivii. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  285 

ticular  hope  of  immediate  relief,  since  there  had  not 
been  the  expected  rush  of  settlers  into  these  territories. 
The  land  in  East  Florida  had  been  taken  up  very  gen- 
erally by  speculative  friends  of  government,  who  had 
made  no  efforts  to  secure  colonists,  though  there  was  an 
undertaking  to  introduce  Greeks.  In  West  Florida 
conditions  were  much  worse.  First  of  all  a  tradition 
that  the  country  was  unhealthy  had  arisen  very  early 
in  its  history  and  had  persisted  in  spite  of  the  published 
descriptions  inspired  by  the  ministry  and  interested 
parties.  The  knowledge  of  the  ill  health  suffered  by 
the  troops  became  public  property  and  made  people 
skeptical  of  all  enthusiastic  accounts.  To  this  tradi- 
tion must  be  added  the  very  serious  controversy  between 
the  governor  and  the  military  commandant,  between 
whose  duties  the  ministry  had  failed  to  draw  a  sufficient- 
ly clear  line  of  delimitation.  Governor  Johnstone  was 
one  who  stood  strongly  on  his  prerogative  and  insisted 
on  performing  functions  obviously  belonging  to  the  Mil- 
itary Department.  Furthermore  he  had  been  instructed 
to  erect  posts  wherever  they  were  required  and  in  ac- 
cordance with  this  instruction  he  had  established  Fort 
Bute  on  the  Iberville  River  and  had  thus  infringed  up- 
on the  rights  of  the  commander-in-chief,  to  whom  had 
been  confided  the  duty  of  distributing  the  troops.506 

Thus  wherever  they  cast  their  eyes  the  ministers  dis- 
covered expenditure  of  money  accompanied  by  failure. 
The  past  experience  in  colonial  enterprises  gave  little 
encouragement  to  new  undertakings  so  far  as  the  rela- 
tion of  expense  and  income  were  concerned.  If  colo- 
nies on  the  seacoast  had  failed  to  meet  expectations  what 
chance  was  there  that  colonies  in  the  interior  would 

see  Gage  to  Haldimand,  September  6,  1767,  in  British  Museum,  Additional 
Manuscripts,  21663,  p.  112. 


286  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

prove  to  be  greater  successes?  Here,  in  the  great  val- 
ley of  the  West,  the  situation  was  complicated  by  the 
presence  of  the  Indians  and  by  the  many  rival  interests 
that  have  already  been  pointed  out;  yet  it  was  concern- 
ing this  land  that  the  true  policy  must  be  formed.  This 
vast  and  rich  territory  remained  a  wilderness,  the  home 
of  the  Indians,  still  closed  to  colonization  by  the  procla- 
mation of  1763.  The  neighboring  colonies  were  look- 
ing across  the  mountains  with  longing  eyes.  Some 
hardy  adventurers  had  even  passed  the  divide  and  in  de- 
fiance of  the  authorities  had  made  homes  for  them- 
selves along  the  banks  of  the  upper  Ohio  waters. 


XI.     INDIAN  MANAGEMENT  AND 
WESTERN  TRADE 

People  must  be  ruled  in  a  manner  agreeable  to  their  temper  and 
dispositions,  and  above  all  people  of  a  free  and  independent  character. 
The  British  colonist  must  see  something,  which  will  distinguish  him 
from  the  colonists  of  other  nations.  —  History  of  the  First  Ten  Years 
of  George  III. 

While  Halifax,  Hillsborough,  Dartmouth,  and  the 
other  politicians  of  Great  Britain  had  been  discussing 
and  debating  about  the  future  of  the  new  acquisitions 
and  while  King  George  III.  with  a  childlike  eager- 
ness to  see  the  anticipated  consequences  of  his  peace  had 
been  urging  his  servants  to  initiate  some  definite  action, 
events  had  been  occurring  within  the  far  off  forested 
heights  and  wide  stretches  of  prairie  land  of  the  Amer- 
ican hinterland  that  had  brought  many  changes  in  con- 
ditions.    The  Indians  who  had  so  boldly  and  unitedly 
answered  Pontiac's  summons  to  battle  had  felt  the  iron 
hand  of  Great  Britain  and  had  sued  the  despised  white 
man  for  peace;  the  British  flag  was  at  last  waving  over 
the  walls  of  Fort  de  Chartres  in  the  Illinois  country 
symbolizing  the  completed  occupation  of  the  ceded  ter- 
ritory; large  numbers  of  traders  were  passing  up  and 
down  the  rivers  and  wandering  over  unfamiliar  paths 
in  the  search  for  furs;  the  superintendents  of  Indian  af- 
fairs had  inaugurated  the  centralized  system  of  control 
of  the  trade  and  were  trying  through  deputies  and  com- 
missioners to  maintain  amicable  relations  between  the 
arrogant  whites  and  the  sullen  brown  visaged  natives 


288  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 


the  West;  and  lastly  several  new  land  companies 
possessing  great  prestige  and  influence  had  been  formed 
and  were  impatiently  waiting  for  an  opportunity  to  ex- 
ploit various  parts  of  the  territory.  Lord  Shelburne's 
correspondence  during  the  years  1766  and  1767  brought 
him  full  information  of  these  many  events.  Letter  fol- 
lowed letter  presenting  before  his  eyes  the  changing 
picture  of  the  unknown  land,  and  his  imagination  en- 
abled him  to  seize  the  constant  and  significant  and  to 
form  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  many  complex  prob- 
lems in  that  vast  territory  which  had  been  committed  to 
his  care. 

In  his  eyes  as  in  those  of  his  contemporaries  the  oc- 
cupation of  the  land  by  the  Indians  was  the  factor  that 
stood  out  most  conspicuously  in  the  western  situation 
and  with  its  many  complications  overshadowed  all 
others.  In  whatever  direction  he  cast  his  eyes  the  omi- 
nous problem  of  the  rights  of  the  natives  and  of  their 
management  raised  its  head.  From  Canada  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  the  Indians'  hunting-grounds  stretched  along 
the  slopes  of  the  mountain  westward,  even  here  and 
there  crossing  the  divide  to  the  eastward  as  in  New 
York  and  the  southern  colonies.  How  should  these 
natives  be  managed?  What  advantages  could  be  drawn 
from  them?  Should  their  lands  be  opened  for  settle- 
ment? If  so,  how  could  it  be  done  without  raising  an 
Indian  war?  How  could  the  natives  be  protected  from 
the  rapaciousness  of  the  traders?  All  these  questions 
had  been  forced  on  the  attention  of  the  ministries  since 
1763  and  it  has  been  seen  how  they  were  answered. 
These  were  the  same  questions  that  confronted  Lord 
Shelburne  three  years  before  when  he  was  president  of 
the  Board  of  Trade;  but  now,  however,  the  measures 
of  his  predecessors  had  added  to  his  perplexities.  An 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  289 

imperial  system,  founded  on  a  belief  in  the  administra- 
tive ability  and  honesty  of  crown  officials,  had  been 
partially  but  not  authoritatively  put  in  execution.  This 
experiment  had  been  in  operation  for  a  few  years  and 
some  idea  of  its  effectiveness  and  cost  could  be  estimated. 
The  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  for  the  South- 
ern Department,  John  Stuart,  was  the  first  to  inaugurate 
the  Grenville-Bedford  plan  for  the  organization  of  In- 
dian affairs.  He  received  a  copy  of  this  plan  in  1764 
while  he  was  in  West  Florida.  Although  he  was  not 
authorized  to  introduce  it  in  its  entirety,  he  consulted 
Governor  Johnstone  and  the  two  were  of  the  opinion 
that  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  final  orders  to  do 
so  would  be  forthcoming  in  due  season ;  and  they,  there- 
fore, took  definite  steps  to  put  the  plan  in  operation  in 
the  Southwest.  When  Stuart  was  later  taken  to  task 
for  his  action  he  claimed  that  he  had  received  orders 
from  General  Gage.507  In  accordance  with  the  plan 
the  southern  superintendent  appointed  commissaries  for 
the  various  Indian  tribes,  but  he  limited  himself  tem- 
porarily to  one  deputy,  Charles  Stuart,  who  resided  in 
West  Florida.508  Printed  instructions  for  the  guidance  / 
of  traders  were  distributed  and  every  effort  was  made  / 
to  bring  the  expected  order  out  of  the  chaos  that  reigned 
in  the  trade.509 

507  Hillsborough  had  instructed  both  superintendents  to  put  in  force  as 
much  of  the  plan  as  possible. 

sos  The  commissaries  were  as  follows,  according  to  Stuart's  letters  in 
Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ivii:  John  Mclntosh  for  the  Chickasaw;  Elias 
Legardere  for  the  Choctaw ;  Alexander  Cameron  for  the  Cherokee ;  Roderick 
Mclntosh  for  the  Upper  Creeks;  Charles  Taylor  for  the  tribes  on  the  Missis- 
sippi. Stuart  appointed  Montberault  a  deputy  agent  for  a  short  time.  See 
Stuart  to  Pownall,  August  24,  1765,  in  idem,  vol.  Ix.  Consult  also  Hamilton, 
Colonial  Mobile,  passim. 

509  Stuart's  instructions  are  indorsed:  "Copy  of  regulations  of  trade  with 
the  Indians  agreed  to  by  the  governor  and  council  of  West  Florida  and  pro- 
posed to  the  governors  of  East  Florida,  Georgia  and  South  Carolina."  They 


290  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Sir  William  Johnson,  superintendent  of  the  northern 
Indians  had  also  understood  that  he  was  empowered  to 
organize  his  department  along  the  line  of  the  plan  sent 
to  him;  but  he  delayed  doing  so  until  the  spring  of 
1766,  when  the  reports  from  the  Illinois  country  proved 
that  the  French  from  Saint  Louis  were  monopolizing 
the  western  fur  trade.  To  prevent  this  the  various  posts 
named  by  the  Board  of  Trade  were  established  and 
commissaries,  smiths,  and  interpreters  were  appointed, 
and  these  were  regularly  supervised  by  the  deputies.510 
There  is  in  existence  among  the  Johnson  manuscripts  at 
Albany,  New  York,  the  form  of  instructions  sent  to  these 
commissaries.511  They  were  informed  that: 

The  inspection  of  trade,  correcting  abuses,  redressing  griev- 
ances, gaining  intelligence  of  all  Indians,  being  the  principal 
objects  of  your  appointment,  you  will  diligently  apply  yourself 
to  discharge  these  important  trusts,  to  which  end  you  are  imme- 
diately to  inform  yourself  of  the  manner  in  which  trade  has 
been  hitherto  carried  on,  and  the  most  reasonable  prices  of 
goods,  and  peltry;  [and]  the  strength,  connections  and  interest 
of  the  several  tribes  about  you  with  their  sachems,  warriors,  etc., 
all  which  you  are  to  report  without  delay,  etc. 

are  found  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  323.23.  They  were 
sent  to  London  in  his  letter  of  August  24,  1765.  The  next  year  these  instruc- 
tions were  somewhat  altered  and  widely  distributed  throughout  the  Southwest. 
These  are  found  in  idem,  323.25,  p.  26.  Stuart  sent  to  Shelburne  a  copy  of  the 
printed  instructions  on  April  i,  1767.  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  li,  161. 

510  The  western  district,  comprising  Fort  Pitt,  the  Illinois  and  Detroit  was 
under  George  Croghan;  the  province  of  Quebec  was  under  Daniel  Claus;  the 
middle   district,   comprising   Michillimackinac,   Niagara,   and   Ontario,   under 
Guy  Johnson;  Nova  Scotia  under  Joseph  Gorham.     See  Johnson  Manuscripts, 
vol.  xv,  237. 

511  These  steps  were  not  completed  until  June,   1766.     In  March  of  that 
year,    Johnson    wrote    of   the    fitness    of    Lieutenant-colonel    Cole    (Fort   de 
Chartres),  Lieutenant  Roberts   (Michillimackinac),  and  Lieutenant  Jehu  Hay 
(Detroit)  for  such  positions.     See  idem,  vol.  xii,  90.     On  March  22,  he  wrote 
to  the  Board  of  Trade  that,  with  the  concurrence  of  General  Gage,  he  had 
made  such  appointments  without  waiting  for  authorization,  and  gives  the  rea- 
son cited  in  the  text.     See  idem,  101.     The  instructions  to  commissaries  are 
printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collec- 
tions, vol.  xi],  529. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  291 

The  instructions  to  traders  drawn  up  by  the  two 
superintendents  were  very  stringent  and  were  intended 
to  control  the  traders  in  the  minutest  details  so  that 
there  should  be  no  opportunity  for  them  to  practice 
such  tricks  upon  the  Indians  as  had  been  the  case  in  the 
past.512  By  a  clause  in  the  proclamation  of  1763  trade 
was  free  to  all,  and  anyone  upon  application  to  a  gov- 
ernor could  obtain  a  license.  By  the  superintendent's 
regulations  the  trader,  as  he  traveled  through  the  In- 
dian country,  was  required  to  show  his  license  from  his 
governor  at  each  post  visited  and  also  to  exhibit  an  ex- 
act invoice  of  his  goods.  Having  completed  his  busi- 
ness he  must  secure  a  pass  from  the  commissary  in  order 
to  go  to  the  next  post.  He  was  strictly  forbidden  to 
open  his  packs  for  the  purpose  of  sale  except  at  a  post 
and  under  the  eye  of  the  commissary,  one  of  whose  chief 
duties  was  the  determination  of  prices.  The  efforts  of 
the  representatives  of  the  superintendents  were  not  suc- 
cessful in  ending  the  Indian  disturbances,  for  as  John- 
son wrote  to  Lord  Shelburne: 

The  Persons  I  have  appointed  as  commissarys  are  gentlemen  of 
understanding  and  character  known  to  the  Indians  and  ac- 
quainted with  their  dispositions.  My  three  deputies  have  each 
a  district  allotted  for  their  visitation  and  transacting  all  business 
subject  to  my  directions,  but  as  yet  their  powers  are  not  at  all 
ascertained,  the  commissaries  have  no  authority,  and  it  is  not  in 
my  power  to  enable  them  to  execute  their  office  as  they  ought, 
and  as  the  plan  directed  from  the  many  obstructions  and  dis- 
putes of  their  authority,  and  their  inability  to  punish  any  frauds, 
or  redress  any  grievances,  my  own  case  and  that  of  my  deputies 
are  circumstanced  in  the  same  manner,  whilst  reasonable  powers 
supported  by  laws,  and  the  proposed  expences  for  presents,  etc., 
would  enable  me  to  pursue  that  uniform  system  from  which 
alone  I  can  hope  fox  success.513 

512  The  date  of  Johnson's  instructions  is  not  given  but  it  must  have  been 
some  time  in  1766. 

513  January  15,  1767.     New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  893. 


292 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

The  plan  for  the  management  of  the  Indian  trade 
had  thus  received  a  trial  in  both  the  northern  and 
southern  districts,  and  it  was  possible  for  the  new 
southern  secretary  to  obtain  opinions  from  various  men 
on  the  subject.  It  was  very  evident  after  two  years'  ex- 
periment that  the  system  would  entail  a  great  expense 
upon  the  mother  country.  The  bills  sent  in  by  Stuart, 
who  had  been  the  first  to  try  the  experiment,  were 
heavier  than  those  from  the  Northern  Department, 
while  it  was  under  the  old  regime;  but  as  soon  as 
Sir  William  Johnson  had  appointed  his  deputies  and 
commissaries,  there  was  a  marked  increase  in  ex- 
penditure in  that  region -particularly  in  the  Illinois 
country  where  Edward  Cole  represented  the  Indian 
Department.514 

The  merchants  and  officials  with  the  best  opportuni- 
ties to  observe  the  conditions  existing  in  the  West  were 
on  the  whole  the  most  severe  critics  of  the  methods  of 
the  department.  Each  region,  however,  experienced 
its  own  particular  troubles.  The  principal  complaint 
in  the  Southwest  was  not  caused  by  the  trade  regula- 
tions which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Stuart  found  it  very 
difficult  to  enforce  on  account  of  lack  of  authority,  but 
was  the  result  of  one  of  the  provisions  in  the  proclama- 
tion by  which  the  trade  had  been  made  free  to  all. 
Previously  the  skin  trade  in  this  region  had  been  con- 
ducted by  a  few  large  firms  in  the  southern  colonies; 

514  On  December  n,  1766,  Shelburne  wrote  to  Stuart:  "The  plan  for  the 
management  of  Indian  Affairs,  part  of  which  you  have  too  hastily  adopted  in 
West  Florida,  is  now,  and  has  been,  for  sometime  under  consideration.  The 
expence  incurred  by  it  for  services  very  inadequate  is  not  one  of  the  least  ob- 
jections to  it;  and  I  am  sorry  to  be  obliged  on  this  occasion  to  observe  to  you, 
that  the  expenses  of  your  district  run  so  much  above  all  expectation  and  pro- 
portion, that  it  is  very  necessary  you  should  attend  to  this  point  very  minutely 
for  the  future."  -Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  liii,  305.  For  the  expenses  of 
the  northern  district  see  Johnson  Manuscripts,  passim. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  293 

but  after  1763  numerous  small  traders  rushed  into  the 
field  and  competition  became  very  intense.  In  1765 
Stuart  wrote  that  the  issuance  by  the  governors  of  gen- 
eral licenses  to  trade  with  all  tribes  had  resulted  in  the 
increase  of  the  class  of  small  traders  and  packhorse  men 
among  the  Chickasaw  to  seventy-two,  though  the  war- 
riors of  that  tribe  numbered  only  three  hundred  fifty, 
and  that  the  keen  competition  had  distracted  the  tribe 
and  thrown  it  into  confusion.  He  wrote,  further,  that 
the  disorder  among  the  Choctaw  and  Creeks  was  still 
greater.515  In  this  opinion  of  the  evils  of  general 
licenses,  Stuart  was  upheld  by  Governor  Wright  of 
Georgia  and  by  the  traders  of  Georgia  who  drew  up  a 
memorial  on  the  subject.516  The  assembly  of  West 
Florida,  which  was  amenable  to  the  influence  of  the 
southern  superintendent,  also  passed  in  1766  a  represen- 
tation against  the  practice.517 

Not  all  the  Indian  troubles  in  the  Southwest,  however, 
arose  from  the  freedom  of  trade.  Many  can  be  traced 
to  a  lack  of  power  to  enforce  the  regulations.  Stuart 
did  not  exercise  the  same  influence  over  traders  and  In- 
dians as  did  his  colleague  in  the  North  whose  powerful 
personality  was  a  factor  in  preserving  some  kind  of 
order  in  his  district.518  His  regulation  that  traders 

515  Stuart  to  Pownall,  August  24,  1765,  in  Lansdo<wne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ix. 
In  his  "Observations  on  the  Plan  for  the  Future  Management  of  Indian  Af- 
fairs," December  i,  1764,  Stuart  recommended  that  the  number  of  traders  be 
limited.     See  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  323.19,  p.  20. 

516  Lansdoiune  Manuscripts,  vol.  li,  118,  203. 

517  November  22,  1766  in  idem,  vol.  xlix,  564.     The  objection  to  the  free 
and  general  licenses,  because  they  increased  the  number  of  traders,  was  very 
general.     Adair,  in  his  famous  book,   The  History  of  the  American  Indians 
[351,  366,  and  elsewhere]  also  advocated  the  limiting  of  the  number  of  traders. 

518  Stuart  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  August  8,  1766  in  Public  Record  Office, 
Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.67,  p.  213.     From  all  the  facts  known  it  can  not  be 
said  that  Stuart  was  an  able  superintendent.     For  a  very  unfavorable  view 
see  Adair,  History  of  the  American  Indians,  367  ff. 


294  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

should  give  bonds  that  they  would  obey  the  laws  of  the 
•department  could  be  enforced  only  by  colonial  officers, 
jbut  these  latter  exhibited  little  disposition  to  assist  in 
preserving  order.  Virginia,  whose  claims  to  the  west- 
ern territory  made  her  always  an  ardent  opponent  of  the 
imperialistic  views  of  the  mother  country,  responded  to 
Stuart's  efforts  with  an  evasive  answer.  In  1767  Lieu- 
tenant Governor  Fauquier  wrote  to  him:  "I  know 
nothing  of  the  proclamation  of  the  7th  October  1763." 
As  to  the  plan  for  the  regulation  of  Indian  affairs  he 
pointed  out  correctly  that  it  had  never  been  adopted  by 
the  government  and  that  no  instructions  concerning  it 
had  been  received  by  the  governors.  His  final  con- 
clusion was:  "Upon  the  whole  I  am  of  the  opinion 
that  I  have  not  authority  to  do  anything  in  this  affair 
as  matters  stand  circumstanced  with  me;  for  I  cannot 
stir  in  it  without  infringing  the  liberty  of  the  subject; 
as  every  man  is  at  liberty  to  trade  with  Indians  in  the 
manner  he  chooses,  without  any  restraint  of  license  or 
anything  else,  but  just  as  the  traders  and  Indians  can 
agree  between  themselves."  Virginia  was,  in  fact,  plan- 
ning to  take  care  of  her  own  trade  and  appointed  com- 
missaries for  that  purpose.519 

The  merchants  of  Pennsylvania  and  New  York  were, 
on  the  whole,  favorable  to  the  plan  that  had  been 
adopted  for  the  regulation  of  Indian  affairs,  although 
they  raised  objections  to  certain  details  such  as  the  es- 
tablishment of  prices  by  the  commissaries  and  the  pro- 

519  Fauquier  to  Stuart,  May  6,  1767  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 
Office  Papers,  5.70,  p.  273 ;  Stuart  to  Shelburne,  July  28,  1767,  and  an  undated 
paper  marked  "Virginia,"  in  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  15,  89,  169.  A 
longer  account  and  criticism  of  the  purposes  of  Virginia  may  be  found  in 
Stuart  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  July  10,  1766  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 
Office  Papers,  5.77,  p.  91.  Virginia  was  evidently  intending  to  exploit  the  ter- 
ritory she  claimed  without  regard  to  imperial  regulations. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 295 

hibition  of  the  sale  of  rum.520  These  two  provinces  did 
not  possess  the  vast  claims  to  the  West  which  made  Vir- 
ginia so  antagonistic  to  the  imperialization  of  the 
region ;  and  the  plan  for  organization  of  Indian  affairs 
was  really  an  outgrowth  of  their  experiences  and  needs, 
with  which  Johnson,  who  had  been  the  chief  adviser  of 
the  Board  of  Trade,  was  very  familiar.  These  col- 
onies, therefore,  had  little  criticism  to  make  of  the 
superintendents'  regulations  and  were  generally  in  fa- 
vor of  confining  the  traders'  operations  to  posts,  since 
such  a  limitation  equalized  their  opportunities  by  dimin- 
ishing the  value  of  that  easy  access  to  the  West  enjoyed 
by  the  Canadians,  their  chief  competitors.521 

The  real  criticism  of  the  plan  came  from  Canada. 
After  the  conquest  of  that  territory  a  great  change  in 
its  economic  development  began.  The  fur  trade,  its 
principal  industry,  had  been  diligently  practiced  by  the 
French ;  but  the  many  minute  rules  issued  by  their  gov- 
ernment and  the  limitations  of  the  French-Canadian 
nature,  not  well  fitted  for  the  exploitation  of  large  in- 
dustries, had  restrained  the  traffic  in  narrow  limits. 
With  the  change  to  the  dominion  of  Great  Britain  there 
came  the  Scotch  merchants  with  their  business  acumen, 
which  had  brought  about  the  regeneration  of  their  own 
country.  The  future  of  Canadian  business  passed  into 

520  See   Hanna,    Wilderness    Trail,   vol.   ii,   308;    also,   "Remarks   on   the 
plan,"  etc.  in  Franklin,  Writings   (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  467.     This  latter  was 
written  for  Lord   Shelburne   and  belongs   to   a  later  period  of  development 
than  that  which  I  am  discussing  at  this  point.     There  were  other  fundamental 
objections  that  may  be  found  in  the  discussion  between  Franklin  and  Shel- 
burne. 

521  At  least  this  was  the   reason  for  the  favorable  attitude  of  the  New 
Yorkers   towards  the   regulations  that  was   given  by  the   Montreal   traders. 
"Memorial   of   [Canadian]    Traders,"    in   Johnson   Manuscripts,   vol.  xii,    x. 
The  date  of  this  memorial   is  not  given   in  the  manuscript  copy,  but  from 
Lansdoiane  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  235,  it  is  learned  that  the  date  is  September 
20,  1766. 


296 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

their  hands  and  there  began  that  long  and  brilliant 
dynasty  of  Scotch  fur  barons  which  has  endured  down 
to  our  own  day. 

Although  the  French-Canadians  had  not  proved 
hemselves  equal  to  large  undertakings,  they  had  shown 
hemselves  qualified  in  a  high  degree  to  carry  out  the 
Operations  of  the  fur  trader.  Intuitively  they  knew  how 
to  manage  the  American  Indians,  and  the  latter  gave 
their  French  brothers  the  heartiest  welcome  in  their 
wigwams  and  laid  out  the  choicest  furs  for  their  in- 
spection and  purchase,  even  when  the  British  were  of- 
fering a  higher  price.  These  French  coureurs  de  hots 
had  also  learned  the  best  method  of  conducting  the 
business  long  before  the  British  merchants  had  eman- 
cipated themselves  from  the  traditions  of  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company  or  of  the  merchants  of  Albany  who 
erected  their  trading  posts  on  the  coast  or  near  the  set- 
tlements whither  they  expected  the  Indians  to  convey 
their  peltries  even  though  compelled  to  travel  a  dis- 
tance of  hundreds  of  miles  over  swollen  rivers  and  high 
mountains.  It  was  in  accordance  with  this  long  es- 
tablished British  practice  that  the  Board  of  Trade  had 
incorporated  in  their  plan  the  establishment  of  posts  to 
which  the  buying  and  selling  of  furs  should  be  limited. 
The  French-Canadians,  however,  were  not  prepared  to 
conduct  the  industry  in  the  British  manner.  Their 
custom  had  been  to  go  to  the  Indian  villages  to  trade 
and  then  during  the  winter  to  follow  the  tribesmen  to 
their  winter  hunt  and  on  the  spot  where  the  fur-bear- 
ing animals  were  caught  to  exchange  their  merchandize 
for  the  peltries.  This  method  of  business  had  become 
fixed  among  the  Canadians,  and  the  Indians  with  whom 
they  traded  were  not  in  the  habit  of  traveling  miles  with 
their  packs  for  the  sake  of  making  a  sale.  The  new 
requirement  of  the  British  ministry  and  their  agents  was 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 097 

thus  running  contrary  to  customs  a  hundred  years  old, 
and  the  attempt  to  turn  the  business  into  new  channels 
and  strange  methods  was  a  failure.  If  the  new  plan 
were  to  succeed  at  all,  it  would  mean  such  a  multiplica- 
tion of  posts  that  the  cost  to  the  mother  country  would 
be  enormous,  and  it  was  soon  perceived  in  Canada  that 
it  was  totally  impracticable.  The  most  northern  post 
was  at  Mackinac ;  but  the  French  traders  had  wandered 
much  farther  to  the  north  and  had  already  accustomed 
the  natives  to  a  market  located  on  the  banks  of  Lake 
Winnipeg. 

The  British  merchants,  who  began  immediately  to 
exploit  the  French-Canadian  genius,  could  not  be  com- 
pelled by  London-made  enactments  to  abandon  this 
profitable  traffic  and  paid  almost  no  heed  to  the  new 
regulations.  Sir  William  Johnson  complained  that 
they  and  their  agents  went  to  the  Indian  country  with-  / 
out  passes  and  followed  the  warriors  to  their  hunting- 
grounds,  and  that  when  his  agent  tried  to  enforce  the 
rules  he  met  with  a  flat  defiance.522  In  1766  the  Cana- 
dian merchants  angered  at  the  attempted  restriction 
of  their  movements  memorialized  the  governor  and 
council  on  the  subject  of  the  Indian  trade.  They  made 
the  charge  that  no  steps  had  been  taken  to  place  the 
management  on  a  right  basis,  that  the  confinement  of 
the  traders  to  the  established  posts  occasioned  a  serious 
loss  to  them  and  a  very  grievous  hardship  to  the  Indians, 
and  that  the  French  traders  of  Spanish  Louisiana,  since 
they  were  not  so  restricted,  were  monopolizing  all  the 
western  trade  formerly  centering  in  Montreal  and  Que- 
bec.523 The  merchants  who  made  Detroit  the  scene  of 

522  Johnson  to  Shelburne,  May  30,  1767  in  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xiv, 
199.  See  also  Johnson  to  Carleton,  January  22,  1767  in  idem,  26. 

623  —  Idem,  vol.  xii,  i.  This  memorial  is  without  place  or  date,  but  the 
fact  that  it  was  inclosed  in  a  letter  to  Johnson,  April  15,  1766,  fixes  the  time 
approximately. 


298  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

their  operations  drew  up  a  similar  list  of  complaints  in 
a  memorial  to  Jehu  Hay,  the  Indian  commissary  at  that 
place.  They  pointed  out  that  some  Indians  were  com- 
pelled to  travel  immense  distances  in  order  to  purchase 
their  supplies  and  that  the  traders  who  obeyed  the  regu- 
lations were  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  competition  with 
those  who  did  not524 

The  Canadians  found  in  their  new  governor,  Sir  Guy 
Carleton,  a  sympathetic  listener.  He  was  a  man  who 
adjusted  his  ideas  readily  to  the  new  conditions  sur- 
rounding him  and  perceived  that  the  traditional  poli- 
cies of  Great  Britain  were  in  many  ways  inapplicable 
to  the  French  civilization.  The  new  Canada  must  be 
built  upon  the  old.  An  uncompromising  break  with 
her  past  would  mean  both  political  and  economic  dis- 
aster. It  was  from  this  viewpoint  that  he  looked  at  the 
problem  of  the  fur  trade,  and  he  concluded  that  the 
safest  course  for  Canada  was  the  continuance  of  her 
well  established  methods.  He,  therefore,  became  the 
advocate  of  the  cause  of  the  new  subjects  both  with  Sir 
William  Johnson  and  the  home  government525  and 
fought  for  the  right  of  the  Canadians  to  conduct  their 
business  in  their  customary  manner.  Finally  Lord 
Shelburne  was  convinced  of  the  justice  of  this  view  and 
ordered  Johnson  to  permit  traders  to  range  freely  over 
the  country  north  of  the  line  of  the  Ottawa  River  and 
the  Great  Lakes.526 

Upon  one  value  of  the  new  acquisitions  London  pol- 
iticians agreed.  They  were  convinced  that  the  fur 

524  The  correspondence  is  in  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xv,  56,  57,  157. 

525  His  correspondence  with  different  people  on   this  subject  is  found   in 
Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xiv,   199,  236;   vol.  xxv,   52;   Lansdoivne  Manu- 
scripts, vol.  li,  279. 

526  Shelburne  to  Johnson,  June  20,  1767  in  idem.     Johnson  himself  seems 
to  have  been  convinced  that  this  was  the  safest  course. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  299 

trade  would  prove  to  be  profitable;  and  they  all,  with 
a  few  exceptions  like  Lord  Harrington  and  his  follow- 
ers, were  angered  by  the  reports  of  the  encroachments 
upon  British  territory  by  traders  from  New  Orleans 
and  Saint  Louis.  Under  the  French  regime  the  Cana- 
dians had  carried  on  the  trade  throughout  the  territory 
surrounding  the  lakes  as  far  south  as  the  Illinois  and 
Wabash  Rivers,  and  the  citizens  of  Louisiana  had  ex- 
ploited the  Indians  to  the  south  of  that  line,  though 
they  had  found  formidable  rivals  coming  from  Virginia 
and  the  Carolinas.  After  the  conquest  it  was  expected 
that  the  British  would  immediately  inherit  the  whole 
of  the  Canadian  trade  without  any  competition ;  but  this 
did  not  happen.  From  all  sides  came  complaints  con- 
cerning the  intruders.  The  foreign  merchants  of  Louis- 
iana went  everywhere.  They  were  found  among  the 
Choctaw  and  Cherokee  of  the  Southwest;  they  ascended 
the  Mississippi  to  its  sources ;  they  crossed  the  portages 
to  Lakes  Michigan  and  Superior;  and  the  old  friendli- 
ness of  the  Indians  for  the  French  gave  them  an  advan- 
tage in  every  place. 

The  seriousness  of  this  situation  was  not  realized  un- 
til the  spring  of  1766.  The  occupation  of  the  Illinois 
country  by  the  British  troops  had  been  impracticable 
until  after  the  Indian  uprising  incited  by  Pontiac  had 
been  completely  crushed.  It  was  not,  therefore,  until 
October,  1765,  that  a  detachment  of  the  Black  Watch 
under  Captain  Stirling  took  possession  of  Fort  de  Char- 
tres  and  that  the  British  flag  waved  over  all  the  terri- 
tory ceded  by  France.527  A  few  days  later  Major 
Farmer  arrived  with  more  troops  from  New  Orleans. 

527  The  documents  concerning  these  events  in  the  Illinois  country  arc 
printed  by  Alvord  and  Carter  in  the  British  Series  of  the  Illinois  Historical 
Collections,  vols.  x-xi. 


300  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  French  were  compelled  to  take  the  oath  of  alle- 
giance and  a  form  of  military  government  was  estab- 
lished at  this  farthest  western  post.  Nothing  appeared 
now  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  expansion  of  British 
trade  and  preparations  were  being  made  at  all  the 
commercial  centers  to  reap  the  full  benefits  from  the 
opportunities. 

From  Canada  the  traders  poured  into  the  Great  Lake 
region  setting  up  their  stores  in  Detroit,  Mackinac,  and 
Green  Bay,  and  in  a  short  time  the  flow  of  peltries  that 
had  been  accustomed  for  generations  to  follow  the  Saint 
Lawrence  River  to  Paris  was  turned  aside  to  find  a 
final  harbor  in  the  storage  rooms  of  London  and  Glas- 
gow. In  this  region  the  merchants  from  New  Orleans 
and  Saint  Louis  had  little  chance  of  continuing  the  com- 
petition with  the  better  prepared  British  merchants 
served  as  they  were  by  French-Canadian  employees.528 
In  the  Southwest  the  competition  between  those  of  Eng- 
lish speech  with  the  French  and  Spaniards  was  to  be 
prolonged  till  the  close  of  the  century,  but  the  same 
early  rush  of  traders  from  the  colonies  took  place  here 
as  in  the  region  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  such  crowds 
pushed  their  way  into  the  most  distant  lying  Indian  vil- 
lages that  they  disturbed,  as  has  been  seen,  the  peace  of 
the  frontier. 

In  the  central  valley  of  the  Mississippi  the  phenome- 
non was  equally  conspicuous.  In  anticipation  of  the 
peace  with  the  Indians,  the  Pennsylvania  merchants 
transported  their  wares  by  packhorses  and  wagons  to 
Pittsburgh,  and  in  1766  on  the  spring  flood  the  boats 
of  the  trading  house  of  Baynton,  Wharton,  and  Morgan 
floated  down  the  Ohio  en  route  to  the  Illinois  country. 

528Jo/2nson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xv,  157.  See  also  Nevins  (ed.),  Ponteach 
[Caxton  Club,  Publications],  119. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  301 

This  was  their  first  convoy,  but  many  were  to  follow, 
for  these  enterprising  merchants  had  made  elaborate 
preparations  for  the  exploitation  of  their  western  trade. 
In  time  they  invested  over  £30,000  in  this  enterprise 
and  were  employing  over  three  hundred  boatmen  on  the 
river,  making  it  one  of  the  most  frequented  routes  to 
the  West.529 

The  second  convoy  of  boats  sent  down  in  the  spring 
of  1766  by  Baynton,  Wharton,  and  Morgan  was  com- 
manded by  the  junior  partner,  George  Morgan,  who 
was  to  become  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  figures  in 
the  history  of  the  development  of  the  West.  On  the  trip 
he  was  accompanied  by  George  Croghan,  deputy  and 
agent  of  Sir  William  Johnson,  and  by  Captain  Harry 
Gordon,  who  was  sent  by  General  Gage  to  report  on 
the  conditions  and  needs  of  the  far  western  country. 
From  now  on,  news  of  the  encroachments  on  the  fur 
trade  by  the  French  was  plentiful.  Morgan's  corres- 
pondence with  his  partners  was  extensive  and  regular. 
Both  George  Croghan  and  Captain  Gordon  made  full 
reports  to  their  superiors,  as  did  the  commanding  of- 
ficers of  the  posts  and  the  numerous  Indian  commis- 
saries.530 These  all  united  in  complaining  of  the  French 

529  Baynton,  Wharton,  and  Morgan  to  MacLeane,  January  9,  1767,  Alvord 
and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  475; 
the  same  to  Irwin,  September  21,  1766  in  idem,  383. 

530  A  copy  of  George  Morgan's  Letter  Book  is  preserved  in  the  Illinois 
State  Historical  Library,  as  are  copies  of  his  partners'  letters,  collected  from 
many  places,  principally  from  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania.     These 
with  similar  material  and  all  the  journals  are  being  published  in  volumes  of 
the  Illinois  Historical  Collections.     Gordon's  Journal  was  first  published   in 
extract  in   1778   in   PownalPs   Topographical  Description  and  recently  more 
fully  by  Mr.  Hanna  in  his  Wilderness  Trail  [vol.  ii,  40].     Croghan's  Journal 
has  never  been  found.     Morgan's  Journal  is  in  the  form  of  letters  to  his 
wife;  a  journal  of  John  Jennings  who  commanded  the  first  fleet  of  the  mer- 
chants has  been  published  in  the  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Bi- 
ography, vol.  xxxi,  145,  and  another  by  William  Clarkson,  also  an  employee 
of  Baynton,  Wharton,   and  Morgan  in  Schoolcraft's  Indian  Tribes,  vol.  iv, 


302  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

traders  from  the  western  bank  of  the  Mississippi. 
Gordon's  description  of  the  condition  is  typical  of  the 
others.  When  he  reached  Saint  Louis,  he  thus  wrote: 

At  this  place  Mr.  Le  Clef  [Laclede]  the  principal  Indian 
trader  resides,  who  takes  so  good  measures,  that  the  whole  trade 
of  the  Missouri,  that  of  the  Mississippi  northwards,  and  that  of 
the  nations  near  La  Baye,  Lake  Michigan,  and  St.  Josephs,  by 
the  Illinois  River,  is  entirely  brought  to  him.  He  appears  to 
be  sensible,  clever,  and  has  been  very  well  educated;  is  very 
active,  and  will  give  us  some  trouble  before  we  get  the  parts  of 
this  trade  that  belong  to  us  out  of  his  hands.531 

George  Morgan  also  found  the  situation  harassing  and 
on  December  10,  1767,  in  writing  to  his  partners,  com- 
plained: 

An  English  trader  cannot  at  present  with  the  least  security  of 
his  life  vanture  even  to  Post  Vincent  for  want  of  a  garrison 
there  — to  asscent  [«'c]  the  Mississippi  or  the  Illinois  Rivers 
with  goods  would  be  certain  death,  so  great  is  the  influence  of 
the  French  in  that  part,  by  our  not  having  a  post  at  the  mouth 
of  the  latter. 

The  peltries  which  would  be  taken  at  those  places  alone 
wire  [j/V]  proper  measures  fallen  on,  would  pay  a  sufficient 
duty  to  support  the  garrisons,  by  which  the  nation  would  reap 
a  double  advantage,  as  our  natural  enemies  would  be  deprived 
of  the  benefit  of  that  trade  and  there  by  considerable  numbers 
of  English  subjects  would  find  profitable  employment.532 

The  expectation  of  the  Philadelphia  merchants,  a 
hope  shared  by  the  British  ministry,  of  making  the  Ohio 
such  a  great  artery  of  western  trade  that  it  would  eclipse 
its  rivals  the  Saint  Lawrence  and  the  Mississippi  Rivers 

265.  Letters  by  Edward  Cole,  Indian  commissioner  in  the  Illinois,  have  been 
published  by  myself  in  the  Illinois  State  Historical  Society  Journal  (October, 
1910),  vol.  iii,  no.  3,  p.  23.  All  the  above  journals  have  recently  been  printed 
by  Alvord  and  Carter  in  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections, 
vol.  xi]. 

531  —  Idem,  300. 

532  Morgan's  Letter-Book. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  303 

failed  of  realization.  The  long  land  carriage  to  Pitts- 
burgh was  a  decided  disadvantage  which  was  only  par- 
tially offset  by  the  better  markets  in  the  East.  The 
freight  by  boats  on  the  Ohio  was  relatively  inexpensive, 
and  early  experience  seemed  to  prove  that  it  was  possible 
to  land  goods  in  Illinois  at  attractive  prices;  but  in  the 
long  run  the  supplies  from  New  Orleans  seem  to  have 
had  the  advantage.533  The  Philadelphia  merchants 
found  out  also  that  it  was  impossible  to  bring  their  furs 
back  by  way  of  the  Ohio,  and  were  forced  to  ship  these 
down  the  Mississippi,  and  they  sometimes  sold  them  in 
New  Orleans,  which  was  the  natural  market  of  the 
West.  General  Gage  wrote  Shelburne  in  December 
1766: 

It  is  reported  that  the  traders  in  West-Florida  carry  most  of 
their  skins  to  New  Orleans,  where  they  sell  them  at  as  good  a 
price  as  is  given  in  London.  As  I  had  before  some  intelligence 
of  this,  the  officer  commanding  at  Fort-Pitt  had  orders  to  watch 
the  traders  from  Pensylvania  who  went  down  the  Ohio  in  the 
spring  to  Fort  Chartres;  and  to  report  the  quantity  of  peltry 
they  should  bring  up  the  Ohio  in  the  autumn.  He  has  just  ac- 
quainted me  that  the  traders  do  not  return  to  his  post,  that  they 
are  gone  down  the  Mississippi  with  all  their  furrs  and  skins 

533  Experience  and  estimates  are  not  fully  convincing  because  of  the  par- 
tiality of  the  informants.  The  first  estimate  was  made  by  Lieutenant  Eraser 
who  was  sent  to  the  Illinois  country  in  1765  by  Gage.  He  thought  that  the 
British  merchants  could  sell  their  goods  twenty-five  per  cent  cheaper  than  the 
French  from  New  Orleans.  The  cost  of  transportation  from  Philadelphia  to 
Pittsburgh  was  not  excessive.  On  March  21,  1766,  Baynton,  Wharton,  and 
Morgan  contracted  with  Edward  Morton  to  carry  goods  to  Fort  Pitt  for  forty 
shillings  per  hundred  weight  and  to  bring  back  peltries  at  twenty  shillings 
per  hundred  weight.  He  was  to  keep  twenty  wagons  ready  for  this  purpose. 
See  Manuscript  in  Division  of  Public  Records,  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania, 
printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Col- 
lections, vol.  xi],  192.  By  1769  General  Gage  was  convinced  that  French 
goods  sold  thirty  per  cent  cheaper  than  English  in  the  Illinois  country  and 
that  peltries  received  twenty-five  per  cent  more  at  New  Orleans  than  in  the 
eastern  cities.  See  Gage  to  Hillsborough  in  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial 
Office  Papers,  5.87,  p.  143. 


304  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

under  pretense  of  embarking  them  at  New  Orleans  for  Eng- 
land.534 

The  events  thus  briefly  outlined  had  an  influence, 
when  reports  reached  London,  on  the  views  of  the  poli- 
ticians; but  the  opinion  of  the  highest  imperial  official 
in  America,  the  general-in-chief  of  the  military  forces, 
had  the  added  weight  of  his  prestige  and  dignity.  Dur- 
ing the  period  of  his  command,  General  Gage  was  fre- 
quently asked  to  give  the  ministers  his  advice  on  west- 
ern problems;  and  from  his  numerous  communications 
his  views,  constantly  changing  as  fuller  and  more  cor- 
rect information  arrived,  may  be  learned.  His  advice, 
however,  did  not  always  correspond  with  the  news 
which  was  sent  from  the  frontier,  for  Gage  did  not 
possess  a  strong  character,  was  constantly  playing  the 
game  of  politics,  and,  like  most  of  the  public  men  of  his 
generation  and  of  others,  adjusted  his  views  to  the 
wishes  of  his  changing  superiors! 

When  the  British  armies  occupied  the  West,  the 
opinion  was  widely  spread  that  the  war  had  been  fought 
mainly  for  the  purpose  of  colonizing  the  region  with 
men  of  English  speech.  It  was  well  known  that  the 
men  who  had  made  the  treaty  of  peace  were  virtually 
pledged  to  such  a  policy,  and  accordingly  General  Am- 
herst  distributed  the  troops  in  small  garrisons  with  that 
end  in  view.  A  man  of  Gage's  characteristics  was  not 
likely  to  run  counter  to  purposes  with  such  weighty  in- 
dorsement and  began  immediately  to  busy  himself  with 

53*Alvord  and  Carter,  The  nevi  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections, 
vol.  xi],  462.  See  also  Gage  to  Shelburne,  February  22,  1767,  in  idem,  506  ff. 
Gage  seems  to  have  been  firmly  convinced  that  this  practice  was  usual;  but 
when  General  Haldimand  sent  an  officer  to  New  Orleans  to  investigate,  he 
reported  that  the  English  merchants  were  carrying  on  a  perfectly  legitimate 
trade  in  agricultural  products,  and  that  he  found  no  evidence  of  their  ever 
having  traded  in  furs.  Captain  Marsh  to  Haldimand,  November  20,  1767,  in 
British  Museum,  Additional  Manuscripts,  21728,  p.  190. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  305 

similar  plans.  It  was  not  until  considerably  later  that 
he  became  an  opponent- though  never  a  bold  one -to 
western  expansion. 

The  problem  of  the  defense  of  the  new  acquisitions 
was  the  first  which  appealed  to  the  mind  of  the  general. 
Amherst's  distribution  of  the  forces  had  entailed  a  large 
expense  on  the  department  and  in  the  crucial  test  of  the 
Pontiac  War  had  completely  failed  to  maintain  peace. 
Here,  then,  was  a  military  problem  of  the  first  moment. 
Gage's  opinion  after  consultation  with  Colonel  Bouquet 
and  others  was  that  the  best  means  to  defend  the  West 
would  be  to  erect  military  settlements.  A  pamphlet  on 
the  subject  was  prepared  by  William  Smith  of  Phila- 
delphia with  the  assistance  of  Ensign  Hutchins  and  un- 
der the  general  supervision  of  Colonel  Bouquet.535  The 
author  advocated  the  establishment  of  settlements  of 
soldiers  whose  families  would  in  the  course  of  time  sup- 
ply the  defenders  of  the  frontiers.  To  the  general  the 
plan  appeared  so  simple  and  workable  that  he  expected 
no  opposition  to  it  from  the  ministry;  and  in  the  treaty 
of  peace  with  the  Indians  after  their  uprising,  he  ex- 
acted tracts  of  land  around  Niagara  and  Fort  Pitt, 
where,  he  wrote  Lord  Halifax,  he  had  determined  to 
establish  such  military  colonies.536  As  soon  as  he  learned 
of  the  occupation  of  the  Illinois  country  by  his  troops, 
he  selected  that  region  for  another  such  settlement.537 
But  the  opinion  in  ministerial  circles  concerning  the 
West  was  changing,  and  the  Board  of  Trade,  even  un- 

535  Historical  Account  of  the  Expedition     .     .     .     under  Henry  Bouquet, 
etc.     This  was  published   at  Philadelphia  in   1765.     The   authorship  of  this 
pamphlet  has  been  determined  by  Mr.  Spofford,  formerly  of  the  Library  of 
Congress. 

536  Gage  to  Halifax,  April   14,  1764  in  Alvord  and  Carter,   The  Critical 
Period  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  240. 

537  Gage  to  Conway,  March  28,   1766,  in  Alvord   and   Carter,    The  new 
Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  197. 


306  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

der  a  Chatham  ministry,  reported  unfavorably  on  this 
project.  General  Haldimand,  in  1767,  while  com- 
manding in  the  South,  made  a  similar  proposal  for  the 
region  of  the  lower  Mississippi ;  but  Gage  had  already 
become  skeptical  about  the  value  of  maintaining  costly 
posts  in  the  West  and  gave  him  no  encouragement.538 

Gage's  attitude  towards  the  lower  Mississippi  posts 
was  dependent  on  the  feasibility  of  utilizing  the  right  to 
navigate  the  river  which  had  been  secured  by  the  treaty 
of  peace.  The  British  had  not  been  long  in  possession 
of  the  West  before  they  discovered  their  mistake  in  not 
insisting  upon  the  cession  of  New  Orleans  which 
guarded  so  securely  the  entrance  to  this  great  artery  of 
trade  and  was  the  important  market  towards  which  the 
commerce  of  the  valley  drifted.  It  was  soon  perceived 
that  some  means  of  direct  approach  to  the  river  must 
be  found  that  would  not  compel  the  British  traders  to 
pass  through  that  stretch  of  river  where  the  two  banks 
were  in  the  possession  of  a  hostile  nation ;  both  trading 
interests  and  military  necessity  demanded  this,  since  .in 
case  of  war  the  Spaniards  could  easily  close  the  Missis- 
sippi against  any  force.  Gage  gave  his  attention  to  this 
problem  and  decided  to  open  a  water  route  via  the  Iber- 
ville  River  and  the  lakes  to  Mobile.  Work  was  pushed 
on  this  channel  for  several  years,  but  in  the  end  all  hope 
of  making  it  practicable  was  abandoned.539 

In  the  preceding  chapter  there  was  quoted  at  length 
a  letter  in  which  Lord  Shelburne  expounded  his  ideas 

sss  Gage  to  Haldimand,  September  6,  1767  in  British  Museum,  Additional 
Manuscripts,  21663,  P-  II2-  Haldimand  to  Gage,  June  17,  1767  in  idem,  85. 

539  These  details  are  to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  of  General  Gage 
with  the  home  government  and  with  the  various  officers  in  the  South.  See 
particularly  letters  in  Haldimand  Papers,  in  British  Museum,  Additional 
Manuscripts,  21622  and  21633.  *n  J766,  Captain  Gordon,  in  charge  of  the 
engineering  work  in  the  West,  declared  "The  free  Navigation  of  the  Missis- 
sippi a  joke."- Hanna,  Wilderness  Trail,  vol.  ii,  53. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 307 

* 

in  regard  to  the  future  of  the  West  and  requested  Gen- 
eral Gage's  opinion  upon  them.  The  latter  answered 
on  February  22,  1767,  and  his  letter  is  the  best  source  of 
the  general's  contemporary  views  concerning  the  trans- 
montane  region.  By  this  time  he  had  received  consid- 
erable information  from  various  sources  but  in  par- 
ticular a  full  report  from  Captain  Gordon,  who  had 
been  sent  throughout  the  West  on  a  tour  of  inspection.540 
He  summed  up  his  wisdom  as  follows : 

That  trade  will  go  with  the  stream,  is  a  maxim  found  to  be 
true,  from  all  accounts  that  have  been  received  of  the  Indian 
trade  carried  on  in  the  vast  tract  of  country,  which  lies  on  the 
back  of  the  British  colonies;  and  that  the  peltry  acquired  there, 
is  carried  to  the  sea  either  by  the  River  Saint  Lawrence,  or  River 
Mississippi,  as  the  trade  is  situated  on  the  lakes,  inland  river 
and  streams,  whose  waters  communicate  respectively  with  those 
two  immense  rivers.  The  part  which  goes  down  the  St.  Law- 
rence we  may  reckon  will  be  transported  to  Great  Britian,  but 
I  apprehend  what  goes  down  the  Mississippi  will  never  enter 
British  ports;  and  I  imagine  that  nothing  but  a  prospect  of  a 
superior  profit  or  force,  will  turn  the  channel  of  the  trade  con- 
trary to  the  above  maxim.541 

Starting,  therefore,  with  this  maxim  he  concluded 
that  the  only  practicable  method  to  offset  the  difficulties 
was  to  make  a  display  of  force  by  the  erection  of  forts 
at  the  mouths  of  the  Ohio  and  Illinois  Rivers.  This 
might  prevent  furs  being  carried  down  the  Mississippi 
and  Spanish  traders  from  encroaching  on  British  terri- 
tory. A  fort  on  Lake  Pontchartrain  would  serve  the 
same  purpose  in  West  Florida.  Gage  himself  was, 
however,  very  skeptical  of  the  efficiency  of  such  forts, 
since  traders  and  Indians  could  pass  them  by  night  with 

540  Gordon's  report  is  printed  in  extenso  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  neia 
Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  290  ff. 

541  The  whole  letter  which  is  extremely  interesting  is  printed  in  idem,  506. 


308 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

great  ease.  After  expounding  these  more  general 
thoughts,  the  general's  letter  turned  to  the  question  of 
the  management  of  the  Indians.  He  expressed  great 
satisfaction  with  the  superintendents  and  their  commis- 
saries in  governing  these  unruly  natives,  but  he  had 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  policy  of  limiting  the 
trade  to  posts  was  wrong  since  these  could  not  be  multi- 
plied sufficiently  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  numerous 
Indian  tribes.  Regulations,  he  asserted,  were  very  nec- 
essary to  control  the  wanderings  of  the  traders  who 
should  be  compelled  to  bring  back  the  peltry  to  the 
colony  from  which  they  received  their  license.  With 
the  exception  of  the  feature  of  the  posts  he  approved 
of  the  plan  as  it  had  been  outlined  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  and  was  actually  inaugurated  by  the  superin- 
tendents. He  closed,  however,  with  a  suggestion  of  an 
entirely  different  system,  namely,  that  of  the  French, 
who  had  divided  the  country  into  districts  wherein  the 
exclusive  trading  privileges  were  sold  to  merchants  or 
companies  for  an  annual  rent  paid  to  the  crown.542 

Besides  seeking  information  from  his  correspondents 
in  America,  Lord  Shelburne  examined  carefully  the 
archives  of  the  Board  of  Trade  and  of  his  own  depart- 
ment and  in  both  places  discovered  many  communica- 
tions of  interest.  On  the  plan  for  the  organization  of 
Indian  affairs  were  found  many  criticisms  which  had 
been  written  at  the  request  of  Lord  Hillsborough  by  a 
large  number  of  persons  familiar  with  western  America. 
These  Lord  Shelburne  supplemented  by  submitting  the 
document  to  others,  and  he  also  sent  out  Lord  Barring- 
ton's  plan  for  similar  criticism.  Many  of  these  papers 

542  He  had  changed  his  opinion  on  this  point,  for  in  his  report  on  Canada 
in  1762,  he  distinctly  disapproved  of  this  method.  See  Shortt  and  Doughty, 
Constitutional  Documents,  70. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  309 

have  been  preserved,  and  from  them  it  is  possible  to  dis- 
cover the  prevailing  opinion  in  administrative  circles 
about  the  organization  of  the  West.543 

It  would  be  monotonous  to  analyze  the  discussions 
presented  in  all  these  documents,  though  taken  sepa- 
rately they  are  illuminating.  The  majority  of  the  writ- 
ers gave  a  general  approval  of  the  plan  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  and  limited  their  objections  to  particular 
points.  Thus  Benjamin  Franklin  thought  that  it  would 
be  a  mistake  to  repeal  the  colonial  laws  governing  In- 
dian trade,  and  he  was  very  certain  that  it  would  be  im- 
practicable to  establish  a  tariff  of  prices;  but  Sir  Wil- 
liam Johnson,  whose  recommendations  formed  the  basis 

543  The  following  criticisms  of  the  Board  of  Trade's  plan  have  been 
found : 

1.  By  Sir  William  Johnson,  October  5,  1764,  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The 
Critical  Period  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  x],  327. 

2.  By  Lieutenant  Governor  Golden  of  New  York,  October  12,  1764,   in 
New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  667. 

3.  By  Colonel  Bradstreet,  December  4,  1764,  in  idem,  690. 

4.  By  Governor  Grant  of  East  Florida,  Decemb«r  i,  1764,  in  Lansdoiane 
Manuscripts,  vol.  Ix. 

5.  By  Benjamin  Franklin,  no  date,  but  indorsed,  "Written  at  the  Request 
of  Lord  S."  so  that  it  must  have  been  in  1766  or  1767,  in  Franklin,  Writings 
(ed.  Smyth),  vol.  iv,  467. 

6.  By  Richard  Jackson,  no  date  but  in  October,  1766  in  Lansdoiune  Man- 
uscripts, vol.  Ivii,  64,  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  ne<w  Regime  [Illinois 
Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  422. 

7.  By  unknown,  no  date,  Lansdotvne  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ivii. 

8.  By  John  Stuart,  December  i,   1764  in  Public  Record  Office,   Colonial 
Office  Papers,  323.19,  p.  20. 

Of  the  criticisms  of  Lord  Barrington's  plan,  the  following  have  been 
found : 

1.  By  General  Gage,  no  date,  but  1766  or  1767,  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts, 
vol.  1,  49,  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical 
Collections,  vol.  xi],  243. 

2.  "Remarks  on  Lord  Barrington's  plan,  No.  i,"  no  name,  no  date,  but 
probably  by  General  Amherst,  in   1766  or  1767  in  Lansdoiane  Manuscripts, 
vol.  1,  65. 

3.  By  Captain  B.  Roche  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Regiment,  February,  1767, 
Idem,  vol.  Ix. 

4.  By  Richard  Jackson  in  the  same  paper  cited  above. 


3io  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

of  the  plan,  maintained  the  opposite  opinion  on  both 
these  points,  as  did  Governor  Grant  of  East  Florida. 

Lord  Harrington's  plan  was  not  received  so  favor- 
ably. His  radical  and  absurd  recommendation  to  aban- 
don the  West  did  not  receive  the  indorsement  of  any  of 
the  writers,  although  it  was  known  that  he  had  received 
the  support  of  many  influential  politicians.  General 
Gage,  in  his  notes  on  the  paper,  revealed  his  usual 
timidity  and  his  disinclination  to  offend  a  powerful 
nobleman  in  his  few  gentle  remarks  about  the  actual 
conditions  which  had  been  misunderstood  by  Lord  Bar- 
rington.  If  the  identification  of  the  writer  of  "Re- 
marks, No.  i."  as  General  Amherst  is  correct,  he  can  not 
be  charged  with  similar  timidity,  for  he  stood  squarely 
by  the  opposite  opinion  to  that  upheld  by  the  noble 
lord.  To  his  mind  it  was  evident  that  the  greatest  bene- 
fit of  the  West  to  Great  Britain  could  be  obtained  only 
by  occupying  the  region  immediately.  In  the  matter 
of  the  forts,  he  held  that  they  were  important  and  neces- 
sary for  the  maintenance  of  peace  with  the  Indians  and 
for  protecting  the  country  against  foreign  foes. 

One  of  these  papers  is  of  preeminent  importance  on 
account  of  its  influence  upon  the  mind  of  the  secretary 
of  state,  whose  characteristics  put  him  in  sympathy  with 
the  radical  views  of  the  writer.  This  paper  was  writ- 
ten by  Richard  Jackson,  called  by  his  friends  "Omnis- 
cient" until  Dr.  Samuel  Johnson  changed  the  epithet  to 
"all-knowing"  because  "omniscient  is  verbum  solemne 
appropriated  to  the  Supreme  Being."544  Jackson  had 
been  friendly  with  the  faction  of  the  court  and  was 
appointed  secretary  to  George  Grenville  in  1763.  At 
the  time  he  was  agent  for  Pennsylvania.  He  was  a 
strenuous  opponent  of  the  Stamp  Act;  and,  at  the  in- 

544  Quoted  in  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Sfielburne,  vol.  i,  224,  footnote. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  311 

auguration  of  the  Chatham  ministry  was  one  of  the 
principal  advisers  of  Lord  Shelburne.  His  most  in- 
timate friend  was  Benjamin  Franklin  with  whom  he 
wrote  in  1760  the  famous  pamphlet,  The  Interests  of 
Great  Britain  considered,  which  has  been  described  in 
another  connection.545  The  two  men  appear  to  have 
been  in  substantial  agreement  on  all  colonial  problems 
throughout  their  lives. 

Jackson  wrote,  at  the  request  of  Lord  Shelburne,  a 
criticism  of  both  the  plan  of  the  Board  of  Trade  and 
that  of  Lord  Barrington.546  His  fundamental  thought 
was  that  of  the  physiocratic  political  philosophy :  Lais- 
sez  faire,  laissez  alter.  Governmental  control,  partic- 
ularly when  exercised  at  a  long  distance,  could  result 
only  in  harm.  The  great  American  West  offered  in- 
finite opportunities  for  trader  and  settler,  both  of  whom 
would  make  the  best  use  of  them,  provided  they  were 
given  the  utmost  freedom  compatible  with  good  gov- 
ernment. To  place  the  power  of  regulating  trade  in 
the  hands  of  governmental  officials,  even  when  these 
were  men  of  the  most  honest  character,  would  be  a 
most  dangerous  experiment.  The  evils  that  resulted 
from  freedom  were  infinitely  to  be  preferred. 

Starting  with  such  a  philosophical  basis,  Jackson 
could  find  very  little  to  be  recommended  in  either  of 
the  systems  proposed.  The  plan  of  the  Board  of  Trade 
he  regarded  as  "in  a  great  measure  impracticable."  He 
thought  that  it  would  be  unwise  to  repeal  all  the  colo- 
nial laws  regulating  the  Indian  trade.  There  have 
been  evils  in  it,  but,  he  wrote:  "There  are  mischiefs 
irreparable  from  the  situation  and  circumstances  of 

545  See  page  58. 

546  Printed  by  Alvord  and  Carter  in  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical 
Collections,  vol.  xi],  422  ff. 


312  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

countries,  as  well  political  as  natural;  perhaps  these  are 
as  well  provided  for  as  the  nature  of  the  case  will  ad- 
mit." Certainly  there  was  no  proof  that  the  proposed 
regulations  would  prove  to  be  efficient.  The  powers 
granted  the  Indian  superintendents  were  certainly  so 
great,  that  they  could  not  escape  the  dangers  of  favor- 
itism and  corruption.  The  proposal  to  establish  a  tariff 
for  the  sale  of  goods,  Jackson  pronounced  "little  better 
than  a  solecism."  He  denied  that  he  was  insensible  to 
the  evils  suffered  by  the  Indians,  but  he  wrote : 

I  have  long  since  learnt  that  though  all  evils  are  not  incurable 
some  are  so,  or  at  least  are  curable  only  by  greater  evils.  I  have 
long  thought  the  Indians  and  Europeans  will  always  necessarily 
incommode  one  another,  until  the  former  wear  out  which  I  be- 
lieve they  will  certainly  do  within  a  compass  of  years  abun- 
dantly shorter  than  is  generally  expected. 

Jackson  found  himself  entirely  opposed  to  the  plan  of 
Lord  Harrington.  The  general  principle  of  abandon- 
ing the  West  he  regarded  as  "surely  ill-grounded."  It 
would  deprive  Great  Britain  of  a  valuable  trade  and 
might  be  the  occasion  of  the  French  again  gaining  the 
dominion  of  that  region.  He  himself  was  in  favor  of 
the  rapid  settlement  of  the  territory,  and  recommended 
a  colony  on  the  lower  Mississippi  and  one  in  the  Illinois 
country.  He  took  great  exception  to  Lord  Barring- 
ton's  arguments  in  regard  to  the  uselessness  of  forts  in 
the  Indian  country,  though  he,  too,  thought  that  there 
was  no  need  of  so  many.  Jackson's  opinions  on  the 
West  carried  great  weight,  for,  aside  from  his  reputed 
knowledge  on  all  subjects,  his  close  relations  with 
America  and  Americans  had  given  him  a  very  clear  in- 
sight into  conditions  among  the  colonists. 

Up  to  this  point  there  has  been  considered  the  infor- 
mation received  by  the  secretary  of  state  at  his  own 
solicitation;  but  he  also  found  numerous  volunteers 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  313 

anxious  to  impart  their  views  to  him.  Among  these 
were  many  members  of  one  or  other  of  the  numerous 
land  companies  formed  to  exploit  the  West  by  settle- 
ment. They  exercised  great  influence  over  Lord  Shel- 
burne,  and  his  final  program  was  partly  based  on  their 
recommendations,  though  he  seems  to  have  hesitated 
long  before  incorporating  in  his  policy  the  promotion 
of  western  colonies  and  did  actually  lay  before  the  king 
and  his  colleagues  an  outline  of  his  western  plan  with- 
out any  mention  of  this  most  radical  element. 

As  late  as  June  20,  1767,  the  secretary  of  state  was 
interested  only  in  the  enforcement  of  the  provisions  of 
the  proclamation  of  1763,  which  prohibited  all  settle- 
ment west  of  the  mountains.  His  reason  was,  no  doubt, 
that  the  unlawful  character  of  such  settlements  caused 
disturbances  among  the  Indians  and  that,  until  legal- 
ized they  should  be  stopped.  He  wrote  to  Sir  William 
Johnson: 

The  Settlements  lately  projected  near  the  Ohio  by  persons  from 
Maryland  and  Virginia,  as  appears  by  your  last  letter,  and  that 
of  the  15th  Jany  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  are  so  injurious  to  the 
Indians,  so  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  His  Majesty's  prov- 
inces, and  such  an  audacious  defiance  of  his  royal  authority  re- 
peatedly signified  both  in  proclamations,  and  instructions  to  his 
governors  and  superintendents,  that  they  can  by  no  means  be  per- 
mitted; and  every  attempt  towards  the  making  of  them  should 
be  speedily  checked,  and  the  design  effectually  prevented.547 

A  consideration  not  mentioned  by  Lord  Shelburne  may 
have  influenced  him  to  send  the  above  instructions.  The 
settlers  in  the  Ohio  Valley  looked  to  the  eastern  colonies 
for  government  and  the  perpetuation  of  that  connection 

547  Shelburne  to  Johnson,  June  20,  1767  in  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol. 
liii,  331.  Attention  should  be  called  to  the  fact  that  one  of  the  reasons  for 
thinking  that  the  Rockingham  ministry  was  opposed  to  western  settlement  was 
based  on  a  similar  letter  of  instruction  from  Lord  Dartmouth,  but  there  were 
other  reasons,  given  in  that  connection,  which  led  me  to  draw  that  inference. 


3H  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

would  make  it  only  more  difficult  to  assert  the  direct 
dominion  of  the  empire  over  the  territory  west  of  the 
mountains,  should  it  be  determined  to  establish  western 
boundaries  for  all  existing  provinces.548 

From  available  information  it  appears  that  in  the 
beginning  of  the  summer  of  1767,  the  secretary  of  state 
still  held  the  question  of  future  colonies  under  advise- 
ment. He  was,  however,  surrounded  by  men  who  were 
not  so  patient  and  who  awaited  a  decision  in  the  matter 
with  great  anxiety.  It  has  already  been  seen  that  many 
land  schemes  were  initiated  at  the  close  of  the  war,  but 
the  reluctance  of  the  Grenville-Bedford  ministry  to  take 
action  and  the  hostility  of  so  many  of  the  Old  Whigs 
to  western  settlement  had  somewhat  dampened  the 
ardor  of  the  speculators.  Yet  three  projects  were  actu- 
ally launched  during  the  time  of  the  latter  ministry  and 
were  promoted  most  zealously  after  the  Pittites  were 
raised  to  power,  since  their  well  known  imperialism, 
supported  as  it  was  by  the  desire  of  the  king  and  his 
faction  to  justify  the  treaty  of  peace  by  the  development 
of  the  West,  gave  hope  of  some  progressive  policy  being 
inaugurated. 

Strangely  enough  the  Mississippi  Company  did  not 
make  its  appearance  again  at  this  time,  and  there  are 
no  other  indications  of  activity  among  the  Virginians. 
Their  inaction  in  a  matter  of  such  vital  interest  to  their 
colonial  dominion  arouses  the  suspicion  that  the  Chat- 
ham ministry  was  known  to  be  hostile  to  that  colony's 

548  Shelburne  never  considered  the  claims  of  the  colonies  to  the  West  as 
valid.  In  1782,  when  the  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
was  being  negotiated,  he  wrote  to  Oswald:  "Independently  of  all  the  nonsense 
of  charters,  I  mean  when  they  talk  of  extending  as  far  as  the  sun  sets,  the 
soil  is,  and  has  always  been  acknowledged  to  be  the  king's.  For  the  good  of 
America,  whatever  the  government  may  be,  new  provinces  must  be  erected  on 
those  back  lands  and  down  the  Mississippi. "  -  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne, 
vol.  ii,  194. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  315 

extensive  claims  to  territory,  but  possibly  these  prom- 
inent Virginians  of  the  Mississippi  Company  were  of 
the  opinion  that  their  interests  would  be  better  pro- 
moted if  they  pressed  the  undoubted  legal  rights  of  the 
old  Ohio  Company  and  the  claims  of  the  soldiers  who 
had  served  in  the  last  war  under  the  governor's  promise 
of  compensation  in  the  shape  of  western  lands.  Colonel 
Mercer  represented  these  interests  in  London  and  re- 
vived a  petition  of  the  former  which  he  had  failed  to 
press  upon  the  Rockingham  administration.549  The 
officers  associated  with  Thomas  Mant,  who  had  pre- 
sented their  petition  so  unsuccessfully  to  the  previous 
administration,  might  now  expect  favorable  action  be- 
cause their  advocate,  Sir  Jeffrey  Amherst,  was  one  of 
Lord  Shelburne's  favorite  advisers  in  American  affairs. 
The  lands  for  which  the  Mississippi  Company  had 
petitioned  were  also  looked  upon  with  longing  by  Gen- 
eral Phineas  Lyman  of  Connecticut,  who  represented/ 
the  "Military  Adventurers."  These  were  colonial  of-f; 
fleers  who  had  served  in  the  late  war  and  were  now] 
associated  with  the  members  of  the  former  company  of 
Samuel  Hazard.550  Lyman  appeared  in  England  about 
1763,  it  is  said,551  but  there  are  no  direct  evidences  of  his 
activities  until  Lord  Shelburne  became  southern  secre- 
tary in  1766.  In  several  long  memorials,552  addressed 
to  that  official,  Lyman  proposed  that  measures  should 
be  adopted  to  erect  in  the  course  of  years  five  or  six 

549  This  was  considered  by  the  Board  of  Trade  on  June  26,  1767,  but  no 
action  was  taken  on  it.     See  Public  Record  Office,  Colonial  Office  Papers,  5.24. 

550  On  Hazard's  scheme  see  Alden,  New  Governments,  7,  and  also  page  92. 

551  Dwight,  Travels  in  Ne<w  England  and  New-York,  vol.  i,  272;  Mathews, 
The  Expansion  of  Ne<w  England,  126.     On  January  7,  1766,  he  wrote  Dart- 
mouth about  the  Stamp  Act,  see  Dartmouth  Manuscripts. 

052  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  2,  127,  149,  157.  Some  of  these  are  print- 
ed in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  neiv  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections, 
vol.  xi]. 


316  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

colonies  along  the  Mississippi  River  from  the  falls  of 
St.  Anthony  to  the  colony  of  West  Florida.  His  gen- 
eral recommendation  was  that  a  governor  be  appointed 
to  have  oversight  over  all  this  territory,  but  his  immedi- 
ate proposal  was  limited  to  the  establishment  of  one 
colony  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  River.553  The  general 
was  ready  on  his  own  responsibility  to  gain  the  consent 
of  the  Indians  to  such  an  undertaking,  and  he  promised 
to  bring  to  the  region  ten  thousand  settlers  in  four  years. 
He  pointed  out  the  great  need  of  a  government  in  that 
region  to  serve  as  a  protection  against  the  Spaniards,  to 
keep  the  Indians  quiet  by  offering  opportunities  to 
trade,  and  to  make  possible  the  exploitation  of  the  fur 
trade  by  the  Mississippi  River,  which  he  declared  to  be 
easily  navigated.  The  estimated  expense  was  five  thou- 
sand pounds  per  year,  but  in  the  course  of  time  such  a 
colony  would  decrease  the  military  expenses,  since  the 
settlers  would  be  able  to  defend  the  far  western  boun- 
dary, and  the  quitrents  would  reach  in  a  short  time  the 
sum  of  eighty  thousand  pounds  per  year,  which  could 
be  used,  after  providing  for  the  civil  government,  to 
promote  religious  education  and  thus  to  strengthen  the 
bonds  uniting  the  colony  to  the  mother  country. 

This  plan  of  Lyman's  was  in  accord,  except  for  an 
overlapping  of  boundaries,  with  one  formed  in  Phila- 
delphia that  was  destined  to  be  the  most  favored  and  to 
exercise  the  greatest  influence  in  London.  In  the  dis- 
cussion of  a  previous  topic  mention  was  made  of  the  fact 
that  George  Croghan,  while  in  England  on  business  for 
Sir  William  Johnson,  had  become  associated  in  some 
way  with  a  plan  for  a  colony  in  the  Illinois  country.554 

sss  The  extent  of  territory  was  to  be  one  hundred  miles  north  of  the  Ohio 
and  a  similar  distance  south ;  the  eastward  extent  to  be  three  hundred  miles. 
554  See  page  214. 


WESTERN 

COLONIAL,  SCHE3IES 
1766-1767 

(based  cm  John  Mitchell's  Map) 


IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  319 

After  his  return  to  America,  in  1765,  he  was  sent  by 
Johnson  to  the  West  to  assist  in  the  pacification  of  the 
western  Indians.  Although  he  did  not  actually  reach 
the  Illinois  country,  he  was  on  the  Wabash  River  and 
was  able  to  learn  something  of  the  fertility  of  the  sur- 
rounding region.  In  November  of  1765  he  returned 
and  talked  over  the  subject  with  Johnson  and  at  that 
time  there  was  probably  conceived  the  plan  which  was 
later  developed.555  Johnson  immediately  prepared  the 
minds  of  the  British  ministry  for  the  acceptance  of  a 
colonial  scheme  in  a  letter  to  the  Board  of  Trade  in 
which  he  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  British  traders 
purchasing  French  land  in  the  Illinois  country  and  thus 
forming  the  nucleus  of  a  colony.556  General  Gage  was 
later  approached.  Although  he  refused  to  become  a 
partner  in  the  undertaking,  the  plan  which  was  being 
formed  naturally  appealed  to  him,  since  he  was  at  that 
very  time  turning  over  in  his  mind  the  question  of  the 
best  means  of  protecting  the  frontiers  at  the  least  ex- 
pense and  was  recommending  in  a  tentative  way  the  erec- 
tion of  military  colonies.  His  correspondence  with 
Johnson  on  the  subject  had  an  immediate  effect.  On 
March  28,  1766,  Gage  advised  that  a  military  govern- 
ment be  established  in  the  Illinois  country.557 

Throughout  the  period  of  his  superintendency  of 

555  Croghan   was   undoubtedly   the   originator    and    Sir   William   Johnson 
gave  him  the  credit.     W.  Franklin  to  B.  Franklin,  April  30,  1766  in  Franklin, 
Papers,  vol.  ii,  17,  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois 
Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  221. 

556  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  809. 

557  The  best  account  of  the  scheme  is  in  Carter,   Great  Britain  and  the 
Illinois  Country,  1763-1774,  chap.  vi.     For  references,  his  pages  may  be  con- 
sulted.    The   above   account  of  the  development   differs  somewhat  in  minor 
particulars.     All  the  documents  to  which  reference  is  made  have  been  printed 
in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol. 
xi]. 


320  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Indian  affairs  Johnson  was  closely  associated  with  the 
Philadelphia  firm  of  Baynton,  Wharton,  and  Morgan 
which  sent  its  young  partner,  George  Morgan,  to  open 
up  the  trade  in  the  Illinois  country.  Much  of  the 
financial  business  of  the  superintendent's  office  was  con- 
ducted through  the  firm,  and  from  the  tone  of  his  letters 
Johnson  had  a  very  kindly  feeling  for  the  merchants. 
In  its  trading  venture  to  the  West,  Baynton,  Wharton, 
and  Morgan  probably  had  other  purposes  than  the  mere 
purchase  of  furs.  While  Morgan  was  still  busy  mak- 
ing his  preparations  to  go  to  Pittsburgh  and  embark  on 
the  Ohio,  he  and  his  seniors  held  a  meeting  with  their 
friends,  Joseph  Galloway,  John  Hughes,  Sir  William 
Franklin,  George  Croghan,  and  others  for  the  purpose 
of  considering  the  future  of  the  country  into  which  the 
young  man  was  to  introduce  British  trade.  Croghan 
disclosed  what  he  had  discussed  with  Johnson  during 
the  preceding  November,  and  it  was  determined  to 
form  a  company  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  land 
from  the  Illinois  French558  in  order  to  anticipate  the 
formation  of  a  colony  that  it  was  expected  would  soon 
be  established  by  the  British  government.  The  ex- 
pansion of  this  plan  was  due  to  the  advice  of  Sir  Wil- 
liam Franklin,  who  proposed  petitioning  for  the  erec- 
tion of  a  colony.  This  met  with  the  approval  of  the 
company,  and  it  was  decided  to  petition  for  a  grant  of 
one  million  two  hundred  thousand  acres  or  more  within 
such  a  colony  without,  however,  making  any  offer  of 
purchase.  Roughly  speaking  the  colony  was  to  include 

558  Croghan  wrote  to  Johnson  on  March  30  that  by  letters  from  England 
favorable  action  on  such  a  plan  was  to  be  expected.  See  Johnson  Manuscripts, 
vol.  xii,  127.  John  Baynton  in  a  letter  dated  March  i  said  the  same.  See 
Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  Ohio  Company  Papers.  It  has  been  impos- 
sible to  learn  who  these  correspondents  were  and  what  their  reasons  were  for 
expecting  such  action. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  321 

the  territory  lying  between  the  Wisconsin  and  the  Ohio, 
the  Wabash  and  the  Mississippi  Rivers.559 

To  the  original  members  of  this  company  Sir  Wil- 
liam Johnson  was  added  on  account  of  his  influence  in 
matters  of  western  policy;  Benjamin  Franklin,  at  the 
time  in  London,  was  also  admitted  and  chosen  as  the 
company's  representative  in  England;  and  permission 
was  voted  him  to  add  the  names  of  "such  gentlemen  of 
character  and  fortune  in  England"  as  he  thought  would 
be  most  likely  to  promote  the  undertaking.56'  The 
agent  could  not  have  been  better  selected,  for  the  Rock- 
ingham  ministry  was  drawing  to  its  end  and  with  the 
Chatham  ministry  came  Lord  Shelburne,  the  friend 
and  admirer  of  the  Philadelphia  philosopher.  Other 
considerations  also  made  the  path  easy  for  this  enterj 
prise.  The  Chatham  administration,  unlike  that  o 
Lord  Rockingham,  was  in  favor  of  establishing  royal 
governments  in  place  of  all  the  proprietaries  in  Amer- 
ica; and,  since  the  Pennsylvania  members  of  this  new 
land  company  belonged  to  the  anti-proprietary  party 
of  Pennsylvania,  whose  interests  Franklin  was  promot- 
ing, their  representative  naturally  received  very  cor- 
dial treatment  from  the  ministers. 

Through  the  letters  of  Franklin  to  his  son  and  others, 
it  is  possible  to  follow  the  negotiations  by  which  Lord 
Shelburne  was  won  over  to  the  radical  measure  of  dis- 
regarding all  opposing  interests  and  proposing  a  line  of 
colonies  extending  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico.561  General  Lyman  joined  his  forces  with 

559  See  "Reasons  for  Establishing,  etc."  in  Alvord  and  Carter,   The  new 
Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  248  ff. 

560  W.  Franklin  to  B.  Franklin,  April  30,  1766  in  Franklin,  Papers,  vol.  ii, 
17,  printed  in  idem. 

561  These  letters  have  not  all  been  preserved  but  extracts  from  them,  found 
among  the  Sir  William  Johnson  Manuscripts,  have  been  printed  in  Franklin, 
Works  (ed.  Bigelow),  vol.  iv,  416  ff. 


^^^.     \\ 

* 


322  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Franklin;  and  no  doubt  General  Amherst  was  a  party 
to  the  negotiations,  though  his  name  does  not  appear  as 
a  participant  in  the  successive  conferences.  Franklin 
I  wrote  on  May  10,  1766,  that  he  liked  the  project  of  a 
colony  in  the  Illinois  country  and  would  forward  it. 
Later  he  expressed  regret  that  he  had  not  been  per- 
mitted to  add  more  than  two  partners  to  the  undertak- 
ing, for  "by  numbers"  he  wrote,  "we  might  increase  the 
weight  of  interest  here.  But  perhaps  we  shall  do  with- 
out." To  this  proposal  to  increase  the  number  of  peti- 
tioners, Franklin's  partners  \vrere  agreeable,  provided 
"a  proportionate  number  of  acres  be  added." 

In  September  the  scheme  was  laid  before  Shelburne 
who  had  already  read  the  plan  and  its  recommendation 
y  Johnson.  His  opinion  was  favorable  but  he  said  the 
reject  was  not  in  accord  with  the  opinion  of  certain  of 
his  colleagues.  Franklin  thought  the  reference  was  to 
Lord  Hillsborough,  the  president  of  the  Board  of 
Trade,  who  feared  Ireland  might  be  depopulated.  The 
other  objections  were  the  usual  ones,  the  territory  was 
too  far  inland  for  commerce  and  for  government,  etc. 
There  was,  however,  one  reason  for  opposition,  unmen- 
tioned  by  Franklin.  In  1764,  the  ministry  had  deter- 
mined on  the  gradual  expansion  of  the  settlements  west- 
ward and  Lord  Hillsborough  was  at  that  time  in  favor 
of  such  a  policy;  but  the  plans  of  these  land  companies 
looked  to  the  opening  up  of  territory  in  the  far  West, 
which  was  separated  by  hundreds  of  miles  from  the 
settled  parts  of  the  colonies  and  was  situated  in  the 
midst  of  Indians  known  to  be  hostile  to  the  English. 
The  various  objections  were  discussed  at  length;  and 
although  Lord  Shelburne  declared  them  to  be  of  little 

562  Thomas  Wharton  to  Franklin,  November  n,  1766,  Franklin,  Papers, 
vol.  ii,  52,  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new  Regime  [Illinois  His- 
torical Collections,  vol.  xi],  431. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  323 

weight,  he  refused  to  commit  himself.  In  a  conference 
in  October,  the  secretary  of  state  went  further  and  said 
he  approved  of  the  scheme  but  that  every  proposed 
expense  for  America  would  meet  with  many  objections. 
The  next  month  Richard  Jackson  added  his  influence 
and  drew  up  the  long  paper  on  the  plan  of  the  Board 
of  Trade  and  that  of  Lord  Barrington,  that  has  already 
been  commented  upon.  In  this  the  author  wrote 
strongly  in  favor  of  western  colonies  and  particularly  of 
one  in  the  Illinois  country.563 

No  further  progress  was  made  during  the  winter  and 
spring  months,  for  reasons  that  will  be  sufficiently  clear 
when  the  condition  of  the  ministry  during  this  period 
is  remembered.  In  June,  1767,  Lord  Shelburne,  who 
had  by  that  time  worked  out  the  other  details  of  hi 
western  policy,  told  Franklin  again  that  he  approve 
of  the  colony,  but  that  the  members  of  the  Board  of 
Trade  raised  many  objections.  It  was  at  about  this 
time  that  Shelburne  was  ordering  the  unauthorized  set- 
tlers on  the  Ohio  to  be  removed.  The  summer  of  1767 
was  one  of  great  political  unrest,  but  towards  the  close 
of  August,  the  secretary  of  state  and  Secretary  Conway 
had  a  conference  with  Franklin  and  the  latter's  eloquent 
tongue  persuaded  both  to  adopt  the  plan  of  promoting 
western  colonies.564 

Lord  Shelburne  had  in  a  little  over  a  year  collected 
an  enormous  amount  of  information  from  all  quarters 
and  was  in  a  position  to  formulate  and  promote  an 
American  policy  that  would  be  based  on  a  wider  knowl- 
edge of  conditions  than  had  been  possessed  by  any  other 
minister  save  Lord  Halifax;  but,  since  his  mind  was 
more  comprehensive  and  studious,  he  was  able  to  form 

563  The  paper  is  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  ne<w  Regime,  428. 

564  B.  Franklin  to  W.  Franklin,  August  28,  1767  in  Franklin,  Works   (ed. 
Bigelow),  vol.  iv,  309;  Writings  (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  v,  45. 


324  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

a  more  statesmanlike  plan  than  the  latter.  What  his 
policy  was,  through  what  vicissitudes  it  passed  and  how 
it  was  endangered  by  the  ill  considered  action  of  a  col- 
league form  a  most  interesting  chapter  in  the  history  of 
America. 


XII.     LORD  SHELBURNE'S  WESTERN 
POLICY 

Neither  the  actors  nor  the  actions  are  great,  and  yet  I  could  foresee 
great  consequences,  according  as  the  scenes  shall  be  shifted;  but  I 
think  the  whole  more  likely  to  subside  into  trifling  and  instability. 
We  are  nothing  but  factions,  and  those  factions  have  very  limited 
views.  -  HORACE  WALPOLE. 

The  Chatham  ministry,  though  composed  of  many 
discordant  elements,  had  originally  presented  the  ap- 
pearance of  great  unity  on  account  of  the  supremacy  of 
one  man,  who  had  been  vested  with  an  almost  unlimited 
authority  from  the  king.  In  a  moment  of  raillery  Ed- 
mund Burke  drew  a  caricature  of  the  situation  so  deli- 
cate as  to  be  almost  a  life  sketch.  He  was  speaking  on 
the  East  India  bill,  and  after  pointing  out  the  ill  effects 
of  so  violent  a  measure,  he  said:  "But  perhaps  this 
house  is  not  the  place  where  our  reasons  can  be  of  any 
avail :  the  great  person  who  is  to  determine  on  this  ques- 
tion may  be  a  being  far  above  our  view;  one  so  immeas- 
urably high,  that  the  greatest  abilities  (pointing  to  Mr. 
Townshend),  or  the  most  amiable  dispositions  that  are 
to  be  found  in  this  house  (pointing  to  Mr.  Conway), 
may  not  gain  access  to  him;  a  being  before  whom 
'thrones,  dominations,  princedoms,  virtues,  powers 
(waving  his  hand  all  this  time  over  the  treasury-bench, 
which  he  sat  behind),  all  veil  their  faces  with  their 
wings:'  but  though  our  arguments  may  not  reach  him 
probably  our  prayers  may!"  Burke  then  proceeded  to 
offer  up  a  prayer  to  the  "Great  Minister"  above  be- 


326  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

seeching  him  who  "rules  and  governs  all  to  have  mercy 
and  not  destroy  the  work  of  his  own  hands."565 

Through  Chatham's  prolonged  sickness  such  unity  as 
existed  broke  down,  the  councils  became  divided,  and 
the  definitive  acts  of  the  government  upon  which  the 
king  and  all  progressive  men  had  built  such  high  hopes, 
were  just  the  opposite  of  what  had  been  expected.  In 
the  end  the  ministry  became  so  disunited  that,  instead 
of  inaugurating  an  era  of  reform,  it  marked  the  begin- 
ning of  that  long  period  of  loosely  jointed  and  ineffi- 
cient administrations  which  continued  until  after  the 
close  of  the  American  Revolution.  The  preceding 
ministries  of  George  III.  had  possessed  some  coherence 
through  the  decisive  leadership  of  a  guiding  committee 
resembling  a  cabinet,  the  members  of  which  were  on 
the  whole  able  to  agree  on  measures;  but  from  now  on 
each  head  of  a  department,  becoming  more  and  more 
independent,  opposed  any  attempt  on  the  part  of  his 
colleagues  to  interfere  with,  or  to  direct,  his  business. 
Lord  North,  under  whom  this  system  of  divided  re- 
sponsibilities reached  its  culmination,  told  Charles  Fox 
in  1782  when  the  latter  urged  that  the  king  should  not 
be  his  own  minister:  "If  you  mean  there  should  not 
be  a  government  by  departments,  I  agree  with  you.  I 
think  it  a  very  bad  system.  There  should  be  one  man, 
or  a  cabinet,  to  govern  the  whole  and  direct  every 
measure.  Government  by  departments  was  not  brought 

\   in  by  me.     I  found  it  so  and  had  not  vigour  and  resolu- 

,   tion  to  put  an  end  to  it." 566 

V  Unless  this  condition  existing  in  the  Chatham  min- 
istry is  remembered,  the  occurrences  of  the  winter  and 
spring  of  1767  will  be  misunderstood.  Each  member 

565  Quoted  in  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  ii,  145,  footnote. 

506  Fox,  Memorials,  vol.  ii,  37,  quoted  in  Rose,  William  Pitt,  118. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 32? 

of  the  so-called  cabinet  was  a  head  of  a  department  re- 
sponsible solely  to  a  prime  minister  lying  on  a  sick-bed 
from  which  he  might  never  rise.  Such  independence 
had  different  effects  on  the  various  members.  In  the 
case  of  the  Duke  of  Grafton,  nominal  head,  it  seems  to 
have  increased  his  tendency  to  postpone  all  decisive 
action  in  the  hope  of  pleasing  all  parties ;  the  responsi- 
bility of  making  up  his  mind  frightened  General  Con- 
way  and  he  wished  to  resign;  to  Charles  Townshend, 
the  sickness  of  his  chief  offered  an  opportunity  to  push 
those  projects  that  would  increase  his  own  importance; 
meanwhile  Lord  Shelburne  continued  to  follow  the 
course  upon  which  he  and  Chatham  had  agreed  and  was 
always  looking  forward  to  the  time  when  his  idol  would 
be  sufficiently  recovered  to  return  to  the  helm  of  state.567 
Divided  as  the  cabinet  was,  it  was  able  generally  to 
carry  through  Parliament  the  bills  upon  which  the 
members  could  agree;  but  this  was  accomplished  with 
very  small  majorities,  particularly  in  the  House  of 
Lords.568  The  climax  of  weakness  was  reached  when 
the  Grenvilles,  the  Bedfords,  the  Rockinghams,  and  the 
Tories  united  to  reduce  the  land  tax  from  four  to  three 
shillings.  This  measure  received  the  enthusiastic  sup- 
port of  the  country  members  and  was  carried  in  Febru- 
ary, 1767,  in  opposition  to  the  administration.569  The 
loss  to  the  revenue  was  very  considerable;  and,  there- 

567  The  best  accounts  of  the  weakened  condition  of  the  ministry  are  to  be 
found  in  Grafton,  Autobiography,  and  the  letters  of  Grafton  and  Shelburne 
to  Chatham  in  Pitt's  Correspondence.  On  April  9,  1767,  Lord  Charlemont 
wrote:  "The  ministry  is  divided  into  as  many  parties  as  there  are  men  in  it: 
all  complain  of  his  [Chatham's]  want  of  participation.  Charles  Townshend 
is  at  open  war,  Conway  is  angry,  Lord  Shelburne  out  of  humour,  and  the 
Duke  of  Grafton  by  no  means  pleased."  Quoted  in  idem,  vol.  iii,  241,  footnote, 

568 —  Idem,  258,  260. 

569  —  Idem,  224;  Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  37  ff . ;  Wai- 
pole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  297 ;  Parliamentary  History,  vol.  xvi, 
362 ;  Walpole,  Letters,  vol.  v,  37. 


328  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

fore,  the  action  gave  force  to  the  very  popular  idea, 
already  discussed  in  Parliament,  of  cutting  down  the 
American  expenses  and  of  raising  a  revenue  from  the 
colonies. 

During  these  winter  months,  the  evils  of  the  depart- 
mental system  of  government  grew  every  day  more  ap- 
parent. The  prime  minister's  representatives  in  the 
cabinet,  Grafton  and  Shelburne,  gave  their  cordial  sup- 
port to  Alderman  Beckford  who  had  been  placed  in 
charge  of  the  East  India  measure,  which  was  regarded 
by  its  friends  as  the  most  important  of  those  to  be 
passed;  but  by  some  of  their  colleagues,  particularly 
Townshend  and  Conway,  this  was  opposed ;  and  finally 
all  efforts  to  reduce  the  company  to  submission  ended 
in  a  compromise  very  favorable  to  that  corporation  and 
far  removed  from  the  purpose  intended  by  Chatham. 

It  was,  however,  in  the  Colonial  Department  that  the 
prime  minister's  plans  were  most  completely  thwarted 
and  at  last  were  so  altered  by  a  parliamentary  act  as  to 
appear  to  be  the  reverse  of  his  policy.     This  was  due 
principally  to  the  rashness,  conceit,  and  instability  of 
(me  man,  Charles  Townshend,  the  chancellor  of  the  ex- 
/chequer.    His  administration  of  the  finances  might  in- 
fluence colonial  policies  because  there  were  imperial 
expenses  to  be  met  in  the  colonies;  the  civil  officers  in 
the  new  provinces  had  to  be  paid  and  the  military  estab- 
lishment must  be  supported.     During  a  debate  on  the 
army  extraordinaries  in  the  House  of  Commons,  on 
|  January  26,  1767,  George  Grenville,  whom  Franklin 
j  called  "almost  insane"  on  the  subject,  moved  that  the 
v  whole  support  of  the  army  in  America  be  laid  on  the  col- 
onies.   In  the  course  of  the  debate,  Townshend,  who  was 
charged  with  his  inconsistency  concerning  the  Stamp 
Act,  endeavored  to  escape  from  an  unanticipated  dilem- 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 329 

ma  by  declaring  himself  a  firm  believer  in  that  measure 
and  by  ridiculing  the  American  distinction  between  in- 
ternal and  external  taxes.  Finding  that  his  words 
touched  a  responsive  chord  in  the  House,  he  boasted  that 
he  knew  how  to  raise  a  revenue  from  America,  which 
might  not  be  adequate  to  meet  expenses,  but  would  be 
nearly  sufficient,  should  these  be  properly  reduced.5" 
This  statement  was  made  without  any  consultation  with 
his  colleagues,  who  were  in  no  wise  prepared  for  his 
boast  and  disagreed  with  him  entirely  in  such  a  colonial 
policy. 

The  heedless  statement  by  Townshend  had  again 
raised  the  question  of  American  taxation  in  Parliament, 
but  it  could  no  longer  be  discussed  with  that  unanimity 
of  opinion  which  had  characterized  the  debate  on  the 
Stamp  Act.  Prejudices  had  now  become  firmly  fixed 
in  the  minds  of  the  leaders  of  the  factions  and  armed 
hosts  were  already  drawn  up  in  battle  array.  In  the 
debate  which  occurred  in  February  there  was  displayed 
a  comprehensive  understanding  of  the  issue  and  of  the 
many  ramifications  of  the  colonial  problem.  The  dis- 
position of  the  West  soon  became,  as  might  be  expected, 
the  point  in  hottest  dispute  and  over  Lord  Harrington's 
plan  of  the  total  abandonment  of  the  transmontane  ter- 
ritory to  the  Indians  the  battle  of  arguments  was  waged. 
It  was  pointed  out  that  as  long  as  the  empire  garrisoned 
this  region  the  transportation  of  supplies  to  distant  posts 
was  one  of  the  largest  items  in  the  cost  of  maintaining 

570  The  best  accounts  of  this  extraordinary  act  are  Lord  Shelburne's  letter 
to  Chatham,  February  i,  in  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  184,  and  Lord 
Charlemont  to  Flood,  January  29,  in  idem,  178.  But  see  also  Walpole,  Mem- 
oirs of  George  III.,  vol.  ii,  299,  317;  Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iv,  211;  Graf- 
ton,  Autobiography,  126;  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  304;  Caven- 
dish, Debates  of  the  House  of  Commons,  vol.  i,  391  ff.,  483  ff. ;  the  letters  of 
William  S.  Johnson,  in  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Collections,  fifth  ser., 
vol.  ix,  214  ff. 


330  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

the  military  establishment,  and  the  debate  came  back 
again  and  again  to  the  best  method  of  cutting  down  this 
expense.  Economy  appeared  to  many  the  only  solu- 
tion ;  the  abandonment  of  the  West  the  only  salvation. 
Finally  George  Grenville  centered  the  discussion  on 
this  issue  by  moving  that  an  address  to  the  king  "be  pre- 
sented to  pray  that  the  troops  be  withdrawn  from  the 
frontiers  and  forts  to  the  internal  part  of  the  province." 
His  legal  mind  had  penetrated  to  the  very  heart  of  the 
problem- at  least  such  was  his  opinion -and  he  asserted 
that  if  such  an  economy  in  the  disposition  of  the  troops 
was  not  practiced,  then  the  colonies  must  be  forced  to 
bear  some  part  of  the  imperial  burden.  Charles  Town- 
shend,  who  had  probably  never  been  in  favor  of  west- 
ern expansion,  declared  that  he  would  support  Gren- 
ville's  principles  to  the  utmost  of  his  abilities,  but  for 
the  most  part  "harangued  most  inimitably  on  both  sides 
of  the  question."  In  his  mild  and  hesitating  way  Gen- 
eral Conway  protested  against  the  act  of  his  colleague 
and  ably  defended  the  policy  of  the  ministry.  For  a 
time  it  looked  as  if  the  Pittites  would  be  outvoted  on 
this  purely  western  American  question,  but  their  salva- 
tion came  through  the  indiscretion  of  their  principal 
opponent,  George  Grenville.  Tactless  as  usual,  he 
made  an  ill  timed  attack  on  the  former  conduct  of  the 
Old  Whigs,  who  were  expecting  to  vote  with  the  oppo- 
sition, and  forced  them  to  maintain  their  self-respect 
by  withdrawing  from  the  House.571 

This  escapade  of  Charles  Townshend,  his  loss  of  the 
one  shilling  in  the  land  tax,  and  his  opposition  to  the 
policy  concerning  India  were  sufficiently  momentous  to 

571  The  best  account  is  in  Rouet  to  Mure,  February  21,  1767,  Caldwell 
Papers  [Maitland  Club  Publications'},  part  ii,  vol.  ii,  106.  Another  is  in 
Flood  to  Charlemont,  February '-19,  1767,  in  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  210, 
footnote  2. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 331 

bring  Lord  Chatham  from  his  sick-bed  to  the  capital. 
The  only  possible  escape  from  the  perplexities  of  the 
ministry  was  the  dismissal  of  the  troublesome  member 
and  the  selection  of  his  successor.  The  king  showed 
his  disapproval  of  Townshend  by  readily  consenting  to  • 
this,  and  Lord  North  was  invited  to  join  the  cabinet;  I 
but  after  a  careful  consideration  of  the  situation,  the 
latter  refused.  Since  Lord  Chatham  was  in  too  weak- 
ened a  condition  to  undertake  more,  the  ministers  were 
compelled  to  get  along  as  best  they  could  with  the  irre- 
sponsible Townshend.  Nobody  save  Chatham  had  the 
power  to  dismiss  him.572 

The  failure  to  secure  the  services  of  Lord  North  be- 
came known  to  Townshend ;  and,  seeing  the  opportunity 
to  become  the  champion  of  popular  measures,  he 
brought  up  the  subject  of  colonial  taxation  in  a  cabinet 
meeting  on  March  12,  when  he  declared  that  he  would 
resign  if  the  cabinet  did  not  reach  some  decision  on  the 
whole  subject  of  the  state  of  America  so  that  he  could 
lay  before  the  House  the  opinion  of  administration  on 
the  maintenance  of  forts  in  the  interior,  on  the  concen- 
tration of  the  military  force  in  the  eastern  towns,  on 
laying  the  charges  of  the  Indian  trade  on  the  provinces, 
and  concerning  a  tax  on  imports.573  The  principles 
underlying  Charles  Townsend's  policy  as  thus  indicated 
were  the  same  as  those  of  Lord  Barrington.  He  de- 
manded the  practical  abandonment  of  the  West,  the 
concentration  of  the  troops  in  the  East,,  and  the  con- 
finement of  settlement  to  the  east  of  the  mountains.574 

572  Grafton,  Autobiography,  122. 

573  See  accounts  by  Grafton  and  Shelburne,  March  13,  in  Pitt,  Correspond- 
ence, vol.  iii,  232,  233. 

574  It  is  worth  noticing  that  those  who  favored  the  abandonment  of  the 
forts  in  the  West  were  in  favor  of  the  confinement  of  the  settlements  to  the 
east  of  the  mountains  and  vice  versa. 


332  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

The  issue  thus  unequivocally  joined  between  the  most 
conservative,  even  reactionary  policy,  and  the  more 
radical  and  progressive  one  advocated  by  Lord  Shel- 
burne,  was  portentous  and  fundamentally  more  far 
reaching  in  its  many  ramifications -certainly  to  con- 
temporaries it  must  have  appeared  so -than  the  mere 
question  of  tax  or  no  tax.  To  the  members  of  the  cabi- 
net it  meant  the  abandonment  of  the  ideal  of  their 
absent  chief  and  the  absolute  nullification  of  his  plans. 
It  is  possible  that  not  all  his  colleagues  appreciated 
the  full  significance  of  this  demand  by  Townshend ;  but 
to  the  southern  secretary  of  state,  the  meaning  was  self- 
evident,  the  consequences  unmistakable.  There  must 
also  have  swept  across  Shelburne's  mind  a  feeling  of  re- 
sentment at  this  invasion  of  his  province;  Townshend's 
demand  was  an  attempt  by  the  head  of  one  department 
of  government  to  shape  the  policy  of  another,  an  effort 
on  the  part  of  a  chancellor  of  the  exchequer  to  use  the 
budget  as  a  club  to  force  from  a  secretary  of  state  his 
consent  to  an  unacceptable  imperial  plan.  The  alter- 
native proposed  was  a  call  to  battle.  What  would  the 
outcome  be? 

One  of  Lord  Shelburne's  greatest  faults  as  an  admin- 
istrator was  his  deliberateness  which  resulted  from  his 
desire  to  gather  the  fullest  knowledge  attainable.  He 
was  continually  waiting  for  more  information  or  search- 
ing for  a  happier  expression  with  which  to  clothe  his 
thought.575  Of  rashness,  such  as  this  of  Townshend's, 
he  could  never  be  accused;  but  now  the  act  of  his  col- 
league caused  him  to  gather  together  those  parts  of  his 
policy  which  were  already  settled  in  order  to  defeat 
this  ill  considered  proposal.  From  his  letters  to  Gen- 

575  On  this  trait  see  "Knox  Manuscripts,"  in  Historical  Manuscripts  Com- 
mission, Report  on  the  Manuscripts  in  various  Collections,  283. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  333 

eral  Gage  and  the  governors  in  the  previous  fall,  it  is 
very  clear  that  the  salient  features  of  his  plan  had  al- 
ready taken  shape  in  his  mind ;  and  in  his  letter  to  the 
Earl  of  Chatham  reciting  Townshend's  conduct  in 
Parliament  in  January,  the  fundamental  ideas  can  also 
be  perceived.576  It  is  probable  that  about  this  time  he 
himself  set  down  his  thoughts  on  the  two  previous  plans 
concerning  the  West  which  have  been  so  frequently  dis- 
cussed.577 

On  the  basis  of  the  facts  he  had  already  obtained  and 
the  phases  of  the  policy  he  had  worked  out,  Lord  Shel- 
burne  drafted  his  reasons  for  opposing  Townshend's  de- 
mand that  the  whole  question  of  the  reduction  of  Amer- 
ican expenses  and  the  raising  of  a  revenue  in  the  colonies 
be  immediately  discussed  and  determined  in  the  cabinet, 
and  read  them  to  his  colleagues  on  March  3O.578  He 
began  by  asserting:  "There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the 
minister  who  could  lessen  the  American  expence,  or 
who  could  establish  an  American  fund  adequate  to  such 
expence  would  do  his  country  a  very  essential  service." 
The  whole  burden  of  his  argument  was  that  the  gov- 
ernment must  proceed  with  caution  and  wait  for  in- 
formation which  was  expected  to  come  from  America. 
He  reviewed  the  plans  that  had  been  proposed  and  the 
arguments  that  had  been  advanced  for  and  against 
them,  and  concluded  that  the  system  in  operation  should 
not  be  lightly  cast  aside  in  order  to  inaugurate  an  ill  di- 
gested measure.  "The  general  who  commanded  at  the 
time  and  who  recommended  the  military  system  for 

576  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  185. 

577  Lansdoiune  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ix,  62. 

578  —  Idem,  vol.  Ixxxv,  102  ff.,  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,   The  nev) 
Regime    [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],   536.     I   have  been   unable 
to  find  any  evidence  of  a  cabinet  meeting  on  March  30,  except  that  given  in 
this  paper,  which  asserts  that  such  was  the  case. 


334  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

America  which  has  been  adopted  subsequent  to  the 
peace,  as  well  as  the  minister  who  approved  it,  were 
both  remarkable  for  their*  oeconomy.  And  so  neces- 
sary a  part  of  the  national  burthen  did  this  minister 
think  it  that  he  chose  rather  to  subject  himself  to  all  the 
inconveniencies  which  he  could  not  avoid  foreseeing 
must  be  the  consequence  of  the  fund  which  he  attempted 
to  establish  for  its  support  rather  than  avoid  them  by 
a  diminution  of  the  expence  by  a  reduction  of  the  estab- 
lishment or  by  the  abandoning  of  the  frontier  posts. 
This  system  has  now  been  followed  four  years,  and  al- 
tho'  it  may  admit  of,  or  even  require,  many  essential 
amendments  yet  that  can  never  justify  a  rash  or  over 
hasty  innovation."  He  attacked  particularly  the  pro- 
posal to  abandon  the  trade  of  the  Mississippi,  which  he 
estimated  as  one-half  of  the  Indian  trade.  The  prob- 
lem of  how  to  conserve  it  was  difficult,  but  time  and  in- 
formation would  show  a  way.  His  attitude  towards 
Lord  Hillsborough's  plan  for  Indian  affairs  was  very 
similar.  It  was  not  the  best;  in  fact,  he  found  "scarcely 
an  article  of  it  free  from  great  inconveniences,"  still  he 
was  not  in  favor  of  an  alteration  until  a  better  consid- 
ered measure  was  produced,  and  this  would  require 
time  to  formulate. 

Turning,  then,  to  the  question  of  the  fund,  he  wrote 
that  the  required  revenue  might  be  expected  in  the 
course  of  time:  "It's  basis  must  be  laid  on  proper 
regulations  for  the  better  management  and  receipt  of  the 
quitrents  and  the  future  grants  of  lands,  on  such  aids  as 
may  be  beneficial  to  the  colonies,  at  the  same  time,  that 
they  lessen  the  burthen  of  the  mother  country,  but  chief- 
ly on  requisitions  from  the  different  provinces  to  be 
granted  annually  by  their  assemblies  according  to  their 
respective  abilities." 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 335 

It  is  possible  to  picture  in  the  imagination  the  scene 
enacted  in  this  important  cabinet  meeting.  The  secre- 
tary of  state,  in  all  probability,  read  this  paper  with  his 
usual  smile  and  irritating  courtesy.  He  had  been  care- 
ful to  choose  his  language  so  that  no  offense  would  be 
taken  even  when  he  attacked  the  arguments  of  those 
with  whom  he  disagreed.  Around  him  sat  his  col- 
leagues in  unfriendly  attitudes.  There  is  no  record  of 
the  discussion  or  of  the  vote  on  this  portentous  issue. 
Lord  Shelburne  could  hardly  have  expected  the  most 
cordial  hearing  of  his  paper  for  at  this  moment,  as  at 
so  many  others  during  his  public  career,  the  distrust 
felt  for  him  by  his  associates  had  undermined  his  in- 
fluence and  even  neutralized  his  ablest  arguments.  Al- 
ready was  the  Duke  of  Grafton  prepared  to  play  him 
false,  and  his  former  friends,  Lords  Northington  and 
Camden,  had  become  cold;  in  two  months'  time  the 
king  was  to  write  Lord  Chatham  that  he  and  these  three 
lords  suspected  Shelburne  of  being  a  secret  enemy; 
Charles  Townshend  must  have  listened  to  his  oppo- 
nent's words  with  a  flippancy  that  showed  itself  in  his 
whole  bearing  for  he  openly  professed  to  hold  the  earl 
in  the  "greatest  contempt."579 

In  the  face  of  this  unfriendliness  the  triumph  of  Lord 
Shelburne  was  all  the  more  remarkable;  the  ministry 
accepted  his  progressive  program.  Townshend  had 
arrogantly  demanded  that  the  cabinet  adopt  the  plan 
for  the  abandonment  of  the  West,  proposed  by  Lord 
Barrington,  and  had  publicly  announced  that  he  would 
resign  before  he  would  introduce  the  budget  with- 
out the  cabinet's  acceptance  of  such  reduction  of  the 

579  The  king  to  Chatham,  May  30,  1767,  Pitt,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii,  260. 
See  also  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  321.  Grafton  kept  Shelburne 
in  ignorance  of  the  negotiations  during  the  summer  as  also  of  the  plan  to 
divide  his  department,  which  was  later  carried  out. 


336  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

American  expenses  as  would  be  thus  brought  about. 
He  did  not  resign,  nor  did  he  announce  the  adoption  of 
this  plan  of  reducing  the  colonial  expenses.  The  most 
that  he  could  do  was  to  inform  the  House  of  Commons 
that  the  subject  "was  actually  under  consideration,  and 
that  before  the  approaching  winter,  some  plan  should 
take  place  which  should  lessen  the  burthen  to  Great 
[  Britain."580  The  bill  imposing  his  notorious  taxes, 
/  which  he  did  propose  and  which  was  "too  lightly 
adopted  .  .  .  before  it  had  been  well  weighed"581 
\  by  Parliament,  aroused  the  spirit  of  antagonism  in  the 
colonies  and  acted  as  an  irritant  until  independence  was 
declared.582  Still  in  the  spring  of  1767  the  future  con- 
sequences could  scarcely  have  been  foreseen,  and  the 
question  of  imposing  such  futile  taxes,  that  could  be 
later  so  easily  repealed,  must  have  appeared  to  Lord 
Shelburne  as  insignificant  in  the  light  of  his  greater  vic- 
tory. The  passing  of  the  Townshend  taxes  by  a  min- 
istry mustered  under  the  banner  of  the  Earl  of  Chatham 
was  absurd  enough;  but  the  enactment  of  Lord  Barring- 
ton's  plan  for  perpetuating  a  great  Indian  reservation 
in  the  heart  of  America  would  have  been  the  complete 
repudiation  of  the  Chatham  platform.  In  the  fight 
over  the  greater  issue  the  Earl  of  Shelburne  had  won. 
The  experience  of  the  ministers  during  the  winter 
and  spring  had  revealed  the  weakness  of  their  system  to 
all.  The  disagreements  among  the  members  were  the 
talk  of  the  street  and  had  been  heralded  in  many  a  debate 
within  the  halls  of  Parliament.  The  defeat  on  the  land 
tax,  the  opposition  of  Conway  and  Townshend  to  the 
East  India  policy,  the  passage  of  the  colonial  taxes  had 

580  This  outcome  was  reported  by  Shelburne  in  a  cabinet  meeting  on  Sep- 
tember n,  1767.     See  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  185. 

581  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III.,  vol.  iii,  21. 

582  For  an  account  of  the  passage  of  the  Townshend  taxes  see  idem,  21  ff. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 337 

given  courage  to  an  arrogant  opposition;  and  the  hope 
of  victory  had  united  such  irreconcilables  as  the  Gren- 
villites  and  the  followers  of  Lord  Rockingham,  whose 
coalition  was  always  the  hope  of  the  Bloomsbury  Gang. 
On  the  other  hand  the  situation  in  the  cabinet  had 
reached  such  an  impasse  that  the  leaders  realized  that 
some  reinforcement  to  their  ranks  must  be  gained  dur- 
ing the  summer  or  the  ministry  itself  must  fall. 

In  order  to  make  any  move  towards  a  reorganization 
the  consent  of  the  king,  who  was  strongly  in  favor  of 
maintaining  his  present  ministry  with  Lord  Chatham 
at  its  head,  must  be  secured.  This  was  won  with  dif- 
ficulty, but  finally  George  III.  permitted  the  negotia- 
tions which  were  held  during  the  summer.583  He  de- 
manded, however,  that  an  effort  be  made  first  of  all  to 
consult  the  prime  minister.  Upon  an  urgent  request 
from  his  majesty  Lord  Chatham  consented  to  receive 
the  Duke  of  Grafton  who,  in  a  two-hour  conference, 
explained  the  critical  situation.  Chatham  was  con- 
vinced that  there  was  need  of  including  one  of  the  fac- 
tions in  opposition  within  the  ministerial  ranks;  and,  in 
agreement  with  his  opinion  of  the  previous  autumn,  he 
expressed  his  preference  for  the  Bedfords.584  Although 

583  \ye  are  remarkably  well  instructed  on  the  course  of  these  negotiations 
since  we  have   the   letters   which   passed   daily   among  the   members   of   the 
various  factions  and  accounts  of  the  several  conferences  written  by  different 
hands;  yet  the  motives  underlying  the  actions  of  the  various  parties  are  diffi- 
cult to  disentangle.     For  the  ministry  there  are  the  Grafton,  Autobiography; 
Walpole,   Letters;   Walpole,  Memoirs   of   George  III.;   Fitzmaurice,  Life  of 
Shelburne;  Pitt,  Correspondence.     For  the  Rockinghams,  there  are  Albemarle's 
Rockingham  Memoirs;  Burke,  Correspondence;  Newcastle,  Narrative  [Cam- 
den  Society,  Publication,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix]  ;  Harris,  Life  of  Hard<wicke.     For 
the  Bedfords,  there  is  only  the  Bedford,   Correspondence;   but  many  letters 
from  that  faction  are  to  be  found  in  the  following  collections  for  the  Gren- 
ville   faction:   Grenville,   Papers;    Lyttelton,   Memoirs   and   Correspondence; 
Almon,  Anecdotes  of  Pitt.     This  last  was  drawn  largely  from  information 
furnished  by  Lord  Temple. 

584  An   account  of  this   important  conference  may  be  found   in   Grafton, 
Autobiography,  136-139. 


338  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

this  advice  did  not  accord  with  the  opinion  of  George 
III.,  who  favored  the  choice  of  the  Old  Whigs,585  Chat- 
ham's expressed  wish  was  of  greater  weight;  and  the 
Duke  of  Graf  ton  was  instructed  to  learn  the  demands  of 
the  Bedfordites.  In  a  confidential  conversation  with 
Lord  Gower,  it  became  evident  that  the  Bloomsbury 
Gang  were  convinced  that  the  critical  condition  of  the 
ministry  must  sooner  or  later  force  the  monarch  to  seek 
their  aid  and  that  they  were  unwilling  to  place  any 
limit  on  their  rapaciousness.  They  not  only  exhibited 
their  greed  for  office  but  showed  their  continued  hos- 
tility to  the  Earl  of  Bute  whom  they  now,  as  in  1765, 
wished  to  drive  from  his  imagined  position  of  influence. 
The  first  attempt  to  gain  reinforcements  having 
failed,  it  was  decided  to  approach  the  other  wing  of  the 
opposition.  The  Marquis  of  Rockingham  was  per- 
fectly willing  to  form  a  new  administration  on  a  "broad 
bottom;"  but  during  the  past  winter  events  had  ce- 
mented the  alliance  of  his  faction  and  the  Bedfordites, 
and  the  marquis,  who  had  a  keen  sense  of  honor,  de- 
manded permission  to  consult  with  his  friends.  Thus 
the  negotiation  was  broadened  out  so  as  to  include  not 
only  the  Bedfordites  but  their  close  adherents,  the  Gren- 
villites;  and  the  three  strong  factions  which  had  in  coa- 
lition so  recently  almost  overwhelmed  the  ministry 
seemed  on  the  point  of  achieving  a  greater  triumph. 
Although  the  old  issue  of  the  Stamp  Act  reared  its  head 
like  a  mountain  that  might  prevent  any  movement  from 
one  side  to  the  other,  the  camps  of  these  factions  were 
not  so  far  apart  on  other  issues  that  a  union  was  im- 
possible. Two  of  them,  at  least,  inherited  from  a  long 
past  the  traditions  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Whig  fami- 

585  Grafton,  Autobiography,  139.  The  king  still  clung  to  a  decided  dislike 
to  the  Bedfords  and  was  particularly  fearful  of  their  close  connection  with  the 
Grenvilles. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 339 

lies  in  Parliament  and  the  subjection  of  the  monarch 
to  the  will  of  these  noble  connections.  They  were  all 
three  bitterly  opposed  to  the  court  faction  and  the  sup- 
posed influence  of  the  Earl  of  Bute.  The  idealistic 
political  philosophy  of  Bolingbroke  was  unacceptable 
to  them,  except  the  Grenvillites  who  were  still  un- 
weaned  from  their  youthful  enthusiasm;  but  they  had 
now  all  learned  to  talk  his  language  and  had  seized  up- 
on the  practical  idea  of  a  "broad  bottom  ministry"  as 
politically  workable  under  their  system.  On  the  fight 
against  special  privileges,  such  as  those  enjoyed  by  the 
East  India  Company,  they  had  all  three  united  in  op- 
position to  protect  what  they  called  the  rights  of  private 
property.  On  the  problem  of  western  America  they 
were  now  in  harmony  and  could  join  hands  on  the  pro- 
gram so  boldly  advocated  by  Charles  Townshend,  whom 
all  three  factions  were  ready  to  retain  in  office.58* 

According  to  the  best  information  the  king  and  his 
advisers  were  not  wholly  disingenuous  in  giving  an  op- 
portunity to  their  opponents  to  enter  into  negotiations 
with  one  another.587  Their  coalition  was  threatening  to 
bring  back  the  conditions  of  the  first  two  Georges,  when 
the  great  Whig  families  were  established  in  absolute 
authority.  Such  a  reversion  was  dreaded  not  only  by 
the  place  hunters  of  the  court  but  also  by  the  liberal- 
minded  men  of  the  ministry,  since,  unless  an  end  of  the 
coalition  was  made,  the  former  would  lose  their  sine- 
cures and  the  latter  would  see  their  hopes  of  reform 
crushed.  It  was  good  politics,  therefore,  to  permit  the 

586  In  one  of  their  conferences,  "Rigby  said,  not  one  of  the  present  cabinet 
should   be   saved.     Dowdeswell   asked,   'what!   not   one?'     'No.'     'What!   not 
Charles  Townshend?'     'Oh!'   said  Rigby,   'that   is  different;   besides   he  has 
been    in    opposition.'  "-Walpole,    Memoirs    of    George    III.,    vol.    iii,    59; 
Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iv,  89.     See  also  idem,  104,  where  the  account  is  some- 
what different. 

587  Grafton,  Autobiography,  143  ff. 


340  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

factions  in  opposition  to  fight  over  policies  and  places, 
until  their  union  was  proved  even  to  themselves  to  be 
impracticable.  The  menace  of  the  Old  Whig  domina- 
tion would  then  be  dead. 

This  maneuver  of  the  administration  proved  very  suc- 
cessful. At  a  conference  on  July  20  between  the  Rock- 
inghams  and  the  Bedfords,  the  latter  representing  the 
Grenville  interests,  a  letter  from  Lord  Temple  and 
George  Grenville  was  read  in  which  they  declared  that 
they  would  give  their  support  to  the  ministry  to  be 
formed,  provided  there  was  a  declaration  "to  assert  and 
establish  the  sovereignty  of  Great  Britain  over  Amer- 
ica." The  followers  of  Rockingham  took  exception  to 
the  words,  but  at  this  conference  and  at  a  second  one 
held  the  next  day  it  appeared  that  this  point  at  issue 
might  be  adjusted.588  Then  they  began  to  discuss  the 
vital  question,  the  distribution  of  places.  All  had 
agreed  that  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham  should  be  the 
first  lord  of  the  treasury;  but  when  he  announced  that 
he  must  have  Conway  as  a  leader  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, the  Bedfordites  who  had  selected  that  position 
for  Grenville  protested.  The  leader  of  the  Commons 
was  the  most  influential  officer  within  the  government, 
because  through  him  was  exercised  the  important  pat- 
ronage and  political  jobbery  of  the  administration.  It 
was  asking  much  of  the  Bloomsbury  Gang  that  such  a 
position  be  yielded  to  the  Rockinghams  but  to  demand 
that  it  be  given  to  their  particular  enemy,  General  Con- 
way,  whom  they  had  once  dismissed  from  office,  could 
mean  only  the  end  of  all  negotiations.  This  it  effected. 

588  The  Rockinghams  believed  that  the  Duke  of  Bedford  practically  gave 
up  the  declaration  and  was  ready  to  stand  on  their  platform.  See  New- 
castle, Narrative  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  142; 
Grenville,  Papers,  vol.  iv,  81,  footnote;  Bedford,  Correspondence,  vol.  iii, 
383,  385- 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  341 

Both  sides  refused  to  submit,  and  the  conference  closed 
as  had  been  expected.  The  impracticability  of  form- 
ing the  proposed  coalition  was  proved. 

After  the  failure  of  the  opposition  to  reach  any  agree- 
ment, one  more  attempt  was  made  by  the  Duke  of  Graf- 
ton  to  bring  the  Rockinghams  to  his  assistance,  but  he 
met  with  no  success.  This  final  refusal  of  the  Old 
Whigs  was  responsible  for  a  loss  of  prestige  and  a  par- 
tial disintegration,  for  their  stubbornness  aroused  the 
anger  of  the  king  against  them  and  caused  the  later  de- 
sertion of  many  of  their  own  adherents  who  preferred 
to  join  other  alliances  offering  greater  opportunities  of 
employment.589  They  suffered  also  in  popularity,  since 
people  argued  thus:  the  faction  of  the  Old  Whigs  had 
been  offered  an  opportunity  to  enter  into  a  coalition 
either  with  the  Bedfordites  and  the  Grenvillites  or  with 
the  Pittites  and  the  court  faction ;  and  they  had  refused 
to  join  with  either  group.  Their  action  could  have  on- 
ly one  interpretation ;  their  talk  of  a  "broad  bottom  min- 
istry" was  mere  words ;  they  were  evidently  unwilling 
to  enter  a  ministry  in  which  they  did  not  wield  all  the 
power;  they  desired  a  return  to  the  government  by  Old 
Whig  connections,  a  revival  of  the  "Venetian  party." 
This  appeared  to  be  the  height  of  arrogance  in  a  faction 
which  at  this  time  had  become  one  of  the  weakest  in 
Parliament.590 

589  The  Duke  of  Newcastle  and  his  followers  were  far  from  pleased  at  the 
result  of  the  negotiations.     See  Newcastle  to  Rockingham,  July  25,  1767,  in 
Newcastle,  Narrative  [Camden  Society,  Publications,  new  ser.,  vol.  lix],  161. 
In  a  very  illuminating  letter  of  October  4,  the  Duke  of  Richmond  placed  his 
views  before  the  Marquis  of  Rockingham:     "If  the  support  of  Lord  Bute's 
friends,  which  you  would  have,  if  you  joined  the  present  ministers,  frightens 
you,  I  suppose  you  mean  never  to  come  in,  but  when  you  have  them  in  op- 
position to  you.     If  so,  I  would  ask  your  Lordship  if  you  think  you  can  ever 
come  in  but  by  force?"- Albemarle,  Rockingham  Memoirs,  vol.  ii,  62. 

590  Grenville's  "Diary,"   in   Grenville,   Papers,  vol.   iv,  219.     The  whole 
passage  is  worth  quoting:     "Mr.  Grenville  held  much  the  same  language  to 


342  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

After  the  failure  of  these  negotiations  the  king  had 
no  choice  but  to  continue  in  power  the  Chatham  min- 
istry; but  some  coherence  in  it  was  secured  by  confer- 
^ring  on  the  reluctant  Duke  of  Grafton  the  leadership 
until  Lord  Chatham  should  be  able  to  resume  his  duties. 
At  this  point  in  his  Autobiography,  Grafton  wrote: 
A  much  greater  degree  of  responsibility  you  see  directly  de- 
volved on  my  shoulders;  and  you  will  consider  this  hour,  as 
having  opened  a  fresh  aera  in  my  life.     I  hope  I  am  not  too 
presuming  in  thinking,   if  the  same  disposition   for  moderate 
councils  had  been  pursued  by  my  successor,  that  this  country 
would  readily  have  settled  all  its  disputes  with  our  colonies; 
have  released  America  from  the  fetters  of  their  old  charters, 
and  in  conjunction  with  them  bid  defiance  to  all  our  enemies.591 

One  important  change  in  the  cabinet  was  caused  in 
September  by  the  death  of  the  erratic  Charles  Town- 
shend.  His  successor  was  Lord  North,  who  was  in  two 
years  and  half  to  begin  his  career  as  chief  minister.  It 
was,  however,  with  practically  the  same  colleagues  that 
the  Duke  of  Grafton  prepared  to  meet  another  session 
of  Parliament;  but  before  that  time  came,  a  very  im- 
portant decision  had  been  reached  in  regard  to  west- 
ern America.  The  southern  secretary  had  completed 
the  work  of  gathering  the  information  and  had  made 
his  report  to  the  king  and  the  cabinet.  The  important 
problem  of  what  should  be  done  with  the  new  acquisi- 
tions seemed  about  to  be  solved. 

him  as  he  had  done  to  Lord  Mansfield  upon  the  idea  of  an  extensive  plan  free 
from  exclusions,  saying,  that  if  the  Duke  of  Bedford  and  his  party,  Lord 
Temple,  himself,  and  their  party,  could  have  the  temper  to  say  and  mean 
this,  it  was  still  more  the  interest  of  the  Rockinghams  to  do  so,  who  were 
inferior  in  number,  and  far  less  congenial  with  those  who  were  called  the 
King's  friends,  and  Lord  Bute's  party,  than  they  were."  Notice  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  "King's  friends,"  and  "Lord  Bute's  party."  The  Old  Whigs 
were  not  well  united  at  this  time.  The  whole  family  of  the  Yorkes  was 
ready  to  desert  them.  See  idem,  224. 
591  Grafton,  Autobiography,  155. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 343 

Disraeli  in  one  of  his  best  novels,  Sybil,  devotes  sev- 
eral pages  to  a  sketch  of  Lord  Shelburne,  whom  he  calls 
"the  ablest  and  most  accomplished  minister  of  the 
eighteenth  century."592  The  basis  for  any  such  claim 
for  Shelburne  must  find  a  justification  in  his  formula- 
tion of  policies  which  it  was  given  not  to  him,  but  to 
others,  to  carry  into  effect,  for  with  the  exception  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  the  United  States  when  his  know- 
ledge of  conditions  and  his  humanitarian  principles  in- 
fluenced him  to  draw  the  present  boundary  lines,  there 
is  no  great  political  measure  associated  with  his  name. 
He  was,  however,  the  first  to  advocate  reforms  of 
many  evils  in  the  political  and  social  life  of  his  people, 
and  he  lived  to  see  some  of  these  placed  on  the  statute 
books  by  his  most  famous  pupil,  the  younger  Pitt;  but 
others  were  so  far  in  advance  of  contemporary  opinion 
that  they  were  to  be  found  acceptable  only  after  the 
lapse  of  many  years  when  enlightenment  on  social  sub- 
jects had  become  more  widely  diffused.593  A  worse  fate 
than  postponement  was  meted  out  to  Shelburne's  Amer- 
ican policy.  It  was  still-born.  For  that  reason  there  is 
no  means  of  judging  its  worth,  although  one  may  in- 
dulge in  unprofitable  speculation  about  what  its  final 
consequences  would  have  been,  had  it  been  inaugurated. 
Still,  after  considering  the  policy  from  every  possible 
angle,  there  comes  to  one  the  feeling  that  in  view  of  the 
breadth  of  vision  and  of  the  philosophical  principles 
shown  in  it,  Lord  Shelburne's  western  American  policy 
must  be  judged,  with  some  limitations,  a  wise,  concili- 
atory, and  statesmanlike  measure. 

In  the  course  of  the  previous  discussion  there  has 
crept  in  some  indications  of  the  character  of  the  policy; 

592  This  sketch  and  quotation  are  in  chapter  iii. 

593  See  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  ii,  300. 


344  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

but,  even  with  the  danger  of  repetition,  it  is  necessary 
at  this  time  to  examine  more  carefully  the  final  results 
of  the  secretary's  methodical  garnering  of  information 
and  opinions.  The  situation  precipitated  by  Charles 
Townshend  in  March  had  caused  him  to  collect  the 
many  lines  of  his  investigation  and  to  reach  some  tenta- 
tive conclusion  on  them.  The  date  when  he  had  finally 
so  rounded  out  his  thoughts  on  American  affairs  that 
they  might  be  presented  as  a  definitive  policy  is  known. 
On  June  1 1,  1767,  Lord  Northington  sent  a  confidential 
letter  to  the  Duke  of  Grafton,  wherein  there  is  mention 
of  a  meeting  with  Lord  Shelburne  at  court.  He  wrote 
that  the  latter  began  "a  long  account  of  the  state  of 
Am  [eric]  a  his  having  got  to  the  mastery  of  it,  and  yes- 
terday rec[eive]d  gen[era]l  directions  thereon  from  the 
K[ing]."594 

It  was  an  unfortunate  time  to  present  such  an  im- 
portant subject,  for  the  king  and  the  ministry  realized 
their  weakness,  and,  as  has  been  seen,  began  in  the  next 
month  negotiations  with  the  opposition  in  the  hope  of 
increasing  their  parliamentary  strength.  So  far  out  of 
agreement  was  Lord  Shelburne  with  his  colleagues  that 
he  was  not  taken  into  their  confidence.595  Still  he  must 
have  known  the  general  character  of  the  negotiations 
sufficiently  well  to  realize  that  no  careful  consideration 
of  his  plan  could  very  well  be  undertaken  until  some- 
thing definite  had  been  determined.  At  any  rate  he  did 
not  press  the  subject  until  September.  Meanwhile  he 
renewed  his  conversations  with  Benjamin  Franklin  and 
was  finally  persuaded  to  incorporate  in  his  recommen- 
dation a  scheme  for  colonies ; 506  and  when  the  ministe- 

594  Grafton,  Autobiography,  175. 

595  Fitzmaurice,  Life  of  Shelburne,  vol.  i,  328. 

596  B.  Franklin  to  his  son,  August  28,  1767,  in  Franklin,  Works  (ed.  Bige- 
low),  vol.  iv,  309. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  345 

rial  situation  was  settled  by  the  consent  of  the  Duke  of 
Grafton  to  become  the  responsible  head,  Lord  Shel- 
burne  was  prepared  to  lay  before  his  colleagues  a  well 
rounded  policy  for  the  West. 

The  paper  which  the  southern  secretary  read  to  his 
colleagues  on  September  n,  1767,  has  fortunately  been 
preserved.597  Two  fundamental  principles  underlie  the 
policy  which  he  outlined.  The  first  was  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  prevent  the  working  of  natural  law,  and  the 
second  that  such  regulations  as  must  be  made  for  the 
proper  conduct  of  trade  can  best  be  passed  upon  by 
those  familiar  with  conditions.  Under  the  first  prin- 
ciple must  be  classified  his  objections  to  Lord  Hills- 
borough's  plan  which  "tends  by  a  variety  of  minute 
regulations  to  restrain  commerce  (which  can  scarcely 
admit  of  any  regulations  which  do  not  naturally  follow 
from  itself)  and  to  bind  people  from  their  tempers  and 
habits  of  living  the  least  disposed  to  submit  to  any  regu- 
lation whatever."  The  same  principle  is  perceived  in 
his  discussion  of  western  colonization.  The  proposal 
to  limit  settlements  to  the  east  of  the  mountains  seemed 
to  Lord  Shelburne  "founded  on  a  contracted  policy 
amounting  to  little  less  than  an  attempt  to  set  limits  to 
the  encrease  of  our  people  and  the  extension  of  our  do- 

597  The  paper  is  entitled:  "Minutes  submitted  to  the  cabinet  in  the  be- 
ginning of  summer  1767 -relative  to  the  system  of  Indian  traffick." - Lans- 
doiune  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  185.  The  given  date  offers  a  somewhat  baf- 
fling problem.  The  paper  contains  a  recommendation  for  the  establishment 
of  western  colonies,  a  resolution  which  Franklin  says  Lord  Shelburne  reached 
after  the  middle  of  August.  Franklin,  Works  (ed.  Bigelow),  vol.  iv,  309. 
Later,  in  November,  Shelburne  told  Franklin  that  he  had  drawn  up  a  paper 
justifying  such  colonies.  See  idem,  332.  The  reference  was  evidently  to  this 
paper.  There  are  two  explanations  possible.  The  indorsement  on  this  paper 
may  be  a  mistake  or  else  Shelburne  did  not  permit  Franklin,  in  August,  to 
learn  how  far  he  had  already  gone  in  the  matter  of  western  colonies.  If  the 
indorsement  is  a  mistake,  it  probably  arose  from  the  fact  that  there  was  a 
similar  paper,  without  the  recommendation  concerning  colonies,  that  was 
read  to  the  cabinet  in  the  beginning  of  summer. 


346  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

minions,  besides  that,  it  is  impracticable  to  prevent 
along  such  a  frontier,  the  taking  possession  of  unoccu- 
pied lands  and  resisting  a  general  inclination  of  settle- 
ment by  means  of  any  force  whatever."  The  supple- 
ment of  this  principle,  namely  that  natural  forces  can 
be  harnessed  and  guided  towards  desired  ends  was 
equally  well  understood  by  Lord  Shelburne;  and  he 
argued  that  the  opening  of  the  West  to  colonization 
would  draw  off  the  surplus  population  of  the  eastern 
settlements  and  thus  postpone  the  time  when  the  in- 
habitants there  would  turn  to  manufacture  and  finally 
win  both  economic  and  political  independence. 

The  second  principle,  that  of  local  autonomy  in  trade 
regulations,  is  perceived  in  his  opposition  to  the  pro- 
posed plan  of  abrogating  all  colonial  laws  concerning 
the  Indian  trade  and  of  imposing  imperial  regulations. 
He  objected  to  this  because  "Many  of  those  laws  are 
the  result  of  long  experience,  made  by  the  people  on 
the  spot  interested  in  their  consequences,  some  of  them 
are  also  particularly  fitted  to  the  condition  and  situation 
of  the  several  colonies ;  and  although  they  may  not  have 
been  absolutely  effectual  in  removing  many  evils  com- 
plained of,  yet  it  does  not  follow  that  those  evils  are  in 
their  nature  remediable,  or  that  any  plan  formed  here 
and  to  be  executed  by  officers  who  carry  on  a  distant 
correspondence  would  do  better;  to  repeal  therefore 
those  laws  without  distinction  appears  a  measure  high- 
ly dangerous  and  unadvisable." 

Taking  his  stand  upon  reason  he  made  certain  very 
'  definite  recommendations  which  would  lead  to  a  reduc- 
tion of  American  expenses  and  to  the  future  creation  of 
a  fund  sufficient  to  meet  all  colonial  demands  upon  the 
treasury.  First  of  all  he  proposed  that  the  whole  In- 
dian establishment,  with  its  superintendents,  deputies, 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  347 

and  commissaries,  be  abolished  and  that  the  colonies 
take  charge  of  Indian  affairs  which,  he  pointed  out,  had 
passed  only  since  1755  into  the  hands  of  the  imperial  of- 
ficers. In  the  second  place  he  advised  that  there  be 
formed  two  new  colonies,  one  in  the  Illinois  country 
and  the  other  at  Detroit.  These  would  serve  many  pur- 
poses: they  would  furnish  supplies  to  the  troops  in  the 
frontier  forts  at  a  reasonable  price;  would  be  attractive 
to  settlers  from  the  old  colonies;  in  the  course  of  time 
they  would  render  interior  forts  unnecessary,  since  the 
Indians  would  either  become  domestic  or  move  away; 
and  most  important  of  all,  "The  quit  rents  would  in  a 
few  years,  not  only  defray  the  expence  but  form  a  fund 
for  other  purposes,  especially  if  the  grants  of  lands  were 
put  under  proper  checks."  The  last  recommendation 
concerned  the  forts  and  the  army.  According  to  it, 
eight  interior  forts  were  to  be  maintained.598  These 
could  be  garrisoned  by  four  battalions,  thus  leaving  the 
other  eleven  of  the  American  contingent  to  be  disposed 
of  as  seemed  best. 

The  policy  thus  outlined  shows  unmistakably  signs 
of  the  influence  of  Benjamin  Franklin  and  Richard 
Jackson;  and,  judging  from  the  expression  of  its 
thought,  it  was  based  very  largely  on  the  paper  of  the 
latter.599  In  his  treatment  of  the  future  of  the  Indian 
tribes  he  adopted  the  ideas  of  Jackson  and  may  seem  to 
be  heartless.  Certainly  in  his  eagerness  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  the  Americans  for  land  and  to  prevent  by 
western  expansion  the  development  of  manufactures  in 

598  These  were  at  Crown  Point,  Frontenac,  Mackinac,  Niagara,  Pittsburgh, 
Illinois  River,   Natchez,   and   the  River  Iberville.     In   my   transcription,  the 
name  of  the  Illinois  River  is  omitted,  and  the  fort  is  referred  to  later  as  near 
the  Missouri.     Shelburne,  who  was  not  strong  in  geography,  meant  undoubt- 
edly the  Illinois  as  Gage  had  recommended. 

599  See   a  story  about  its   authorship  in  Franklin,   Works    (ed.  Bigelow), 
vol.  iv,  332. 


348 THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY [vol. 

the  colonies  he  had  shut  his  eyes  to  one  half  of  the 
western  problem  which  he  was  attempting  to  solve. 
His  plan  would  most  generously  supply  the  needs  of  the 
growing  frontier  population,  but  it  failed  to  provide 
^protection  for  the  Indians.  From  tHe^ character  of  his 
policy  it  is  evident  that  Shelburne  was  not  a  sentimen- 
talist and  therein  perhaps  lies  his  limitation,  but  it  is 
equally  evident  that  like  a  prophet  he  had  caught  a 
vision  of  the  inexorable  march  of  the  white  men  across 
the  American  continent.  In  smaller  matters  he  was, 
however,  very  thoughtful  of  the  natives'  welfare  and 
very  just  in  his  dealings  with  them.  When  he  first  be- 
came secretary,  he  was  shocked  to  find  that  it  was  the 
universal  custom  in  America  to  stir  up  the  tribes  to  fight 
among  themselves;  and  he  ordered  that  such  practices 
be  stopped  and  efforts  be  made  to  conciliate  the  Indians 
by  justice  and  kindness,  which  is  aa  system  as  much 
superior  in  sound  policy,  as  it  is  in  humanity,  to  that  of 
spiriting  up  one  tribe  to  cut  the  throats  of  another." 

One  point  requires  further  discussion  before  leaving 
this  paper.  Exactly  what  were  Lord  Shelburne's  inten- 
tions in  regard  to  the  reform  of  the  sale  of  land  by 
which  he  expected  to  secure  a  revenue  for  the  support 
of  the  imperial  establishment?  Unfortunately  the  in- 
formation concerning  this  phase  of  his  policy  is  not 
clear  since  his  own  expressions  on  the  subject  are  merely 
oratorical  generalities;  nor  does  a  study  of  the  colonial 
schemes  which  he  favored  make  it  possible  to  decide 
what  method  he  had  in  mind.  The  Illinois  company 
represented  by  Franklin  was  composed  of  a  number  of 
shareholders  who  petitioned  to  receive  one  million  two 
hundred  thousand  acres,  free  of  quitrent,  in  return  for 

coo  This  thought  is  found  in  many  of  his  early  letters  to  America.  The 
passage  is  quoted  from  a  letter  to  Stuart,  December  n,  1766,  in  Lansdowne 
Manuscripts,  vol.  liii,  295. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  349 

which  they  would  at  their  own  "expence,  settle  thereon 
at  least  one  white  Protestant  person  for  every  hundred 
acres."  The  imperial  government  would  be  obliged 
to  pay  the  salaries  of  the  civil  officers  for  a  few  years, 
until  the  colony  was  self-supporting.  General  Lyman's 
plan  called  for  a  settlement  that  should  be  directly  un- 
der the  crown  and  wherein  "the  grants  of  land  be  made 
under  proper  restrictions  and  limitations  as  to  quantity 
and  subject  to  a  quit  rent  of  one  halfpenny  per  acre  to 
commence  in  five  years  from  the  date  of  the  grant." 
The  whole  tone  of  the  paper,  outlining  this  proposal 
would  indicate  the  purpose  of  attracting  men  who  de4 
sired  small  holdings.602  The  Detroit  colony  was  planned 
by  a  number  of  American  officers  and  the  promoters 
were  expecting  to  receive  land  grants,  evidently  free, 
provided  they  should  settle  at  their  own  expense  a  cer- 
tain number  of  families.603 

Another  piece  of  information  which  seems  to  be 
somewhat  though  not  entirely  irreconcilable  with  Shel- 
burne's  oft  repeated  statements  that  the  sale  of  lands 
would  be  made  productive  of  a  large  revenue,  comes 
from  a  later  period.  In  1770  and  the  following  years 
Samuel  Wharton,  Benjamin  Franklin,  and  many  others 
formed  the  Walpole  Company  and  attempted  to  buy 
from  the  government  a  large  tract  of  land  in  the  upper 
Ohio  Valley.  They  asserted  that  Shelburne  who  op- 
posed their  efforts  was  inconsistent  since  he  had  not  de- 
manded any  payment  for  the  land  in  the  colonies  he 
proposed  in  1767,  but  offered  the  most  liberal  terms, 
namely,  that  to  each  of  the  hundred  proprietors  there 

601  Alvord  and   Carter,   The  ne<w  Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections, 
vol.  xi],  256. 

602  Plan  proposed  by  Lyman  in  Lansdoivne  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  157.     This 
is  printed  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  op  cit.,  260. 

603  See  page  244. 


350  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

was  to  be  ceded  twenty  thousand  acres  of  land  free  of 
quitrents  for  fifteen  years  and  that  at  the  expiration  of 
this  period  they  were  to  pay  two  shillings  per  hundred 
acres,  which  sum  was  to  be  used  for  the  support  of  the 
government.004  This  information  is  uncorroborated  by 
other  testimony,  but  the  positiveness  of  the  statement 
and  the  fact  that  it  was  made  in  a  printed  pamphlet  by 
men  who  had  opportunities  to  know  give  it  great 
weight.  Unless  it  is  correct,  the  discovery  of  how  the 
southern  secretary  did  intend  to  dispose  of  the  land  is 
impossible  from  the  evidence  at  hand;  and  after  sur- 
veying all  the  testimony,  particularly  that  respecting 
the  need  of  raising  a  revenue,  and  giving  due  allowance 
to  the  fact  that  Shelburne  was  ever  slow  in  making  up 
his  mind,  the  probability  is  that  the  details  were  not 
worked  out  with  any  minuteness.  The  plan  seemed  to 
Shelburne  feasible  and  the  statement  of  his  purposes 
was  for  the  time  being  sufficient. 

Shelburne  was  successful  in  persuading  his  col- 
leagues to  accept  tentatively  the  results  of  his  investiga- 
tion and  thought.  Although  there  has  been  preserved 
no  account  of  the  discussion  which  must  have  followed 
the  reading  of  this  remarkable  paper,  the  final  action  of 
the  cabinet  was  satisfactory  as  appears  from  the  follow- 
ing minute: 

Resolv'd  that  it  be  submitted  to  His  Majesty  as  the  opinion 
of  the  Lords  present,  that  it  be  referr'd  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
to  consider  the  present  state  of  the  Indian  trade,  together  with 
the  expences  attending  the  same,  and  how  far  they  may  safely 
and  properly  be  reduc'd,  likewise  to  report  their  opinion  upon 
the  utility  of  the  forts  at  present  subsisting,  and  the  inconven- 
iences or  advantages  arising  from  keeping  the  same  still  under 
His  Majesty's  troops  or  giving  them  into  the  hands  of  the  prov- 
inces. The  Lords  are  also  of  opinion  if  it's  agreeable  to  His 

604  Considerations  on  the  Agreement  with  the  Honourable  Thomas  Wai- 
pole,  22. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  351 

Majesty  that  it  should  also  be  referr'd  to  the  Lords  of  Trade 
to  consider  the  several  applications  made  for  new  governments 
or  settlements  at  the  Detroit  and  the  Illinois,  and  whether  the 
establishment  of  such  government  or  settlement  will  not  in  time 
render  the  greatest  part  of  the  present  Indian  expence  unneces- 
sary.605 

The  resolution  was  not  drawn  precisely  in  accordance 
with  ideas  propounded  by  Lord  Shelburne.  The  clause 
concerning  the  maintenance  of  the  forts  by  Great 
Britain  "or  giving  them  into  the  hands  of  the  Provinces" 
would  indicate  that  there  were  supporters  in  the  cabi- 
net of  Lord  Barrington's  plan,  which  contained  this 
recommendation. 

In  accordance  with  the  above  decision  the  southern 
secretary  laid  the  whole  subject  before  the  Board  of 
Trade  on  October  5,  ijbj.™*  His  letter  of  transmission 
contained  the  same  recommendations  as  those  he  made 
to  his  colleagues,  so  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  summarize 
it.  On  the  question  of  the  best  disposition  of  the  forts 
in  the  interior,  concerning  which  the  cabinet  was  unde- 
cided, he  made  it  perfectly  clear  that  he  was  not  in 
favor  of  their  abandonment  by  the  empire.  There  is, 
moreover,  one  change  of  interest.  The  letter  recom- 
mended the  erection  of  new  colonies  "on  the  Missis- 
sippi, the  Ohio,  and  at  Detroit,"  which  seems  to  mean 
three  separate  colonies  instead  of  the  two  proposed  by 
Shelburne  in  his  earlier  paper.  These  three  were  un- 
doubtedly: the  one  proposed  by  the  American  officers, 
which  was  to  have  its  center  at  Detroit  and  whose  ex- 
treme boundaries  were  to  be  marked  by  the  headwaters 
of  the  rivers  flowing  into  the  Great  Lakes; 607  the  Phila- 

605  Indorsed:  "Minute  of  Cabinet,  Held  at  Genl.  Conway's  ofnce,  Sep- 
tember n,  1767"  in  Lansdowne  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  185. 

eoe  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  981  ff. 

607  Observation  by  General  Amherst,  November,  1767,  in  Lansdo<wne  Man- 
uscripts, vol.  1,  123. 


352  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

delphia  scheme,  which  was  to  extend  from  the  Ohio 
River  as  far  north  as  the  Wisconsin  River:  and  General 
Phineas  Lyman's  plan,  which  as  originally  outlined 
overlapped  the  Illinois  colony.608 

The  plan  thus  launched  by  Lord  Shelburne  had  to 
follow  the  regular  course  through  the  departments  of 
government  and  must  be,  therefore,  reported  upon  by 
the  Board  of  Trade,  before  it  could  be  referred  to  the 
Privy  Council  for  final  action.  On  its  journey  such  a 
radical  proposal  was  bound  to  meet  with  opposition 
from  many  quarters  and  its  friends  would  be  obliged 
to  meet  many  arguments  and  to  propitiate  many  indi- 
viduals who  were  hostile  or  indifferent.  Benjamin 
Franklin  took  upon  himself  the  persuasion  of  the  presi- 
dent of  the  Board  of  Trade,  Lord  Clare,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded Lord  Hillsborough  in  the  previous  December. 
In  his  report  of  his  conversation  to  Shelburne,  Frank- 
lin wrote  that  Clare  was  favorably  impressed  with  the 
idea  of  a  colony  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  River  as  it 
"might  be  of  use  in  securing  the  country"  but  that  he 
did  not  approve  of  one  at  Detroit,  and  that  the  presi- 
dent thought  the  trade  would  be  "of  little  consequence, 
if  we  had  all  the  peltry  to  be  purchased  there,"  for  he 
supposed  New  Orleans  would  get  most  of  it  anyway.60' 
In  order  to  create  a  public  sentiment  in  favor  of  the 
recommendations,  measures  were  also  taken  to  obtain  an 
indorsement  of  the  projects  from  the  London  merchants 
who  were  summoned  to  appear  before  the  Board  of 
Trade.610 

Lord  Shelburne  used  his  influence  to  win  the  Board 

608  These  proposed  colonies  are  traced  on  the  map,  page  317. 

609  To  William  Franklin,  November  25,  1767,  Franklin,  Works  (ed.  Bige- 
low),  vol.  iv,  333. 

610  "The  Advice  of  the  North  American  Merchants  to  the  Board  of  Trade, 
about  Indian  Trade,  30  Oct.  1767,"  in  Lansdoiane  Manuscripts,  vol.  Ixii,  205. 


one] IN  BRITISH  POLITICS 353 

of  Trade  over  to  his  side  and  was  prepared  even  to  dis- 
cuss a  compromise  provided  he  could  obtain  a  favorable 
report.  During  November,  he  had  a  conversation  with 
one  of  the  members,  Jeremiah  Dyson,  a  devoted  sup- 
porter of  the  court  faction,  and  wrote  an  account  of  it 
to  Lord  Clare.  Evidently  many  members  were  in  fa-  I 
vor  of  turning  over  the  management  of  the  Indian  trade  I 
to  the  colonies  but  objected  to  abolishing  the  office  of  | 
superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  on  account  of  "this  hav- 
ing subsisted  so  many  years."  Lord  Shelburne  pro- 
posed, therefore,  that  there  be  made  a  division  between 
the  commercial  and  political  relations  with  the  Indians 
and  that  the  superintendents  be  charged  only  with  the 
latter.611  With  this  alteration  the  principal  duties  of 
the  office  would  be  to  make  treaties  and  to  inform  the 
government  about  the  needs  of  purchasing  territory 
from  the  Indians  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  ex- 
panding settlements.  In  this  way  the  king's  rights  as 
"Lord  of  the  Soil"  would  be  preserved,  and  there  would 
be  laid  the  foundation  of  a  real  and  permanent  revenue 
from  the  quitrents.  On  the  other  hand  the  colonies 
would  make  all  the  regulations  for  the  government  of 
the  interior,  should  keep  the  peace  there  by  their  own 
militia  and,  should  there  be  need,  could  call  on  the 
king's  troops,  for  the  expense  of  which  they  must  them- 
selves provide,  as  had  been  proposed  in  Lord  Barring- 
ton's  plan. 

The  time  in  which  Lord  Shelburne  was  to  have  power 
over  the  American  colonies  was  fast  drawing  to  a  close 
and  with  a  new  secretary  there  was  to  begin  a  new  era 

611  The  paper  is  entitled:  "The  substance  of  what  passed  between  Lord 
Shelburne  and  Mr.  Dyson  about  the  superintendents,  given  afterwards  to 
Lord  Clare."  See  Lansdotvne  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  219.  Besides  this  paper, 
there  is  a  similar  one  called:  "Notes  by  Lord  Shelburne  concerning  the  Super- 
intendants  in  America."  See  idem,  227. 


354  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

in  the  history  of  the  western  policy;  but,  before  his  re- 
tirement, and  at  the  eleventh  hour,  he  was  able  to  in- 
augurate the  second  important  positive  act  affecting  the 
West.  During  all  the  correspondence  between  Lord 
Shelburne  and  the  officials  in  America,  the  plan  of  es- 
tablishing another  Indian  boundary  line  farther  to  the 
West  than  the  mountains  in  accordance  with  the  plan  of 
1763  had  been  mentioned  only  incidentally.  In  a  gen- 
eral way  the  ministers  knew  that  John  Stuart,  the 
southern  superintendent  for  Indian  affairs,  had  run  such 
a  boundary  along  the  back  of  several  of  the  southern 
colonies,  and  his  act  had  received  praise  from  them;612 
but  the  plan  to  establish  such  a  line  by  agreement  be- 
tween the  Indians  and  the  empire  as  a  matter  of  gen- 
eral policy  seems  to  have  been  forgotten  by  every  one 
connected  with  the  home  government.  It  was,  there- 
fore, somewhat  of  a  surprise  to  Lord  Shelburne  when 
Benjamin  Franklin  forwarded  to  him  letters  from 
Joseph  Galloway,  Samuel  Wharton,  and  George  Crogh- 
an,  written  by  collusion,613  in  which  the  danger  of  a 

812  Farrand,  "The  Indian  Boundary  Line,"  in  American  Historical  Review, 
vol.  x,  782-791 ;  Alvord,  "The  British  Ministry  and  the  Treaty  of  Fort  Stan- 
wix,"  in  Wisconsin  Historical  Society,  Proceedings,  1908,  pp.  165-183.  A  map 
of  the  line  is  published  in  both  the  above  essays.  For  the  correspondence  of 
Sir  William  Johnson  on  the  subject,  see  his  letter  to  the  Board  of  Trade, 
May  24,  1765,  in  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  Critical  Period  [Illinois  Historical 
Collections,  vol.  x],  501;  January  31,  1766,  Alvord  and  Carter,  The  new 
Regime  [Illinois  Historical  Collections,  vol.  xi],  150;  June  28,  1766,  New 
York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  838.  On  the  question  of  a  boundary  line 
see  pages  170,  202. 

613  The  following  is  from  Croghan  to  Johnson,  March  i,  1768:  "After 
I  parted  your  honor  last  fall  after  our  return  from  the  New  England  both  I 
ingaged  G.  Franklin  Gov.  Penn  Mr.  Peters  and  Mr  Gallaway  and  others  to 
write  to  thire  frends  in  England  to  use  thire  intrest  with  the  ministrey  to 
adopt  the  gineral  boundry  and  send  your  honour  orders  to  confirm  and 
ratifye  itt."  -Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xvi,  29.  There  are  two  letters  from 
Samuel  Wharton  on  the  subject,  Lansdovune  Manuscripts,  vol.  1,  105,  108. 
The  assembly  of  Pennsylvania  was  also  persuaded  to  adopt  a  resolution  in- 
dorsing the  plan.  Assembly  to  Franklin  and  Jackson,  January  19,  1768,  in 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  355 

new  Indian  war  was  depicted  in  the  gloomiest  colors 
and  the  government  was  urged,  in  order  that  the  fron- 
tier might  be  spared  the  horrors  of  another  Indian  up- 
rising, to  run  the  boundary  line,  already  promised  by 
Johnson,  between  the  Iroquois  country  and  the  colonies. 
The  writers  of  the  letters  were  all  connected  with  that 
company  of  Indian  traders  who  were  seeking  compen- 
sation for  the  losses  they  had  suffered  in  1763  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Pontiac  War  and  were  now  hoping  to  re- 
ceive as  indemnity  from  the  tribes  a  grant  of  land  that 
would  fall  to  the  east  of  the  proposed  limits.614  Al- 
though Lord  Shelburne  had  himself  made  in  1763  all 
arrangements  for  running  such  a  line,  the  discussion  of 
it  in  the  letters  sent  by  Franklin  appeared  to  him  to 
contain  a  new,  not  to  say  a  novel,  idea;  and  he  immedi- 
ately invited  the  Philadelphia  philosopher  to  dine  with 
him  and  discuss  the  whole  subject.  Search  was  im- 
mediately instituted  for  the  letters  of  Sir  William 
Johnson  on  the  need  of  such  a  measure  and  after  a  long 
delay  they  were  found.615 

The  danger  of  an  Indian  war  seemed  so  threatening 
and  the  means  of  preventing  it  so  reasonable  and  so  in 
accordance  with  previous  decisions  that  Lord  Shelburne 
was  easily  persuaded  to  include  this  recommendation 
in  his  western  policy.  He  also  accepted  Franklin's  sug- 
gestion that  the  land  to  be  thus  purchased  from  the  In- 
dians should  be  paid  for  by  the  crown  within  the  con- 
fines of  royal  colonies,  but  otherwise  by  the  colonies 
themselves.61(  In  accordance  with  this  resolution,  Lord 

idem,  vol.  xv,  238.  Proprietor  Thomas  Penn  also  used  all  his  interest  to 
promote  it.  See  Johnson  Manuscripts,  vol.  xx,  202. 

614  For  account  of  this  company  of  merchants  see  page  95.     The  company 
was  afterwards  called  the  Indiana  Company.     Benjamin  Franklin  was  their 
representative   in  England. 

615  Franklin,  Writings   (ed.  Smyth),  vol.  v,  67,  68,  113. 

67. 


356  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY  [vol. 

Shelburne  brought  the  subject  to  the  attention  of  the 
Lords  of  Trade,  who  on  December  23,  without  entering 
into  a  discussion  of  other  phases  of  the  western  policy, 
made  a  favorable  report  in  which  they  connected  this 
jplan  with  their  previous  recommendations :  "The  com- 
plaints of  the  Indians  on  account  of  encroachments  up- 
on their  lands,  and  the  expediency  of  the  establishing  a 
boundary  line  between  their  country  and  the  settlements 
of  his  Maj[es]ry's  subjects  have  long  been  urged  by  the 
superintendent  for  Indian  affairs,  as  a  consideration  of 
very  great  importance. 

"It  was  this  consideration  which  occasioned  the  pro- 
visional management  in  the  proclamation  of  1763,  and 
induced  this  Board  to  propose,  in  the  plan  for  the  man- 
agement of  Indian  affairs  prepared  in  1764,  a  boundary 
line  being  established  by  solemn  compact  with  the  In- 
dians."617 This  recommendation  was  rapidly  passed 
through  the  Privy  Council  and  on  January  5,  1768, 
Shelburne  authorized  Sir  William  Johnson  to  carry  it 
out.618 

The  running  of  the  Indian  boundary  line  was  to  re- 
ceive a  final  indorsement  from  another  secretary,  and 
the  actual  completion  of  the  line  was  to  be  accomplished 
under  his  supervision ;  but  Lord  Shelburne  sent  the  first 
order  for  the  execution  of  this  important  plan  which  he 
himself  had  developed  when  he  was  president  of  the 
Board  of  Trade  in  1763.  This  was  the  only  part  of  his 
comprehensive  policy  that  he,  as  an  administrative  of- 
ficer, had  any  share  in  putting  into  operation ;  and  this 
opening  of  the  upper  Ohio  Valley  to  settlement  was  in 
no  sense  a  new  idea  but  rather  the  completion  of  his 

617  New  York  Colonial  Documents,  vol.  vii,  1004.     The  letter  from  Shel- 
burne to  the  Board  has  not  been  found. 

618  —  Idem,  vol.  viii,  a. 


one]  IN  BRITISH  POLITICS  357 

own  earlier  thought  and  also  that  of  the  Grenville-Bed- 
ford  ministry.  Later  events  were  to  bring  to  the  sur- 
face many  perplexing  problems  in  regard  to  the  owner- 
ship and  the  development  of  this  region;  but  at  this 
time,  as  in  1763,  there  was  no  intention  of  forming  a 
new  colony  there,  at  least  such  was  not  openly  ex- 
pressed. The  letter  of  the  Board  of  Trade  to  Lord 
Shelburne  contained  a  statement  of  the  purpose  of 
the  ministry:  "Yet  it  does  on  the  contrary,  leave 
room  ...  to  the  inhabitants  of  Virginia,  to  extend 
their  settlements  further  to  the  westward  than  they  have 
hitherto  been  able  to  do  with  any  degree  of  safety." 

The  events  which  led  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Amer- 
ican colonies  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  secretary  of 
state  for  the  Southern  Department  must  now  be  nar- 
rated. It  will  be  seen  in  the  next  chapter  that  the 
changes  in  administration  that  brought  to  an  end  Lordi 
Shelburne's  connection  with  colonial  affairs  were  not 
due  to  any  feeling  of  opposition  to  his  administration  oi\ 
to  the  policy  which  he  had  developed.  From  the  avail- 
able information  the  weight  of  evidence  favors  the 
opinion  that  the  other  members  of  the  cabinet  were  dis- 
posed to  follow  his  leadership.  When  Charles  Town- 
shend  had  made  a  direct  issue  of  the  disposition  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley  by  advocating  the  creation  of  a  per- 
petual Indian  reservation  to  the  west  of  the  mountains, 
Lord  Shelburne  had  been  able  to  win  over  his  un- 
friendly colleagues  to  his  better  conceived  plan,  the  es- 
sential features  of  which  they  later  in  the  year  indorsed. 
Considering  the  chaotic  condition  into  which  the  min- 
istry had  fallen  on  account  of  the  sickness  of  Lord  Chat- 
ham, this  was  a  triumph  for  the  southern  secretary. 
Had  his  chief  and  idol,  Lord  Chatham,  been  able  to 
return  to  his  duties  the  policy  that  had  cost  so  much 


358  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 

time  and  thought  to  formulate  would  undoubtedly  have 
been  now  inaugurated  and  every  opportunity  would 
have  been  afforded  the  British  colonies  to  adjust  for 
themselves  those  difficulties  which  the  undisputed  pos- 
session of  the  eastern  half  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  had 
made  so  momentous.  This,  however,  was  not  granted 
by  fate,  and  for  the  fifth  time  the  development  of  the 
West  as  a  problem  in  imperialism  still  unsolved  was 
passed  on  to  perplex  men  imbued  with  principles  dif- 
fering from  those  of  their  predecessors.  Ellis  and  Am- 
herst  had  made  the  first  decision  by  distributing  the 
troops  in  small  companies  throughout  the  valley,  then 
had  come  Shelburne  who  carved  out  the  new  provinces 
and  proposed  the  Indian  boundary  line,  the  Grenville- 
Bedford  ministers  had  been  responsible  for  the  procla- 
mation of  1763  and  had  evolved  a  centralized  system 
of  government,  Lord  .Barrington  had  tried  to  cut  down 
expenses  by  creating  a  perpetual  Indian  reservation, 
and  Shelburne,  acting  on  the  opposite  principle,  had 
made  plans  for  colonial  control  and  rapid  westward  ex- 
pansion. He  was  to  be  superseded  in  January  of  1768, 
and  Lord  Hillsborough,  assisted  by  the  Bedfordites,  was 
to  pass  upon  his  recommendations. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  ILLINOIS-URBANA 


maaKMiirAWmin 


